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DEDICATION

This 89th issue of the **Darshana International** *is most respectfully* **dedicated** *to the loving memory of*

Dr. Anna Freud

The great Psychoanalyst and youngest grand daughter of Renowned Psychoanalysist Dr. Sigmund Freud who revolutionised the World of Psychology by his great Contribution. May her contributions guide the coming generations in further Researches.

Anurag Atreya
Managing Editor

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OF
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I

Psychic Energy and the Conception-Analysis of Borderline-cases

M. Lietaert Peerbolte

I. Conception-shock, general view

Since the publication of my book "Psychic Energy in prenatal dynamics, para-psychology and peak-experiences" (1975) with much materials concerning prenatal circumstances, the psychoanalytical investigations of prenatal psycho-dynamics have made further progress. Specially conceptional disturbances have formed a main part of these researches in pre-psychotic states of depersonalization as well as some borderline-cases.

As to the notion "borderline-case" I have made a distinction between schizoid and cycloid cases. The schizoid borderline-cases are well known with temporaly regression toward more or less schizophrenic states: hallucinations, fallacies, fears of being persecuted. Cycloid borderline-cases refer to regressions toward maniac as well as depressive states which are on the edge of a maniac-depressive psychosis.

Both forms of borderline-cases show as a basic point a deep state of depersonalization, the understanding of which, at a conceptional level, is a first condition. For this reason a rather extensive study is made of dreams which refer to such states of depersonalization.

The interpretation of these dreams is based on the theory of a psychic energy as meant in the book mentioned above. These interpretations can cause a conflict with the officially accepted laws of heredity in so far as these prepsychotic states would be hereditary. In our opinion the only condition which may be "hereditary" in these cases is formed by conditions concerning the chromosomes, specially the two X chromosomes in the ovum, which are able to cause engrams in the psychic energy, whereas the analysis of such engrams gives the opportunity to solve the working-power (compulsive repetition) of these engrams. The fact that such prepsychotic states are continued in following generations (if the psychic energy is not freed from these engrams) can also be interpreted as forms of paradosis, e.g. via partner-choice.

Hypothetically we presume that these pathogenic engrams are caused by a delay of the meiosis in the ovum so that the sperm, when entering the ovum, comes in collision with the one or two X chromosomes. This collision causes an engram in the psychic energy. We have derived this hypothesis about a delay from the knowledge that in special cases, where both X chromosomes stay in the ovum after conception, so-called trisomy X (XXX, or XXY) can appear. Moreover, a similar lack of meiosis is also known on the side of the sperm in some cases of criminals : XYY. Some analyses of monozygote twins cause the suggestion that in these cases a delay of the mitosis in the ovum by which normally the first polar body arises, causes two kernels in the ovum and on this base the monozygote twin. Mainly such a delay seems to be the expression of a special oedipal structure of the maternal psyche, based on her oedipus-complex with some fixations on one of her parents.

The working hypothesis has two aspects. The one regards the analysis of conceptional disturbances is that a delay of the meiosis in the ovum would cause a collision between the fertilizing sperm and one or two X chromosomes in the ovum. The second aspect of this hypothesis refers to different characters of these two chromosomes, the one of which is a derivation of the paternal X chromosome by which the woman herself came into existence. The other X chromosome is a derivation of the X chromosome of her mother. There is a suggestion that the collision between the fertilizing sperm and the paternal X chromosome in the ovum has a more sexual character as a kind of "paternal interdiction" of the sexual aspect of fertilization, more or less comparable with the oedipus-complex in postnatal youth. On the other hand, a collision between the fertilizing sperm and the maternal X chromosome in the ovum seems more to refer to the emotional aspects of "orgasm": a defence against orgastical-oceanic aspects of fertilization. In the "schizo model" (c.f. V) the prohibition of this emotional aspect is interpreted as an "oceanic narcissism" on the mother's side.

These two aspects, the delay of the meiosis and the different character of the two X chromosomes in the ovum, form the base of the working-hypothesis related to conception-analyses.

Both forms of collision are called "conception-shock", a notion which the late psychoanalist Nandor Fodor introduced in his book

"New Approaches to dream interpretation (Citadel Press, New York, 1951).

In this hypothesis the question whether psychiatric illnesses are submitted to the laws of heredity is reduced to the question whether the delay of meisosis in the ovum might be a hereditary matter, or a matter of paradosis from mother on daughter. At any rate, for the moment, it seems rather sure that this delay of call-division is related to anorgasmy on the side of the woman.

The terms "oceanic" and "oceanos" are already introduced in our book "Psychic energy" under the heading "The Orgastical experience of Space" (book I, Chapter XV, 145-151). Characteristics of it are: the absence of the "I" bound to sensorial perceptions an extrasensory perception; feelings of unity with a partner, or with nature, etc., i.e. disappearance of the subject-object discrimination; awareness of unlimited space and timelessness.

The feeling of "unity" together with the awareness of timeless, unlimited space are the original contents of prenatal consciousness, already present at conception. In the pre-conceptional field of attraction between the two germs this consciousness is called "Ur-ego", as a consciousness of infinity.

II. Conception-shock and states of depersonalization

Introduction

Several years ago already I analyzed states of depersonalization which were based on conceptional disturbances. In my book "Psychic Energy" some examples of these analyses are published.

It is my purpose to compare these states and their basic conceptional disturbances with those of borderline-cases. For this reason I will quote several dreams out of the book "Psychic Energy".

A. Dream I was published in the Psychiatric Quarterly in 1952 and reprinted in "Psychic Energy". (page 18) :

"There is something peculiar going on. There is an eerie, ghostly atmosphere which last through the rest of the dream. There are weird things floating about the sky. At one point, I look out of a window and I see series of flags going quickly by, as though drawn along on pulleys, similar to telegraph wires. One lot that goes by are American flags, stars and stripes. Another lot also has stars, but they are red and green. At another point I see a man who is fond of me lying dying or injured on the floor. I leave him. Perhaps I have no time. This may be connected with an upheaval of some sort I have a vague idea that it is all connected with people coming to the earth from another planet. No doubt based on the flying saucer project. At one point it becomes clear that strange people from another planet have arrived. I think I realize this, and certainly one other man in the room does so too, because he suggests that we let them in. Apparently we do so, because small people enter the room, wearing porkpie hats. Some of the hats are green and some orange and there is something shining on the hats. I speak to one of the little men, saying : "Your planet is the lost section of the earth. In the year ? a section of the earth sank, or was it rising?".

I enter a room leading off the room where I left the fat injured man lying on the floor. There is a tall, glamorous girl who I think, has just taken something for a headache. She is standing behind a curtain looking out of a window. We lift the curtain aside and she tells us to look out at something peculiar in the sky. I look out. It is night time and I see in the sky shadowy outlines which look like cigars on the right hand side and balls on the left hand side, while in between there is some other object. The object on the left is moving as if it were opening and closing a mouth. The girl mentions the word "mills". Perhaps in a way this resembles the movement of windmills. I say to her : "Come and see the real cause of all the trouble" and I am referring to the arrival of the little men from the unknown planet. The small people are much more advanced than we are in atomic power. I am sure that they will laugh at us for the way we do things. I imagine that they will scoff at the way we run our yellow motorbusses and other things. They must be shown around".

The beginning of this dream refers to the prenatal trauma of a partial placenta rupture as well as to the main theme of this dream : people coming from another planet to the earth which surely indicates a conceptional root. In connection with this placental rupture the dream starts in an "eery, ghostly atmosphere" in which flags with stars and stripes appear and moreover, a dying man is seen on the floor. Seeing stars and stripes can be interpreted as: she is dizzy. In her analysis the symbol "Male" was always associated with consciousness, mind. So, according to this analysanda, the dying man refers to a state of being out of consciousness. On the other hand, however, her "I", or ego, sees the dying man. Which kind of consciousness is dying and which ego can, nonetheless, record what has happened !

In connection with the female cycle the symbol "male" is rather often used as a symbol of eros: about a week before menstruation it can happen that dreams refer to a dying man, which is resurrected after mensturation. Does the "dying man" in the present dream refer to the same libidinal facet ? At any rate this "dying man" is associated with "strange people from another planet". These little people, wearing porkpie hats, seem, according to the dreamer, "much more advanced than we are in atomic power". A further characteristic of these little people is that their "planet" is the lost part of the earth; a "section of the earth sank, or was it rising ?".

Although in those days the analysanda had no association with this "lost part", perhaps the old hypothesis may be mentioned that the moon would be a lost part of the earth. If this suggestion is right, these little men's planet could refer to the moon which in this analysis of a partial placental rupture symbolized the placenta. But what are these little men representing in connection with the placental rupture ?

Here, it seems that the second part of the dream gives some indications. First, a glamorous girl shows her "cigars and balls", while in between there is some other object. When taking the glamorous girl as a symbol of the analysanda's sexy aspect, the picture is that this sexy aspect sees male (cigars) and female (ball) objects whereas the ball is "moving as if it were opening and closing mouth": a conceptional picture in which this "opening and closing mouth" expresses the sucking, attracting force on the side of the ovum.

But the analysanda, represented by the ego, says (in other words) "no, the real cause of all the trouble is not the conceptional attraction, but the arrival of the little men from the unknown planet". Their typifying attribute is a porkpie hat. Is this porkpie (flat) an indication of the traumatic event by which a bormal hat becomes flat ? In this case the porkpie hat would also refer to the traumatic event which caused her fits of depersonalization (the eery, ghostly atmosphere). But nonetheless this traumatic characteristic, these little men are "much more advanced". So they are not related to the dying man in the first part of the dream.

When publishing this dream with some comments I associated these little men with a primary narcissistic (the ego occupied by libido) thinking and experiencing. Although Freud used this term for the primal state of a babe after birth, since the prenatal psychodynamics are elaborated this same state exists also during fetal life as long as it is undisturbed. It is the same state as is meant by the term "oceanos". One can define this state as an all-world-experience, or, with Matto Blanco, as "emotion as a form of thinking". I also call it a "feeling of objectless love". On the other hand one can interpret it as the prime root of the sevral drive as well as being a prime root of consciousness: a noetic facet (these little men are much more advanced in atomic power").

From a biological point of view it would be possible to interpret these little men as sperm, whereas the "atomic power" would refer to the fertilizing ability of sperm. Without any doubt this interpretation is alo right. However, these little men also indicate the oceanic aspect. The porkpie hats can be interpreted as caused by the traumatic experience of the placental rupture. The question whether the "other planet" is due to a "section of the earth which sank, or was it rising" refers to mind, or consciousness which by this rupture (part of the earth) sank, whereas at conceptional level this mind rose : came into existence.

So, in the second part of the dream the dreamer makes a difference between, on the one hand, the cigar, the ball and some object between these two (i.e. the mutual attraction of the two germs), and, on the other hand, the original state of mind, or consciousness; the oceanic experience as a noetic aspect which, indeed, is related to the sexual aspects of ball, cigar and attracting forces, in a non-material, but in a noetic way.

Also the peculiarity that the glamorous girl (sexy) has a headache points to the fact that this headache is caused by the placental rupture: headache-mind-porkpie hat and eery atmosphere.

This dream, as a whole, shows a mixture of the effects of the placental rupture: states of depersonalization, and conceptional pictures. The associations between these two aspects might be formed by the depersonalization as the traumatic disturbance of a primal state of conscious-oceanic experiencing, although one can also suppose that the association between these two aspects is formed by a first depersonalization during conception by the little men with their atomic power and the second depersonalization by the placental rupture.

This example is mentioned and commented upon in order to illustrate the importance of prenatal investigations with regard to the symptom of depersonalization. It is, moreover, the reason why I decided to study again case-materials out of former years of my practice. At the conceptional level, namely, the roots of such states of depersonalization can be found.

B. Four dreams of an analysanda

Dream II The first dream, here to be discussed, is mentioned in "Psychic Energy", page 89. :

> I am somewhere near a railroad between a telegraph-pole and a signal-box. A small airplane is flying near the electrical wire. The pilot touches the wire, rounds the pole and lands in the signal-box. When I see the landing I think "this will cause a crash". A second plane follows the first one. They seem to come out of infinity. The wire ends in the signal-box.

In "Psychic Energy" this dream is interpreted as a pre-conceptional picture in which the signal-box (female) represents the ovum and the airplane (male) the sperm. The dreamer herself, the "I", which records, is standing between the signal-box and the telegraph pole (male). Apart from the fact that the "I" records the planes, it also records a notion of infinity; the planes come as if out of infinity.

Later on I have called such an "I" an Ur-ego which has notion of infinity.

But why is there a telegraph-pole which is rounded by the plane? It must be a male symbol which, however, is not identical with the airplane. On the contrary it is far more related to the signal box.

As to the fact that this "I" records two planes, in her analysis there are some vague indications about a twin, alleged to be lost in a very early stage of her fetal development. But these indications are too vague. Therefore, it seems better not to attempt interpreting the second airplane.

The dreamer's "I" is standing near a male and a female object, both belonging to the ovum. Remarkable is the duality of railroad and electrical cable, the latter ending in the signal box. The attractive force, as a guiding line, is represented by this cable.

The dreamer's "I" knows that the plane will cause a crash when landing in the signal box. This crash is expressed in the following dream (c.f. Psychic Energy, page 136, nr. III).

> Dream III I am in a room with my mother. There is a flash of lightning. The first does not hurt me; the second, however, throws me to the floor. My mother comes and is going to lie next me. I keep her off as I think that, touching me, she too will be electrocuted.

This dream concerns conception-shock; the "crash" when the plane in dream II enters the signal box. Here two flashes are mentioned, whereas in dream II two airplanes are recorded. In this dream, moreover a first indication of a state of depersonalization can be found: the dream mentions that she prevented her mother to lie next to her. In reality, after conception and during the implantation of the ovum, a threat of abortion existed: the mother keeping the fertilized ovum off from embedding. In connection with this "turning things upside down it can be mentioned that when the analyst compared the field of attraction between the two germs with a magnetic field, the analysanda acknowledged that she often felt herself as if in a field of magnetic forces. She added that it causes a feeling as if one were turned around." If it should continue, I should lose all contact and all ability of discrimination".

Another way of denoting this "turning facts upside down" in her state of depersonalization is depicted in the following dream (Psych. Ener., p. 89, nr VIII).

> IV. I am in a house with a girlfriend and her mother. I say: "now I want to try these garden shears". I take them and by the quick movement of the shears I am being drawn right to the window on the left side. But now the room is changed: it is empty and bare. Through the window I see a clock. This

clock has a face with two wooden ears and a moustache, which is made out of two pieces of wool: one is round in the form of a loop and the other straight, going through the loop".

In the former publication I interpreted the dreamer together with her friend and this friend's mother as the "I-cell" together with the polar body and connected with the mother-image by this polar body. It is one of those dreams in which the "friend" vaguely suggests the original existence of a twin, which, on the one hand, would have come into existence by the fertilization of the first polar body, and which, on the other hand, would have been lost soon after conception. In "Psychic Energy" I have again and again used the term "I-cell" by which I meant the second polar body which comes into existence by the meiosis of the ovum. In those days I used this term on purpose in order to prevent conflicts with the laws of heredity. As a matter of fact, however, I think that this dreamer's "I" represents the male factor in the ovum which is a derivation of the X chromosome of her mother's father. It is this X chromosome which causes conception-shock when the meiosis is retarded so much that a conflict arises between the old and the new, fresh "male". Further I really think that the telegraph pole in dream II also indicates this male aspect of the ovum, which as a "telegraph pole" is connected with the mother's psyche. Essentially I have handled this "I-cell" as a male component So, in a way there is no difference in psychodynamics aspects whether this component is called "I-cell", or grandfatherly X chromosome. The conflict with the laws of heredity in which the grandfatherly X chromosome is interpreted as the carrier of heredity qualities like, for instance, haemophily, cannot yet be solved; the laws of heredity are based on statistics whereas the present interpretations are based on psychodynamic aspects. As to psychodynamic facets in haemophily L. L. Dubin, DDS and S. S Shapiro, M. D.'s publication "Use of hypnosis to facilitate dental extraction and hemostasis in a classic hemophiliac with a high antibody titer to factor VIII (American Journ. of Clinical Hypnosis, Vol. 17, Nr. 2, October 1974, 79-83) is surely very important. As to another so-called heredity quality, colour blindness, I can refer to Nandor Fodor's publication "Sexual aspects of hysterical color blindness". in his book "New Approaches to dream interpretation, Citadel Press, 1951.

Returning to the dream itself the "I" takes garden shears and is drawn by these shears as by an attractive force. But the "I" is pulled by a symbol of castration. So it is already a reversed picture as it is the "I" which hes to be "castrated" by the fertilizing sperm: a castration which means that mother's paternal X chromosome has to leave the ovum via meiosis. The reversed picture, however, goes on. First, the room is changed, empty and bare. Secondly, when looking out of the window this "I" see the clock with two ears: the ovum with two polar bodies, whereas the moustache, composed of a straight piece of wool (male) through a woollen loop (female) accentuates the process of fertilization. The reversed situation is depicted by the fact that the "I" is in the room, or ovum, and the ovum (the clock) is outside the room. The "I" has, as it were, projected the fertilized ovum. The beginning of the dream with the castrating shears points to the germ of sadomasochism evoked by the battle with the sperm.

This same turning upside down in the state of depersonalization is also expressed in the next dream (Ps. En. p. 90, IX):

> V. During the war I have to cross a bridge from Holland to England. This bridge is a raft. My father is with me on the raft. The weather is so stormy that sometimes the raft is vertical on the water. My father says : "formerly it used to be much more dangerous; then the woman saw her own image in the water. Then I arrive in England. All is poor there, badly lighted, no food, no warmth".

The dreamer crosses a bridge which is a raft (ovum) and her father is with her. Here, the depersonalization is depicted by her father's saying that women could see their own image in the water. In this way this father explains that sometimes the raft is standing vertically on the water and even turned upside down. The fixation of the "I-call", as if still in the ovum, causes this "I" to see her own image in the water, like in dream IV the "I" see the clock outside the room.

C. Conceptional castration

At first view the following dream (Ps. En. p. 98, XXV) suggests a typical postnatal, oedipal conflict between a father and a son. This dream refers, however, to a conceptional conditioning :

> VI. I am the president of some society. When entering the conference room I see my father and two other men, members of the Reformed Church. One of these two speaks, and it seems as if he were the president. Suddenly I notice that all the people in the room accept his presidency. Then I get furious and I say : "Ladies and gentlemen, if you want another president. you can have one. But the way in which you now have changed the presidency, without discussing anything with me, is so impertinent, that I will not only retire from the presidency, but even give up my membership of the society". Then I think: "why did they do so ? Well, it is true that I never had any great capacities for being a leader. Strange, I have never looked my father so straight in the face as now. He is not angry with me, he looks friendly, but he does not stir from his place; he belongs to those two other men."

"I am the president of the society": the society refers to the ovum before its fertilization being part of the mother's psyche, i.e.

the ovary. The "I" is the ovarian male. "My father" sticks to these two men who are orthodox Christian people, one of them seems as if he were the president: the fertilizing sperm. The "I" of the dreamer feels castrated and in the dream he puzzles about the question why his father belongs to these two men. The dream refers to the tension between the male "I" in the ovum and the male masochistic reaction from the ovarian oval male "I" is expressed in his first reaction of being furious as well as in his second reaction: reasoning that this "I" is not the right one for being a leader. The ovarian oval male has the function to stimulate the growth of folliculi (F. S. hormon). In the dream there is no further mentioning of depersonalization. The dreamer interprets the "I" as male.

D. Part of the following dream has been mentioned in Psy.

En. p. 199, XV :

VII. The dream starts with the female dreamer gliding down a kind of hill. She is sitting on its surface in such a position that she exhibits her genital with her legs bent and widely spread. Then she enters a room in a house 7. This room is round and she walks clockwise. She knows that her mother is in it. Then she goes through a door into another room, where she, however, walks anti-clockwise. There she sees a man who is beating boys. One boy who is beaten is in an arcen circle with his back bent backwards. She is very afraid and runs away from the house, hides herself a o. in a bus and she skates on ice wearing a strange kind of hat.

Her fleeing away from that house means to camouflage herself so that nobody can recognize her as belonging to that house.

In connection with this study the most important fact is that in the second room the father plays a sadistic role against "boys" which she associates with chromosomes. One boy, in arcen circle, is beaten by this man (the sperm): male against male, with a sadistic accent.

After the ovulation the ovum, the "I" is sliding down via the fallopian tube (hill) till she arrives at the room where conception takes place. Remarkable is that in the one room she walks clockwise and in the other one anti-clockwise. It reminded the analyst of the hypothesis that left-handedness in postnatal life could refer to a twin-structure (one of the two lost du ng fetal life). The room where she walks clockwise pointing to the first polar body and where she walks anti-clockwise the ovum itself This difference could indicate a mirror effect in the polar body. In this analysis, however, no clear evidence existed about a lost twin.

E. The next dream, taken from a conception analysis

(Ps. En. p. 182, XX) shows the same "male" accent regarding conception. I will quote it together with the associations advanced :

VIII I am in a schoolyard in U. There are two headmasters: the old head, who in reality is dead, and his successor.

This dream was produced during conception analysis of a patient suffering from episodes of deep depersonalization. When the narcissistic roots came up for treatment she associated the "old head" with the "I" (second polar body) and his successor with the new sperm. Why did she make use of a headmaster who in reality was long dead ? Here, she associated for her mortal fear during the episode of depersonalization, when she has a feeling of having lost all powers of discrimination. This is the negative experience of death at conception. The real conception-shock, however, is not mentioned in this dream, only slightly indicated by this death-motive.

F. Three dreams of a conception analysis :

IX (Psy. En. p. 129, V) I am in a boat, it is dark. One is in the water and yet in the boat, as if there is only a kind of cover. Then a very large and immense bird comes and pulls at the boat. There is a sort of turnover, perhaps first the boat was leading and now the bird leads. Then the boat sails in another direction. I am disturbed about this turn, about the bird pulling the boat in a reversed direction. The boat is something which keeps things together.

It is a conception picture whereas the "I" is placed on the side of the ovum, (the boat). The boat is said to "keep somethings together" and yet "as if in the water" : libido. Although the shock itself is not expressed, the result of it is depicted in the following dream (Ps. En., p. 167, I) :

X An accident has happened on a road; a nice dog lies decapitated. A man lies flat on the ground. When I approach him he jumps up and is apparently quite well. Suddenly he jumps on a bicycle and departs. This is too much, for he is the delinquent. Pursuit starts and he is quickly encircled.

Associations : accident-conception; a man and a dog are knocked down by the conception-shock; a cyclist runs away after the accident without looking at his victim. It looks as if I accuse my father in some way. The dog's decapitation points to some castration and it looks as if this is my father's fault.

Comment: These briefly recorded associations show that the analyst has already reached the conceptional level. The dream starts after the "accident". The conception-shock as such is not re-experienced in this dream. We can therefore expect a reversed picture, or "fantasy" in this dream. She associates the feeling of accusing her father of being the guilty part in the accident. Moreover, the dream fantasy has him knocked down together with the dog. The "I" is not knocked down; this would have expressed the violent ejection of the second polar body, caused by the sperm: the biological aspect of the "accident". However, the shock is projected in reverse, as if the sperm is knocked down and decapitated (castrated). Instead of the actively penetrating sperm, the dream picture makes the "I" the active part: she (the oocyte) encircles the delinquent. This is the depiction of conception reversed by the wish to defend herself from re-experiencing the conception shock.

I have quoted this dream together with the associations and my comments from my book "Psychic Energy".

The motive "dog and man" appears more often in her analysis :

XI (Ps. En. p. 174, X) : A miracle has happened. A boy and a dog suddenly disappeared and dissolved to nothing somewhere in a forest, years ago. When I recover the spot of their disappearance years later and blow on it, they re-appear.

This dream was one of the first dreams in the beginning of the postmenstrual period. The dog indicates the instinctive aspect of the ovum and the boy represents the erotic facet. Here is no question of conception, it only demonstrates the "resurrection" of sexual libido after menstruation.

G. Finally two dreams are chosen, one of which has been published in "Praenatale Psychologie" (Eg.G.H. Graber, Kindler, Munchen, 1974, dream II).

XII The preparations for an election in which I have an active role are in full swing. Before the election I walk in a dark street in which in reality I was born. Attentively I look at the door on which I read the name "Faber". This is, I realize, the famous theologist-politician. At the end of the street a police-man watches a house, he is on the backside of this house. A well known politician also lives in this house, or there is a conference. I see light in one of the windows high up in the house and I conclude that the election-committee will be there. It is here that I should be present. But the police-man has seen me and I withdraw as quickly as possible for I do not want to be regarded as a person under suspicion.

The house with the name Faber represents the male factor: associations are "maker" and "father". The female pole is represented by the house in which upstairs the election-committee is gathered. This refers to the maternal aspect, whereas the election itself is associated with ovulation. Behind this maternal house, however, a police-man is watching and the dreamer, or "I" withdraw, preventing a confrontation with this police-man.

As to the street, this represents the field of attraction between the male (sperm-Faber) and the female-ovarian and ovulation : The opposing "male" (police-man) is on the side of the ovarian female. It is this "male", however, which prevents the dreamer to re-experience his being elected, i.e. conception. This dream typifies the Ur-ego in the field of attraction, the street, which is opposed by the male in the mother's psyche and in the ovum. Preventing to be a suspect person means preventing the sexual aspect of fertilization and conception-shock (police-man).

In the next dream this shock is announced :

XIII The dreamer stands on a dune near the sea. Out of the sea a strange object is raised up, which flies over the dune, landinwards. There it attempts to land. The dreamer is frightened, for such a landing means an explosion. The object is a combination of a helicopter pulling a lorry. Moreover, there is a plane which surveys this flight.

Here the landing indicates the biological realization of conception, where-as the helicopter represents the sperm and the lorry the ovum. The observing "I", or Ur ego stands on a high point, a dune between the sea, symbolizing infinity, and land, the material aspect. The analysand was amazed that apart from the male-female composition, he also saw an airplane as a surveyor. He could, however, not give any further explanation. So the conclusion is that in this dream there is an observing ego plus a surveyor.

H. Discussion

First, the author has to admit that for several years an effort to construct a general point of view concerning depersonalization in connection with conception, has been a very difficult one. As soon as one tries to enter into details of this kind of materials, sometimes it seems as if the analyst, when trying empathically to enter in these materials, he himself started to hover on the edge of a kind of depersonalization, asking himself: "am I mad, or what is the hidden clue of these materials all put together". The working hypothesis that consciousness, the "I", can be interpreted as a configuration of psychic energy with a higher level of energy in a certain point, became a first aid. Sometimes, namely, in the materials the "I" is placed on the side of the ovum (e.g. dream IX, VIII), sometimes it is outside the things which happen, as an observer (e.g. dream II, XII, XIII); sometimes this "I" seems to be a victim. Finally this working hypothesis, together with a second one, seemed to enable the author to put order in the pre-psychotic diversity of the present materials.

The hypothesis starts at the preconceptional level of the mutual attracting forces between the two germs. In this field of attraction the supposition is that an observing "I" exists. In accordance with this supposition the observing "I" in dream II and XIII can be interpreted as an "Ur-ego".

Let us now suppose what happens during the biological process of fertilization if there is no shock, so no resistance against the penetrating sperm. When we call the field of attraction a field of a primal form of love, the penetration of the sperm, as a carrier of love, will cause "joy", an oceanic-orgastical experience in the ovum with a much higher level of energy. On purpose I use the word "oceanic" in order to indicate that the "I", as Ur-ego, has a notion about infinity. In dream I this infinity is expressed by "little people from another planet who are more advanced in atomic power"; in dream II this infinity is indicated by the airplanes since they seem to come out of infinity; in dream XIII the infinity is symbolized by the helicopter together with the lorry as coming out of the sea (ocean). This Ur ego enters the ovum and causes an "orgastical-oceanic" experience.

However, in the materials also another "I" is mentioned on the side of the ovum: dream VII, IX According to the hypothesis that the "I", as consciousness, exists by a concentration, or configuration of psychic energy, or libido, in such cases the "I" indicates a libidinal configuration in the ovum, whereas the quality of this configuration in itself is not explained. But this situation of an ovum with a libidinal configuration seems to be related to a conception-shock (dream VII and IX). Moreover, this shock is suggested in dream XII and XIII (avoiding the police-man and announcing the shock just as in dream II). As to the quality of this "I" several dreams point at a male factor (dream VI, VII, boys tortured, VIII and X), whereas in dream III the "I" is identified with the dreamer herself with garden shears as castration motive.

Which psychodynamic quality is represented by this "I" on the side of the ovum? The most probable interpretation seems that this oval "I" represents the male factor in the ovum (the only exception is dream III). This male factor offers resistance against the penetrating sperm: the telegraphpole in dream II does not yet function, but the "I" in dream III seems to be as if it were her mother's voice, offering this resistance against fertilization.

Now the supposition in this hypothesis is that oval "I" represents an over-accentuation of the X chromosome by which the mother of the dreamer came into existence. The mother's paternal X chromosome seems to combat the penetrating fresh sperm.

This resistance causes the depersonalization in which now the suggestion exists that this X chromosome remains in the ovum, whereas this "I" sees the fertilized ovum somewhere outside (dream III and IV), now this "I" is turning its back to the whole battle field of conception, camouflaging itself completely in strange surroundings (dream VII), then again the Ur ego is suggested to withdraw from the oval "I" (dream XII) and finally, in dream X, in order to avoid the experience of the conception-shock the picture turns the conceptional process upside down: the oval "I" is encircling the male (Ur-ego) who decapitated the dog (ovum).

In all these cases, however, the oceanic-orgastical experience during fertilization is "castrated" and instead of a pleasure-full arising of the new human being, a sadomasochistic tendency arises due to the male factor in the ovum: the domination of the mother's paternal X chromosome which has to leave the ovum (dream VI).

It is already mentioned that this interpretation of the "male" in the ovum, being represented by this grandfatherly X chromosome, is in conflict with the laws of heredity insofar these laws attribute hereditary qualities to this X chromosome which can be followed in next generations, whereas according to my interpretation this grandfatherly X chromosome has to leave the ovum via meiosis. As to two of the so called hereditary qualities, memophily and colorblindness, I have already mentioned two studies who contradict the hereditary factor. As to hemophily, moreover this illness might indicate a special form of masochism, whereas it might be expected that in other situations and reactions the same person could be extremely sadistic, together with a suppression of oceanic-orgastical experiences. Surely, at present all this is only suggestive imagination. But if it would be possible to prove this psychodynamic structure of the background of hemophily, the hereditary explanation of this illness, based on statistics, could possibly be replaced by a paradosis, based on conception shock with the coming into existence of sadomasochistic tendencies. In that case the continuation of generations of this illness might be related to a compulsive repetition via marriage choice.

III A case of conception-shock in a cycloid borderline case

The case concerns a teacher of classical languages. over sixty years of age who is pensioned owing to medical reasons. His main motive for applying for treatment was that every attempt to undergo cosmic experiencing (in the sense of Bucke's book Cosmic Consciousness, 1934) caused a dreadful fear of a complete "naught". As I interpret this cosmic consciousness, or peak experience (Maslow, 1962) as a conceptional orgastic oceanic experiencing, I call this experience an individual oceanic one.

Educated in a strictly Roman Catholic milieu, he has been a "religious seeker", a.o. in the Greek orthodox church. Besides this main motive he was liable to excessive outbursts of temper which had caused a former psychiatrist to diagnose him as a psychopath. Moreover, he suffered from pedophilic phantasies in which, when seeing a young boy, he evoked phantasies in which he imagined himself absorbing this boy orally. But these phantasies were always accompanied by a background-fear that his mother would see what he was doing. If making advances to women such an attempt would be frustrated by a feeling of utter impotence undergoing a kind of mental "Todtstell" reflex and a fear that the woman herself would devour him. Lurking in the background of such phantasies there was always a god-image that did not allow him to experience in a "cosmic" way.

He had a maniac-depressive structure with an accent on depression. There were also thoughts of suicide. But he has never suffered a really psychotic state. Therefore my diagnosis was a cycloid borderline-case.

After a short explorative phase this analysis started in a completely unorthodox way, first of all because this analysand did not come forward with even a single dream; secondly, as his conception took place when his mother was about 40 years old. So, it could be expected that in this severe Catholic milieu the mother had the attitude that she had to obey her husband's wishes, even if there could be a danger of her becoming pregnant. Thirdly, his former psychiatrist's treatment had been a failure and had only been concerned with subjects connected with his postnatal occurrences such as education, environment, etc.

In this analysis the starting point was formed by the analysis of his conception, whereas all kinds of postnatal data came haphazardly to the fore. Shortly said: the postnatal oedipus-complex was replaced by the conception and its shock like experience.

So, one of the first rather "wild" suggestions was that perhaps his pedophilian phantasies could be associated with an ovum that wanted a sperm to enter, whereas the prohibition of this phantasy, indicated by the presence of his mother, might point to her fear of becoming pregnant (the exploration of his postnatal oral phase did not cause any emotional reaction on his side). After I had advanced this suggestion the analysand told me about his fear regarding women who would devour him, also of his anxiety for the imagined "god" who forbade him to take up contact with women.

Bypassing the further exploration of his postnatal stages, the next suggestion I made was that this "God" might refer to the X chromosome of his grandfather on his mother's side, the expulsion of which out of the ovum by a meiosis could have been delayed. To this suggestion I added a phantasy that this grandfather would have been a jolly man, instead of a severe patriarchical one and that he would have been pleased if his daughter, the analysand's mother, could have a jolly good sexual pleasure and I concluded that in that case his mother would have reacted in quite another way when becoming pregnant. This phantasy brought about the following dream :

I. I am in your consulting-room. You say to me; "it is better that you leave me as I do not feel so well". Then there is a change in your room so that you, standing somewhere in the room, have become an archetypical old wise man, with long hair. Such a love radiates from your eyes ! Besides you your wife is present. I fall into a trance and kiss you on your mouth. And then I go away together with your daughter.

Associations : I dreamt this old man after your suggestion about a jolly grandfather. That I depart with your daughter means a conception without shock. Your wife will have been a positive mother image.

Commentaries : In this dream the image of the grandfather has been transferred on the analyst. First, this "grandfather" asks the analysand, representing the sperm, to go away, indicating the start of conception shock. But then the whole situation changes and the analyst becomes the old wise man who "does not at all forbid the sperm to enter: together with the ovum the sperm can go its way".

Theoretically it is remarkable that, first, the transference does not take place based on a sensory father-image, but on the archetypical father of his mother, and, secondly, the question can be put whether Jung's archetypes might be interpreted by such backgrounds, namely: the grandparents of the parents. Moreover, the question rises whether the "ideal-priest" figure might he related to such benevolent grandfathers and therefore are mostly depicted as a-sexual. It is this grandfather-image, may be forbidding, may be benevolent, which is projected in the oedipus-complex on the real father.

After this dream had been worked over, a phase set in which the analysand experienced a fear that when the ovum has been fertilized by the sperm against the will of "grandfather" and against the mother's wish, all ties with the mother would be broken down and the "mother would then let me fall into the void". Although I was conscious of the possibility that this anxiety might refer to a spontaneous abortion, the analysand's feeling and thoughts did not correspond with this possibility. So, the analyst was forced to interpret this anxiety of "falling" in a much subtler way. I made the suggestion that perhaps the grandfather (or X chromosome), when dominating the ovum, could have the function of a kind of antenne of the maternal psyche and her compulsive wishes not to become pregnant; as soon as this "grandfather" has to leave the oval field, the anti-pregnancy-wish, as libidinal dynamics, would break down, and the ovum passes beyond the sphere of the maternal psyche's domination. I thought I could make this suggestion as it is well-known that in some way or other the fertilized ovum sends a "signal" toward the ovary. Moreover, there are cases in which the mother knows exactly when she becomes pregnant. With these considerations in the background I ventured to make this suggestion.

His first reaction was that this made things clear to him, insofar the maternal psyche was anti-sex that this dynamic was transferred on to the "grandfather" in the ovum, with as a consequence to the analysand the warning: "take care, or you will fall" as soon as something refers to sex. This grandfather like warning could explain his god-image.

Then his analysis entered a stage in which he saw that the cosmic experience could be a circle of light. But he could not enter this circle as within it there was a black circle. As soon as he would be able to enter this circle, he would have found his Self back again. In this stage the main stress was laid on the oceanic aspect and its reverse: an immense hatred. I suggested that the black circle might refer to negative oceanic dynamics, or hatred.

Dream II: I am in a waiting room, let us say of a railway station. A very tall man enters, but 3 policemen stop him. The tall man kills the first policeman by shooting him. Then he no longer has a weapon. Whereas the second policeman wants to shoot him, the tall man holds him in check by looking at him. But the 3rd policeman took his chance and started to saw the skull of the tall man. I could not look at it any longer and awoke.

Associations: waiting-room-ovum, waiting for fertilization: going its journey. The 3 policemen refer to three aspects of grandfather and mother's psyche. I think the policeman with the saw refers to that dark circle within the circle of light. It can be the factor of hatred on the mother's side. This policeman symbolizes my feelings of "naught": to be doomed. I cannot face it.

Commentaries: Here, the resistance in the maternal psyche and the ovum are depicted as 3 policemen; three as a male number! But this dream indicates his fear of "falling into the void", which can be interpreted as a very, very early depersonalization. Moreover, it gave me the opportunity to ask him whether his fits of temper might be associated with the sawing policeman and could be interpreted as a paradosis. His reaction was that his mother could have fits of bad temper in the analysand's youth, so that here there might be a kind of conceptional mother-identification.

Shortly after this dream he produced the following:

Dream III. I have intercourse with my mother. It is very peaceful and something like a Holy Ghost is in it. My mother was only afraid of becoming pregnant.

Although much of his analysis was still a verbal one, I think such a dream shows that the analysis is on the right track, (father-identification).

Dream IV. I am in a house without a roof My father found it as he liked to move quite often. I am furious and beat him. My mother is in the background.

Associations: Indeed my father wanted to move. The house without a roof seems to indicate a direct contact with the sky.

Commentaries: I had to ask him about another interpretation; whether. namely, the roofless house might refer to the tall man whose skull was sawn off In that case, his father would replace his "grandfather" in this dream and the house would point to the ovarian and impersonal state of oceanos (pre-oceanos).

Dream V. A priest climbs on a ladder which reaches into heaven and he returns again. I try to follow him with my eyes, but I am only able to do so to a certain distance. Then I feel the tendency to jump from the ladder and to crash down on earth.

Commentaries : I did not enter too much into this dream as obviously the motive of "falling" showed a danger of suicide as a masochistic reversal of his original fear that the mother would let him fall.

Dream VI. I make desperate efforts to keep a dog in a fire-extinguisher and again and again the dog tries to escape. My mother is somewhere in the background.

Associations : Dog-castration vagina dentata.the saw and anti-sex.

Commentaries : Indeed, I think the suppression of the maternal hatred (probably self-hatred for being a woman and according to her belief to have to obey the wishes of her husband) is here depicted, a hatred which he cannot yet face.

Dream VII. I walk together with miss X. We meet you as an old man who has a baby on his shoulders. You say : "I still can easily give the sting". We both admire you that you, so old as you are, can do so. Then the situation changes and I see the testes of this baby, shriveled up. The baby is "ontmandeld".

Associations : "Ontmandeld" was used in the dream: castrated and also tonsilectomy (in Dutch tonsil-amandelen). To give a sting: fertilization.

Commentaries : Here, the analyst seems to be a two-faced symbol; on the one hand the fact he has a baby seems to refer to his potency; on the other hand he also seems to be a castrator. This aspect was associated with the policeman with the saw as well as with the dog in dream VI.

Just as in dream IV, where the father seems to replace his conceptional grandfather, here too the father-image shows its ambivalency.

At the time the analysis has turned in such a direction that the analysand puzzles about the loss of some basic contact. As far as I can see this loss refers to the following: if on the ovum's side a mnene exists about the libidinal collectivity in the ovary (which is "Psychic Energy" I have called an impersonal oceanos), this libidinal aspect might be important in that way that the real orgastical experienee of space, or the conceptionally cosmic experience, means that the ovarian, still impersonal oceanos, as part of the maternal psyche, has to change through conception into a personal oceanos, i.e. into the orgastical experience. The fear of losing this base might, however, refer to the maternal hatred, so that the ambivalency, in dream VII which refers to a father-image, might be based on the antagonism between these ovarian aspects and the maternal psyche. I know that in so called schizoid borderline-cases the bad individuation can refer to a regressive tendency backwards to the ovarian, impersonal oceanic state.

About $2^{1}/_{2}$ months later the analysand related a dream which is important regarding this supposition :

Dream VIII. Two glass windows form a corner at right angles the one to the other. I am outside the corner formed by these windows. I look through the two windows and see a woman standing near the other window. She is outside the rectangular corner. She is in a white dress. I am interested whether she will stay there, or disappear. She disappears.

Associations : The anlysand thinks this a very important dream. "This woman is related to what I always have said; there must be something behind the negative mother". I am sure that the rectangular position on the windows is connected with what you call the imaginary aspects of psychic energy.

Commentaries : Indeed, the notion "imaginary" is surely derived from my hypothesis that psychic energy is a real energy that stands to light and electromagnetism as 1 to $\sqrt{-1}$ (the number i). This imaginary number i points to another dimension (e.g. a 5th) which in a diagram can be represented by a line perpendicularly to the line which represents the other dimension (e g. the 4th). The acceptance of such an energy with "supraluminous velocity" runs parallel with the acceptance, on mathematical grounds, of gravitons and tachions. The analysand looks through two windows and sees the woman in white dress. He associates her with a mother image. I asked him whether this Ur mother-image could represent the "herdwoman" of the ovarian collectivity and could refer to the X chromosome which his mother inherited from her mother. At once he accepted this interpretation and remembered a photograph of his grandmother in a white dress (he had never seen her in his life-time). This Ur mother-image is an imaginary personification of the ovarian collectivity which at conception could not become individuated by the mother-image which was anti-sex and anti-pregnancy.

Two weeks before this dream he had another dream :

Dream IX : In an underground temple some priests bring a man in lying on a catafalque. He seems dead They put the catafalque against a wall and rub ointment over the body, also his penis is rubbed with a green ointment. Owing to the ceremony the man revives. Somewhere in this temple a woman is present. She makes remarks, since she does not believe in such nonsense. But the man revives.

Associations : The colour green has a very religious meaning in icons of the Greek orthodox church. By the religious ointment he revives.

Commentaries : the two libidinal poles, eros and oceanos, come together and the analysand overcomes the conception-shock

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(death) After this dream he could dream about the Ur-mother, the imaginary, positive mother-image.

Metapsychologically one can ask oneself whether this Ur-mother-image might be related to the ancient Magna Mater; at any rate this Ur-mother image seems to represent the personification of the ovarian oceanic aspects: a "prematernal oceanos". It seems to me that it refers to the maternal X chromosome as the counterpart of the paternal (grandfather) X chromosome which can cause the conception shock, suppressing the engram of the prematernal oceanos.

Out of the further analysis two dreams have to be mentioned:

Dream X: I only see a priest, fully dressed up with his mitre on his head. He lies flat on the ground and is dead.

Associations: the grandfather is dead. But still I go on feeling that the forbiddding, demon-God is somewhere in me.

Shortly after this dream the next step was taken in his process of conceptional individuation:

Dream XI: I am in Switzerland with a Swiss virgin. We are standing at the edge of an extensive green meadow. She says: "Here, it is neutral". But I think: "If I should enter this meadow, I should be attacked from all sides". Then I am in a castle. A certain man is willing to show me something. It appears to be a procession of women dressed in clothes of former fashions: one dressed as in 1600, one as in 1700 and one as in 1800. The dress of the last one is a bit erotic, showing some breast. I speak with her, asking whether she is still conscious of times around 1800. She answers in the affirmative.

Associations: I don't think the dangers in the green meadow refer to spermia, attacking the ovum. I think this meadow represents a maidenly oceanic experiencing. There must be another danger from the maternal side. The castle seems to me something that defies the ages, stable, and the procession of women refers to what you call the prematernal aspects. The danger in the meadow must refer to my mother's hatred against her mother. The fact of the different ages of the dresses seems to me to show that those prematernal aspects in my mother have a long history, I think of Victorian.

Commentaries: The analyst was surprised by these associations. In reality the analysis of this dream took several weeks. The analyst was the more surprised by these associations as they brought to light the other part of his mother's oedipus-, or electra-complex: the hatred against her mother and the admiration for her father in a de sexualized way, This hatred seems to me a kind of collective hatred against being a woman, the collective character being expressed by the procession of women from several centuries. This electra-complex of his mother resulted in her marriage with a husband whom she could dominate. As to the stability of the castle it seem to me to be a symbol of a strong narcissistic structure.

To be concluded

II

Faulty Judgment and the Subversion of Humanism

Henry Winthrop

1. The Context of Judgment as a Block to Understanding

In our judgments of other persons we tend to operate in terms of ingrained social habits. Rare, indeed, is the person who has designed a varying and flexible, *individuated* framework for judging the qualities and characters of other persons. Rarer still is the person who is sufficiently sensitive to put strenuous effort into trying to perceive the meanings and the causes of the actions of other individuals. Rarest of all are those persons who attempt to reach decisions that will be optimally appropriate for meeting the hidden needs of those who are being judged. The social habits of judgment to which we have been conditioned are quite often obtuse, frequently tyrannical and destructive as Fromm (*The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*) has shown, and on numerous occasions they are quite wide of the mark. Similar limitations and weaknesses occur in our judgments of many events and situations. But because we are usually distanced in space and time from events and too often obstructed, through insufficient information, from a real comprehension of situations in which we find ourselves immersed, we hesitate more to make judgments in these contexts than in the matter of judgments in interpersonal relations.

Our batting average is low in our judgments of others because of our failure to resort to certain types of innovative, exploratory postures. It is equally low in our judgment of events and situations because we are frequently the victims of obstructed feedback, as Garcia (*The Moral Society*) emphasizes. This applies in particular to administrators and bureaucrats who, in effect, *deprive themselves of due process.* This they can do by refusing to let themselves become familiar with *easily obtainable facts* that might change their administrative ideologies, biases or erroneous frame-works for decision-making. This attitude is an obtuse equivalent of "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil." Such administrators and bureaucrats might as well put a sign above their office doors, which reads "Please don't confuse me with the facts. I've already made up my mind." Obstructed feedback not only affects such decision-makers; it also affects the underlings who are forced to operate and make decisions in the occupational, social, economic or political context fashioned by the disorganization, bureaupathoses and social entropy created by such administrators. We can therefore place a partial but heavy blame on organizational malstructure and administrative obtuseness when we make misjudgments of events and situations in organizational settings.

But when it comes to our misjudgments of persons *with whom we do have direct contact*, often very frequently, we usually have ourselves chiefly to blame. Our misjudgments are then related to inappropriate postures we take and sins of commission and omission in which we blithely and freely engage. What, then, are some of these mistaken postures and misbehaviors ?

2. Modes in Which our Misjudgments May Occur

We judge people, of course, either (1) in terms of what we have observed of their behavior, (2) our interpretations of the behavior observed, (3) what we have heard about the behavior, qualities or character of the person being judged, or (4) the labels other have attached to him or her or the interpretations others have made of his or her behavior. Let us say something about some of these ways of judging.

The first question that arises in our methods of judgment is "Just what has A, in fact, done"? After all we have only "observed" A's behavior. Its social significance will lie in the purpose A had in mind in doing what he, in fact, did, and in the interpretation he makes retroactively—mistaken or accurate—of his own behavior. The significance of his actions will also lie in part in the interpretations made by others, of A's behavior, when these interpretations have reached us and where we were unable or unwilling to close our ears. In fact, we may have been enthusiastically "all ears" in this connection. But above all, the judgment as to the meaning of A's behavior will come *chiefly from our own interpretation or misinterpretation of that behavior.*

From this mix of considerations a judgment on A will emerge. This judgment, however, may fail to distinguish between A's *manifest* behavior and its *latent* meaning. We shall never, of course, discover that latent meaning unless we communicate with A and try to ascertain, as diplomatically as possible, why A did what he did, that is, what was the meaning of his own behavior in his own eyes. We cannot do this if A refuses to discuss the matter. But if he is more than willing and we do not engage him in conversation, then it is *we* who are unwilling to discuss the matter. If we talk with A we must be ready, if justified, to dissolve the cognitive framework within which we previously interpreted his behavior. In short, we must be ready to dissolve the interpretation we have attached to that behavior, if our previous interpretation appears to have been mistaken.

But it is equally important that we achieve some understanding of how A views his own behavior, of A's motivational dynamics and of A's self-deceptions, where an accumulation of evidence warrants our conviction that A is self-deceived as to the reasons for his own behavior. Nor are these the only considerations with which the meaning of A's behavior must be approached. Once we are sure we have understood the grounds for A's behavior, we still have to ask ourselves what meanings A's behavior — as well as the grounds for that behavior — have *for us*. Obviously if Y and Z are clear on these matters but Y and Z operate from different value-systems and different, cognitive frameworks, we shall derive different meanings for A's behavior, depending upon whether we are talking to Y or Z. Two different judgments about the grounds for A's behavior will, in general, emerge, depending upon whether we are talking to Y or Z. In this sense, judgments will be pluralistic and this judgemental pluralism will point to the fact that often there will be no such thing as a "correct interpretation" of what A's behavior should mean for others.

Finally, where we find that Y and Z (and possibly others) impose different meanings on the behavior of A, we must certainly take this pluralism in interpretation into account, if we hope to approximate the definitively accurate interpretation of A's behavior. We face the *task of coordinating* the rich plenum of other people's interpretations or misinterpretations of A's behavior, if we expect to wind up with a judgmental resting point of some sort. This will have to be true unless, of course, we choose instead to play God and — lacking patience or the judicial temperament for fair play—we single out either our own interpretation or one of the received interpretations, as the definitively, correct interpretation.

But even if we apply ourselves to the task of coordination, we shall find that it ptesents fresh difficulties. An eclectic coordination manages to assemble the different interpretations other make of A's behavior and knit them into a reasonable combination in which each received interpretation is an aspect of the total pattern of truth. Such a coordination rests on the assumption that many heads and many judgments are likely to be better than one. But an effort at synthesis that brings together interpretations that are, in some sense, incompatible with one another or where any single, received interpretations in incompatible with some—not all—of the other received interpretations, is not a *coordination at all*. This is *syncretism* at its psychological and judgmental worst. And it is only the synthesizing agent who must be held responsible for the quality of the total pattern that has been judgmentally fabricated. It is a poor pattern, that is, a syncretic one, we have then given birth to a massive and sophisticated *misjudgment* whose public impact on A may leave him worse off than before, insofar as A desires that public understanding of his behavioral motivations be accurate, understood and, hopefully, capable of receiving social approval.

A further difficulty arises in the effort to understand how A sees or interprets his own activity. Assuming that A has welcomed our effort to communicate with him and also welcomes the diplomatic probes by which we have tried to explore the grounds of his behavior, as A, himself, sees that behavior, there is still an aspect to our probing that must not be neglected. It involves many communicants in the total situation involving the interpretation of A's behavior. It is up to the inquirer—the temporary proxy, as it were, of the psychiatric viewpoint—to *evaluate* A's explanations of his own behavior, both with respect to its breadth as its depth. It is equally obligatory that we evaluate other people's interpretations of that same behavior. And, finally, it is equally obligatory that we submit *our own evaluations* to introspection because we, too, as the aware, analyzing and evaluating agent, are capable of all the psychoanalytic, defense mechanisms that experience has taught us other people dredge up in order to justify their behaviors and their judgments. These are the rationalizations they employ to achieve intellectual and judgmental resting points in the effort to terminate their self-problings. If we are unprepared to engage in this massive, multidimensional process of evaluation and analysis, if we seek to achieve a premature foreclosure on the process of examining *all* the grounds different judges give for the interpretations they make of A's behavior, then we are electing to obstruct the process of psychological feedback. This process of feedback is basic to approximating accuracy of social judgment. If such blocking of feedback is substantial, then the exploratory activity we have pursued will become a matter of love's labor lost.

Finally, since our own judgments of all received interpretation, including our own, will reflect differences in values held by individuals, we must be aware of the role played by such variation in valueou looks. But this awareness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for completing the activities incidental to making a final judgment of the meaning of A's behavior. We must also ourselves how open we are *to tolerating* the many different dimensions of value that other interpreters have brought into play. De we look with approval upon the existence of value multidimensionality among those who judge other people's behavior? Or are we somewhat rigid and inclined to think that other judges are confused with respect to the exigencies demanded by the process of evaluation? Do we tend to lapse into the smug conviction that our own framework of evaluation should be taken more seriously than the value-frameworks within which other judges operate, who are less sophisticated with respect to both the logical and the psychological requirements of the process of evaluation? Do we hold that their lower level of sophistication denatures the appropriateness of the value-outlooks from which they have chosen to make their interpretations?

All of the preceding considerations affect human judgment -- of individuals, of events and of situations. We have chosen to illustrate the complexity of the judgmental process by singling out the context in which individual and social judgments are made of the individual behavior of the other. But a quite analogous set of considerations would apply to the judgmental context of *events* and *situations*. The important point to focus upon here is that out of this judgmental context, out of this plurality of interpretations and out of this value-manifold, emerges the notions of ethics and morality that preoccupy modern men.

Judgments short of these in-depth processes will be called ethical and moral by most men. But only *approximations* to the extensively constructed operations we have described here can yield an authentic ethics and morality. rooted deeply in, and spread widely over, the human condition. Other processes presumed to reflect ethical and moral judgment, often tend to be masquerades and charades of the processes that are really required for the careful and substantive judgments of human behavior, events and situations. Such other processes are often hollow shells of the real thing, the products of peace-time. social conditioning and brain-washing, as it were. Not many of us are given to engaging in the judgmental activities we have described.

It is for these reasons that an authentic ethic and morality is most unlikely to come from, or be appreciated by, mass-man. A similar assertion can be made for thousands of power-seekers and power wielders who are all choked up with detestable forms of *hubris*. The judgmental processes I have described are what might be called the "technology of *awareness*" and the activities that create "awareness," as described by Garcia. are not characteristic of most human beings Today, in decadent societies throughout the world. awareness is increasingly being eschewed. In this sense morality is on the decline everywhere and there is an avalanche of literature that bears testimony to this unpleasant fact. The long and short of our theme is, then, that moral behavior is not to be expected from most men who, either, as Thoreau put it, "lead lives of quiet desperation" or as Garcia puts it, pursue the Game of Pleasure which decreases awareness, instead of the Game of Life which increases it. The achievement of a felt and viable human morality will, I am afraid, be a long time in coming.

3. The Secularization of Misjudgment

In a sense modern society has secularized the means for creating erroneous bases for others to make poor judgments. One has only to remember the many professions that are deliberately devoted to creating poor judgment. We have the image merchants who are devoted to packaging appealing—though false and dishonest—images of candidates who are running for office. More often, of course, they are packaging a new face, figure and personality for TV or for the stage and screen. Image-merchandising is enhanced mightily by the camera—whether on TV or on a Hollywood stage set. The camera goes out of its way to create a phony personality, a physical but ersatz attractiveness or appeal, or a stature or shape that one does not have. The histrionic arts supplement illusion with a conversational style created wholly offstage, via clever coaching techniques, or by an acting method of some sort that is regarded as having a sure-fire touch for impressing and captivating the groundlings, or by attractive speech patterns and diction that are the product of the professional's touch. The clothes stylist adds his skills to the preceding ingredients. When all is over, the figure being merchandised can hardly recognize himself or herself. In the contest between appearance and reality in the modern world, almost always appearance wins. All this superficiality, this shallowness, this infatuation with the patina of personalities, situations and things, is precisely what Sorokin (*The Crisis of Our Age*) meant when he described contemporary, Western Culture as hopelessly "sensate."

The Italian playwright, Pirandello, was profoundly aware that the average. human being not only shows a proclivity for poor judgment but, what is worse is delighted when you provide him with an excuse for displaying judgment gone astray. The recognition of human fallibility in judgment runs as a *leit-motif* through such famous, Pirandellian dramas as *Right You Are If You Think You Are* (*Ragione Voi Avete Se Voi Ci Pensate*) and *As You Desire Me* (*Come Voi Mi Desiderate*). When it comes to pretension and manner in political leadership, Machiavelli's *The Prince* showed an early recognition of the depth of poor judgment in the general populace and outlined some of the means for exploiting it. In our modern world with its rich variety of technologies available for the creation of illusion and misjudgment, we have more sophisticated means for politically misleading the populace, as we can see from Theodore H. White's volumes on *The Making of The President* (1968 and 1972). Politics certainly provides fertile ground for the sowing of illusion and the forced feeding of the population with respect to the means for misjudgment. Parades, conventions, rallies, interviews, ceremonies, panels, structured debates—all are part of the fare used to reduce social perception and accuracy of judgment to a minimum.

Our judgement is clearly misled with respect to persons through modern advertising. It is also easily misled with respect to things. We have convinced 30 million TV viewers that we can get health out of a medicine bottle, facial beauty from a soap or cream, glorious tresses from a spray, femininity and charm from a diaphanous nightgown, beautiful breasts from the right, form fitting brassiere or a beautiful shape *a tergo* from the right type of panties, and so on and so forth. All you need to do is to associate a pretty girl with the product you are trying to sell. A pretty face and a *svelte* figure seem to narcotize judgment in both sexes. Sometimes I think that it would be possible to persuade millions of viewers to kill themselves, merely by showing a pretty girl sucking a popsicle made of potassium cyanide and exclaiming while doing so "Yum ! Yum ! A cyanide popsicle just takes me out of this world." This at least would certainly be truth in advertising.

Image merchants belong to a profession whose members are paid to *create mis judgments* for others They are not, however, paid to be victims of their own artifices. In contrast, many psychiatrists and clinical psychologists — not all, to be sure — are paid *to make misjudgments* by which they, themselves, are often deceived, in addition to patients and colleagues. With the use of an obfuscating nomenclature, sloppy thinking, a penchant for categorizing and a drive to play God to a circumscribed clientele, psychiatrists and clinical psychologists can deliver misjudgments at about the fastest clip ever recorded historically. They are the great rubricizers of the twentieth century. often using these rubrics to put down colleagues and decrease respect for them — a phenomenon that has been recorded by many writers.

In the historical past a man might have been shunned if he was called a Waldensian or Albigensian heretic. Today he is shunned if he is called psychotic, schizophrenic , paranoid, psychopathic or any one of a dozen other pejorative labels. Those who employ these labels as well as those take them seriously are often substituting psychological red herrings for judgment. For a judgment of other persons to even begin to approximate accuracy, painstaking work has to go into them. A few hours contact with a patient or a colleague, in a highly limited environment, and where only the shallowest of relationships have been formed, is hardly propitious for authentic understanding and perceptive judgment.

There is often little recognition of the patient's or colleague's historical life-situation and often little awareness of how much the psychotherapist in a work setting — who commands administrative advantages that can be exercised punitively, if he is so inclined—can contribute to unacceptable behavior in others. He can contribute to another's unwillingness to relate to him by his own behavior, denseness, lack of imagination and humanity, as well as by his own critical and shallow rubricizing. Above all, he can make a damn nuisance or a damn fool of himself by a professional *hubris* which, at bottom, assumes a stance that belies the possibility of personal fallibility in judgment.

I have seen clinical psychologists exercise the most woeful misjudgment and after a 20 minute interview label a patient with meaningless phrases to indicate that the patient was seriously ill, mentally or emotionally. The great and powerful Russian novelists sometimes spent years trying to capture the flavor of a central character and even after a novel had achieved success and been internationally acclaimed, they were often not quite sure whether they had successfully understood the central character in question. But a young, clinical psychologist on his first job can pinpoint the full, psychic richness of a patient or colleague after 20 minutes. The absurdity of misjudgment to which these off the cuff, clinical follies can lead was best illustrated, I believe, by one cheerful clinician I knew who had been assigned the task of interviewing a sample of institutional inmates in one particular building and assessing their general psychological condition. Being relatively new to his job and being somewhat unfamiliar with the population assigned to the different buildings of the institution in question, he wandered into the wrong building rather than the one to which he had been assigned. Determined to show what a fine, professional job he could do, he selected a small sample of the residents in the building and conscientiously devoted considerable time to the interview he gave to each. He prepared a typewritten report on each of the residents he had interviewed.

The clinicians at this particular institution met once a week to read their reports to one another and to comment on each interviewee's case. This particular clinician had apparently tried to do a professional, spit-and polish job on each of his interviewees. He proudly droned on as he read each of his reports. In report after report he saw in each patient a case of "debilitated ego" with "passive-aggressive trends". Each report that he finished had the debilitation becoming more and more severe. Unfortunately for him these "debilitated egos" that he was discovering were all *institutional idiots*. He had, you see, wandered into the wrong building. Before he was finished with his reports, the staff supervisor had decided that he, too, was an idiot, albeit not an institutional one. This clinician, a student of Freud's, had memorized the Freudian schemas concerning id, ego, and superego, and having no contextual reference, placed no restrictions on his application of these concepts. However, few of us expect idiots to develop egos or anything else in the context of their vegetative and institutional existence.

The life-history and situational factors that are often ignored in clinical labelomania and clinical judgment have been dealt with extensively by a number of psychiatrists. One of the best treatments of the subject has been produced by Szasz (*Ideology and Insanity*).

The long and short of psychiatry and clinical psychology is that they are oversold professions in which some practitioners are paid to make misjudgments of people — misjudgments that can often be harmful. More modesty and more restraint could, perhaps, tone down some of the free-wheeling misjudgments made by practitioners in the healing professions. Often these misjudgments and the categories of labeling employed on patients or colleagues are an absurd form of modern shamanism, that has become highly respectable.

4. Some Consequences of Misjudgment and Mislabeling

Many contemporary writers have remarked upon such phenomena as the following: (1) the decline of social responsibility, (2) the increasing, social, acceptability of shared brainwashing, (3) the rise of Hobbesian types of immorality in the modern world, (4) the substitution of rumor, gossip and indictment for facts and logic with respect to the factuality and quality of the behavior of others, (5) the marked, growing indifference to the need for due process in human relations, administrative decision-making and institutional procedures, and many other types of contemporary, moral decline, too numerous to mention here. All of these growing, social deficiencies are, at bottom, forms of moral decadence that are among the many factors that now help to support our misjudgments of persons, places and things.

When people *accept and pass on* the characterizations of individuals made by others, without checking into the justification and accuracy of the characterizations made, this is a form of social irresponsibility. It can also be an unintelligent way of accumulating the misjudgments of others. This is doubly the case, when those who pass on unchecked gossip and rumor are, in effect, passing on defamatory characterizations that are almost certain to prove socially or occupationally injurious. Likewise, accepting legend and myth with respect to people, events, situations, etc—even when these legends and myths can be checked out with ease—is to subscribe to a socially approved form of brainwashing. Such subscription seems inevitably to increase. the more complex the social setting which is to be checked, the more time one would have to spend investigating the myths and legends to which one is exposed, and the more difficult and painstaking are the processes involved in exploring for the correctness or inaccuracy of the legend or myth in question.

A few examples of the absurd and injurious misjudgments that can arise when people allow themselves to be easily brainwashed by accepting unchecked characterizations, are in order. I am here referring to misjudgments that are passed on after being accepted, so that they may subsequently prove to be damaging. The following examples immediately come to mind.

I have heard both myself and others refered to by different individuals, as radical, liberal, conservative and reactionary. *All* these silly but potentially damaging labels were thoughtlessly applied to each one of us. with no effort to become familiar with the values of those who were so labeled. I have witnessed postures taken towards those who were so indicted, that were solely and strictly a function of these labels. I have seen shallow individuals, with little or nothing on the ball—whose judgements were wooden extensions of a politically oriented, self-serving group—refer to people who were intellectually barren and without achievement, as "distinguished scholars". No effort was made to see what their intellectual or professional achievements were. I have heard the same or similar individuals refer to nationally and internationally known scholars as "stupid, incompetent, ignorant and uninformed."

I have had to listen with irritation. while some young, academic fool referred to such figures as Keynes, Galbraith, Tinbergen, Samuelson, etc, as economically confused. The individual who was badmouthing these luminaries was an ignoramus who, incidentally, had never read a chapter on economics in his entire life. I have had to listen, flabbergasted, as a young and snotty, experimental psychologist referred to Abraham Maslow as an "asshole". And I have been helplessly mortified while a young, logical positivist referred to Reinhold Niebuhr as an addle-pated and obfuscated jackass. Incidentally, he also had never read anything by Niebuhr. *Sic transit gloria mundi* ! What are we to think of the general quality of judgment that can be exercised by such characters ? What are we to think of the quality of the processes by which they arrived at these judgments ?

Mislabeling and misjudging are currently on the increase. Only recently I have been staggered over the response to the turndown of the ERA in my home state of Florida One of my students referred to the state legislators who voted in the negative as "barbarians" and passionately advocated that their careers be destroyed. When asked why, she asserted most uncritically and immorally that "The end justified the means." The end, of course, was explicit constitutional assertion of equality for women. I, myself, had wished to see the ERA pass in Florida. But clearly there are some young women who—when full equality is reached—are ready to live politically by the conviction that the end justifies the means. I can well imagine the social, economic and political horrors that these young women would be likely to help usher into being, were they ever to possess untrammeled, political power. Historically men have often abused freedom shortly after receiving it, by visiting evil on others less free. Apparently some young women are anxious to do likewise.

By now the public has learned of the woman legislator in Florida who referred to at least one legislator who voted against ERA as "a son of a bitch." This is an outrage. I am opposed to almost all the arguments used against ERA but I am equally opposed to dealing with individual members of a legislative, opposition bloc, by the use of hostile epithets and characterizations of the sort I have just mentioned. I am even more strongly opposed to the poor, judgmental processes by which such epithets are generated. I am opposed to such epithets because of their irrational, ideological roots. They imply that all those who are pro ERA are the "good guys and gals" and all those who are anti-ERA are "bums and villains." Those who engage in such epithets ignore the fact that one can *honestly* — although possibly *mistakenly* — be against ERA. The type of black-and white judgment evidenced in the two examples I have just furnished, spring in substantial measure, I believe, no only from the exercise of questionable modes of judgments but also, in part, from the substitution of pejorative labels for efforts at fact-finding and accurate description.

The Florida state legislator who referred to another state legislator who had voted against the passage of the ERA, as a "son of a bitch," is, in general, harming the movement for women's equality and women's rights and, at the same time, is creating doubts about the fairness of feminine leadership in the grueling fight for equal rights. It is such unfairness and extremism that is contributing to the declining popularity of the women's movement — a declining popularity that has been emphasized and catalogued by Veronica Geng. ("Requiem for the Women's Movement," *Harper's*, November, 1976), a friendly critic.

Increasingly we are witnessing many evidences of moral decadence in contemporary society. Unfortunately, many of these forms of decadence are being generated by pathological and immature forms of judgment. In particular, one of the factors involved is an utter unwillingness to make inquiries before characterizing persons, places and situations. This gut-like unwillingness to make proper enquiry is one of the major forms of pathology of judgment in the modern world. At the same time it is a form of social irresponsibility. If it continues, no good can come out of it.

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III

Saiva Philosophy: An Introduction

Bansidhar Biswal

Śaiva philosophy has been systematised, on the basis of older Upanisads, in the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad for the first time prior to Christian era. During Christian era, it has given rise to Pāśupata, Pratyabhijnā, Raseśvara, Siddhānta maintaining a little variation in each. Really Raseśvaravāda, though simple in character, is the true representation of Śiva's philosophy of life and it is more antiquarian.

Certainly, the great national leader has a philosophy for the nation. We have seen that his figurine in the Indus valley was the product of his desire. His being multi-frons in the Gupta age indicates a clear departure of medieval philosophy from Raseśvaravāda. His multi-frons signify the national character of becoming aimless and so, he was kept aside due to superimposition of heterogenous ways of life. His way of life had made him endowed with seven musical notes— 'saptasamapagitam tvam' and his people (gaṇas) were there to play on lute and flute as well as the drum and cymbals in most of the occasions. The Śitarudrīya itself conveys his sense of aesthetic pleasure with the words, 'svanyāya', 'pratiśravāya', dundubhyāya, and āhananyāya'.[1] So he was (Śabdabrahma). It was not confined within Śiva, it was for all saivites. After Pāṇini and Soma-deva, the followers came in succession and have propounded his mission taking share with Pāṇini and Somadeva. They rained commentaries giving rise to heterodox and orthodox systems-Pāśupata, Śaiva Siddhānta and Pratyabhinjā. So these commentaries which are otherwise called philosophies put the gaṇas en-masse in cross-roads of controversies. Those gaṇas were singing and dancing together and were feeling united with the attraction of the national anthem— "Mātābhūmih putroham pṛthivyān", they became motivated with selfish ends and each one became distinct. The sad

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1 Satarudriya published by Abhinava Publication, 1976, p. 5.

position of life philosophy has crossed the barriers of seas and mountains and echoed — "when rock and hill

> The woods, and distant skiddaw's lofty height
> Were bronzed with deepest radiance, stood alone
> Beneath the sky, as if I had been born
> On Indian plains, and from my mother's hut
> Had run abroad in Wantonness.[2]

This failure of Indian philosophical tenets in general was realised by Srikrishna Mishra, a dramatist in Sanskrit, of eleventh Century A. D. He reconciled the controversies arise out of affection, devotion, knowledge, conscience etc., and made self-knowledge to be the greatest virtue (Prabodha Chandrodaya). This was also followed by Vijnanavikshu and S. Radhakrishnan. S. Radhakrishnan says that "if the philosophy of man is, at present, to know himself and to further the universal life, of which each individual is an integral part, this is to be seen in the figurine of a great Yogi, known as Proto-Śiva It is easily understood from the sitting condition of the Yogi that he had a sermon to the nation— "perfection can be achieved only through self-conquest, through courage and austerity, through unity and brotherhood in life" [3]

ATTACHMENT

For self-knowledge Śaiva philosophy is typical for it presses upon attachment for detachment while the Vedanta admits it in a round about way. Very popular term 'neti' or negation came from its own account. not for affirmation of superior genee or for affirmation of God's immensity of being as S. Radhakrishnan says.[4] The dialogues between Āruni and Śvetaketu (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Ch. VI) and Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi (Bṛhadāranyak Upanisad, Ch.II) speak high of leaving the world. It happened so as they were inured to the situation created by the indegenes. Really, to Yajnavalkya detachment was for upholding the spirit which brings wisdom and establishes harmony with the environment. To Aruni the whole world was reality. It was real being a form and an expression of the ultimate. To regard the world as ultimately real is delusion. It is same as 'attachment for detachment'. Detachment is purely unflowering The Vedic poets spoke of attachment, but they spoke for their selfish ends. They invoked gods for worldly happiness at at the cost of enemies. The Upaniṣadic poets depart from them due to the fact that they were infulenced and were adhered to non aryan tradition. On the other hand, their suffering was so much drab, irritating and continuous that they could not hope to save themselves if they cling to Vedic way of life. So they raised their suffering to a leval of mortification of body in the non aryan way. In the end it was their declaration, as Nirod C. Choudhury says— "remain corruptible and corrupt flesh or become incorruptible and incorrupt stone".[5] Of course, both the ends were cruel, one was cruelty of degradation and the other cruelty of enoblement. Śiva Indra and Kesins were of later order. Their activities echoed in the Indus valley, Rigveda, Yajurveda and Atharva veda that "The world is my country, to do good is my religion, which comes out of delusion. The declaration of the Upaniṣadic poets results in second birth.

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[2] The Prelude — Words worth published by AARTI Book Centre, '1973. p. 107.

[3] Eastern Religions and Western Thought 1975. p. 36.

[4] Ibid. p. 192.

SECOND BIRTH

Yājnavalky says to Gargi that a man who departs this world without knowing his imperishable self is a vile. (Bṛ. U. iii. 8. 10). This imperishable self is above the apparent self. The knowledge about this self is possible in the present life or life after death is debatable in different philosophies which we have said puzzles. The argumentation simply has shattered the spirit of belief in God. What we do not feel or see in life and get result there from we keep ourselves aside. In this respect Raseśvaravāda keeps itself higher than other philosophies. The doctrine of 'Rasa', an aesthetic feeling for the spiritual persons and 'Rasa', a healing element for the common people and also for the spiritual persons are needed. The second birth or jivanmukti in Raseśvaravāda corresponds to Bṛhadāranyak Upaniṣad IV.4.23 and Taittirīya Upaniṣad and it differs from six main philosophies "ṣad darśanepi muktistu darśitā pindapātena"[6]. The Raseśvara vāda differs from Paśupata and Pratyabhijnā philosophies to a greater extent and from Śaiva siddhanta to a little. In Pasupata and Pratyabhijnā systems the individual loses his entity and becomes one with the self. In Śaiva Siddhānt the individual enjoys God or tastes sugar. Like siddhantic idea, Rasa itself is a blissful state which waits for enjoyment. Besides, Somadeva directs for the use of mercury, which is secondary thing for second birth, the first being austerity.[7] The Taittirīya Upanisad mentions that the liberated soul feels his oneness with God, but not absorbed in him. By that the soul becomes—"Rasa vai sah' (ii.7.1). Śamkar in course of interpretation of 'Tattvamasi' pressed upon erradication of avidyā which results in second birth.[8] But his idea of jivanmukti is abated by Mānickavachakar as follows :—

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[5] Continent of Circe p. 172.

[6] Sarva darsana Sangraha — Vidyabhavan Sanskrit Granthamata No. 113. p. 377.

[7] Ibid. p. 389.

[8] Ibid. p. 886.

"Thyself is what Thou hast given : My self is what Thou hast got;
Who is the cleverer of the two ? O Śankar do speak.
The Rapture-bliss that knows no end I have well gained from Thee !
Is there e'en a single thing that Thou hast got from me ?
(Tiru va chakam —393 stanza)

In Śamkar's opinion soul becomes God when he knows the self. Somadeva says that mercury, a material object prepared for use as drug can bring health and mind to a state of knowing Brahma. So in the matter of knowing the self Rasesvara vāda for its two-fold use is more practical rather than theoretical.

SELF VERSUS ADVAIT

The self-knowledge brings jivanmukti in the present life of individual. The term self has been interpreted variously as to 'what does it mean'. It connotes perishable as well as imperishable energy of the soul. Each system of philosophy, though based on tradition, intends for some speculative life and ends in realisation of self which is otherwise told soul, ultimate Truth, Paramśiva, and so on. Such realisation of self of any one does not bring social or national well-being The intellectual bargaining of philosophers could not go beyond the proximity of make-believe. The honest adherants are worsted in intellectual combats. Madhavācārya in his Sarvadarśana Sangraha has provided a list of jivanmuktas-Maheśa Sukrāchārya, Vālakhilya, Vyāli, Kapāli, Kandalāyana, Somesvara, Govinda bhāgavata padācārya, Carvāti etc., but we do not know how do they serve the purpose of our national character or national well being. The fore-runners of the vedanta has simplified the term as physical body, mind, individual self, food, the absolute self or the universal self etc. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII. 7-12) mentions that the self is the supreme light by which we hear and see; think and meditate. S Radhakrishnan summerising the statements given in the Vedānta asserts that the self is "the primal spirit, pure awareness, distinct from the bodily states and mental happenings. By a process of analysis, the self can be discriminated from the not-self. The self is assumed to be that which remains identical in the varied experiences of life".[9] The idea of supreme light and primal spirit is one conceptual thing which has a place in the imagination only. This imaginary thing was felt by the spiritual leaders as the commentators or disciples say. But the material world is least concerned to them with the exception of Śiva, Indra, Bhava and Yājnavalkya. They were jivanmuktas and were concerned to the society at large. Like them, Einstein, Karl Marx and Mahātmā Gāndhi were no less jivanmuktas. Jivanmuktas are in the spiritual world and also in the material world. Combining the two, look to a definition of the self given in the Praśnopaniṣad which is to be experienced by all in every walk of life. "hṛdi hyeṣa ātmā, atraitadekaśatam nādīnam tā ām śatam śatamekaikasyām dvāsaptatirdvāsaptatih prati śākhārādi sahasrāṇi bhavantyasu anascarati" (iii. 6). It means the life principle (prāṇa) which is often associated with air. It is physical air and also, the principle which produces action upto the fullness of the individual. This principle is no other than mind. So the air and the mind form the core of the self which had been attained to by austerity and thereby, action upto the fullness of life of individual was produced. The action was varied according to the personality. It is due to the fact that the self has relation with the world nature, and mind is the link between the two. The mind also acts on body and body on mind. So Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII. 7.1 and Bṛhadāranyak Upaniṣad IV. 12 mentions that food, water etc. constitute prāṇa. It would be seen that Ātman, Brahman, and Prāṇa are one and the same which has a place within the individual soul.

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[9] Eastern Religions and Western Thought. 1977. p. 122.

In the above frame-work of self we can assume that the self is subject to law of evolution. It contrasts to the general principle that the living souls having existence are born again and again till immortality is achieved through extreme penance. Here immortality may mean not to born. Primitives had idea of man to born again after death and so they give ancestor's names to their off springs. We have seen that Yājnavalkya had re-oriented the primitive and contemporary idea of transmigration. The immortality based on penance does mean second birth in present life and so also, penance does mean meditation on prāṇa, social work or any aspect of life-science. That is the reason the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa mentions "ātma vai mano hrdayam prāṇah" (S. B. 3. 8. 3. 8). Again the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa clarifies prāṇa that Gotama Rahugana had known a sacrifice called Mitrāvinda. He who attains this sacrifice conquers the cycle of birth and rebirth. Such a person performing the sacrifice in Agni attains the special quality of being the manifestation of Prajāpati and he never dies (S. B. 10.1.4.14) Here Prajāpati, Prāṇa, self—all do not mean an abstraction, certainly it has an existence. The seers of the Brāhmaṇas, the Āranyakas and the Upaniṣadas were not supposed to run after an abstraction which was called ultimate truth, Prāṇa, Self and so on. The age of Yājnavalkya, Mahidāsa Aitareya and others were in the age of Renaissance in Indian Culture and Civilisation. Any fiction or airy things had no worth then. They are supposed to award a position of fantum to perceptible and experiencing things for more localisation on the line of tribal behavior. It is known that Paila was the teacher of Yājnavalkya and was the disciple of Veda Vyāsa who had compos d the Mahābhārata. Following them Indra, Yāska, Pānini, Pingala and meny others had heightened metrical science and phonology to an unexpected level. These were social necessities. How it is that a set of thinkers were only indulged themselves in tracing out the Ultimate Truth which is one and only one, and also the creating agency. This was the departure from preceding idea of supreme god in tribal society. In making visible supreme god invisible, no social purpose was to meet with. It is likely that the enlightened social thinkers were confined to prāṇa and others were used as epithets of prāṇa. The prāṇa in the Āranyakas is raised and also, is determined as the supreme spirit in the light of tribal supreme God, Citing—"apaśyam gopāmanipadya mānamiti. Prāṇo vaigopah" (Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa 7. 37. 2). The prāṇa is equated with gopa. It radiates rays and it helps prajā to settle either forward and retrograde. It is omnipresent in the three lokas. The prāna is enwrapped in its māyā or supernatural power and it is known to the learned. The learned who is compared to Kavi infuses the secret to the people. (J.U.B. 3.35.6)

This above position of prāṇa which stands for Ultimate Truth or Advait comes from nutrition and it is a substance belonging to the soul. It is the food of developing human consciousness. Occasionally, it is described to be composed of fine stuff and is a material thing. But it is not all about prāṇa. The principle of Parama Śiva and Śiva underlies in the concept of prāṇa being Ultimate Truth. In Indian philosophy the Ultimate Truth is often said One which manifests the world. This One can be understood only as a conceptual interpretation of the experience of meditation. The experience in meditation of stillness is the experience of self. It can not be the whole which consists of the world. In case of manifestation, it is subject to lose his wholeness. It is like an atom. The atom is not a system of nucleus and electrons; nucleus and electrons are discovered when atom is destroyed. In partition, the atom loses its wholeness.[10] The quantum idea of atomic system was used by Einstein in accounting for some of the experimental observation on the photoelectric effect and he established dual character of electromagnetic radiation, one is particle like and the other wave like. The Uncertainty principle postulates that these are pairs of variables conjugate to each other. The conjugation is such that to localise one, we have to lose all knowledge of the corresponding component of its position at a given time.[11] These varibles in the atomic system are Śiva and Sakti in the Saiva system which constitute the conception of Paramaśiva. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad considers them as Pathi, Paśu and Pāśa; God, soul and matter; the tree and two birds, and tree, Īśa and Aniśā (IV 6.7). On the tree Aniśā sits grieving for his own imporence. But when he sees Īśa looking at him he knows his power and his grief passes away. He became alert of his own power. Here tree represents the Ultimate Truth which has a existance. This has been clarified in the Śvetāśvatara (4.5) as "ajāmekam lohita śukla kṛṣṇam vahnih prajāh sṛjyamānām svarūpah". R. G. Read translates the hymn as follows :—

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[10] Kundalini — Gopikrishna —1978. p. 44.

[11] Quantum Mechanics by L. I. Schiff — 3rd Edition. p. 3-7.

"Aye, that one unborn (aja-soul) sleeps in the arms of one unborn (nature. pradhāna) enjoying (her of nature) who brings forth multitudinous progeny like herself. But when her charms have been enjoyed he (soul) quits her side, the unborn other, Anyata (Lord).[12] Yājñavalkya the authority, of vedic conception of One says that "He who dwells in (Vayu and Vijnāna) Ātmā and different from Ātmā whom Ātmā does not know, whose body the Ātmā is and who rules Ātmā within, He is thy Ātmā, the ruler within, the immortal. (Br. Upanisad-iii 7.7 & iii. 7.22). Here he establishes a position of Ātmā with soul which is not different. It is same as Anyat in the Śvetāśvatara. The Satapatha Brahmana stresses much upon to variables "Sarve ha vā ete svapnato pakrāmanti prāṇa eva na. taire vaitat suptvā punah samga chate (SB.3.2.2.23). This also refers to 'tatra jāgṛo asvapnajau satra sajau ca devau (Yaju 4 55). As Satya Shrava interpretes these hymns, 'when all the senses are asleep only prāṇa and apāna, the two devas, are awake.[13] These two devas constitute the Vital Air or prāṇa in general which stands for ultimate Truth. This prāṇa corresponds to gopa in Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brahmana. The prāṇa, the tree, the Anyata in the sense of Ultimate Truth have existence and so the conception of Ultimate Truth, Supreme consciousness, Paramsiva and Advait are conceptual figures in meditation only, but really these are symbolic terms for vital air or atomic system. This is postulated in philosophy as Advaita on the basis of its relation with soul The term 'anya' in "ajo hyeko juṣamano nuś-te jaha tyejām mukta bhogā majo byah" refers to simply, the exalted position of either of the two variables. It means two are opposite entities but conjugate together. In saiva philosophy, often, either Śiva or Śakti has the opportunity of being exalted. In the Siva Purana, we have seen that Śiva occupies the fourth place and he is other than Rudra who is perceptible. Śiva, therein is Paramaśiva as like Ultimate Truth in meditation.

Rudra is 'anya' in the Śvetāśvatara. He being Vital air justifies the scholarly term 'Rudra Śiva' as Vital air makes Śiva by his constituents — prāna and apāna. So in the Yajurveda Rudra is conceived — "Ekohi rudro nadvitiyaya tasthu" (1 8.6). This hymn. with a little variation took place in the Chandogya Upanisad — "Ekamevā dvitīyam Brahman (VI 2.1). Here Rudra and Brahma both seem to stand for 'anya'. but really it is not so. In the Śvetaśvatara (V.1) it is said that the imperishable and infinite highest Brāhmana where in the two, Vidyā and Avidya are hidden, the one Avidyā perishes, the other Vidyā becomes immortal; but he who controls Vidyā and Avidyā is 'anya.' Here this 'anya' is conceptual figure which has no

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12 Special Lectures on Saiva Siddhanta published by the Annamalai University, '1959. p. 14.

13 A Comparative History of Vedic Literature published by Pranava Prakashana 1977. p. 246.

existence like Paramaśiva. He is unqualified entity and may be ever-immortal. But really, he is not to be immortal. So 'anya' is no other than Rudra in the material world. Rudra can not be one. So 'Advaitam' has become a Gordian knot in the philosophy. K. M. Bala Subramaniam has clarified the Vedic hymn corresponding to our Tapa personified who is constituted of fire and water. The original form of the term 'nadvītiyam' with the negative prefix of 'na' added to 'dvītiyam' in the Yajurveda. The term has dropped its prefix 'na' and has become 'advītiyam' in the case of 'Brahma' in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. The popular term 'advaitam' has been derived from 'advītiyam' corresponding to 'nadvītiyam'.[14] The term 'Brahma' would have been the fourth entity, but for other parts of the hymn 'Brahma' is no other than Rudra. Moreover, as we have seen above, the seers in the Brāhmanas, the Āranyakas and the Upaniṣadas were more practical than theoretical.

The negative prefix 'na' connotes three meanings of negative character; 1—Sadṛśya, 2—abhāva (positive negation), 3—Virodha (opposite). So sadṛśya meaning of 'Advaitam', is 'they are not two,; abhāva meaning 'there are not two' and Virodha meaning is 'the existence of the different entities of God and soul'. Taking sadṛśya meaning, Rudra, Tree, Atom, Vital air, Brahma as 'Advaitam' connote 'there are prima facie two but they are in reality not two'. The negative prefix ('na' or 'a' in Sanskrit is capable of expressing three such meanings only when used in connection with nouns. But when it is used in connection with numerals, it gives only sadṛśya meaning. Thus the word dvaitam with the prefix 'a' would be 'Advaitam'. The word 'Advaitam' means 'no doubt there are two but in fact they are not two; they are ananya or non-different. The relation between Rudra with fire and water; Vital air with prāṇa and apāna, Tree with two birds; Tree with Aniśā and Īśa; Atom with particle- like and wave like character is such that though a difference in substance is perceptible, no absolute separation between them is possible and a non-different relation can be emphasised. Swami Vedachalam has clarified the relation between them as follows :—

> ''dvitam' and dvītiyam are not identical in meaning. 'Dvitam' means two and 'dvītiyam' means a two fold state. It follows from this that 'Nadvītiyam' ought to mean a 'not two state'. The relation between two categories is neither one nor two, but a kind of 'not-two' state.[15]

Rudra is 'one without the second' and Not-two state' have broadly divided the Śaiva philosophy in two main systems — Real and Ideal The Realistic system comprising of Raseśvara and Śaiva Siddhānta propounds 'Not-Two' state of Rudra and second birth is their ultimate desire The Idealistic philosophy comprising of Pāsupata system and Pratyabhijnā propounds that Rudra is one without the second and they surrender their selves to Rudra

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[14] Special Lectures on Saiva Siddhanta, published by Annamalai University. '1959. p. 35.

[15] Ibid. p. 41.

IDEALISTIC SCHOOL

1. Pratyabhijñā – Pratyabhijñā is also known as Kashmir Śaiva philosophy or Trika philosophy. This philosophy was grown and developed in Kashmir. Its main scripture was 'Isvara Pratyabhijñā'. I am Śiva' has been stressed upon in the Pratyabhijñā. It is Trika because Siddhatantra, Nāmakatantra and Malinitantra—these three are accepted as canonical scriptures. It is based on the main principle of Abhedavāda and for this, the system interpretes Bheda and Bhedābheda principles.

In the Pratyabhijñā, Paramaśiva is omnipresent and Citrūpa. Śiva Sūtra mentions that Paramaśiva is Caitanyātmā (1. 1) In this Caitanyātmā the whole universe resides—Yat parātattvam tasmin Vibhati sat trimśadātma jagat (Paramartha sārakārikā—11) Paramaśiva has Prakaśa—Vimarṣa. In manifestation of Paramaśiva, Prakaṣa and Vimarṣa are non different.[16] Prakāśa is Ātmā and Vimarṣa is Paramātmā and again, Prakāśa is Viśvarūpa and Vimarṣa is Śaktirūpa, Paramaśiva is the combination of Śiva and Śakti. His desire is knowledge and action, both indifferent, which pervade thirty six principles begining from Śiva to earth.

2. Pāsupata system—The Paśupata system is first among four Śaiva philosophies. It stresses upon Guru and dukhānta. In this system kārya is dependent entity, kāraṇa is God, Yoga is unity between soul and God, and Vidhi is action leading to Dharma. These are the principal features of Pāśupata system The knowledge of Śiva has greater importance for salvation. For this Guru has become an essential factor. Guru is the knower of acquisition, (ābha). impurity (mala), expedient (Upāya), locality (deśa), perseverence (avasthā), purification (viśuddhi) initiation (dikshyākārin), power (vala) and functions (Vṛtti)[17]. Pāśupata system for its Guruvāda was most popular in India. In this system the Disciple surrenders his self to the Guru.

REALISTIC SCHOOL

1. Śaiva Siddhanta— 'Śaiva Siddhanta' system is based on Śiva-sambitā, Ahirvundya Samhitā. Āgamas and Yāmalas. It is originated in the northern India and developed in the Southern India. In this systen, Parameśvara is the cause of the universe It divides the whole matter into three heads. Pati, Paśu and Pāsa. Pasa is of three types—Vijnānakala, Pralayākala and Sakala. each having sub divisions. The bondage of Pasu is paśa. The paśa is of four kinds—mala, karma, māyā and rodhaśakti. The metaphysics of South Indian Śaiva Siddhānta in its general features as much as Vedic School of thought.

2. Raseśvaravada—It is the ancient system of Śaiva philosophy. It concerns primitive magic, sarcery and austerity and it got scriptural value from Somadeva. In this system austerity results in Rasa of literature, and magic and sorcery results in herb and nature treatment, which come under the scope of Āyurveda. It stresses upon health for achieving jivanmukti in present life.

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16 Vijnana Bhairava Vivrti. p. 122.

17 Sarva Darsana Sangrah — Vidyabhaban Prakashan No. 113.

IV

Two Dogmas of Buddhism

A. L. Herman

Introduction

The Buddhist tradition in contact with Western philosophy for several centuries now has produced, thus far, negligible philosophic change in that latter discipline. Western philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries who made contact with Buddhism have also generally failed to make significant philosophic alterations in that discipline and for four reasons : First, the very dispersed and diffuse populations of the Buddhists themselves have made Buddhism a religion without a pope bishop or administrative authority, a religion without a central cathedral or university but a religion with numerous independent sects, schools and subdivisions set into parts of the world where, until very recently, enormous problems of communication obtained; all this made physical contact and philosophic influence extremely difficult. Second, many of the evaluations and criticism that were offered of Buddhism came from Western anti-Buddhists and non Buddhists who eagerly demonstrated both their ignorance of, and their felt superiority to, Buddhism; the result was that Buddhists, valuing their own traditions more than they valued contact with the hostile and the heterodox, simply avoided the contact; again, philosophic influence was made difficult. Third, many Western critics became apologists for, it not converts to, Buddhism and sought refuge in the Dharma and its mysticism; these Western critics closed ranks with the Buddhists and, as Buddhists themselves, communication and philosophic dialogue turned instead into a useless monologue making philosophic influence impossible. Fourth, many Western critics see Buddhism as essentially anti-intellectual and beneath rational contempt; consequently, Western critics prefer to have no contact with Eastern philosophic imports that they feel are destructive of both reason and common sense. With these four reasons in mind one can perhaps appreciate why it has been that Western contact with the Buddhist tradition has failed to make significant philosophic alterations in that tradition even though contact between the two disciplines has increased enormously over the last four decades.[1]

The present paper is predicated on the assumption that wherever serious philosophic work has been done then contact with that philosophic work ought to be seriously made. And Buddhist philosophy, as many responsible Buddhologists have shown, constitutes serious philosophic work. It is my contention that the greatest intellectual service that one can perform for one's Buddhist colleagues is to critically analyze, through reason and common sense, the philosophic claims of Buddhism. The following paper is one such attempt at that kind of philosophic contact.

Two Dogmas of Buddhism

Buddhism, whether Southern Thervāda or Northern Mahāyāna, has been conditioned for the most part by two dogmas : One is the dogma of anitya-duḥkha, viz., that the impermanence (anitya) of existence is, or inevitably leads to, pain or sorrow (duḥkha): and the other is the dogma of nirvāṇa viz., that impermanence and sorrow, anitya and duḥkha, can both be ended. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill-founded because, first, each is false and. second, they are logically inconsistent in the sense that if one dogma is true then the other dogma cannot be true. I shall contend that the dogmas of anitya-duḥkha and nirvāṇa rest upon each one's failure to meet the philosophical standard of common sense; and that the inconsistency of anitya and nirvāṇa rests upon its failure to meet the philosophical standard of logical non contradiction. The effect of abandoning either or both of these dogmas would call for a radical reconstruction of Buddhism for it goes without arguing that both dogmas lie at the very foundation of Buddhism.

In what follows I shall, first, state the dogma of anitya-duḥkha and then argue for its being false; second, state the dogma of nirvāṇa and then argue for its being false. By "false" in both instances I simply intend "generating problems of such a magnitude that abandonment of the dogma becomes necessary"; third, I shall conclude by attempting to demonstrate that the two dogmas are logically inconsistent in the sense that if anitya duḥkha is true then nirvāṇa cannot be true and *if* nirvāṇa is true then anitya duḥkha cannot be true.

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[1] Nolan Pliny Jacobson in a remarkably fine book on Buddhism comments on contact and confrontation between Buddhism and the West and the provincialism and narrowness of the Westerner as "the greatest obstacle to mutual understanding" :

> It is conceivable, of course, that the long isolation that is now ending between East and West is more responsible for the slow progress in mutual understanding than any shocking cultural contradiction. There has been considerable confrontation over recent centuries. but a genuine cultural encounter is only now beginning. (Nolan Pliny Jacobson, *Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis* (Southern Illionois University Press, 1974/1966), p. 15 16)

I. The Dogma of Anitya Duḥkha

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* three apparently independent characteristics (trilakṣana, Pali Ti-lakkhaṇa) of existence are cited. Buddha says :

> Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary constitution of being, that all its constituents are transitory... that all its constituents are misery...that all its elements are lacking in self, [*Aṅguttara-Nikāya*] III. 1341 quoted in *Buddhism in Translations* by Henry Clarke Warren, (New York : Atheneum, 1963), p. xiv. For "self" Warren uses "Ego"]

In a brief space this canonical text of about the first century B. C. has stated three of the most important concepts of Buddhism, viz., anitya (Pali anicca), impermanence; duḥkha (Pali dukkha), suffering or anxiety; and anātman (Pali anatta) non-self or non-substance. This early text has defined the problem of human existence in its characterization of all existence: Human existence is subject to inexorable change, unending misery and the total absence of an unchanging and eternal self or substance to halt the flow of events and time and misery. The doctrine of anitya, as David J. Kalupahana has correctly surmised, is undoubtedly an empiricist theory and early passages in the texts serve to support this contention. A common expression from the *Digha Nikāya* and the *Samyutta-Nikāya* runs, "Impermanent (anicca) indeed are the compounded (conditioned) things; they are of the nature of arising and passing away. Having come into being, they cease to exist. Hence their pacification is tranquility". [*Digha Nikāya* 2. 157 and *Samyutta-Nikāya* I. 191 quoted in David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy*: *A Historical Analysis* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii 1976), p. 36] In other words, the world of compounded things is impermanent (a fact) because it is continuously arising (uppāda) and passing away (vaya) as anyone can plainly see who has eyes and common sense.

But these three so-called "independent" characteristics are, in reality, not independent at all. Rather the latter two, duḥkha and anātman, are, in reality, logically entailed by the first, anitya, and they are in fact, causally dependent on it; in other words, as we will attempt to show, if all existence is characterized by inexorable flux, flow and change, then it follows that there must be both misery as well as non-self or non-being for it is only through the total stoppage or halting of the flux that non-misery and self or being could result.

The American novelist, Thomas Wolfe, has illustrated this connection between time and misery in a remarkably beautiful passage on growing old and man's attempt to grasp and cling to youth, beginning. "Man's youth is a wonderful thing : It is so full of anguish and of magic and he never comes to know it as it is, until it has gone from him forever," and ending:

> ...we yet know that we can really keep. hold, take, and possess forever-nothing. All passes; nothing lasts: the moment that we put our hand upon it is melts away like smoke, is gone forever, and the snake is eating at our heart again; we see then what we are and what our lives must come to [Thomas Wolfe. *Of Time and the River A Legend of Man's Hunger in His Youth* (Garden City, New York : The Sun Dial Press, 1944). p 454]

It is the anguish at the discovery that nothing really holds still long enough for man to significantly cling to it that leads man eventually to search for the substantial, the eternal and unchanging (nitya). It is, in other words, the discovery of the dogma of anitya duḥkha, that all existence is fleeting and sorrowful, that drives man to seek the permanency of nirvāṇa (Pali nibbāna). But if anitya is a fact and everything is truly in a ceaseless state of flux, change and impermanence then finding a permanent place to stand, is as useless as the search for permanent happiness and sorrowlessness. For, once again, if everything changes all the time then nothing is permanent, neither happiness nor self; and man, devoured forever by the snake eating at his heart, is doomed to misery and suffering : The dogma of anitya-duḥkha follows from the fact of anitya. The point is made by another Western writer, Alvin Toffler, in an enormously popular book that begins, "This is a book about what happens to people when they are overwhelmed by change." Toffler defines change as "the process by which the future invades our lives" [Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 1] and uses the term "future shock" to describe "the shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in individuals by subjecting them to too much change in too short a time." [*Ibid* , p. 2] Future shock, in other words, is "the disease of change," i.e. what the Buddhists have referred to as "duḥkha". Toffler believes that any attempt to adapt to change will be unsuccessful and that man's psyche, as a consequence of this change, is doomed to undergo profound alterations. Again, this should come as no surprise to the Buddhists. Summarizing research on what happens to people when they are subject to repeated changes in their lives Toffler states :

> ...those with high life change scores were more likely than their fellows to be ill in the following year. For the first time,

> it was possible to show in dramatic form that the rate of change in a person's life—his pace of life—is closely tied to the state of his health. [*Ibid.*, p. 330]

One of the researchers, whom Toffler quotes, had said that the results of their work were so spectacular that "at first we hesitated to publish them" The findings which inexplicably startled the investigators were released in 1967. Toffler then concludes, perhaps a bit uncautiously but certainly enthusiastically :

> In every case, the correlation between change and illness has held. It has been established [*sic*] that "alterations in life style" that require a great deal of adjustment and coping, correlate with illness—whether or not these changes are under the individuals own direct control, whether or not he sees them as undesirable. Furthermore, the higher the degrees of life change, the higher the risk that subsequent illness will be severe.

And Toffler concludes :

> So strong is this evidence, that it is becoming possible, by studying life change scores, actually to predict levels of illness in various populations [*Ibid.*, p. 330]

The physiological relationship between change (anitya) and stress (duḥkha) has been known for some time in both the East and the West. The experiments that Toffler cites and the experiences to which Wolfe poetically alludes give dramatic reconfirmation to that previous knowledge : When everything changes then sorrow is sure to follow.

What man has discovered is that in life "there is not a moment, not an inkling, not a second when a river does not flow" [*Aṅguttara Nikāya* IV. p. 137] and that "what is impermanent, that is not worth delighting in, not worth being impressed by, not worth clinging to." [*Majjhima Nikāya* II. 63, both of the quotations from the *Nikāyas* are from Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 34] Once again, given the fact of anitya then duḥkha and anātman are sure to follow; in other words, if change is universal then misery follows and there is nothing to hold onto to prevent that misery.

Anitya is, consequently, a central concept in Buddhism and it can even be spoken of as the central concept of Buddhism.[2] For it is the discovery of the fact of anitya and the problems that it engenders that leads to the search for the way out of those problems. It is from Buddha's own experience of anitya and the sorrows of sickness old age and death that flowed from it that led Buddha to enunciate the four noble truths of Buddhism, viz , duḥkha exists; there is a cause of duḥkha (desire or ignorance); duḥkha can be stopped (nirodha or nirvāṇa): and there is a way, the eightfold path, to that stoppage. In other words, anitya is, indeed, the central concept in Buddhist thought. So central is this concept, in fact, that the subsequent history of Buddhism can be seen as a concentrated attempt to find a way to subvert the force of anitya, to mitigate the awe-fulness of the discovery of change.

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[2] Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky and his discussion of the doctrines of instantaneous being (Kṣaṇika-vāda from "Kṣaṇika", "existing for only one moment"), a corollary to the concept of anitya. Stcherbatsky notes the singular importance of Kṣaṇika as a basic concept of Buddhism and the implications of Kṣaṇika vāda for other philosophic concepts, implications which could apply with equal force to Anitya; in the process he quotes the 8th century Mādhyamika philosopher, Kamalaśīla :

This Buddhist attempt to escape the Eastern version of future shock followed two routes : The first way of ameliorating the effects of anitya led to a search for nitya, the Unchanging, the Absolute, by way of nirvāṇa : Let's call this "the way of nirvāṇa." The second way of ameliorating the effects of anitya led to a search for peace and tranquility through Ātman : Let's call this "the way of Ātman." The way of nirvāṇa and the way of Ātman are both ways of meeting the effects of change or anitya and the future shock or duḥkha to which anitya led. The way of nirvāṇa is historically prior to the way of Ātman and it may. consequently, be more closely associated with Southern or Theravāda Buddhism, while the way of Ātman may be more easily identified with later Buddhism especially Northern or Mahāyāna Buddhism. Very briefly let's examine these two ways before we turn to a critique of anitya itself.

The way of nirvāṇa is easily identified with one of the central themes of the *Samyutta Nikāya* when it announces, "The ceasing of becoming is nibbāna" In this *Nikāya* one of the chief disciples of the Buddha, Sariputta, answers the question, "What is nibbāna ?" by answering that it is "The extinction of desire, the extinction of hatred, the extinction of illusion." [*Samyutta Nikāya* IV, quoted in

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> All things without exception are nothing but strings of momentary events. "This their character of being instantaneous, of being split in discrete moments," says Kamalaśīla, "pervades everything. By proving this our fundamental thesis alone, we could have repudiated at one single stroke the God (of the theists), the eternal matter (of the Sānkhyas) and all the wealth of (metaphysical) entities imagined by our opponents."

And Stcherbatsky comments on these remarks by Kamalaśīla :

> Such is the leading idea of Buddhism — there is no other ultimate reality than separate, instantaneous bits of existence... Ultimate reality is instantaneous. (Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Two Volumes (New York: Dover Publications, 1962/1930), Volume I, pp. 79-80)

Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1974), p. 37] In other words, such ceasing or stopping of the coming into existence of desire, hatred and illusion is extinction, and only when all such becoming, i.e. *all* becoming, has been achieved will there be nirvāṇa. In the *Udāna* (Sayings) of the Pali *Khuddakanikāya* Buddha reiterates this same theme :

> O bhikkhus, there is the unborn, ungrown, and unconditioned. Were there not the unborn, ungrown, and unconditioned, there would be no escape for the born, grown, and conditioned. Since there is the unborn, ungrown, and unconditioned, so there is escape for the born, grown, and conditioned. (*Ib.d.*)

In other words, without nirvāṇa as nitya there would be no escape from anitya, i e. unless absolute, changeless Being existed there would be no escape from anitya and duḥkha. Thus the way of nirvāṇa leads, one must suppose, to an unchanging Absolute and an Absolute in which all traces of personality and plurality are extinguished. The way of nirvāṇa as a solution to the duḥkha brought about by anitya is finally, remarkably like what has been called "the metaphysical way" of Hinduism, a way which entails absorption into the absolute Holy Power of the universe, i.e. into parā or nirguṇa Brahman [Cf. A L Herman, *An Introduction to Indian Thought* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 276-277]

The way of Ātman, on the other hand, leads to the stoppage of duḥkha through the mystical discovery of a subjective and ultimately real and unchanging Self or Ātman. Early Buddhism travelling the way of nirvāṇa to liberation had tried to rid the system of all traces of Ātman or Self but without complete success : They got rid of the concept but not the need for a passionate and personal Self surviving day to day and into the next earthly or heavenly life. Early Theravāda Buddhism had recognized the imperativeness to render all vestiges of a real Self nugatory and one must acknowledge and applaud this valiant but vain attempt. The drive to make all concepts consistent with anitya drove them into anātman and left them ultimately with an "incomplete" religion.

Edward Conze has commented on the historic endeavor by later Buddhists to grapple with and ultimately reject the earlier anātman doctrine at the same time that they tried to find an alternative to that plainly unacceptable philosophic doctrine :

> In spite of their professions to the contrary, the Buddhists were constantly drawn to the belief in a 'true self', which would act as a permanent constituent (*dhatū*) behind the ever changing 'continuity'. [Edward Conze. *Op. Cit.*, p. 133]

This temptation to establish such a 'true self' is clearly illustrated in the history of Buddhism. The Sautrāntikas, for example, postulated an unchanging "seed of goodness" along with an āśraya or permanent substratum; the Mahāsaṅghikas argued for mūla or basic consciousness; the Sarvāstivādins propounded prāpti, a force, that keeps a saṁtāna, or pattern, of dharmas constituting a self in existence; and the ālaya-vijnāna, store-house consciousness, of a minority of ogacarins is the monstrous climax of this desperate search for an acceptable "self." The way of Ātman as a solution to the duḥkha brought about by anitya is, furthermore, remarkably like what has been called "the religious way" of Hinduism wherein one's "Self" (now with an honorific upper case initial 'S') following its liberation from duḥkha, survives perpetually as a real but wholly separate entity distinct from other similar Selves. [A L Herman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 278 279]

The way of nirvāṇa and the way of Ātman approach the problems raised by duḥkha and anitya from quite opposite directions. The way of nirvāṇa attempts to transcend anitya in its search for nitya and nirvāṇa. It seeks escape from the future shock that anitya promises to bring and in doing so it admits that nothing can be done about anitya save to go beyond it. The way of Ātman, on the other hand, does not attempt to escape anitya so much as it seeks accommodation to it. It admits and accepts anitya as a universal metaphysical principle (as does the way of nirvāṇa) and it then attempts to live within that acceptance. The devotee can accept or make room for change and change becomes part of reality. The way af Ātman optimistically holds that adaptation to anitya is possible and advisable: "Saṁsāra is nirvāṇa and nirvāṇa is Saṁsāra" Whereas the way of nirvāṇa pessimistically holds that successful adaptation to anitya is simply not possible: "Saṁsāra is not nirvāṇa and nirvāṇa is not saṁsāra."

In conclusion let me say that what we have attempted to show in our remarks about anitya is that it is an extremely important concept in Buddhism and that it can quite rightly be said to lie at the very foundation of Buddhism. Anitya might be said to be the cause of the problem, duḥkha, that sets the Buddhist off in search of a solution, nirvāṇa. From anitya there flows the concept of anātman and with it the atheism of early Buddhism. It's a busy concept, indeed, and its analysis will be important for our purposes.

I turn finally to the analysis of anitya where n I will attempt to show that the dogma of anitya-duḥkha is false and consequently ill founded.

The Critique of Anitya

My argument is based largely on the accommodation to anitya made by the way of Ātman, above, and that argument is this: Not all change is sorrow or duḥkha producing and, in fact, some change is happiness or nirvāṇa producing; hence it's false to assume that everything which is transcient is ill and should be avoided. In other words, if some impermanent event or activity could be shown to be not only happy (aduḥkha rather than sukha) in itself, but happy because it leads to happiness and the avoidance of all duḥkha then it would be wrong and ill-founded to argue as the Buddhists do that "what is impermanent that is not worth delighting in, not worth being impressed by, not worth clinging to." [*Majjhima Nikāya* II. 63] The full argument more carefully laid out looks like this :

1. If any activity produces happiness (while it's being done or as it leads to happiness) then it is not sorrowful or ill. (This is a statement justified by common sense, i.e. by introspection and pragmatics)
2. The way of nirvāṇa and the way of Ātman are activities that produce happiness. (The Buddhists admit this but see footnote[3]).

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[3] The Buddhists are extremely careful on this matter pointing out that nirvāṇa is unconditioned and cannot, therefore, be the effect of any cause. If it were conditioned and an effect like any other effect then, given the fact of anitya, nirvāṇa could come to an end. In other words, unless the Buddhists can protect nirvāṇa in some way, e.g , by calling it unconditioned, one could pop into and out of nirvāṇa just as one pops into and out of bed. Walpola Rahula comments on this protective device as follows :

> It is incorrect to think that Nirvāṇa is the natural result of the extinction of craving. Nirvāṇa is not the result of anything If it would be a result, then it would be an effect produced by a cause. It would by *Samkhata* 'produced' and 'conditioned' Nirváṇa is neither cause nor effect. It is beyond cause and effect.

Rahula continues by drawing an analogy with truth :

> Truth is not a result nor an effect. It is not produced like a mystic, spiritual, mental state, such as *dhyāna* or *samādhi*. TRUTH IS, NIRVĀNA IS. The only thing you can do is to see it, to realize it. There is a path leading to the realization of Nirvāṇa. But Nirvāṇa is not the result of this path. [Walpola Rahula, *Op. Cit.*, p. 40].

This is orthodox doctrine but I find the defense quibbling and obfuscating. "Quibbling" because it flies in the face even of Buddhist common sense where paths that lead to things, if followed, get you to those things; and that's all one wants to claim about nirvāṇa, viz., it's what happens after following a certain path. Rahula concludes :

> You may get to the mountain along a path, but the mountain is not the result, not an effect of the path. You may see a light, but the light is not the result of your eyesight. [*Ibid.*]

I find this "obfuscating" because the analogy is misleading and the point is hopelessly lost. If one gets to the mountain along a path then the mountain-experience one also gets is the result of

3. Therefore, the way of nirvāṇa and the way of Ātman are activities that produce happiness. (This follows logically from 1 and 2).
4. Therefore, there are some impermanent activities that are not sorrowful or ill. (This follows logically from 3).
5. Therefore, it is false and ill-founded to state that everything that is impermanent is ill. (A restatement of 4)
6. Therefore, it is false and ill founded to state that anitya is always duḥkha. (A restatement of 5).

In other words, if philosophic activity, as defined by the ways of nirvāṇa and Ātman, involves and leads to happiness then the dogma of anitya-duḥkha is false, i.e. the dogma of anitya duḥkha is ill-founded which is what we set out to prove (see *supra* p 1)

The first premise of the previous argument needs some explanation. It simply intends that certain activities are not subject to the usual or normal conditions that obtain in the dogma of anitya-duḥkha. It points out Platonic fashion, for example, the joy that comes from the intellectual activity in solving practical problems; and if one were to be consistently Platonic in this regard one could argue that man is truly happiest and at his best when he is exercising his intellect for practical ends. Finding intellectual solutions to practical problems is not confined to the Greeks, however, and one has merely to point out, as many commentators have, that the Buddha's own four noble truths read precisely like a physician's prescription or solution to a practical medical disease or problem: There is a problem (duḥkha); there is a cause (tṛṣṇā or avidyā); there is a solution (nirodha or nirvāṇa); there is a way to the solution (the eightfold path). Similarly, it can be noted that the Buddhist philosopher, in general, is dealing constantly with a problem (suffering); its causes (desire, ignorance); its solution (happiness, nirvāṇa); and the ways to that solution (desirelessness and knowledge along with the ways of nirvāṇa and Ātman).

The activity of thought, whether seen as epistemic, discursive, prajñā or jñāna, is always an activity in which duḥkha is absent, for some temporarily, for others permanently. And the point can be proved by introspective examination while engaged in philosophic problem solving: Philosophy, in other words, can be seen as a way to happiness and nirvāṇa. But the instrumental happiness involved in the

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following path. What more could one want? Finally, the light is not the result of my eyesight, and it's surely misleading and obfuscating to assume that is what anyone ever wanted to prove in the first place: All that is needed is to state that my seeing or experiencing the light is the result of my eyesight, conjoined with light and several other necessary conditions being present and experienced under so-called standard conditions. Finally, be ware of arguments that have to employ a plethora of upper case letters to make their point.

very activity of philosophizing is a temporary by-product of thought and should not be confused with the ultimate happiness, nirvāṇa, achieved when the philosophic activity or mystical activity has been successfully concluded. Further, the instrumental and ultimate happinesses produced in the philosophic activity of, for example, the way of nirvāṇa and the way of Ātman, are characterized by an absence of duḥkha, a fact which can again be discovered by simple introspection when one is on one or the other of the two paths. Finally, it should be clear, given the pragmatic proclivities of the Buddhists themselves, that any activity which successfully leads to the end being sought is right and any statement descriptive of that activity would thereby be true. The first premise of the argument is justified, therefore, on the basis of both introspection and pragmatics, i.e. by common sense. In other words, the defender of the first premise is inviting the reader to set his mind to a philosophic problem, in this instance the Buddhist problem of duḥkha, and see for himself that such problem solving is an instrumentally happy activity and that it could lead ultimately to a future state, nirvāṇā, wherein there would or could be no duḥkha or ill. Finally, having illustrated the first premise in this manner one can then see that here is, indeed, an activity, fraught with anitya that need not be, produce or lead to duḥkha. Consequently, it is false to state that anitya is or inevitably leads to duḥkha. In other words, the dogma of anitya-duḥkha is ill founded.

II. The Dogma of Nirvāṇa

If the dogma of anitya-duḥkha defines the cause (anitya) and the problem (duḥka) of existence in general and of human existence in particular then anātman, the third characteristic of existence mentioned in the *Aṅguttara-Nikāya* (see *supra* p. 2), point in a sense to the solution of the problem. But the recognition of anātman and the intuitive realization that there is no Self or Substance or permanent Being which one can successfully desire, cling to or grasp in order to solve the problem is tantamount to letting go and achieving the liberation known as nirvāṇa. [See A. L. Herman, "A Solution to the Paradox of Desire in Buddhism," *Philosophy East and West* 29, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 92-84] "Nirvaṇa" means "blown out" and the analogy most frequently employed by the Buddhists to explain it is that of the blowing out of the flame of a candle. The flame is the flame of desire (tṛṣṇā, Pali tanha) which, once extinguished, can never be started again (in this body) or passed on to other candles (other bodies): To be "nirvāṇ-ed" is to be liberated from desire, is to solve the problem of duḥkha.

In the *Mahāvagga* Buddha preaches his famous "fire sermon" on liberation (nirvāṇa) that begins, "Everything, brethren, is on fire ...with the fire of passion, of hate, of illusion, is it on fire, with birth, old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow, and despair." The sermon ends as Buddha recommends indifferences or aversion to whatever is on fire, from the senses to physical objects :

> And being indifferent he becomes free from passion, by absence of passion is he liberated, and when he is liberated, the knowledge 'I am liberated' arises. Rebirth is destroyed, a religious life is lived, duty is done, and he knows there is nothing more for him in this state. [*Mahāvagga* I 21 in E. J. Thomas *Buddhist Scriptures* (London: John Murray, 1931), pp. 54-56]

There is no mention of peace and tranquility in this Pali text, a point to which we shall recur in our criticism of nirvāṇa, below. Nirvāṇa to the author of this text is essentially negative in its function bringing, as it does, an end to suffering and rebirth.

A latter text, the *Milindapañha,* also discusses nirvāṇa and its implications. A certain Bactrian Greek King, Menander (Pali Milinda) is questioning a Buddhist monk, Nagasena, about the Buddhist religion. Among the questions that he asks about nirvāṇa are these : "Is it cessation?" ("Yes"), "Do all win nirvāṅa?" ("No"), "Is it a happy state?" ("Yes"), "How can one know about it without having attained it?" ("By analogy and through metaphor"). Thereupon through analogy and metaphor Nagasena speaks of the qualities of nirvāṇa :

> As the lotus is unstained by water, so is Nirvāṇa unstained by all defilements—As cool water...Nirvāṇa is cool and allays the fever of all the passions... [and it] removes the craving for sensuous enjoyments, the craving for further becoming, the craving for the cessation of becoming As medicine protects... so Nirvāṇa [protects] from the torments of the poisonous passions [and] puts an end...to all sufferings. [Like space] neither is it born, grows old, dies, passes away, or is reborn... Like the wishing jewel, Nirvāṇa grants all one can desire, brings joy, and sheds light... [*Milindapañha* in *Buddhist Scriptures* translated by Edward Conze (Baltimore, Md : Penguin Books, Inc., 1959), p. 157].

For the author of this text, nirvāṅa is essentially a positive state or condition. And the Bactrian King, a possible convert to Buddhism, responds at this point, "Well said, Nagasena ! So it is, and as such I accept it."

Between these two texts about nirvāṇa, the *Mahāvagga* and the *Milindapañha* a good deal of philosophic time and controversy has passed. Each tends to see nirvāṅa in a different light and each has come to represent the two quite different attitude towards nirvāṇa as adopted by first, the Theravāda school of Southern Buddhism and, second, the Mahāyāna school of Northern Buddhism.[4] In order to show that the second dogma of Buddhism is false and ill-founded I want to turn to a critique of nirvāṇa as that concept is understood by these two schools. I want to argue that no matter which of the two interpretations is accepted, the Theravāda negative view of nirvāṇa or the Mahāyāna positive view of nirvāṇa, insuperable problems result on either interpretation and since there are no other interpretations possible we have a dilemma : Call this dilemma "the dilemma of nirvāṇa."

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[4] The squabble over the interpretations of nirvāna is discussed in Guy Welbon's, *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and It's Western Interpre-*

The Critique of Nirvāṇa

The dilemma of nirvāṇa holds that if nirvāṇa is seen negatively as the total absence of passion and desire and feeling then this is tantamount to being dead, and who wants to pursue a goal that leads to death : Nirvāna is suicide on this first interpretation. On the other hand, if nirvāna is seen positively as the presence of peace and tranquility wherein all that I desire is fulfilled then desire is not ended or blown out and the whole intent of nirvāna is contradicted: nirvāna is inconsistent on this second interpretation. But, the dilemma of nirvāna continues, nirvāna must be seen either negatively or positively, there is no third alternative.[5] There are alternatives

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ters (University of Chicago Press, 1968). The squabble centers precisely around the question of the essential nature of nirvāṇa as either positive or negative, as bliss or annihilation. One or another view has been adopted by the various interpreters of Buddhism over the decades. The interpreters that Welbon mentions include such distinguished Indologists as H. T. Colebrooke, Eugene Burnouf, Jules Barthelemy Saint Hilaire, F Max Muller, T. W. Rhys Davids, Th. Stcherbatsky, Arthur Berriedale Keith and Louis de La Vallee Poussin. What the various negative and positive interpretations give us, Welbon observes, is really a measure of each scholar's own insight into Buddhism ;

> ...their evaluations, never based exclusively on philological and historico-critical considerations, in every instance reflect the individual scholar's own personal commitment, his *sitz im leben*, and his understanding of the essence of Buddhism.

And Welbon concludes :

> The response to the question of nirvana's meaning is at the same time an answer more or less complete to all questions about Buddhism. (*Op. Cit.*, p. viii)

I would only remark that if Welbon is correct then nirvāṇa can legitimately be seen as both a positive as well as a negative concept and that it is an important standard by which to judge the interpreters' own attitudes towards Buddhism in general.

[5] Once more, several Buddhists might take exception to the characterization of nirvāṇa as negative and positive. Again, Walpola Rahula takes to the attack beginning :

> Because Nirvāṇa is thus expressed in negative terms, there are many who have got a wrong notion that it is negative,

of course and the Buddhists, particularly the Mādhyamikas, are notorious at seeing alternatives wherever a dialectic of position occurs. Thus one could, through some sort of Nagarjunian *aufgehoben*, resorts to talk about śūnya at this point and retreat to silence or metaphors and symbols. But the plain man, our common sense critic here, must feel that such retreats are essentially anti intellectual and the worst interests of Buddhism and philosophy. If there is a dilemma here the thing to do is to recognize it and hunt for a genuine solution rather than to retreat to spurious solutions, anti-intellectual mysticism and obscurantism. The dilemma of nirvāṇa concludes that either nirvāṇa is suicide (it's like being dead) or nirvāṇa is inconsistent (it's like being alive). The full argument more carefully laid out looks like this :

1. If nirvāṇa entails the absence of human passion, desire and feeling then achieving nirvāṇa is like being dead (This seem to be what the *Mahāvagga* was saying above) : Nirvāṇa is suicide and who needs it ! ?
2. If nirvāṇa entails the presence of human passion, desire and feeling, peace, enjoyment and tranquility then achieving nirvāṇa is like being alive (This seems to be what the *Milirdapañha* was saying above) : Nirvāṇa is no different from this life.
3. Either nirvāṇa entails the absence of human passion, desire and feeling or nirvāṇa entails the presence of human passion, desire and feeling. (This is an assumption that nirvāṇa is either a negative or positive condition. But see footnote 5).
4. Therefore, either nirvaṇa is suicide or nirvaṇa is no different from this life. (This follows logically from 1, 2 and 3) In either case the dogma of nirvāṇa generates problems of such

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> and expresses self-annihilation, Nirvāṇa is definitely no annihilation of self, because there is no self to annihilate. If at all, it is the annihilation of the illusion, of the false idea of self.

Perhaps that's all true but illusions die just as hard as veridical interpretations of the world. And any removal of such hard illusions must be seen as negative despite what Rahula goes on to say :

> It is incorrect to say that Nirvāṇa is negative or positive. The ideas of 'negative' and 'positive' are relative, and are within the realm of duality. These terms cannot be applied to Nirvāṇa, Absolute Truth, which is beyond duality and relativity. (*Op. Cit.*, pp. 37 38)

'Beyond' or not, people will, Buddhists among them, in their more talkative and speechy moments continue to speak about the unspeakable. All that philosophy can do is to make sure the talk is as consistent and meaningful as possible. I take it that is precisely what Rahula, himself, is bent upon in his own writings, all beyondness, duality, relativity and upper case initial letters to the contrary notwithstanding.

a magnitude that it ought to be abandoned i e. the dogma of nirvāṇa is false (see *supra* p. 1).

There are ways out of the dilemma, of course, and we mentioned the dialectical move the Mādhyamikas might have chosen. The Jain logic of syādvāda[6] expands further the choices beyond the simple Aristotelian "either...or..." mentioned above and might also provide a solution to the dilemma of nirvāṇa. The Hindus, too, have grappled with the dilemma by rejecting the first premise, a premise that threatens to lead to absorption in Brahman and ultimate suicide. Thus in the *Chañdogya Upaniṣad*, the God Indra comes to Lord Prajāpati for instruction on the true nature of Ātman and how to reach that nature in onesself. Prajāpati teaches that the Self is to be found through three stages of descent : The first stage is waking consciousness, the second stage is dreaming consciousness and the third stage is the totally negative stage of dreamless sleep. Indra rejects each of the three as inadequate definitions or stages of reality, and in a panic criticizes the third : If dreamless sleep is to be identified with what his true Self is like then he would be "like one who has gone to annihilation. I see nothing enjoyable in this." [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII. 11. 1]. Nothing enjoyable, indeed, where there is no Self to enjoy : The goal of this *Upaniṣad* would seem to end in nothingness, i.e. it is like being dead. But Prajāpati then instructs Indra further and carries Hinduism out of what we might now liken to philosophic suicide. The Self in the end is shown to be capable of experiencing enjoyment, i.e. bliss or ananda. [*Ibid.* VIII. 12. 5] Therefore, since the essence of Self is enjoyment, the final state of mokṣa will be a state that manifests that essence : Mokṣa is enjoyment.

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[6] The Jain logic of syādvāda (the "somehow view") comes down to stating that reality is many sided and any single statement, such as the "either...or..." view provided by the two valued logics. about that reality is bound to be misleading and narrow. Syādvāda is, consequently, a doctrine of relativism and attempts to demonstrate the complexity of reality. There are, according to Jaina syādvāda, seven possible statements that can be made about reality, all of which are relatively true from a certain point of view, and no one of which is absolutely true :

1. Somehow a thing is.
2. Somehow a thing is not.
3. Somehow it both is and is not.
4. Somehow it is indescribable.
5. Somehow it is and is indescribable.
6. Somehow it is not and is indescribable.
7. Somehow it is, is not, and is indescribable.

(Cf. *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* edited by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore (Princeton University Press, 1957), 260-262)

But this Upaniṣadic attempt to solve the dilemma of nirvāṇa simply won't work. For in rejecting the first premise of the dilemma they have thrown themselves into the second premise. And with that move the new troubles already mentioned have begun. The Buddhist with his commitment to the dogma of anātman is in a still unhappier position for he cannot even claim that the essence of Self is anything at all for there is no Self.

Therefore, it the dilemma of nirvāṇa is sound, i.e. its premises are true and the argument is valid, then the dogma of nirvāṇa is false, i.e. it generates problems of such a magnitude that abandonment of the doctrine becomes necessary. These problems, seeing the end of man as suicide or seeing the end of man as no different from this life, i.e. as the satisfaction of desire for the sake of enjoyment, appear to be insuperable. Hence, the dogma of nirvāṇa that asserts that anitya and duḥkha, impermanence and suffering, can be satisfactorily ended is false, for there is no satisfaction in suicide nor is there an ending in satisfying desires. In other words, the dogma of nirvāṇa is ill-founded.

The general conclusion that we might now draw from our discussion of the dogmas of anitya-duḥkha and nirvāṇa is that both dogmas appear to violate the very basic standards of common sense and logic. The dogma of anitya-duḥkha that asseried that change and suffering are always connected, either logically or causally, is patently false. We found at least two instances of change, viz, the philosophic activity of the way of nirvāṇa and the philosophic activity of the way of Ātman, both of which lead to nirvāṇa, that demonstrated the falsity of the claim of the dogma of anitya duḥkha. The dogma of nirvāṇa that asserted that anitya and duḥkha could be satisfactorily ended is also patently false. We found that the dilemma of nirvāṇa pointed to two unsatisfactory conclusions neither of which would be acceptable by common sense: For either nirvāṇa is suicide or it leads to an existence which is really no different from being alive, i.e. no different from this life. Each of these unsatisfactory conclusions demonstrated the falsity of the dogma of nirvāṇa.

Our grand conclusion to these two sections then is that he dogma of anitya-duḥkha and the dogma of nirvāṇa are both false, that they violate the philosophic and religious expectations of the plain man, whether Buddhist or not; and that both dogmas are consequently, ill-founded.

It remains now to show that the dogmas of anitya-duḥkha and nirvāṇa are mutually inconsistent and then our task will be complete.

III. The Dogmas of Anitya-duḥkha and Nirvāṇa

The dogmas of anitya-duḥkha and Nirvāṇa are ill-founded, as I shall try to demonstrate, because if one of the dogmas is true then the other dogma cannot be true. In other words the two dogmas of Buddhism are mutually inconsistent. The proof of this contention lies in showing that the concepts used in the dogmas are inconsistent; in particular, it lies in showing that the concepts of anitya and nirvāṇa are, indeed, logically incompatible. However, I'm going to modify this claim slightly, for with our discussion of nirvāṇa in Part II of this paper we have seen that "nirvāṇa" is ambiguous : There is a negative nirvāṇa and there is a positive nirvāṇa. We will argue now that the attempt to conjoin the concept of anitya with the concept of negative nirvāṇa, alone, leads to a logical inconsistency; but the attempt to conjoin anitya with positive nirvāṇa does not lead to a logical inconsistency. Let me explain these conclusions very briefly.

First, in a universe where anitya accurately describes the way the universe is there could be no permanent and unchanging state or condition. But negative nirvāṇa, i.e. the nirvāṇa of the Theravāda Buddhist, the nirvāṇa of the *Mahāvagga*, viz., the mokṣa of Prajāpati's third stage of Ātman, is, we are led to believe, just such a static and unchanging state or condition. Therefore, the attempt to conjoin anitya with negative nirvāṇa must fail because the resulting conjunction is plainly inconsistent.

Second, in a universe where anitya truthfully describes the way the universe is there could be a positive nirvāṇa of the sort described by Nagasena to King Milinda, viz., the mokṣa of Prajāpati's fourth stage of Ātman. Such a nirvāṇa would envision the magic "wishing jewel" at the heart of the heavenly experience where touching the jewel and wishing would bring whatever the liberated person would desire. The nature of this liberation and the problem it engendered is bound to crop up once again as it did at the end of Part II but our only problem now is to determine whether or not such positive nirvāṇa is consistent with a world defined by anitya. Again, there seems to be no inconsistency : The heavenly world of positive nirvāṇa is a world governed as much by change, it would seem, as was this world.

Our conclusion then is that the dogma of negative nirvāṇa and the dogma anitya duḥkha form a logically inconsistent set. But the dogma of positive nirvāṇa and the dogma of anitya-duḥkha need not form such an inconsistent set.

This ends our discussion of the two dogmas of Buddhism.

V

Social Role Factors of Psychotherapy

Peter O. Peretti and Mark Emken & Mary Williamson

Psychotherapeutic processes used in the treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally ill are frequently hampered by the client's acceptance of a "sick" role, and his performance of sick role behaviors. According to Parsons (1951, 1958, 1975), the demonstrated behaviors require that the person be labeled as mentally ill based on institutional expectations and social norms. The individual is then expected to perform a social role according to the nature and severity of the illness. In his sick role, the client has an obligation to himself to recognize the deviant behaviors and his expression of them. He also has a responsibility to society to have a desire to recover, or change his behaviors, in order to be re-labeled into a "well" role (Susser, 1973; Twaddle, 1974).

From the viewpoint of sociological theory, the social role dimensions of any mentally ill label can have negative consequences for the individual's self-perceptions, positive self concept and self esteem. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health workers often insist that, in order for rehabilitative processes to occur, the person first needs to accept and acknowledge his sick role — a social role based on normative psychosocial, ethical, and legal cultural standards, which the professionals reinforce and elaborate in the client through their interactions with him (Goffman, 1961; Rosenhan, 1973; Scheff, 1966). Under such conditions, the person is apt to be more comfortable in accepting the mentally ill social role than in defiantly rejecting it, which can lead to increased personality self degradation (Lemert, 1951).

The importance of social role factors of psychotherapy depend, in part, on the extent to which the mentally ill client has become involved in the transition between primary and secondary role deviance. Primary deviance refers to any direct violation of social norms

— in the current context — it is the violation of those norms differentiating between mentally healthy and mentally ill roles. This form leads to little client change in basic self-concept. self-image, or other self perceptions, and leads to less change in social roles. Secondary deviance refers to the fact that the behavior has come to dominate the individual's self-conception. The client modifies his self-image and thinks of himself as mentally ill. In this instance, he identifies with the labelled role and performs the characteristic behaviors associated with it (Lofland. 1969; Lemert, 1967; Schur, 1971).

Mental illness can be a catch all label for wideranging violations of social norms learned in the socialization process (Szasz, 1960). It can be learned from significant others beginning at early ages. Behavioral idiosyncracies may either not be very distinguishable from other individual differences in the client's group. or not be sufficiently different to be defined as serious deviance. These behaviors, and their resultant social roles, which ultimately can come to be regarded as evidence of mental illness, therefore, were learned and reinforced early in life as part of interaction and socialization processes (Becker, 1962; Peretti, 1969, 1976).

The purpose of the present investigation was to determine therapist perceived client social role dimensions of psychotherapeutic processes. It was also conducted to find out their nature and frequency.

METHOD

Subjects : Twenty-seven professionals, certified in the area of mental health—sixteen psychologists and eleven psychiatrists—were selected as subjects. They were actively engaged in psychological counseling and psychotherapy at the Community Mental Health Council, Edgewater Community Mental Health Center, or Ridgeway Hospital, Chicago, Illinois.

Materials : An interview guide was constructed to delimit the *Ss*' responses about psychotherapeutic processes to the area of perceived client social role dimensions. It contained questions focusing on the "sick" or mentally ill role and the extent to which specific social role dimensions were found to occur in the client during therapy. The *Ss* generated the nature of such dimensions as well as their frequency of occurrence.

PROCEDURE

Each *S* was interviewed individually at a private office of the institution at his convenience. Questions were asked each *S* in the same order and in the same manner. Wherever relevant, probing questions were used to attempt to obtain a more complete, meaningful response. All of the *Ss* had volunteered for participation in the research and were interested in the client social role dimensional aspects as they might pertain to their particular psychotherapeutic process. No time limit was given for the completion of the interview; however, the mean time was about forty-five minutes per *S*.

TABLE 1

The Most Frequently Stated Social Role Dimensions and Their Use in First and Second Themes from *Ss*' Verbal Responses.

Social Role Dimension	Themes First Rank	N	Second Rank	N	Totals Rank	N	Percent
Performance	1	9	2	7	1	16	29 63
Ambiguity	2	7	1	8	2	15	27.78
Strain	3	6	3	5	3	11	20 37
Conflict	4	3	4	4	4	7	12.96
Immersion	5	2	5	3	5	5	9.26
Totals		27		27		54	100.00

RESULTS

Table 1 shows the five most frequently stated social role dimensions and their use in first and second themes from Ss' verbal responses. Using content analyses on the interview responses, key words, phrases, ideas, and most frequently stated role concepts, the nature and frequency of the role dimensions generated by the : were compiled. Both the first as well as the second theme was compiled to determine the most significant *S* perceived dimension, the second most significant, and their combined significance, as indicated in the totals column.

In Table 1, response frequency of the social role dimensions, as well as their rank ordering, suggest the relative weight of each criterion measure. In rank order, the most frequently stated social role dimensions were: performance, ambiguity, strain, conflict, and immersion.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Therapists working with the mentally ill do perceive client social role dimensions of psychotherapeutic processes. These factors can hamper the guidance, direction, and/or other positive aspects of the therapy, particularly when the client accepts the "sick" role and its accompanying sick role behaviors.

The most frequently stated perceived social role dimension was role performance, or the behaviors the client displayed which were relevant to the particular mentally ill role he was playing. The client seemed to want to convey, overtly or covertly, to the therapist that part of himself which was expressive of deviant role reformance. Although the role performance did allow the client some flexibility, according to the *S*s, many of his behaviors were fairly simple, automatic, and within the limitations of the labelled classification During the psychotherapeutic process, the therapists would attempt to seek to analyze and classify perceived role performances in terms of the generic quality of the behavior and the goals and motives of that behavior.

Role ambiguity was the second most frequently stated reply in the themes of the *S*s. It pertained to the role of the client which lacked clarity with few guideposts or uniform standards for judging role performance. With the client seemingly striving to cling to the mentally ill sick role, and the therapist attempting to modify and change that role, frequently during the therapeutic process the client's role would appear amorphous, nebulous, and ambiguous. He seemed to be confused as to what was expected of him, and he tended to alternate between discontinuities encountered in passage from a mentally ill to a mentally healthy role. The *S*s sought to clarify and anchor the particular behaviors associated with the latter role status in order that the client might establish more precise expectations of that role, and, hopefully, make a smoother transition in that direction.

Role strain refers to the difficulty individuals have in meeting their role obligations. The *S*s maintained that many of their clients found the sick role the simplest and easiest for them to perform. Such individuals tended to choose this role, because at some time in their "normal" life, they suffered severe role strain as a result of inadequate role preparation, role transitional difficulties, role conflict, or role failure In the course of therapy, the clients gave evidence substantiating these criteria, which tended to lead to self-defeating attitudes and subsequent deterioration of the personality. The *S*s provided assurance and emotional support to the clients, during therapy, and tried to change the self-defeating attitudes into those which might be most beneficial in the construction of new, more positive, socially adequate roles for the future.

The fourth most frequent therapist perceived client social role dimension of role conflict was based on the set of expectations the individuals had for each other. Conflict arose because each person had contradictory expectations of the other. The *S*s' expectations of the clients were directed toward rehabilitative, socially adequate roles; clients' presumed therapists were often directed toward custodial, caretaker, and other roles not pertinent to rehabilitative processes. Resolutions of the conflict for the client were attempted by the therapists when they frequently conducted their sessions with him in objective, dispassionate, and professional manners.

Role immersion was the last of the most frequently stated role dimensions. According to role theory of personality, people tend to behave the way others expect them to behave. As the individuals identify with these actions, they frequently immerse themselves in them and such behaviors become part of their personalities. For the mentally ill client, this immersion can include deviant acts correlated with the mentally ill label. Through role redefinition, the Ss have striven to have clients redefine their own self-concept in roles which do allow them to exhibit socially acceptable behaviors. Through self-analysis, self awareness, and self-identification, the clients are taught and encouraged to develop their concept of self as well as their role concept from mentally ill to mentally healthy.

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VI

Knowledge of God

K. M. P. Verma

I. Introduction

Religion has a beginningless history and men have claimed knowledge of God. Though there is no dearth of men in our days who under the influence of scientific achievement adopt in practice a negative attitude towards religion and declare it to be illusory. They believe that the authority of science is far more potent a force than the religious truths Sometimes the attitude of non religious people ceases to be hostile to religion, and, by becoming contemptuously indifferent, attack religion in a more insidious form. As for example, a young free thinker of the Congress of Liege in 1865 declared that, "Science does not deny God; she goes further, she makes Him unnecessary." So also Schopenhauer sarcastically remarks, "Religions are like glow-worms, they need the dark in order to shine."[1] But what has been of so great a power in the life of mankind cannot be altogether illusory If it be true that man is 'incurably religious' it is only because there is something that makes him so. "Man's nature is so constituted that some kind of consciousness of God is inevitable to him, although it may be only a presentiment or a search."[2] In the earliest days of human civilization the question of the validity of religious truths was not at all a problem People were religious without concerning themselves with the enquiry whether they were capable of knowing a divine Being for their gods were part of their environment. But now religion has become more and more inwardly and spiritual and, therefore, neither any proof nor logical argumentation can give us the knowledge of God It is no more reasonable, therefore, to hold a negative attitude towards religion on the ground that we have not been able to prove for ourselves the reality of its objects than to adopt a positive attitude because we have not been able to disprove it. The attitude of non religious people that religion is a product of pre scientific age and is doomed to dwindle and die is the cause of all the disasters to which it has led. Galloway has very rightly observed that, "The persistence of religion through all the changes of human society is a token that it is deep rooted in the perennial needs of the soul."[3]

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[1] G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p 378.

[2] Pfleiderer's Giffered Lectures on *The Philosophy and Development of Religion*, vol. I, p. 196.

II. Nature and Validity of Knowledge

Nature and validity of knowledge are matters of vital interest to religious men. Scepticism which declares that mind is incapable in knowing what is ultimately real undermines the foundation of both religion and morality. An enquiry, therefore, into the nature and validity of knowledge is relevant to the question of the knowledge of God.

Every theory of knowledge sets out from experience and seeks to explain the process of knowledge revealed therein. But if experience is the foundation it is also the test of every theory of knowledge Experience implies a subject, a knowing mind and an object which is known and an intimate relation between the two, but they cannot be reduced to an identity. And if the knowledge of the object does not constitute the existence of the object known then it follows that there is interaction between the two and knowledge, the outcome of that interaction There must necessarily be harmony between the subjective and objective factors of this cognitive process. This may be regarded as the basic presupposition of the theory of knowledge.

Knowledge is not something mechanically impressed on our mind from without for the knower is always active in knowing and the object in consciousness bears the impress of that activity. But here a question arises as to how fairly can the notion be defended that the impression imprinted on our mind is a complete and perfect expression of what is real. Reality is wider than experience, and experience in its turn is richer than thought. The existence of error forces us to consider the validity of knowledge. Experience teaches us that we do not always know when we think we know. Appearance sometimes wears the garb of reality. P. G. Tait reminds us that, "We do not know, and are probably incapable of discovering, what matter is."[4] So the question is, can we know what is ultimately real? or, is our knowledge valid ? To this question, some may say that if our knowledge is a makeshift and an inadequate device, still it is useful in our mundane needs. But for a religious man who is concerned with the real knowledge of God, this answer is not satisfactory.

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[3] G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 587.

[4] Pearson's *Grammar of Science*, p. 247.

Further, complete scepticism refutes itself and is therefore illogical because there are certain forms of immediate knowledge, the truth of which, it is impossible to deny. For example, two and two make four, a triangle is not a circle, or, the whole *x* is greater than its part *y*. Thus, we may safely say, that reality which is a complete whole, perfect and harmonious transcends our rational thinking. Thought, by its very form, is incapable of grasping the true nature of reality. Bradley, in his *Appearance and Reality*, has rightly declared that Reality transcends the forms of thinking. It can move only in the realm of appearance. Bergson argues that thought because of the static character of its form and the constant use of spatial imagery is incapable of apprehending real duration in which the elements interpenetrates. So he believes that reality is grasped only by intuition.

III. Meaning of the Knowledge of God

Howsoever much the validity of knowledge is doubted, one cannot help asking the question as to how far a religious person knows the object of his reverence and to what extent his knowledge of divine power is a real one. In order to answer this question, let us first ask, what do we find in religious experience.

Religious consciousness has a historic growth and the object undergoes development that corresponds to the developement of the subject. Man apprehends his God but this apprehension is not like understanding or that of explaining in the scientific sense. It is rather a practical acquaintance, a familiarity born of inner experience. In this specific kind of knowledge, there developes the spiritual attitude of faith, with the help of which a religious man strives to enter into an enduring relation with the Being whom he reverses. On the basis of personal faith he developes a conception of God in consonance with his own character which represents the demand of his own inner life. But this spiritual faith does not bring to his task the methods of critical understanding or scientific understanding. The heart believes its own reason. This faith is the living spring of personal religion and it establishes that directly converse with the object on the part of the subject out of which the inner religious life grows. Thus, the knowledge of God which is distinctly religious is based on the affection and will, not on intellect.

God, the object of religious knowledge, is revealed through piety. He is not an object of physical observation and cannot be demonstrated by logical argumentation. But this is not the only sanction of religious knowledge for the reason that a religious man never thinks that his knowledge of God is valid for him alone. Practical and theoretical truths cannot be divorced from one another.

Faith and knowledge must act and react on one another. The proof of this sort of interaction is clearly seen in the influence of the growth of knowledge has on the contents of religious faith and in the response of the religious spirit to change in the intellectual environment.

Now, if religion is the knowledge of God, the question arises what is it that we experience. Religious system differ widely in their answer to this question. It must be borne in mind that articulation in thought of the nature of God is quite different from its real experience. However much friendly our reception of the idea of God may be in our mind, it remains quite a stranger in our mind unless it receives the stamp of endoresement by personal experience. More logical argumentation is in no way capable to demonstrate the existence and real nature of God that would satisfy the seeking heart of a devout. And if experience is a source of all our knowledge then the idea of God cannot be accepted as the character of knowledge unless it is traced to the experience of God. Mere assertion of the reality of God is indirect knowledge while the experience of the reality of God is direct knowledge.[5] Kierkegaard's hostility to Hegel is only due to the fact that while *Hegel maintained truth* as a speculative system and claimed its objective validity, for Kierkegaard, truth can be apprehended by personal commitment and not by intellectual efforts. "Spiritual truth is inwardness, not logical meditation. Truth is existential. To know it, we must live in it."[6] But it must not be forgotten that when Kierkegaard says that truth is subjective, he never means to suggest that man is the measure of all things; he rather seems to suggest that truth cannot be called truth unless the seeker personally appropriates it.

The knowledge of God consists in the participation of the seeker in the spiritual reality, it is touching and tasting of the knowledge. "We see, feel and taste the truth. This is the immediate awareness of Being itself".[7] To know God is to live in Him which satisfies our whole being.

To the question, what religious experience is alike, we find different answers given by different saints and seers The study of comparative religion and the various dialects used by different thinkers and writers reveal that no two religious systems and persons agree in their opinions and accounts of their mystic vision. Sometimes the language is that of the identification of the self with God, sometimes of absorption, sometimes of intoxication and sometimes of marriage relationship, 'spiritual marriage' as recognised by mystical forms of Christianity. But howsoever much divergent assertions and accounts of the mystic vision may be, the fact remains that all presuppose a loss of selfhood through intimate union with the divine. The divergence is, no doubt, important, but, not less significant is the similarity in many religions of 'experience' that man may be so united with God that the term 'deification' does not seem inappropriate. Miss Evelyn Underhill rightly observes, "though mystical theologies of the East and the West differ widely—though the ideal of life which they hold out to the soul differs too—yet in the experience of the saint this conflict is seen to be transcended. When the love of God is reached, divergencies become impossible, for the soul has passed beyond the sphere of the manifold and is immersed in the one Reality."[8] And in 'In Essentials of Mysticism' she writes, "One cannot honestly say that there is any wide difference between the Brahmin, the Sufi or the Christian mystics at their best." Moreover, if we take into account the fact that religious experience is psychologically mediated, the varieties of religious experience become easily intelligible. "The Divine reveals itself within the framework of their intimate prejudices. Each religious genius spells out the mystery of God according to his own endowment, personal, racial and historical."[9]

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[5] S. Radhakrishnan, *Recovery of Faith*, p. 104.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 105.

Now that we are confronted with the conflicting descriptions and assertions with regard to the nature of the knowledge of God, it should not be taken to mean that our notions are purely personal opinions devoid of all elements to objectivity and therefore unreal. Because all great religions of the world are founded on the personal experience of the saints and seers who have directly apprehended God, unending union of soul to God has been the most striking and common element of all personal religions. "If personal equation" says Dr. Radhakrishnan, "does not vitiate the claim to objectivity in sense perception and scientific inquiry, there is no reason to assume that it is not so in religious experience."[10]

Hindu thought and culture have never doubted the reality of God but the nature of the divine is too mysterious to be explained in words. All our descriptions fall flat in describing it. "Divine reality eludes the machinery of speech" writes Dr. Radhakrishnan and, adds "Silence is more significant than speech regarding the depths of the divine."[11] But man, talking animal as he is, finds it almost impossible to take refuge to absolute silence. By the persistent demand of the intellect he is forced to interpret his experience which he does by the use of negatives.

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[8] Miss E. Underhill. *Introduction to the Autobiography of Devendranath Tagore*, p. xi.

[9] S. Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life*, pp. 19 20.

[10] *Ibid*, p. 20.

[11] *Ibid*, p 20

IV. Use of Negatives in Describing the Nature of God in Terms of Our Experience.

Man cannot take refuge in silence for he is a talking being. But all our intellectual representations with regard to the knowledge of God in terms of our experience are relative, not full and final as Plato would have us believe that our accounts of the knowledge of God are rather stories but, all the same, legendary. Therefore, seers and saints have been led to represent the knowledge of God by the use of negatives. The Alexandrian theologian Clement tells us that, "we may in some fashion enter into the knowledge of the Almighty recognising not what he is, but what he is not." and again "God is to be sought in darkness."[12] and in Kena Upaniṣads we read, "There the eye goes not, speech goes not, nor mind, we know not, we understand not how one would teach it."[13]

In the knowledge of God there is a transition from ordinary consciousness to mystic consciousness, from smallness into a vastness and from an unrest to rest. God imperetrates the soul, but in so hidden a way that the soul "finds no terms, no means, no comparison whereby to render the sublimity of the wisdom and the delicacy of the spiritual feeling with which she is filled... we receive this mystical knowledge of God clothed in none of the kinds of images, in none of the sensible representations, which our mind makes use of in other circumstances ..."[14] The incommunicableness of the transport is the keynote of all our knowledge of God. It exists for them alon who have the transport, it resembles more the knowledge given to us in sensation than that given by conceptual thought. Because of its unique nature it can also not be compared to any other experience of life. "... it may fitly be compared to Nothing" writes Boehmen, "for it is deeper than any thing, and is as nothing with respect to all things, for as much as it is not comprehensible by any of them."[15] Even St. Teresa, who, according to William James, is 'the expert of experts' in describing the nature of the experience in the knowledge of God remarks : "If our understanding comprehends, it is in a mood which remains unknown to it, and it can understand nothing of what it comprehends. For my own part, I do not believe that it does comprehend, because, as I said, it does not understand itself to do so. I confess that it is a mystery in which I am lost."[16]

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[12] *Stromata*, v. 12.

[13] *Kena Up*. 3.

[14] St. John of the Cross : *The Dark Night of the Soul*, book ii, ch. xvii, book iii, ch. xi.

[15] Jacob Behmen's *Dialogues on the Spiritual Life*, translated by Bernard, Holland, London, 1901, p. 48.

[16] St. Teresa, *Autobiography*, p. 198.

Not only the earlier saints and seers have stressed upon the inexplicability of the nature of the knowledge of God, rather, the great thinkers and writers of our age are also in complete agreement that the knowledge of God cannot be adequately represented through any media or means we are possessed with. "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion. To compare facts such as these with what is given in outward existence would be to trifle with the subject" says Bradley and adds that "The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness seeks, he does not know what."[17] Because reality is experience transcending all distinctions of self and not-self and prior to all other known experiences. Similarly, Bergson tells us that in the apprehension of God the soul "feels an undefinable presence... a boundless, joy, an all absorbing ecstacy or an all—enthralling rapture God is there and the soul is in God. mystery is no more. problems vanish, darkness is dispelled, everything is flooded in life... The soul becomes in thought and feeling absorbed in God."[18]

Thus, it is obvious that from the earliest time down to our persent age saints and seers, writers and thinkers have contented themselves either in silent adoration and refused to indulge in words or have expressed their experience by the use of negatives. St. Augustine has very rightly said. "God is not even to be called ineffable because to say this is to make an assertion about Him. It is pure silence, a soundless voice."[19] The knowledge of God transcends all human thoughts. "The Divine darkness is the unapproachable light in which God is said to dwell" God is known but not in the sense of knowing and seeing Him but, "really being in him who is above sight and knowledge."[20] Says Pseudo—Dionysius.

But all these negative accounts with regard to the knowledge of God do not mean to suggest that the Supreme is negative. the qualifications are denied "not because the truth falls short of them" as James says, "but because it so infinitely excels them."[21]

V. Knowledge of God in Science, Art and Morality

Knowledge of God is different from scientific knowledge in the sense that while the latter is a gradual winning of assured results by a process of analysis and synthesis. the former is the need and demand of the inner life. Just because by God we mean Ultimate Reality, a reality that is all-inclusive beyond and independent of which nothing can be supposed to exist. knowledge of Him cannot be of the same order as that of the objects whose being cannot be grasped without reference to Him. But in speaking of God or conducting any discussion on the subject we are prone to assimilate God to the things that depend upon Him. Science, for instance, is the knowledge of certain specialised provinces of knowledge. Scientific knowledge abstracts a good deal from the knowledge of reality as a whole and from human experience. We are prone to forget that the cause must at least be commensurate with the effect which mean that nothing can be a cause without stamping its characteristic features in the effect. It is wrong to assert that either the cause can be apprehended or grasped in abstraction from the effect or the effect without its relation to the cause which reveals its nature in it. In the same act of perception we apprehend both the cause and the effect. Now, the universe in relation to which we think of God is neither merely physical nor merely chemical. It has all the wealth of content and diversity of features that God who is its ultimate reality must explain them all and in passing from the given world back to God we must not make the mistake of pronouncing upon the being and nature of God on the basis of what is true of a limited fragment of reality. But it is common knowledge that when we talk or speak of knowledge we always have in our mind the demands and criteria of knowledge of science which is too inadequate and partial to give us even the faintest idea of what God is. Galloway has very rightly observed : "Scientific explanation is, in fact, inapplicable in the case of a Being who transcends the external order of reality, and consequently not to be understood through it. The atmosphere in which the religious spirit moves is one of the reverence and mystery, and in the clear and cold air of scientific explanation it cannot breathe freely."[21] This is true that both scientific explanation and religion have grown out of the felt need of life, yet, the knowledge, religion aspires after is knowledge of a direct and personal kind. Scientific knowledge is mediate and goes back to immediate apprehension as its foundation and it is here that both disclose a common lineage, but the lines they have developed upon run apart. In science value judgments fall into the background which is primary and central in the case of religion. In religion man seeks to know God as the supreme Good which can satisfy the soul and not only as a Being who can explain the world process. This knowledge is practical as it is concerned with the working relation of the human soul to the Divine.

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[17] F.H. Bradley. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 449.

[18] Henry Bergson, *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, E.T. (1938) pp. 196 7.

[19] S. Radhakrishnan *Recovery of Faith*, pp. 145-6.

[20] William James. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 408.

[21] G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 310.

It may be admitted that knowledge of God must be unique because God is unique. There is nothing that is like Him. How can a part be like the whole. We can no more completely comprehend God or for the matter of that knowledge in silence than a "worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet in understanding man."[22]

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22 John Locke, *Essays*, ii. 2 3.

If there is any knowledge that bears the faintest resemblance to the knowledge of God, it must be taken to be of the nature of that which is the characteristic of Art and Morality. In all great arts the first condition of attainment is not loyalty to self but forgetfulness of self in the moment of contemplation. We are completely shut off from the world of human affairs, our memories are arrested and we are lifted above the stream of life. The mental attitude of deep appreciation is of its own nature akin to worship. No aesthetic experience can be intelligible unless there comes through it a revelation from spirit to spirit. Just as in the knowledge of God, the question is not of knowing the object by the subject but in living in it as Eckhart says : "The knower and the known are one. Simple people imagine that they should see God, as if he stood there and they hear. This is not so, God and I, we are one in knowledge."[23] So also in all creative art, such as, dance, painting, music, poem and the same one is not within his senses, the independent individuality is altogether forgotten there. Plato in his *Ion* says "...The lyric poets are not in their senses when they are composing their lovely strains... A poet is a light and winged thing, and holy, and there is no invention in him until he has become inspired, and is out of his senses, and reason is no longer in him. So long he has attained to this state, no man is able to make poetry or to chant in prophecy."[24] And in *Phaedrus* he writes : "He who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, come to the doors of poetry, trusting to enter in, and who things forsooth that art is enough to make him a poet, remains outside, a bungler; sound reason fades into nothingness before the poetry of mad men."[25]

The artist and the mystic differ widely from the rest of men. They differ, primarily in respect of their vision, "a vision which is atonce more subtle and more penetrating" and are therefore, "able to see more in a given situation than his fellows."[26]

No one in the modern world disputes over the issue that religion is concerned with morality. In Upaniṣad we read : "In darkness are they who worship only the world, but in greater darkness they who worship the infinite alone. He who accepts both saves himself from death by the knowledge of the former and attains immortality by the knowledge of the latter."[27] A religious man knows his God as good through which he finds his inward peace and self-completion. And it is through the spiritual function fulfilled by the divine object that he claims to know God. The relation between the worshipper and God is ethical and practical and the knowledge arises out of the sympathetic fellowship and communion of spirit. Knowledge of God, therefore, is not impersonal knowledge. Obligation to perform duty means respect of personality. It is not possible without reference to a person. Obedience of law means respect paid to the law giver. "For no Law, apart from a Lawgiver, is a proper object of reverence. It is mere brute fact; and every living thing, still more every person exercising intelligent choice, is its superior."[28] Knowledge of God, therefore, can be acknowledged to be of that type which is revealed in such higher reaches of the mind as Art and Morality and the ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty.

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[23] S. Radhakrishnan, *Recovery of Faith*, p. 107.
[24] Plato's *Ion*, 534.
[25] Plato's *Phaedrus*, 245.
[26] C.E M. Joad, *Return to Philosophy*, p. 155.
[27] S. Radhakrishnan's *The Hindu View of Life*, p. 57.

VI. Knowledge of God : Exposition and Illustration from Religious Texts

The continuity of religious experience gives weight to the claim that religion is basically the knowledge of God and this knowledge is not an intellectual activity of the mind but "it is a luminous growth into the highest of being by the outshining of the light of the divine sun of Truth."[29] But such knowledge comes only to those persistent seekers who make it their whole aim by a long wholehearted endeavour. When we turn our eyes towards the religious texts of the world we find ample examples of such persons who have attained this knowledge of God.

According to Hebrews God's voice can be heard in prophetic consciousness. The truth of scriptures becomes living truth only in personal experience. Moses and Elijah are the examples who had direct knowledge of God. Moses had communion with God in the mountain and Elijah in the cave. In third chapter of the Book of Exodus the story is narrated as to how Moses had the living relationship with God. There it is said that the Lord revealed himself to Moses "in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush; and he looked, and beheld the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed. And Moses said, I will now turn aside and see this great sight, why the bush is not burnt. And the Lord...called unto him out of the midst of the bush and said... Draw not nigh hither; put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground...And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God."[30]

Moses's communion with God reminds us of the viśvarūpa of Lord Krișna in the Bhagavad-gītā. In the Bhagavad gītā Lord

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[28] William Temple, *Nature Man and God*, p. 254.

[29] Sri Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā*, p. 182.

[30] S. Radhakrishnan, *Recovery of Faith*, p 115.

Krisna appears to be Brahman in personal form, in the beginning, as charioteer to the warrior Arjuna and by answering his questions resolves his doubts by revealing to him the way of devotion. But the Gītā goes beyond and we read that Krişna reveals himself to Arjuna in a multiform transfiguration and the astonished and frightened Arjuna declares the supreme mystery that Lord Krişna is the true God.[31]

Just as Moses and Arjuna were frightened by the vision of Lord so also was the case with Isaiah who, when saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up a sense of sin and unworthiness arose in him and he declared : "Woe is me : For I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips...for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts."[32]

In Islam the central teaching consists in the worship and acknowledgement of Allāh as the Absolute Lord who is infinite and Eternal beyond the order of space and time, sense and thought. Sufi tradition claims Mohammad as its founder who had the personal experience of Allāh and is therefore called the Light of God. He is believed to have existed even before the existence of the world and is adored as the source of all life. He is the perfect man who is in possession of the divine attributes.

According to Sufism there is only one Ultimate Reality which is unknown. His knowledge is possible only through his names and attributes. But Pure Being has no name or attribute. All names and attributes are ascribed to him only when he descends from his absoluteness into the realm of manifestation. The absolute is called the 'darkness' (al' amā) and developes consciousness after passing through three stages, oneness, he-ness, and I-ness, and reveals his Being as divinity with distinctive attributes. Thus, this phenomenal universe is the revelation of the absolute. It is said that just as God is necessary for man's existence so also man is necessary for the manifestation of his Being. Ibn al' Arabī writes : "God is necessary to us in order that we may exist, while we are necessary to him, in order that he may be manifested to himself."[33]

The world and all things in it display a few attributes of God while in man all the attributes are united. It is man wherein God becomes conscious of itself and thus man and God become one in a perfect man. The unique personality of Allāh who is beyond the reach of human capacity becomes transformed into the One Real Being and reveals himself in all created beings. But Allah reveals himself only to those who have cleaned themselves from within.

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[31] *Gītā*, xi, 37 ff.

[32] *Isaiah*, vi, 1. 5.

[33] S. Radhakrishnan, *Recovery of Faith*, p. 139.

Fanā, as a transcendental state can be reached only be means of extinction of all passions and desires And when this state is reached God unites the soul to himself. One finds within him the experience of Allāh. When man becomes pure from within he is raised to the status of divine. Al Ḥallāj's statement, *ann — al Haqq*, I am the Truth reminds us of the great text of Upaniṣads *aham brahmāsmi* I am Brahman. Hence in Sufism we find that the truth is grasped through personal experience and not through philosophical reflection. Bayazid of Khurasan says : "I went from God to God. until they cried from me in me. 'O Thou I' "verily. I am God, there is no God except me, so worship me. Glory to me : How great is my majesty !"[34] And the same echo of personal experience is heard in the saying : "I beheld the Light and I fixed my gaze upon it until I became the Light."[35]

The Christian religion knows no immediate union of the soul with God since all is mediated though the historic figure of Jesus Christ. Of Christ it is said that "He is the image of the invisible God, the first born of all creation"[36] and in the New Testament the teaching of Incarnation shows God present with man ' God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself."[37] So he "became flesh and dwelt among us and we beheld his glory."[38] No man has ever seen or can see the infinite God, but he is revealed to man in 'the son' and this is not only revelation of truth or grace but the very aim of unity with God. Carl Barth observes : "God has revealed himself to man in Jesus Christ. What do we know from any other source of God ? ... Absolutely nothing."[39]

In Christ is the son of God, he is also God himself. He himself says, "I and my Father are one."[40] "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."[41] Thus, if there are passages indicating that the Father and 'the son' are different, they are not to be taken at their face vale. When Jesus says, "why callest thou me good ? There is none good but one that is God"[42] or "I came forth from the Father and am come into the world : again I leave the world and go to the Father"[43] he wants to remind us that our reverence for him should be based not surely on his individuality but on the spirit of God in heaven which he represents on earth.

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[34] Nicholson, *The Mysticism of Islam*, p. 18.
[35] *Ibid* , op. cit, p. 94.
[36] *Colossians*, 1.15.
[37] *I cor*. 5.
[38] *St. John*, 1.18.
[39] Karl Barth, *The Knowledge of God* (1937-38), p. 43.
[40] *St. John*, x, 30.
[41] *Ibid*, xiv, 9.
[42] *St. Matthews*, xix, 17.
[43] *St. John*, xvi, 28.

It is commonly believed by all sections of Christianity that Bible is a divine revelation, a word of God and the distinguishing mark of Christianity is the doctrine that a divine being, the son of God came down from heaven and was made man who lived or earth, suffered and died; God raised him from the dead and set him on the throne of the universe. But whether Jesus of Nazareth, as a historic person, really existed is not open to serious question. Much labour has been spent upon the attempt to establish the assumed "Jesus of history" but all in vain, for in the Gospels and Christian literature, Christ has throughout been represented as one who made claims, such as, no human being can ever make. He claimed to bring to man the Age of God and to effect by his death a new relationship between man and God. He demanded of men such obedience and service which only God can demand. Thus the "knowledge of God is not knowledge of and faith in Jesus as a historic person portrayed in the Gospel" says Radhakrishnan and adds "Christ is not to be equated with the historic Jesus."[44] Similarly, Kierkegaard says, "History has nothing whatever to do with Christ"[45] and Emil Brunner remarks, "Christian faith is not interested in the Founder of Christianity."[46] "Jesus did not require actually to be God."[47]

The knowledge of God is possible only for such persons who are pure and have killed their unholy thought and desires, unrully passions and impulses and who, on the hearts of men, have kindled the flame of righteousness by their own noble examples. Jesus washed the feet of his disciple and says: "Ye also ought to wash one another feet. For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you."[48] Jesus demands an inner change. We should rise above the worldly plane, should wake up from the world of objects, from the sleep of the senses. Even if we have to undergo a great deal of suffering in climbing the ladder of inner developement we should not hesitale because it is only then the birth of God in the soul is possible.

The knowledge of God is not public. God appears in private and makes his presence known only to those who are watching day and night and awaiting his arrival every moment in the dark reccsses of their soul. God makes himself known suddenly without any notice.

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[44] S. Radhakrishnan, *Recovery of Faith*, p. 159.
[45] T.H. Croxall, *Kierkegaard Studies* (1948).
[46] Emil Brunner, *The Mediator*, E. T. (1934) p. 81.
[47] Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 252.
[48] *St. John*, xiii, 14 — 18.

The well known text of the Upaniṣads *tat tvam asi* is the classic example of mystic achievement which plainly means monism and is held widely as the chief characteristic of Hindu thought and culture. The most common feature of this mystic state is the forgetfulness of all barriers between the soul and God, both become one and the soul has the awareness of this oneness. But complete monism spells the end of religion. Because if everything is divine the question of submission does not arise. How can one worship oneself ? The identity of soul and God makes religious language meaningless. The chief features of Upaniṣadic mysticism according to Dr. Dasgupta are "the earnest and sincere quest for this spiritual illumination, the rapturous delight and force that characterize the utterance of the sages. ... Yet this quest is not the quest of the God of the theists."[49] A modified non-dualism, therefore, was set out by Rāmānuja who recognised that the soul is only a part of the infinite Being and Madhva went to the extent of teaching the complete subordination and dependence of the soul on God. Hinduism teaches that the aim of life is to know God and when this knowledge is achieved the chains fall off, sufferings are destroyed and the cycle of birth and re-birth stops. God of worship reveals his Being to the soul and the soul establishes a loving and living relationship with Him.

God loves his devotees beyond measure and cannot maintain separation from them. The author of the Gītā tells us that a true *yogin* is one who pour himself forth in utter worship of the Divine seated in his heart. Union with God attained through *bhakti* is the highest goal. "To those who are in constant union with Me and worship Me with love I grant the power of understanding by which they come unto Me."[50] So the supreme truths are revealed to those who have devotion to God. "To one who has the highest devotion (*bhakti*) to God ... these matters which have been declared shine forth.

The revelation of Lord Kriṣna to Arjuna is an act of grace. When having seen the terrifying forms of God Arjuna is filled with a proper sense of fear, the Lord comforts him by saying 'Be not afraid' and Arjuna is comforted to see the Lord taking again the form of grace.

VII. Religion as a process of the establishment of emotional and practical relationship with God

The truly real must not only be knowable, it must also be such that if attained our aspirations are realised and emotions are satisfied. Every theory of reality must deal with the implications of practical conduct and aesthetic feeling as well as those of knowledge.

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[49] S. N. Dasgupta, *Hindu Mysticism*, p. 42.

[50] *Gītā*, x, 10.

The Good and the Beautiful, no less than the True, should be the objects of our study. Religion is basically the knowledge of God and a process of the establishment of emotional and practical relationship with Him. There is all the difference between those believing in God as a result of logical argumentation and those believing in God with their whole being. A real and living relationship of soul to God is expressed in the form of fuller life and vitality, universal love and charity, deep rooted faith and unshakable belief in God. A religious man who has directly known God cannot but be moved by the pains and sufferings of his fellowmen. It is simply because he is well aware of the truth that unless he loves his fellowmen he cannot enter into that living relationship with God which is essentially demanded by religion. When Jesus says 'love thy enemy' he means that a truly religious man should regard the whole world as his family because we all are the rays of one Divine Light.

Love, in the true sense of the term, means renunciation of one's ownself "It is seeing with the other men's eyes, feeling with his heart and understanding with his mind."[52] Love and suffering must always go together. It is impossible to escape suffering if you are in true love. The greater the love, the more you suffer. Because the man who loves must give his very self to his lover, for that is what love is.

But what is true of love in terms of our worldly relations, is equally true, nay, more true in terms of our relations with God. God is not a hard task master who frames laws and imposes them upon us to follow. He is a loving friend, a sincere guide, a benevolent father who is always attentive to our cry, redemptive to our sins and sufferings entering into and sharing our miseries. Jesus died on the cross for the well-being of humanity. Lord Krishna served as a charioteer of Arjuna out of his unbounded love for him. Now, if the Lord is so much attentive towards his creatures, should we also not bow our heads into His feet and seek refuge into Him? The real meaning of religion is to love God, to enter into a fellowship with the living God who is love.

But here the question that forces itself upon our mind for an answer is, how can we develop an all embracing love in our heart for the Divine and how can it be expressed? Great saints and seers, in all ages and religions, have sung the glory of worship and prayer. It is, no doubt, true that the rites and rituals, worship and prayer, ceremonies and festivals do not by themselves constitute the essence of religion, yet, it must be remembered that it is these seemingly

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[51] *Śvet.* 6, 7; 6, 1; 6, 23.

[52] S. Radhakrishnan, *East and West in Religion*, p. 83.

meaningless and apparently useless dogmas and creeds that keep religion going. If the great hunger and the unceasing unrest of soul for the communion with God is significant, no less important is the practical aspect of religion required for Divine realisation. Religion would have a thing of the moments and a matter of few souls had the external practices been eliminated from it.

Prayer and worship are the direct and immediate, simplest and easiest means through which a soul enters into a living and loving relationship with God. The veil which hides the face of God from the searching eye of the soul is lifted by the direct means of prayer. Privacy remains no more. Man becomes closer to God an inexplicable unity is established between the finite and the infinite, the worshipper and the worshipped. Personality of God is the first determinant of all theistic religion. Gītā arises from faith in a personal God who shows grace to his devotees. In the Avadhūtagītā, Dattātreya asks "How can I bow to Him who is formless, undifferentiated, blissful and indestructible, who has through Himself and by Himself and in Himself filled up everything."[53] and Tulsidas said, "The worship of the impersonal laid no hold on my heart."

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[53] S. Radhakrishnan *The Bhagavadgītā*, p. 293.

VII

The Transition From Traditional Comparative Philosophy To A Global History of Philosophy

Del Lawhon & Paul Mays

By a strict adherence to Historical Method, many ambiguities, such as the "Myth of the Mystical Orient" and the "Myth of the Materialist West", may be cleared up. These ambiguities are flagrantly contradicted by the fact that before the age of European empires, the Orient, if this generic term has any historical foundation, was well known for its material wealth and luxuty; and the fact that the Medieval West had as many Mystics as the Medieval East.

By a strict adherence to Historical Method, the *Problem of Modernization* in all the Traditions may be seen as a parallel problem. The challenge of the Revolution in Science, the Revolution in Transportation and Communications, and the accompanying Social and Political Revolutions (dubbed "the Revolt of the Masses" by Ortegay Gasset), have made and are making a very similar impact on all the Medieval and Classical philosophies of the West, of Byzantine Greece, Russia and Eastern Europe, the Islamic countries, India, Southeast Asia, China, Japan and Latin America.

By a strict application of Historical Method, it may be seen more clearly that the *history* of Indian Philosophy, the *history* of Chinese Philosophy, the *history* of Japanese Thought, the *history* of Islamic Philosophy and the *history* of Byzantine, Jewish, Western and Latin American Philosophies, have been remarkably parallel in at least two respects: they have flourished most where they have experienced the maximum encounter (in the sense that Toynbee has constituted the term) with each other, and they have gone through comparable periods, namely: (1) the classical period of formulation of the Canon, (2) the development of varieties, heresies and counterheresies, in a more or less stabilized orthodoxy, especially during the Medieval period, (3) the break up of the Political Unity of the

Eurasian lands wrought by the ascendance of Islam; the beginning of "renaissances", reformations, counter reformations, etc., stimulated by the abrogation of Edicts of Toleration, (4) the Period of Modernization, characterized both by the beginning of the use of the vernaculars in Philosophy, and by the impact of what has been termed the Period of European Hegemony, and (5) the Period of the Total Encounter, in which we are still engaged, when no one Tradition may be allowed to dominate the others, colonialism is condemned, and the impact of the different religions on each other is almost as great as the impact of the revolutions in science, technology, transportation and communications on each Tradition.

It is true that this is a rough manner of periodizing the global history of philosophy. There are, no doubt, other possible patterns of Periodizing. But the application of historical method should make it clear that it may be a gross error to compare *medieval* Indian philosophers with *modern* Western philosophers, or *classical* Chinese philosophers with *modern* Western philosophers, etc. If one were to adopt the simple method of comparing philosophies in the classical period (roughtly 600 B C. to 100 A.D.) with each other, comparing philosophies in the period from approximately 100 A.D. to the Hegira with each other. Thence, on down in stricter chronological sequence, one will soon find that almost every century in almost every civilization has produced philosophies of almost every type (mystical, idealist, realist, sceptic, yin and yang, satva, rajas, tamas, intuitionist and rationalist, etc.). This rule has emerged so dramatically in our own researches that we invite others to reinvestigate their materials to determine whether we are in error in proposing this as axiomatic, or whether research has been inadequate due to lack of translations.

By a strict application of Historical Method, the field of Comparative Philosophy may be made more pedagogically accessible to the coming generations of students who are increasingly (and healthily, may we submit) aware of World History as a basic discipline and radical prerequisite for World Understanding upon which a Peaceful International Order can be established harmoniously and intelligently.

In a word, by a strict application of Historical Method, ethnocentricities may be transcended. We shall no longer be enslaved to stereo-types (such as the "other-worldliness" of Indian Philosophies, the "ethical emphasis of Chinese Philosophy", the "aesthetic nature of Japanese Thought," the "obscurantism of the dark ages", the "non originality" of Hispano-American Philosophy, the "grass roots" (and rather "seedy") nature of Yankee American Philosophy, the "tyranny" of Soviet Scholasticism, etc. Rather, we may have ready access to the developmental process of the abundant varieties of philosophizing in every Tradition. We shall no longer be floundering in both time and space, trying in vain to make sense out of the juxtaposition of Navya-Nyaya, for example, with Chaitanya eroticism, or the juxtaposition of the Cabala in Renaissance Italy with Pico's *Essay on Man*, or the juxtaposition of Wang Yang Ming with the perpetuation of Chu Hsi tradition, etc. In short, we shall become more vividly aware that there is no such thing as Chinese Philosophy; there are Chinese Philosophies. There is no such thing as "Indian" Philosophy; there are Indian Philosophies. There is no such thing as ' Islamic" Philosophy; there are Islamic Philosoph*ies*. There is no such thing as Byzantine Philosophy; there are both Platonists and Aristotelians, Pythagoreans and Neo-platonists, neo-Pythagoreans, and Zoroastrians even in Byzantine Philosophies. There is no such thing as "Russian" Philosophy, but many Russian Philosophies, etc., etc.

Finally, we shall become aware that Philosophy in its most fundamental sense, is itself dynamic. Philosophies, all types of Philosophies in all civilizations, undergo some remarkable developments, transformations, and even dialectical inversions in the process of historical change. Many other advantages could be listed, but this should be enough to invite further re-investigation, re-thinking, and re structuring of what has thus far been included as Comparative Philosophy.

Much more illustrative material could be introduced to make the above points more poignant, but brevity prohibits this. For the present, let it be sufficient. therefore, to note the following contrasts between "old style" Comparative Philosophy (if we may call it that without offending anyone who has labored to get the field recognized at all, for without this poineering effort. further steps could not be taken) and "historicized" Comparative Philosophy, or as we prefer to call it, the *Globalized* History of Philosophy. Meanwhile, we eagerly concede that the "old style" may still have many advantages, and may indeed still constitute a legitimate field. We only insist that, whether as supplementing the older methods of generalized random comparisons, or as opening a new and distinct field, *related*, but *not* by any means *identical* with "traditional" Comparative Philosophy, the Globalized History will have much salutary value when it become pedagogically available.

Let us, for the sake of vividness, seek to sharpen the distinctions between "old style" and "new style." We beg to be pardoned if we overstate the contrasts for the sake of blurring the distinctions, as is done in other fields in which there are inter-disciplinary integrations. But let us see what emerges :

"Old style" Comparative : Random comparisons and contrasts, such as Shankara and Kant. Chu Hsi and Whitehead, are made without realizing that they are no more dramatic than, say, the comparisons and contrasts between Scotus Erigena and Kant; or Aquinas and Whitehead, because there is as much difference between *medieval* and *modern* Indian Philosophies at between medieval and modern Western Philosophies. This is evidenced, by the difference between Bhaskara or Shankara and Tilak, or Madhva and M. N. Roy; by as many differences between *medieval* Chinese Philosophies and *modern* Chinese Philosophies as there is between medieval Indian and modern Indian or Islamic, or Russian or Japanese Philosophies, for example, by the comparison and contrast between Chu Hsi and Tseng Kup Fan or Liang Chi chao. *Globalized History* seeks to correct these "chronological fallacies"

Without realizing it, "old style" comparative has tended to accept (and we believe to its own deteriment universally) European Philosophies as the common denominator of comparisons. This is an inexcusable remnant of the period of colonialism since the Bandung Conference. By a sound and thorough re-orientation of the field, one may be free, it is hoped, to compare any philosopher in any culture or civilization *inter* se, without this compulsive bi polarization of "western esteem,' with everything else, as though there were not as many differences (and likenesses, also !) between the different possible units of that "everything else[1] *inter se* as between any one of them and the "West."[1] Again, brevity forbids adequate illustration; let me suggest that comparison, let us say, of Liang Chi-chao, Sri Aurobindo, Nishida Kitaro, Vladimir Soloveiv, Ortegay Gasset, and Muhammed Iqbal *together*, *inter se*, is a much more scientific and rational (as well as intuitively more rewarding) procedure than the former random procedure. The same pattern, if followed through the entire Global History of Philosophy. becomes very dramatic indeed, and extremely suggestive and stimulating for both the understanding of the past and laying a non lop-sided foundation for the future. Thus, the globalized historical approach prevents the wrong perception of historical processes in Philosophy.

It prevents warping (as the "old style" comparative Philosophy is inadvertantly in danger of doing) the total perspective by viewing it from one vantage point only. In every century, therefore. one much consider how such-and-such a neo-Confucianist philosopher would look to his contemporaries, whether Hindu,[2] Catholic. Protestant, Shia, Suni, Sufi, Ch'an, Japanese *Soto*-Zen, Nichiren, etc.,etc. *each in his own individuality*, and not stereotyped into a category or pseudo-class to which he does not belong In other words, *Historical position and individual type replace (pseudo) 'common denominator' basis of comparison !* This, "old style' has not yet done

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[1] By now it should be evident that we much prefer the terms "European", Yankee American, Latin American, Byzantino Russian, Islamic, Hindu, Hinayana, Mahayana. Shinto, etc., to "Eastern" and "Western" for this very reason; for that matter. even to include "Islamic" as a generic term is henious, since there were Muslim Zealots who would have nothing to do with Greeks, as well as Muslims Aristotlelians, Muslim neo platonists. Muslim Syncretists, etc. We are *always* confronted with the problem of *vanities*, just as the Marxists are also already confronted with it.

[2] Even here one must be cautious. Monist, dualist, pluralist Hindus are just as common as monist dualist and pluralist neo-Confucianists or European 'Scholastics'.

The net result of sound historical method should be the enabling of scholars to place Monists in all cultures into communication with each other, and pluralists in all cultures in communication with each other, rather than leaving them all "all jumbled up" at one moment, asking Indian monists to defend Indian dualists. and Western Mystics to defend Haeckel's mechanism, although that is what 'old style' tends to do !

The new advantages begin to roll out in our minds now, do they not, faster than the fingers can record them ? For example, from the above follow many things, including (a) the problem of scientific typology, (b) the problem of dynamics of development of any new tradition, (c) the dynamics of the relationship between the development of new traditions and the encounters between old civilizations[3] in the toynbeean sense, or as is the claim of Mormons and the Bahais, from fresh Revelation from on High, (d) the scientific study of interrelations between recalcitrant orthodoxies and 'Fundamentalisms', revolutions, reformations, counter-reformations, neo-orthodoxies and new emergents—all of which have occurred in all civilizations from time to time—completely invalidates most of the pre-suppositions of much of 'old style' comparative philosophy, which tries to dump all these types and periods into single compartments. It would be strange indeed for one infatuated with the "Mysteries of the Orient" to approach a "yogi" and get puccah discourse on Marx and Engels and Lenin. Yet, this has happened more than once, we dare to say to more than just a few of us. It would be strange likewise, according to 'old style', for a young Indonesian, eager for instruction in post Newtonian Astronomy, to be taught instead, the Holy Rosary of our Blessed Lady, and the proper way to warp at Mass Yet, these things are happening in the twentieth century, and have been happening for many centuries. The very example of the Rosary is an almost trite example. It is used in one form or another, by every religion except modern Protestants and secularists and 'liberal' Jews. Likewise, we submit, the Syllogism has been used, in some form or other by any and every culture or philosophy which has graduated beyond the cradle.

Our conclusion, according to some, may be what should have been our introduction :

We propose no resolutions of old discussions; rather we oppose continuing the old discussions without adequate knowledge of the *histories* of the *developments* of philosophies included in the comparative field.

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[3] Whether this Encounter be bi-polar as with Israel and Greece, or multi-polar as with Islam and the Hebraic-Hellenistic synthesis of Mediterranean Christianity and the Hindu and Buddhist India, the Shamanist Central Asia, the Zoraastrain Persia, the animistic Java or the-what shall we call it ?—highly sophisticated brass- and gold producing culture of medieval Timbuktu, etc. This question we must table for more detailed treatment and analysis.

We propose that without the *full* picture of the role of Philosophy—your pardon, Philosoph*ies*—in world History, we are not yet adequately prepared to begin intelligent discussion. Therefore, let some worthy agency either commission the writing of such a History, or else petition UNESCO to so write.

We submit that there will be many good results from such a writing, even though the listing of these is beyond the range of this proposal, which must be brief. Certainly, not the least of these good benefits, should be an increase of mutual accord, as well as intelligent, well informed discussion among ourselves and future generations, who may otherwise remain ignorant of each others' philosophies.

We submit, by corollary, that the tendency of Comparative Philosophy to limit itself to Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Western, in separation from each other, is at least inadequate, if not dangerous, since it may become the breeding ground for even worse ethnocentricities than World History has seen thus far. The old distinctions between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian, saved and heathen, chosen people and pagan, Chinese and (long nosed) barbarian, Muslim and Kafir, Communist and Capitalist, East and West, Cast Hindu and Mleccha—the list can be still further extended, but for courtesy's sake we shall refrain—must be replaced by sound historical facts. I doubt if Comparative Philosophy 'Old Style' (e g. from Masson-Oursel to Raju) can remedy this. But, we submit that a globalized histosical treatment of the materials; stressing *synchronologies* and scientific typology—for there is even a history of those who "do not believe" in history—can do at least a little better, since it can "spot" where and under what conditions these phenomena occur, or have occurred in the past and are likely to occur in the future.

We submit, as corollary, that as Global or Globalized History should be of benefit to philosophers, so Global or Globalized History of Philosophy should be of benefit to historians as well as philosophers—and to sociologists and anthropologists as well.

In a world which has reached such technological advancement that man can destroy almost everything on this planet more easily than he can create a new philosophy it seems morally, intellectually, and (if we may use the term meaningfully) spiritually incumbent on all of us to eliminate sources of conflict and *harmonize* differences, even where we cannot eliminate them. We submit that this applies as equally to philosophers, as to leaders in religion, technology, science, politics, art, communications, industry, and the military. Fortunately, we have the United Nations; fortunately, we have UNESCO; and most fortunately, we have the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights.* But, until we have an adequate *historical* understanding of our living (and dying) likenesses and differences, it is difficult to conceive how we shall apply the proper remedy to our corporate suffering Humanity, any more than a physician can treat a sick individual without a *case history*!

In short, it does seem that Philosophers, as well as Politicians and Prophets, true and false, *can* be Pioneers. It also seems, moreover, rightly or wrongly, that perhaps it is their *duty* to do so. We have a *Histoire Generale* of almost everything else, from soap to musical instruments. Why not Philosophy ?

Book-Reviews

Theos Bernard : *Hindu Philosophy*, pp. 208, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Varanasi and Patna First edition 1947 and Reprint 1981, Price Rs. 50/—

Dr. Theos Bernard the author of this book Hindu Philosophy is an American scholar. In this book he has very ably discussed the six orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy and presents a precise and illuminating study classifying them in to three divisions (1) Nyaya Vaisesika, (2) Samkhya-Yoga, (3) Mimamsa-Vedanta. The first division lays down the methodology of science and elaborates the concepts of Physics and Chemistry to show how manifestations of phenomena come into being. The second division sets forth an account of cosmic evolution on purely logical principles. The third division critically analyses the basic principles, developing them in greater detail and furnishing arguments to substantiate, as well as making incidental contributions on point of special interest.

Besides presenting an account of six philosophical systems of India, the author adds a study of Kashmir Saivism — a system of Ideal Monism founded by Vasugupta and based on Saiva-Sutras. In this connection the author considers the criticism offered against by Western and Indian scholars on the traditional Tantric literature.

Dr. Bernard has very ably discussed the classical schools of Philosophy in a very easy and lucid style making the basic concepts clear. The style of the author is praiseworthy. The book is indeed one of the best introductions of Indian Philosophy both for Indian and western readers. Even those who are not familiar with Sanskrit can very well grasp the basic concepts of Indian Philosophy. The book is very well documented with Preface detailed bibliography, Introduction and Glossarial Index which has added to the utility of the book for both, the beginners as well as Research Scholar. The Publishers thanks deserves for reprinting this book for the present generation of Students.

Jaideva Singh : *Spanda Karikas*, pp. 209. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Varanasi and Patna, First Edition 1980 Price Rs. 35/— Paper back and Rs. 50 cloth Bound.

Dr. Jai Deva Singh an eminent Indian thinker has edited the text, and the Commentary with the assistance of his guru Swami Lakshman Joo. He has provided an English translation of both the text and Kshemrajas commentary. He has given lucid exposition of each verse, new light of many subtle points of the text and the commentary. He has given a scholarly introduction glossary of technical terms, and three indices.

The present work has a great significance. The main points of significance are : The Self is not simply witnessing consciousness as maintained by Sankhya, Patanjala Yoga, Vedanta but an active force of Spanda; Spanda maintains that all energy is in its ultimate analysis, only an off-shoot of spiritual energy; The work elaborates the dynamic side of consciousness and serves as a commentary on the Siva Sutras; and lastly it gives hint of a new kind of yoga for the realization of self.

Dr. Jai Deva Singh in his Preface has explained The Spandakarikas are a number of verses that serve as a sort of commentary on the Siva Sutras. According to Saivagama, the Divine Consciousness is not simply cold, inert intellection. It is rather spanda, active, dynamic, throbbing with life, creative pulsation. Dr. Singh has provided a readable translation of both the karikas and the Spandanirnaya commentary of Kshemaraja. Each Karika is given both in Devanagari and Roman Script, followed by its translation in English. This is followed by Kshemaraja's commentary in Sanskrit. Then follows an English translation of the commentary. Copious notes are added on important and technical words. Finally, Dr. Singh has given a running exposition of each Karika in his own words. A long introduction has been provided in the beginning of the book, and a glossary of technical terms and an index have been appended at the end.

Swami Muktananda Ji has also given blessings to this book and wished that the humanity of the world benefit by the knowledge contained in this book.

This work is one of the important works of Kashmir Saivism. The doctrine of Spanda is scientific and deserve to be studied thoroughly.

Dr. Jai Deva Singh deserves congratulations for bringing Spanda Karikas in English which will help English knowing world to know about Spanda. The style and presentation is easy and clear. The publishers have done great service in bringing out such a nice work on Kashmir Saivism.

I

Psychic Energy and the Conception-analysis of Borderline-cases

M. Lietaert Peerbolte

The analysand himself had developed in his youth an awe of his mother, trying to be the "better wife" of his father. In this way the paradosis of the infantile electra-complex of his mother brought the analysand postnatally in a state that made him wonder whether he was a female or a male. This dream XI formed the crucial point for his integration, or individuation, as here he could contact the prematernal susceptibility, feelings represented in the X chromosome which is a derivation of the one of his mother's mother, symbolized by one of the women in the castle. As to his association that the procession would point to a long series of female self-hatred, I was surprised, and I'll come back to this motive later on.

Some note :

With regard to this case of conception-shock this research seems important for two reasons : 1. a more or less theoretical reason is connected with the oedipal structure (not to be confused with the postnatal oedipus-complex) and 2. a practical therapeutical reason in connection with the psychiatric problem of schizophrenia.

A. Oedipal structure

The general starting point in my interpretations has been a psycho-physical parallelism, or Schilder's suggestion that the organs (and so also the chromosomes) are cristallizations of libido, or psychic energy. In this way the cause of conception-shock has been interpreted as a too strong "feed-back" of the X chromosome in the ovum which is a derivation of the X chromosome by which the mother herself came into existence: a paternal X chromosome.

Continued from *Darshana International* Vol.XXIII No.1 Jan.1983 p.21

It is, namely, known that the reduction division of the ovum takes place in order to make room for the fresh sex chromosome (X or Y) of the fertilizing sperm, which, in this case, has to replace the paternal X chromosome in the ovum. One can suppose that this paternal X chromosome functions as a kind of feed back regarding the fertilizing sperm. If this feed back is too strong, e.g. by a retardation of the reduction division, a more direct confrontation will take place of this paternal X chromosome with the fertilizing sex chromosome of the sperm. This would cause a shock which supposedly would be the more vehement when the feed back is stronger.

According to my viewpoint Freud's myth about the herd with an Ur-father as tribe-leader is less mythical if one takes into account the dominance of the paternal X chromosome of the mother over the ovarian collectivity. In the present analysis it is clear that this Ur-father, as a symbol of this paternal X chromosome, can be transferred in postnatal life on to the postnatal father, so that in one's youth the oedipus-complex can come into existence: the present analysand, namely, has transferred this Ur-father symbol on to the psychotherapist.

Since many years I have thought that the conscious working out of this shock-effect would be sufficient for a more complete individuation. In this present analysis, however, another aspect came to the fore which I had to associate with the other X chromosome in the ovum : a prematernal X chromosome (dream VIII)· The analysis suggests that conceptional contact with this prematernal chromosome is not established sufficiently as a positive libiddinal experience. It seems that the dangers on the green meadow (dream XI) indicate the reverse: a negative hatred, a thanatoid libido. Thereby the question is raised which libidinal function this prematernal X chromosome may represent.

On the base of a psycho physical parallelism I think this libidinal function can be qualified in the following way. This chromosome co-operates with an X chromosome as well as with an Y one of the fertilizing sperm. As such it is suceptible to co-operate in a female as well as in a male way. In dream VIII this function is rightly indicated as "imaginary". When, however, it seems possible that this function is not sufficiently integrated in the own personality, I was first amazed that this lack of integration is the consequence of a strong dominance of the paternal X chromosome and later on I was again amazed that the individuation of the prematernal X chromosome was lacking owing to such a hatred as a negative oceanos (dream XI: the dangers in the green meadow).

B. Some further notes

As to the death-rate, which pre- as well as post-natally is higher in the case of the male gender than of the female one, the question rises whether this fact might be related to a bad homeostasis between the prematernal X chromosome and the Y one. In the forensic psychiatry it is well known that sometimes irregularities in the reduction division of the ovum, or of the sperm can be found: e.g. the type XYY, or XXY.

Another viewpoint regards the origin of schizophrenia. In the present analysis the analysand's fear of the "naught" formed a central datum. Benedetti (1975) emphasizes that one of the important schizophrenic symptoms is the "naught", coinciding with a lack of the ego-development and "egoifizirung"; is this perhaps caused by the lack of the libidinal quality of the prematernal X chromosome ?

The fear of "naught" is expressed in dream II where sawing the skull is a symbolic expression of the missed contact with the susceptibility of the prematernal X chromosome, as a threat against the personality of this analysand and his oceanic experiencing. Guided by the consideration that every psychotraumatic event evokes a regression towards a pre traumatic state, I interpreted the fear of "naught" as a fear of regression into the ovarian pre-conceptional state. This interpretation has prevented that the analysand would explode in a mass-destruction (c.f. the "dog" in dream VI), as a decapitation, or conceptional castration. It seems that in such more or less pre-psychotic states (borderline-cases) the interpretation of the sex chromosome as libidinal symbols can do good service. In part V of this study the schizoid borderline-case will be discussed further on.

IV. Comparison between depersonalization and cycloid borderline-case.

It seems that in states of depersonalization this state is due to an overaccentuation of the male factor in the ovum: the grandfatherly X chromosome which is in opposition to the "love" aspect, together with oceanic consciousness of the Ur-ego. The fixation on the oval "I" seems to form the crucial point in it. It is clear that in the therapy the character of the mother and her "male" aspect as well as her oedipal structure form part of the analysis.

In the materials of a borderline-case (see part II of this study) the conceptional fear of becoming "naught" seems to refer to such a depersonalized state of naught. Also in that analysis the overaccentuation of the oval male is obvious, e g. dream II: 3 policemen. But the dreamer does not identify himself with this oval male. His ego remains an empathical observer. His conflict seems more to maintain this role against the oval male. However, in the background his pedophilic phantasies to absorb young boys play some role, indicating that the mother figure, indeed, did not want this ovum to be fertilized.

When he tries to experience in a religious way (which psychodynamically can be interpreted as an oceanic-orgastical experience), at a certain moment a change takes place, insofar that the religious "God" of love changes into a forbidding "God". Psychodynamically this points to the oval male. So his "I" stands at a turning point of an "I" identical with the Ur ego, or an "I" identical with the oval male and so part of his mother's psyche. Here, the "borderline-case" is just on the borderline of these two ego's, with the fear of annihilation (nothing, naught) as a fear of depersonalization.

Whereas the rather chaotic situations in the conceptional dreams referring to depersonalization are caused by the different evaluations of the "I" represented in the dreams, in the borderline-case this "I" is more established on the side of the sperm as carrier of the Ur-ego.

To resume it into a few words: the love aspect in the boderline-(study II) is more related to the sperm, whereas the love-aspect in states of depersonalization is more related to the mother's male, her paternal X chromosome.

Some additional notes

The question arises whether the 3 polar bodies have any function after the fertilization. The official opinion is that they would perish. But from analyses regarding the coming into existence of monozygote twins, the analytical suggestion is very strong that this is caused by a retardation of the mitotic cell-division (first polar body). In those cases it seems that the one who comes into existence by the fertilization of the kernel which belongs to the not yet divided polar body has a better chance of survival after the implantation than the one which comes into existence by the fertilization of the ovum itself. This could point to a better syntony between the twin which arises from the polar body, a syntony with the ovary (corpus luteum !). Moreover, in normal cases the first polar body imitates the meiosis of the ovum, creating a third polar body. This suggests an a-sexual quality of this polar body and in "Psychic Energy" I have suggested that this first polar body would represent an ovarian mneme. Taking these two considerations together, although they are vague, it would not surprise me if this polar body contributes to that layer of the chorionic villi which is formed by the syncytium, as a material expression of the ovarian pre-oceanic libido.

As to the second polar body, arisen by the ovum's meiosis, the "male" factor might contribute to the cells of Langhans in those villi, forming the base for the syncytium. In that case the third polar body could perhaps contribute to the third layer of this tissue (fibres). The purpose of mentioning this question is that it might be that the oval ego, represented by the second polar body and the grandfatherly X chromosome in it, has a libidinal function, first with regard to the embedding (first contact with the fetal outerworld= uterus) and secondly regarding the formation of the postnatal ego: contacting the outerworld, whereas the first polar body in postnatal life might be represented by the development of the secondary oceanos, as a wish "to belong to" (Freud's "herd instinct"; Adler's "sociotropy"). I agree, however, that these speculations are only based on the opinion that no libidinal energy can be lost completely.

As to the laws of heredity, Lormans-Lauwers a.o. have published a study "Hypophysair hypothyreoidy in a patient with trisomy X (Maands. Kindergenees-kunde, 38:161, 1970). In such cases it appears that the oval male X chromosome has not left the ovum at all. One could expect that in such cases the force of the penetrating sperm, with its X chromosome, is undermined, instead of reinforced. The study mentions literature about this abnormality and concludes that apparently the trisomy -X can cause several disturbances of the physical development and specially disturbances regarding the Central nervous system. On the other hand, however, it seems not possible to indicate any special disturbance in all those cases which are published in the international literature. My preliminary conclusion in this respect is that, indeed, the undermined force of the penetrating sperm can cause several kinds of disturbances by wrong, or feeble stimulation of other chromosomes. Also in so-called cases of statistically proved heredity the sadomasochistic reactions of the ovale male, as germ of destructive tendencies, might be the cause of such illnesses. One must not forget that those researches about heredity do not account for psychodynamical aspects, but are based on more or less statistical data.

Final comparison :

When comparing the materials regarding states of depersonalization with the materials of this borderline-case, two differences are obvious. First, a state of depersonalization is not expressed by this borderline-case. Perhaps the fear of "naught" might be interpreted as a fear of a state of depersonalisation. More probable seems to be that this fear of naught is related to a kind of decapitation (see part II, of this present study: the castration of a kind of consciousness). Of course, it is possible that this castration runs parallel with the garden shears (dream IV, part II of this study). But in that case there is a great difference from the side of the ego. In the case of the garden shears, the ego itself is active, whereas in the case of the third police-man sawing the skull, the dreamer's ego is surely not active. One could call his reaction in the dream masochistic. If a kind of hatred exists in both cases, the ego with the garden shears has identified itself with this kind of hatred, whereas in the borderline case this hatred is outside the dreamer and on the side of a male aspect of the mother. As to the analysand who dreamed about these garden shears, it can be useful to mention that in real life this woman did not dare to look in a mirror, as she could not differentiate between herself and her picture in the mirror.

When overlooking the materials concerning states of depersonalization, it seems to me that there is more a kind of aggressive reactions than a real kind of hatred. It seems that the ego in dream materials regarding such states is rather an exaggerated counteraction against the sexual aspect of fertilization, whereas in the borderline-case this counteraction against fertilization is, as sharply depicted, on the contrary, a much deeper kind of hatred: a hatred against consciousness of oceanic-orgastical experiencing. In the states of depersonalization an existing overaccentuation of a maternal narcissistic tabu against sexuality seems to be active, whereas in the borderline-case the factor hatred presumably regards a mother with self-hatred of being a woman, or very intensive hatred against her husband, at any rate a hatred against the orgastic-oceanic experience itself.

V. Conception and the schizo-problem: a preliminary model

The kernel of the schizo-problem is to be found in a very special psychodynamic structure of the mother. This structure, already well known regarding the postnatal relationship with her child, can be called an "oceanic narcissism". This means that essentually this mother only wants to experience her own all-world, whereas the objective outside world does not exist as a reality; yet reality is only her own all-world. She will defend it against any attempt of a break-through this narcissism, on the one hand, by one form or other of aggression, on the other hand, by strict anorgasmy.

One can imagine this form of narcissism as a closed globe, the center of which is formed by the own ego, whereas the own body with its sexual aspects and ovaries are part of this globe. These sexual aspects represent her psychodynamics, under control of the central ego in a compulsory neurotic way. This structure forms a contrast with the female active susceptibility, manifested in the capacity of orgastically (i.e. oceanically) experiencing.

After ovulation psychodynamically the ovum will still form part of this narcissistic all-world of the mother. This, however, is only a partial result as there exists a mutual attraction between the ovum and the sperm in a pre-conceptional field of attraction. The attracting forces on the side of the ovum form the possibility of a break-through the oceanic narcissism of the mother. So, after ovulation a "double bind" (Bateson) exists in the ovum: on the one hand, the ovum is kept in the narcissistic globe by the psychical structure of the mother and, on the other hand, the ovum is instinctively directed towards the sperm by the sexually attracting forces.

In the pre-conceptional field of attraction, however, a form of consciousness exists, the Ur.ego, the contents of which are a notion of infinity and, emotionally, a feeling of love. Rather often it is supposed that the sperm would represent a first form of aggression. Surely, this supposition is wrong: in principle the instinctive attraction between the ovum and a sperm is not aggressive and is only experienced as aggression when, via the maternal psyche, a resistance exists in the ovum. The Ur-ego contains an Ur-love as the conscious aspect of this attraction.

When the sperm, together with this Ur ego, approaches the ovum, the double bind of the ovum becomes activated. On the one hand, it attracts the sperm, on the other hand, it is kept within the narcissistic globe of the maternal psyche. The consequence of this double bind is that, although the sperm enters the ovum, this ovum simultaneously will "de-realize" this fertilization. One can imagine this process when taking the narcissistic globe as something which, on the outer face, has the capacity to reflect as a mirror. (the mirror-effect as already discussed in II). So, especially the Ur-ego will be reflected on this surface of the globe. By the maternal psyche, however, this reflected image is experienced as a part of the maternal narcissistic all-world: the mother experiences the contents of the consciousness of the Ur-ego, the notion of infinity and the feeling of love, as parts of her own all-world. The image on the surface is as it were a print belonging to her own ego. Moreover, the Ur-ego is confronted with this image of itself and in an anthropomorphic way it could ask itself "whom am I: myself or the mirror-image.

Rightly Benedetti (1975) has mentioned that a characteristic of "schizo" is the egoification (egoifizierung). This possibility of egoification, indeed, starts in the maternal oceanic narcissism. The notion of egoification represents the phenomenological aspect, whereas the model of the reflected image, as mirror effect, regards the psychodynamical one of this characteristic.

As to this mirror-effect it is interesting and instructive to mention "the Violation of symmetry in physics" described by Wigner (1965). Energetically, namely, the reversal in the conceptional mirror-effect runs parallel with what Wigner describes in physics: 1. the reversal of the direction of the spin of a particle (electron); 2. the reversal of the direction of the north-pole of an on-going particle: the north pole in the mirror cannot be found by the so-called right hand rule, but by the left hand rule; 3. the reversal of time (regression towards the direction from where the real electron came). These violation of symmetry are observable in physics as the so-called mirror-effect. In psychodynamics these three characteristics together form the core of 1. the loss of the sense of reality (de-realization); 2. the change of love into hate (destruction); 3. the regression toward non-existence.

It appears that hallucinations can be interpreted as caused by this reflected mirror-image on the maternal narcissistic globe: from de-realization to de-personalization.

However, from the viewpoint of the ovum this process means that two ego's arise, the one belonging to the mother via her egoification, the other representing the original Ur-ego in the ovum. Which ego is the right one, looked at from the point of view of the fertilized ovum !

Both ego's have a conscious content of a notion of infinity, the Ur-ego sui generis, and the reflected image as part of the narcissistic globe. Insofar the reflected image of unlimited hate becomes dominant, the original Ur-ego will be experienced as a strange outer world and vice versa. Moreover, this oceanic narcissism will become incorporated, as paradosis, in the psyche of the new individual, whereas its own wishes and drives are exprienced as a strange outer world: the so-called break-through the ego by the own unconsciousness, whereas this ego is only the reflected image of the original Ur-ego. The own wishes and striving are experienced as to be condemned: the destructive tendencies on the maternal side. This weakness of the schizoid ego can also be interpreted by this model.

A very special aspect is formed by what Freud has called the enormous quantities of aggression which he thought to exist in the narcissistic psychoses. These aggressions are related to the reflected image of the Ur-ego, the "print" on the surface of the maternal narcissistic globe. When a top is placed in front of a mirror, the difference between the real top and its reflected image is that the directions of spin are opposite to each other. Whereas the Ur ego is the bearer of a notion of infinity together with a feeling of love, the reflected image will seemingly have the same notion of infinity, but the feeling of love is reversed into its opposite, so that the seemingly notion of infinity results into an infinite aggression. These enormous quantities of aggression will manifest themselves as soon as the oceanic narcissistic globe, as an undisturbed whole, is threatened. These aggressions are parallel to the oceanic narcissistic structure of the mother. A break-through her narcissism would amongst others mean an orgastical experience of space. This, however. will never happen; more often aggression will exist against the partner who literally or figuratively has to be outraged.

By this model schizoid borderline cases as well as schizophrenics can be interpreted in a psychodynamical way. This model, moreover, demonstrates how a primal oceanos can become, as reflected image, a seemingly primal thanatos, resulting into thanatotic reactions.

The schizophrenogenic mother has not only a fatal influence on her child after its birth, but by her oceanic narcissism she causes the germ of "schizo" at conception, via her egoification.

This psychodynamic interpretation and model does not seem to correspond with the official meaning regarding heredity. However, this contradiction is perhaps not necessary. A fact is that part of the fertilization-process is formed by a meiosis of the ovum by which one of the X chromosomes leaves the ovum. It is surely not impossible that by the oceanic narcissism, with a strong tendency of the maternal ego to keep control over her all-world, this meiosis would be delayed. This delay could have the consequence that, when the sperm enters the ovum, this X chromosome is still present in the ovum and by this, via reflection of the real process, the print arises on the maternal globe. The result would be that seemingly the fertilization happens by this X chromosome with its delay as a consequence of oceanic narcissism.

Some analogy exists regarding the conception of a monozygote twin, when this is based on a delay of the mitosis which normally takes place round the ovulation. By the delay of this mitosis, with a delayed arising of the first polar body, the ovum contains two kernels both of which can be fertilized. In an ovum with two kernels most probably the difference of electrical potency between the inside and the outer cover of the cell might be so great that two sperms can penetrate the cell (as to the principle of this electrical potency with regard to fertilization c.f. Laurinda Jaffe (1976). The compulsory neurotic character of the mother of a monozygote twin (this coincidence existed in several cases in my practice) has something in common with the schizophrenogenic mother, although in a minor degree: both show the tendency to keep their own totality undisturbed and "unviolated". Moreover, in schizo one can find several compulsory neurotic tendencies. So, the understanding of, and the insight in semblance and reality seems to show the way by which the schizo can find himself.

In addition to this model the question arises whether this model of the reflected image can also be useful in two other cases: the cycloid syndrome of maniac-depressive states and in some forms of psychopathy.

As to the cycloid syndrome an indication has been given by a case of a cyclothymic borderline case. The case showed a split on a religious level. As soon as this analysand tried to direct his mind on what he called God, suddenly a reversed divine image arose which was very severe and forbidding. The divine images existed, the one representing a divine love, the other a divine forbidding, with anxiety on the side of the analysand. As a consequence of the negative divinity states of depression came to the fore. Starting from the depressions in this syndrome it seems that first of all the aspect of vitality (of the fertilizing sperm) is suppressed, or "castrated", whereas the erotic sexual aspect becomes reduced. In contrast with the schizo, where the question of the own identity, the own ego, forms the central point, in cycloid depressions it seems that not the own identity as such, but the erotic-vital aspects are reflected by the maternal narcissistic globe: the forbidding, severe, anti-erotic divinity as the reflected image. In the cycloid mania this reflected image would manifest an oceanic-narcissism by the maternal narcissistic satisfaction. During a relatively quiet period on this split of the ego, as an Ur-ego with feelings of love, and its reflected image, can be found facets of the unrealistic reflected image in a degree of seemingly adjustment to the individual notion of reality.

In the schizo-problem the question of identity seems to be a noetic facet, in the cycloid syndrome the problems of the split of vitality with the affective aspects seems to be the central point.

With regard to psychopathic forms the reflected image of the own ego seems to dominate completely, whereas the original Ur ego can be manifested in so-called well-meant and sometimes idealistic phantasies and opinions. These are, however, annihilated by the reflected image. The result is an aggression directed as well against the real outer world as against this own ego: negative oceanic aggression without boundaries.

A dream demonstrating the schizo-problem in a schizoid borderline-case: The dream exists of three components: 1. there is an "eye" which is floating on the water, sometimes under, sometimes above the water. It looks at a "land"; 2. there is a knight in harness who is standing half in the water and half on the land. He threatens the eye and tries to prevent this eye to come on land; 3. there is the land without a special description.

The eye is often a libidinal symbol. Here, moreover, it is an eye with a conscious wish to come on land. Coming on land represents the wish to realize itself. As the dream is produced during the conception-analysis this wish refers to the wish to perform fertilization, whereas the water symbolizes the oceanic aspect of the eye.

This wish is counteracted by the knight as a narcissistic product, whereas the harness indicates a compulsory-neurotic tendency. The knight represents the ego of he dreamer. It is, however, the ego as reflected image on the oceanic narcissistic glove with its negative "spin", preventing the positive oceanic experience of fertilization, when the eye, or Ur-ego, would come on land.

When I asked what would happen if this knight would not be present, the analysand answered: "then I would only be myself".

The symbol "eye" reminded him of some drawings of Odilon Redon, e.g. "The Gnome (1875); "The eye, a strange balloon moves towards the Infinite" (1882); "There was perhaps a preliminary vision tested in the flower" (1883); "Flower with a child' head" (1885); "The cyclop" (1898).

The dream points to the same split of the personality as the split of the two "gods", the God of love and the God of hatred, in the analysis of the cycloid borderline-case.

During the further analysis of this dream, in several sessions. it appeared that the knight in harness only tried to prevent the eye to move toward the land. The reason was that this eye would have to pass a lattice-work and would fall through it. This lattice was associated to his mother's psyche: that she threatened his Ur-ego, the eye. The result of this situation, as a matter of fact, was that the knight in harness was co-operating with the mother: his actual ego, as a mirror-effect, helped the mother in preventing the orgastical experience in the ovum when the Ur-ego would enter it.

As to hallucinations and fallacies in his case an example can be instructive. During his analysis he decided to accept some work. Therefore he had to travel by train every day to another town. Waiting for his train toward the other town suddenly he had the fallacy that the court of justice and the police were searching after him. He got vehement fears.

The fallacy of police, etc. had already been produced in former days during his analysis and it referred to the compulsory neurotic aspects of his mother.

In psychiatry such a fallacy is mostly interpreted as one form or other of unconscious resistance which breaks through the ego as a fallacy. This interpretation is only partly right. Such fallacies, namely, were always produced at such a moment, or situation when this analysand intended to "be himself." In the case of his travel to his work, his intention was to be independent. Just in this situation with this intension the fallacies interrupted to "be himself". The interpetation of these fallacies is that at the moment the analysand thought to be free and "himself," the conceptional engram, engraved by his mother, became activated causing these fearful fallaces.

It is as if his mother were warning him: "don't try to become free from me, as I will capture you in my narcissistic globe". In order to overcome such fallacies this interpretation is proved to be right and helpful.

The fact that such an engram causes a fallacy, or hallucination, points to the fact that the conceptional engram is not his "own", but that it is put on his psyche by his mother. The engram can be compared to any psychotraumatic engram and the treatment is in principle quite the same as any neurotic symptom.

VI. Two types of maternal pathogenic compulsion

The description of the "schizophrenogenic mother is well-known, specially in psychoanalytical literature. This type of pathogenic compulsion refers to the postnatal relation between mother and child. The pathological character starts during the mother child symbiosis and is continued during the child's psychological development. A principal point in it is that this kind of mother does not allow any personal and free development of the child, keeping it as part of her own psyche.

The question, however, of a deeper insight in the psychodynamical structure of such a schizophrenogenic mother is not answered by this description. During the conception-analysis of schizoid borderline-cases the pathogenic structure of the mother also comes to the fore. The split of the schizo's ego appears to be caused by a mother who shows an "oceanic narcissistic" all-world in herself, as I have called it. On the one hand, this oceanic narcissism means a strong defence against a really orgastical experience during sexual intercourse. On the other hand, specially with regard to the process of fertilization, it also counteracts the conceptional-orgastical experience of the new individual.

In order to Get a nearer insight in this mechanism one can mention the following points. 1. In such cases ovulation means a "loss" of ovarian totality; it means a break-through the maternal all-world; 2. If one imagines this all-world as a kind of immaterial globe, this mother tries to keep this ovum after ovulation as part of this globe; 3. The double bind at the conceptional level of the new individual is based on (a) the sexual "wish" to be fertilized by the sperm and (b) the maternal wish to keep this ovum within her globe of oceanic narcissism; 4. The conceptional orgastical experience of this new individual becomes "reflected" on the maternal globe as an attempt to keep the ovum within the domain of the maternal narcissism; 5. This reflected mirror-image, however, of the original orgastical state has the same peculiarity as any mirror-image insofar the "spin" of the mirror-image is reversed: original left becomes right and vice versa. The result is that the love-aspect of the original orgastical experience becomes a "hate" aspect in the mirror-image; 6. For the new individual this means a depersonalization in this way that it cannot experience any personal orgastical state without at the same time a destructive experience of "hate" : "am I part of my mother's psyche, or am I myself." Both aspects are "engraved", or deeply impressed in the psyche of the new individual; 7. As to the underlying maternal structure this compulsory neurotic character becomes clear if one compares ovulation, being a loss of ovarian totality and potency, with postnatal compulsory neurotic symptoms and specially with anal-libidinal structures: the loss of faeces means a break-through the physical sense of totality; 8. Supposing that one X chromosome, representing an ovarian function of "mothering" the ova in the ovary (which namely runs parallel with some hormonal qualities), in the fertilized ovum this X chromosome maintains the "globe-aspect" of this kind of maternal narcissism in a destructive way: hate against orgasm; 9. The question whether this kind of schizoid borderline-cases can be analyzed and can free itself from the destructive (hate) factor depends on the question whether the biological aspects, described here, have to be accepted as "congenital" in the new individual's psyche, or whether these biological aspects have caused an "engram" in the new individual's psyche. When in such cases the pathology refers to psychodynamic engrams, just as in postnatally causing neuroses, the principal question whether these patients can be cured by abreacting and consciously re-working the original psychotrauma might be answered in the affirmative. In my experience this question seems hopeful. Surely, when first of all the pathology of the conceptional processes is analyzed, it will appear that via further dream-analysis the "fixation" on the maternal psyche, which is the base of the double bind can be re-worked consciously.

Freud was right that in narcissistic psychoses masses of aggressions are hidden. These aggressions refer to the "hate" component which originates from the mother's psyche.

The other form of borderline, the cycloid one, tends towards the maniac-depressive psychosis. They show slightly maniac as well as depressive symptoms. The depressive borderline-case, however, may give rise to suicidal tendencies which can manifest themselves "unexpectedly". The underlying, conceptional processes in this form have quite another character. Also in this analytical treatment the help of anti-depressive medicaments cannot be missed. As to the conceptional mechanism the following principle points can be mentioned. 1. The X chromosome in the ovum which is a derivation of the father of the mother's sperm plays a central role: the grandfather-like X chromosome. This chromosome offers strong resistance against the penetrating sperm; 2. The battle between these two forms the compulsory repetition in the cycloid borderline-cases insofar as during the depression the vital energy on the sperm's side seems to fade away; 3. When the grandfatherlike X chromosome would win the battle there would be no fertilization; the unfertilized ovum would die (suicide as compulsory repetition); 4. When the sperm finally would win the battle, it would have lost too much energy so that a real orgastical experience cannot happen; 5. I suppose that the grandmotherlike X chromosome has to be "animated" by the sperm's energy. But by the loss of energy in the battle with the grandfatherlike X chromosome, this grandmotherlike X chromosome is not enough animated so that in the maniac state a seemingly orgastical state appears without, however, being adjusted to "reality": an overaccentuated eros (sexualized or de-sesexualized); 6. Freud is right when supposing that also in such cases enormous masses of aggressions are hidden: aggressions from the side of the grandfatherlike X chromosome; 7. The X chromosome, however, refers to the maternal erotic aspects. So, the question arises which kind of maternal structure is the underlying base of this pathological process. It is my strong conviction that this maternal structure can be typified by the tendency of over activity in daily life: "I'll do it as nobody else can do it as well"; 8. This conviction, moreover, finds a slight support in those cycloid borderline-cases where the question is put by the patient whether perhaps he or she would be a homosexual, or lesbian. It might be that this question is related to an attempt to give in regarding the constant battle in this way that the patient tries to accept that the grandfather like X chromosome has won the battle, as if his or her mother fertilized the ovum. In postnatal life such cases have a deep admiration as well as a deep hate regarding the mother; 9 In postnatal life, and during the education this maternal structure of over-activity results in (a) spoiling the child by taking upon herself the solving of any difficulty and (b) breaking off the spontaneous development of the child by making this child dependent on her over-activity; 10. Although in this description the final result of maternal types seems the same: no spontaneous development of the child, this similarity is a superficial one. Regarding the schizoid cases the destructive tendencies, incorporated from the mother by engram, are deeper impressed, and more disturbing the child's feeling of being a personality of its own, whereas in cycloid cases the sensation of having an own personality remains, although mixed with aggressions, in the maniac state extrovertly, in the depressive state directed towards the own ego. The schizoid has no idea of possessing a personality of his own.

In the case of the cycloid patient the mother prevents a really orgastical experience by over-activity of "I'll do it"; in the case of a schizoid patient the mother's attitude towards her own orgastical experience is one of enmity. Both types of mothers suffer from a form of compulsory neurosis, the one based on fear of losing ovarian totality and potency, the other based on fear of being "influenced", a form of de-sexualized eros.

In both types of borderline cases the compulsory repetition through life seems te be dependent on the engrams of the conceptional disturbances which supposedly are due to a delay of meiosis in the ovum.

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II

On Logical Possibility

Ganesh Prasad Das

Fifty years back, one used to take twelve hours to travel from Bhubaneswar to Balasore by a passenger train. When fast trains came, the time was reduced to five hours. It was further reduced to three hours by cars on the free highway. Technology has made it possible to traverse the distance in thirty minute time by air though service planes for this purpose are not available at present. It might be possible to still reduce the time to three minutes if one travels by some other conveyance which has not yet been invented but the invention of which can be theoretically conceived. Speaking in terms of theoretical conceivability, or, what is the same, logical possibility, one can say that the distance or space between Bhubaneswar and Balasore can be covered in a single second though it sounds very fantastic. Whether this can be made technically and empirically possible or not is an open question and an extra-logical question too. But is certain that one cannot cover the said space in no time. It is theoretically inconceivable, or, what is the same, logically impossible.

In some such manner the terms 'logical possibility' and 'logical impossibility' have been introduced in some introductory books on philosophical analysis.[1] In this note I want to submit that the introduction of these terms in philosophical discussion breed confusion instead of making some contribution towards clarity and that it is better to avoid using them.

David Hume wrote, "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise.*[2]

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[1] See, for example, John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, 2nd. Edn., 1967, R K.P., London, pp. 169-78.

Hume discussed the *kinds of objects* of human reason or human enquiry. These are, he said, either relations of ideas or matters of fact. There cannot be a conformable relation of any idea with any other idea. But there can be any variety of facts. The sun has been rising till today. But it may not rise to-morrow. The fact of its not rising would be surprising and, indeed, very much dangerous for us, but, nontheless, it is possible, logically possible, strictly speaking. It is not, however, possible that any set of ideas may combine conformably because in some cases there might be contradiction.

In Hume's philosophy, one does not find a neat distinction between philosophy and psychology as one finds it in contemporary literature. There is a clear distinction between matters of fact and descriptions of matters of fact. Strictly speaking, descriptions couched in propositions are contrary or contradictory, matters of fact are not. A philosopher is concerned only with description and diction. His task is to probe into the intelligibility of description and diction. But Hume, as the above quotation shows, speak about contradiction of facts.

A new twist is given to this concept of possibility in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus.*[3] In this treatise of the '20's, Wittgenstein enquired into the function of language as a vehicle of thought about the world. He maintained that the world consists of simple facts called atomic facts. The thought is a logical picture of facts, which is a significant proposition. Language gets related to the facts *via* thought. As the world consists of atomic facts, so the language consists of simple propositions called elementary propositions. An elementary proposition represents an atomic fact. (All other propositions called complex propositions must be reduced to these elementary propositions in order to determine their significance) A proposition communicates a state of affairs and constitutes its sense[4]. The state of affairs may exist or may not exist. If it exists, the proposition that represents it or pictures it is true; otherwise the proposition is false.[5] In order to understand a proposition, one has to know what is the case if it is true.[6]

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[2] *Enquiries Concerning The Human Understanding And Concerning The Principles of Morals*, (Ed.) L.A. Selby Bigge, 1966, OUP, London, pp. 25-6. Hume's emphasis.

[3] (Tr) C. K. Ogden, 1922, R. K. P., London. Henceforth referred to as T.

[4] "One can say, instead of This proposition has such and such a sense, This proposition represents such and such a state of affairs". T. 4. 031. See also 2.221.

[5] See T. 2.222 and 4.3.

[6] T. 4.024.

It appears from the above elucidation of the philosophy of early Wittgenstein that meaning of a proposition is tagged with truth of it. Meaning is tagged not exactly with truth but with truth-condition of the proposition, that is the possibility of its being true. A change in meaning relation is taken as a change in truth-condition in this framework. This possibility is no empirical actuality, it is logical possibility.[7] Here logic is not to be taken in the narrow sense of traditional formal logic, but in the wide sense to mean the logic of language that deals with meaning and understanding in general. The logical possibility is unitary. All the possibilities (logical) are given once and for all; a new possibility cannot subsequently be found,[8] for the simple reason that logic is a-temporal, i.e., transcendental.[9] So one is not allowed to speak of possibilities in logic and one is allowed to speak of it elsewhere. As logical necessity is unitary, so logical impossibility is also unitary[10].

This concept of logical possibility undergoes a sea-change in the hands of the logical positivists of the '40's. Like Wittgenstein, the logical positivists link meaning of a proposition with truth of the proposition. "The meaning of a proposition lies in its method of verification."[11] A statement is meaningful to a person "if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or to reject it as being false."[12] So, meaning is dependent on verifiability or the possibility of verification. This verifiability or possibility of verification is distinguished under practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. We are able to verify only a limited number of statements. But we understand quite a lot more, because we can lay down conditions under which those can be verified. Ayer gives the example of the existence of mountains on the farther side of the moon as being verifiable in principle. But that has now become practically verifiable. So we can say with Alston that "There is life on other galaxies"[13] is an example of varifiability in principle.

Wittgenstein remained strictly in the realm of logic. He did not talk about verifiability or possibility of verification. Verification

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7 "The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space." T. 2.202. See also 2.203.

8 T. 2.0123.

9 T. 6. 13. Also 5. 552.

10 T. 6. 375.

11 Passmore's version in *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, 1968, Penguin Books, p. 368.

12 Ayer, *Language. Truth and Logic*, 2nd. Edn., 1946, 17th. impression, 1967, Victor Gollancz, London, p. 35. Cf. T 4. 024.

13 *Philosophy of Language*, 1964, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, p. 70.

smacks of subjectivism. Logic being timeless and objective, he spoke only about the possible existence of affairs in *logical space*. But the logical positivists speak of possible existence of facts in *physical space*. Wittgenstein does not distinguish between logical possibility and factual possibility, "Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilties are its facts."[14] But there is such a distinction for the logical positivists. And, there is a difficulty in their views in talking about the possible existence of facts in physical space. The world is not constructed out of and, therefore, not divisible into blocks of facts, as it were. Wittgenstein said that the world consists of facts from a particular standpoint as we have noted, that is, from the standpoint of meaning and understanding. The force of his statement is that the world *must* be everything that is the case.

The statements of the logical positivists convey an impression as if 'fact' is an indispensable category for our discourse about the world. But no such compunction seems to be there outside the perview of a particular philosophical viewpoint. It depends upon the purpose and strategy which category to posit. It can equally well be asserted that the world consists of things or it consists of events.[15]

The point is that the world not divide naturally into fact. Moreever, what, after all, is to be called a fact, is, itself, a philosophical issue. "How", Peter Herbst asks, "shall we get clear about what to include or what to exclude from amongst facts?" and writes a long essay in his bid to answer it.[16] He assumes the task of examining the use of those phrases in which the word 'fact' occurs.

In the instance cited at the beginning of this note, we observed that it is 'logically impossible' to cover the space between Bhubaneswar and Balasore in no time. It does not pay to present things in clear light. Instead of saying that a state of affairs or situation is logically impossible, it is more appropriate and just to say that a diction is *contra*-diction that speaks of an event, or, to be accurate, of a movement without employing the concept of time. Philosophers have got used to the idiom 'logically impossible' because of the shortcomings of traditional logic in formulating the 'laws of thought' which, they said, were the 'laws of things', which Hospers has not failed to observe.[17] The first of these 'laws' lays down that a thing cannot be at two different places at the same time. Accordingly, one cannot be at Bhubaneswar and at Balasore at the same moment. One's replica or picture can be at different places at the same time, or, one can be at different places with a time lag of even a single moment. But, to remind what is only obvious, it is not the business of the philosopher to deal with things or states of affairs (physical). It deals with rules and roles of concepts in human communication. It examines which moves and manipulations are possible, which moves and manipulations are permissible and which are not. He asserts that it is not permissible to employ the concept of a (physical) body or (physical) change without presupposing the concept of time (and also the concept of space). If somebody violates the prohibition, as it were, his expression becomes contradictory, self stultifying, vacuous or bereft of sense. (For the present purpose I take these epithets as synonymous). Accordingly, it is a contradiction to speak of a physical body without making spatio temporal identification of it. It is said that jumping from the earth and falling on the moon is 'logically possible; but falling upwards is 'logically impossible'.[18] I am afraid whether the predicate 'jump' can be meaningfully applied in inter-stellar affairs because we are told that all the astral bodies are revolving in one and the same plane. Supposing this, can be meaningfully applied, one will be debarred from relating the predicate 'upwards' with the predicate 'fall', if 'fall' will be taken to mean 'downwards'. If one relates them against the prohibition imposed by the rules of language, one produces a contradiction. So, for finding out what is 'logically possible' and what is 'logically impossible', one does not have to look beyond language and its rules. One has to look wholly and solely to the logic of language or to what the latter Wittgenstein calls, logical grammar.[19] So, the philosopher cannot talk about the 'empirical possibility' or the 'logical possibility of this fact or that. He can only talk about the sense or meaning or intelligibility of this description or that, of this diction or that.

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[14] T. 2 0121.

[15] Milne in *Cosmology* maintains, "The universe is the totality of things", whereas S. Alexander in *Philosophy And History* maintains that the world is a world of events.

[16] "The Nature of Facts" in *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* (Ed.) A. Flew, 1966, Macmillan, pp. 134-56.

[17] *Op. cit.* p. 210.

Authors like Hospers create an impression that logical possibility is an extension of technical possibility which is, in its turn, an extension of empirical possibility[20], and that these three types of

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18 Hospers, *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

19 *Philosophical Investigations*, (Tr.) G. E. M. Anscombe, 1958, Basil Blackwell & Mott, Blackwell paperback, 1976, Sec. 520.

20 Sea-fire is an empirical possibility and test-tube baby is a technical possibility. Empirical possibility is that which happens without the application of techniques, artificial tools and know-hows of various sorts. It becomes a technical possibility which happens by the application of techniques, artificial tools and know-hows of various sorts. So they differ only in degree. Both are possibilities in the realm of facts, for that matter.

'possibilities' lie on the same plane. But logical possibility is not a type of possibility alongside of empirical or technical possibility. It cannot said to be a limiting case of the latter. If we take in the distinction of Hospers uncritically and overlook the context in which it came into currency, then there is every possibility of being led astray. Questions become significant and the answers there to become illuminating if we get redemption from the above confusion.[21] A question as to whether such and such is 'logically possible' or not asks, in effect, whether the move of this concept or that in a particular manner in a partcular context is permissible or not.

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[21] This confusion appears complete in the writing of the philosopher-novelist Raja Rao. Ramaswamy, the hero of his famous *The Serpant And The Rope* has a natural love of impossible—"I can think that a building may just decide to fly, or that Stalin may become a saint, or all the Japanese have become Buddhist monks, or that Mahatma Gandhi is walking with us now...".

III

The Similarities of Mystical Thinking—St. Teresa, St. John of the Cross and the Bhagavad Gita

Ronald P. Anjard

In our life odessy, each of us develops our own philosophies of life I recently found some beautiful concepts, like poetry, coupling the east and the west. By sharing these with you now, you will have a deeper appreciation of both the sources and the concepts. St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross are truly Christian Mystics. And to those who understand the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, it is deeply mystical too. This may, at first glance, seem to be a strange coupling. Simply, then, let me now share commonalities of love, joy and prayer.

A Sharing : St. John of the Cross says that "it is love alone that unites the soul with God." and St. Teresa says ' What matters is not to think so much, but to love much." She adds "The love of God must not be built by our own imagination, but must be tried by works." These same ideas are also in the spirit of the Bhagavad Gita. The vision of God is the grace of God; but the grace of God is the reward of the love of man.

A Sharing : All true love is love of Eternity and the inner light of being is revealed only when the clouds of being disappear. In the Gita it says, "Even as all the waters flow into the ocean, but the ocean never overflows; even so the sage feels desires but he is ever one in his infinite peace." Man can only find peace in the Infinite, not the finite. This is so clearly expressed by St. John of the Cross: "When you set your heart in many things, you cease to throw yourself in the All." If we desire anything for its finite pleasure, we shall miss its infinite joy. In the Gita, simply, "Leave all things behind." St. John tells us how we are able to leave all things behind and not to look back : "It is not to leave a vacuum in the soul, but to desire the highest in all with the fire of burning love."

A Sharing : When describing the state of man who has found joy in God, the Gita says "When in recollection, he withdraws all his senses from the attractions of the pleasure of sense, even as a tortoise withdraws all its limbs, then his is a serene wisdom." St. Teresa uses the same imaging when she describes the prayer of recollection : "I think I read somewhere that the soul is like a tortoise or sea-urchin which retreats into itself. Who ever said this no doubt understood what he was talking about."

A Sharing : A spirit of tolerance is basic to St. Teresa when she suggested that her nuns avoid too much zeal. "There is no reason why we should want everyone to follow our own path." This same sense of harmony is found again and again in the Gita, "In any way that men love me, in the same way they find my love." and "Even those who in faith worship other gods, because of their love, they worship me."

A Sharing : St. John of the Cross says "In order to be All, do not desire to be anything. In order to know All, do not desire to know anything. In order to find the joy of All, do not desire to enjoy anything." The sense of being is the sense of Brahman, God, in the Gita. To, be, to know and to find joy—correspond to the Hindu "Being, Consciousness and Joy."

A Sharing : Prayer is a means to describe inner union. It's interesting to compare this concept of the Gita with a passage by St. Peter of Alcantara, the teacher of St. Teresa: "In meditation, we consider carefully divine things and we pass from one to another, so that the heart may feel love. It is as though we should strike a flint and draw a spark of fire. But in contemplation, the spark is struck." The love we were seeking is really here. The soul enjoys silence and peace, not by many reasonings but by simply contemplating the truth.

These concepts are in themselves meditation themes. They are purposely presented in duality to show the universality of mystical thoughts. I'd like to suggest that you "mentally" remove all the references and then you will see the real beauty of these sharings and this real universalness. Each one of us can be a mystic, even in today's world if we truly seek perfection and seek union with God. My blessings to you in your odessy of life !

IV

Agency and Action

Kenneth D. Stephens

It has long been held by philosophers that there is an important relationship between causality and action, and that a full account of human action must include the idea that a doer is, in one way or other, a causal agent. But philosophers have been far from clear as to what this view really amounts to, and there have been large differences of opinion. The aim of this paper is to examine some important contemporary theories in which it is proposed that an action, or at least some actions, are describable or analyzable by reference to the notion of *bringing something about* or *making something happen.* Thus, for example, according to Arthur C. Danto, *some* actions fall under the general description of "causing something to happen."[1] At least two other thinkers have put forward a view according to which *all*, and not merely *some*, actions should be said to fall under the description mentioned by Danto.

I shall argue first that it simply will not do to analyze the notion of an action by reference to the notion of (causal) agency, and give reasons why views like those of Kenny and Chisholm are unsound. Next, I shall try to clarify the distinction, due to Danto, between basic and nonbasic actions. The underlying problem is whether or not there indeed are nonbasic actions, i.e., actions that are caused by other actions. Exploration of the problem leads to the conclusion that the idea of an action's being caused by another action is a doubtful one. Danto's theory in particular suffers from a confusion between : (a) an act, (b) an agent's causing of that act, (c) the event which an agent causes, and (d) the agent's causing of that event.

Kenny's thesis is that, roughly, an action is the same thing as the bringing about of a state or of an activity. More precisely, if

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[1] Arthur C. Danto, "Basic Actions," in *Readings in the Theory of Action*, ed. by Norman S. Care and Charles Landesman (Bloomington, Indiana : Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 93.

O-ing is an action, then there is a present-tensed sentence "S" and either a state or an activity E such that "S" can be used to make a statement *of* E, and O-ing is the same thing as bringing it about that S.[2] Thus take the action of painting Lord Beaconsfield's statue scarlet. With respect to this action there is the sentence "Lord Beaconsfield's statue is scarlet" which can be used to make a statement *of* the state of Lord Beaconsfield's statue being scarlet. Furthermore, the action of painting Lord Beaconsfield's statue scarlet is the same thing as *bringing it about that Lord Beaconsfield's statue is scarlet.*

In his article "Freedom and Action", Chisholm speaks in the same vein about the descriptive element in the concept of an act. "We must say," he writes, "that at least one of the events that is involved in any act is caused, not by any other event, but by the agent, by the man."[3] He also speaks of an act as being "essentially telelogical."[4] Then, attempting more rigorously "to set forth the descriptive element in the concept of action by an undefined locution, one indicating both that the agent is a cause and that the action is purposive or teleological," he proposes the following :

> There is a state of affairs A and a state of affairs, B, such that at time t, he makes B happen in the endeavor to make A happen.[5]

This is presumably meant to be the *analyzans* of some "if and only if" thesis. Unfortunately, it is far from clear just what is supposed to be the *analyzandum*. The intended *analyzandum*, along with the intended thesis as a whole, ought to be stated as follows : A statement of the form "Agent a performed an action at time t" is true if and only if the corresponding statement of the following form is true:

> There is a state of affairs A and a state of affairs B such that agent a makes B happen at time t in the endeavor to make A happen.

Such is Chisholm's attempt "to describe *action* in terms of *making happen*—or, more accurately, in terms of making things happen *in the endeavor* to make things happen."[6] We have, here, a thesis quite similar to Kenny's : If O-ing is an action, then there are states A and B such that O-ing is the same thing as *making B happen in the endeavor to make A happen.* And to prevent confusion both Kenny's and Chisholm's thesis must be distinguished from a thesis mentioned by A. I. Melden[7] according to which *doing something* is identical with *making that thing happen*, or according to which a statement of the form "Agent a performed action A" is true if and only if the corresponding statement of the form "Agent a made A happen" is true. For, as Chisholm himself quite rightly points out, if O-ing is an action then, according to the thesis of Kenny and Chisholm, O-ing is identical not with the bringing about of the *action itself*, but, roughly, with something *else*, namely, a state of affairs. As Chisholm puts it, "the 'A's' and 'B's' of our formulae will not normally be replaceable by expressions which themselves refer to actions. If I am right, the man who raises his arm under ordinary circumstances will make something happen in the endeavor to make it happen, *not* that he raises his arm, but that his arm goes up."[8]

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[2] Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 177-78.

[3] Roderick M. Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in *Freedom and Determinism*, ed. by Keith Lehrer (New York : Random House, 1966), p. 29.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 29,

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

There are several reasons why neither Kenny's nor Chisholm's thesis is acceptable. There is, first, the fact that there are many actions which are not definable in any very natural way by means of the notion *making something happen*. Take the action of raising one's arm. Of which state of affairs is it true that action is identical with the bringing about of that state? The answer to this question would be: *one's arm being raised*. But this seems to have an air of artificiality about it. When we raise our arm in the ordinary way, we do not think of ourselves as bringing something about at all.

Chisholm is well aware that in regard to a case like raising one's arm there is a problem for his thesis, as is reflected in an important passage concerning his conception of *successful undertaking*.[9] But he allows his view to stand unaltered despite his awareness of its divergence from the way we ordinarily use the word "succeed". Actually, there is something that contradicts his overall theory in his remarks concerning so-called basic actions like raising one's arm. According to him, the statement "Chester Bowles performed the action of raising his arm" would be true if and only if the "statement"

> Chester Bowles succeeded in making the action of raising his arm happen (in the way in which he intended), and there is no B, other than raising his arm, which he undertook for the purpose of making the action of raising his arm happen

is true. But this fairly straightforwardly flies in the face of Chisholm's earlier claim, given above, that his view must be kept sharply distinct from the view that doing something is identical with making *that very same thing* happen, that, for example, "the man who raises his arm under ordinary circumstances will make something happen in the endeavor to make it happen, *not* that he raises his arm, but that his arm goes up." Furthermore, what does one make happen in such a case in the endeavor to make it happen that one's arm goes up ?

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[7] Abraham I. Melden, *Free Action* (New York: Humanities Press, 1961), p. 23

[8] Roderick M. Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in *Freedom and Determinism*, ed. by Keith Lehrer, p. 32.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

Where O ing is an action like raising one's arm, it is highly artificial to look for a state of affairs A such that O-ing is the same thing as bringing A about. If O-ing is such an action, then in the sort of case in which we are likely to make a statement of the form "Agent a O'd", there is no state of affairs A such that we are ordinarily prepared to make the corresponding statement of the form "Agent a made A happen".

Restricting ourselves to Kenny's thesis, there is the further objection that in any case if O-ing is an action there is not necessarily a *unique* state of affairs the bringing about of which is plausibly judged to be identical with O-ing. Kenny's theory does require that there be such a unique state of affairs, for how can there be two distinct states of affairs the bringing about of which are identical with one and the same thing, namely the action ?

That there is no unique state of affairs the bringing about of which is plausibly counted identical with O-ing, where O-ing is an action, may be seen by asking yourself of which *unique* state of affairs it would be true that the action of picking up the pieces of a dropped chandelier, say, is identical with the bringing about of that state of affairs. No sooner than we ask that question that we discover that there are a number of distinct states of affairs the choice of one of which must surely be arbitrary. Is the action identical with the bringing it about that the floor is clean ? Is it identical with bringing it about that the bits and pieces are gathered in a safe place ? It should be plain that neither of these states of affairs is identical with the other, and yet there seems to be no procedure by which we may pick out the unique state that is to be proposed to be identical with the action.

Furthermore, if E is the state of affairs the bringing about of which is allegedly identical with an action, say O-ing, the typically a statement of the form "Agent a brought E about" will not reveal the fact that agent a performed the action of O-ing. Indeed a statement of that form might well be true in a case where the corresponding statement of the form "Agent a performed the action of O-ing" is false. The statement "Miss Nightingale brought it about that the dishes were clean" does not reveal the information that Miss Nightingale washed the dishes, and may well be true even though "Miss Nightingale washed the dishes" is false, as should become clear if we ask ourselves : In what sorts of cases would we be prepared to regard as true a statement of the form "Agent a made E happen", where E is a state of affairs or an event? "David Hume made the chandelier drop from the ceiling" is, I suppose, as typical as any, and would naturally be made in answer to the question, "By whose agency did the chandelier drop from the ceiling?" If this is right then a person who makes the foregoing statement should communicate his meaning perfectly well by saying, "The chandelier dropped from the ceiling by the agency of David Hume." The meaning is that David Hume did something or other by which he caused the chandelier to drop from the ceiling. (Here the view should be dismissed as *completely* misconceived that a person who says that Hume made the chandelier drop from the ceiling says that Hume dropped the chandelier from the ceiling.) *What* Hume did by which he caused the chandelier to fall is here not given and is irrelevant: whether it was by banging on the floor upstairs with his silver standish or by shouting at the top of his voice, "You shall *not* steal my silver standish, Adam Smith!" that he caused the unfortunate event cannot affect, in regard to truth, the statement that it was by Hume's agency that the chandelier fell. The statement that David Hume made the chandelier drop from the ceiling does not imply the statement that David Hume dropped his silver standish on the floor upstairs.

The next objection has been made in a somewhat different way by Danto himself.[10] If an action *were* identical with making something E_1 happen, then there must be another action B by the performance of which E_1 is being made to happen. And if B in turn were identical with making something E_2 happen, then there must be still a third action C by the performance of which E_2 is being made to happen. And so on. And by means of this fact, it is easy to draw out the drastic consequence of the view that *every* action is identical with making something happen.

The views of Kenny and Chisholm must be distinguished from the view that *some* actions are the same thing as bringing something about. Danto himself holds this latter view, and we need now to examine his account and defense of it.

In Danto's account we find the following definition: 'B is a *basic action* of a if and only if (i) B is an action and (ii) whenever a performs B, there is no other action A performed by a such that B is caused by A.'[11] Now presumably the action of raising one's arm is intended by Danto to turn out to be a basic for most of us; and yet he does not wish to deny that there might well arise an occasion in which one of us performs that action in a way other than a

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[10] Arthur C. Danto, "Basic Actions," in *Readings in the Theory of Action*, ed. by Norman S. Care and Charles Landesman, pp. 102-103.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

"basic" way.[12] So clause (ii) does not express Danto's actual meaning Accordingly, let us reformulate the definitions in this way: O ing is a *basic action for (or in relation to) agent a* if and only if O ing is an action which is normally or naturally performed by agent a in such a way that there is no other action which he performs and which causes his performance of the action of O ing.

Danto regards the following thesis "as fundamental to the theory of action."

> *Thesis D1.* Not every action is a basic action.
>
> *Thesis D2.* If O ing is an action performed by agent a, then either O ing is a basic action for agent a or its performance is the effect of a chain of causes the originating member of which is the performance by agent a of an action which is a basic action for agent a.[13]

Our concern here is principally with Thesis D1. By the definitions of a basic and a nonbasic action, it reduces to the claim that *there are nonbasic actions.* For suppose that O-ing is not a basic action. Then O-ing is not an action which is normally or naturally performed in such a way that there is no other action whose performance causes the performance of the action of O ing. So O-ing must be an action which is normally or naturally performed by the performance of another action which causes the performance of the action of O ing. And similarly, if O ing is a nonbasic action, then O ing is not a basic action. I follows that O-ing is not a basic action if and only if O ing is a nonbasic action.

If O-ing is a nonbasic action then a man's act of O ing is an act that is normally or naturally *made to happen* by his performance of some other action. Its performance is a result or effect of a performance of another action. Hence if an agent a performs the non basic action of O ing, then we have a case in which we can say that agent a *brought his action of O-ing about* or *made his action of O-ing happen* Conversely, since, as we have argued earlier, the notion of bringing something about "implies" the notion of *agency* or the notion of doing something or other to bring that thing about, and in view of the definition of a nonbasic action, if an agent a makes his action of O-ing happen, then we can say that agent a performed the action of O ing and O ing is a nonbasic action. My point here is to bring out, from the fore-going, that nonbasic actions seem to be describable or definable by means of the notion of making something happen or, in short, the notion of *agency*, in the following way: O ing is a nonbasic action if and only if O-ing is an action that is made to happen or brought about. Alternatively, a statement of the form "Agent a performed the nonbasic action of O ing" is true if and only if the corresponding statement of the form "Agent a made his action of O-ing happen" is true.

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[12] Danto in fact writes: "I have avoided citing unconditional instances of basic actions, in part because any expression I might use, e g, 'moving a limb', could also be used to designate something that was caused to happen, or something that was not an action, much less a basic one. I think there is nothing that is always and in each of its instances an unmistakably basic action." *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

We now see more clearly the relationship between Thesis D1, or the thesis that nonbasic actions exist, and the view, roughly, that *some* actions are identical with making something happen: the former view entails the latter. For the foregoing reasoning seems to lead to the conclusion that if O ing is a nonbasic action, then O-ing is simply the same thing as making the action of O-ing happen. And we may, suggestively, call the action by the performance of which O-ing is performed, or by the performance of which man's act of O-ing is made to happen, the *subservient task action that corresponds to the nonbasic action of O-ing*. How then does Danto defend the view that nonbasic actions exist ?

His argument is best given in his own words :

> Any event that is sometimes a basic action admits of a description which leaves it unclear whether a basic action has really been performed. But some actions admit of comparable descriptions which, while they leave it unclear whether an action has really been performed, at least make it clear that a *basic* action has *not* been performed. So not every action is a basic action [14]

At least two critical remarks seem to be worth making in regard t Danto's general view, particularly as it is expressed in the above passage.

First, observe that the conclusion that not every action is a basic action by no means *follows* from the claim that in such and such a case or on such and such an occasion a basic action was not performed. That conclusion would follow from that claim as premise, given Thesis D2, if we had in addition the information that *some action or other* had been perfo-med. But *this* information is neither stated in nor implied by the context. On the contrary, we seem only to have such information as "to leave it unclear whether an action has really been performed."

My second remark has to do with Danto's *examples* of nonbasic actions. As an example of this type of action, he suggests that "raising a hat seems to be a natural candidate." The chief problem here is that of determining whether the nature of the difference between the action of raising one's hat and the action of raising one's arm (as one normally does) warrants Danto's classification of the former action as a nonbasic action and his classification of the latter as a basic action. His central idea is this: Of the action of raising one's arm he holds that a man performs that action *without causing it to rise*, whereas of the action of raising one's hat he holds that a man *cannot* perform that action without causing it to rise "But the question I am concerned with," he writes, "is whether it is possible that we might move hats the way we do move an arm, ***not*** by causing them to move (and discharging psychic energy would only be a special kind of cause). but by *just* moving them—the way we move our arms: as *basic* actions."[15] The question is answered by Danto in the negative. Again, according to the passage quoted above, notice that the action of raising one's right arm, say. is said to be a basic action when it is performed without *causing* the arm to rise, and presumably such is the case when it is performed in the normal and natural way; whereas it is said to be a nonbasic action when it is "performed" in such a way that the right arm is pushed up with the left arm. that is, when the right arm is *made* or *caused* to rise "by pushing it up" with the left arm.[16] In the latter case it resembles the action of raising one's hat.

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[14] Arthur C. Danto, "What We Can Do." in *Readings in the Theory of Action*, ed. by Norman S. Care and Charles Landesman, pp. 114.115.

Observe first, however, that not all actions that are intended by Danto to be nonbasic actions are very easily susceptible to the foregoing kind of description. If the action of raising one's hat is causing one's hat to rise (for that is what Danto's view amounts to). what would the action of picking up the broken pieces of a dropped chandelier be ? Causing each one of them to rise ? What one says here is at best surely artificial and the theory hardly bears a natural extension to sitil more difficult cases.

In any case, I do not think that Danto's view will hold up even in the central case. Suppose that Galbraith raised his hat when Mrs. Gandhi met him at the Secretariat. Now according to the passage quoted above, there is an event *of* which a certain instance of the form "Agent a's hat rose at time t", namely "Galbraith's hat rose when Mrs. Gandhi met Galbraith", is the statement. Furthermore, Galbraith caused this event, and his act of raising his hat simply *is* his causing the event.[17] But surely the utterance "Galbraith's

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15 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

16 Actually, in a case where a man "pushes up" his right arm with his left, it would be erroneous to say simply that he raised his right arm or that he performed the basic *or* nonbasic action of raising his right arm. Our concepts of particular actions like raising one's right arm are determined, interestingly enough, by the way they are or would be normally or naturally performed.

17 Arthur C. Danto, "Basic Actions," in *Readings in the Theory of Action*, ed. by Norman S. Care and Charles Landesman, p. 93.

hat rose when Mrs. Gandhi met Galbraith" is more than slightly awkward. It sounds much like "Galbraith's hat rose and walked away..." It is surely at best an *artificial* view which equates the action of raising one's hat *in the natural and normal way* with causing the hat to rise.

But even if we grant that raising one's hat in the natural and normal way is identical with causing one's hat to rise, there is still the difficulty that alone is not sufficient to establish that action as a nonbasic action. In order to establish that the action of raising one's hat is a nonbasic action, Danto needs to show that it is an action which is normally or naturally performed by the performance of *another* action which causes *the performance of the action of raising one's hat*. What Danto must show, then, is that the alleged *event* of which "Galbraith's hat rose when Mrs Gandhi met Galbraith is the statement is the same thing as Galbraith's *performance* of the action of raising his hat when Mrs. Gandhi met him at the Secretariat. Danto cannot show this for be has already identified Galbraith's performance with his *causing* that very event, which latter cannot be identified with the event itself. There is a very deep confusion here, the confusion, namely, between the following things: the alleged event just mentioned, Galbraith's act Galbraith's alleged causing of the event, and Galbraith's alleged causing of his act.

In any event, it would be fruitless to identify Galbraith's act with the alleged event of which "Galbraith's hat rose when Mrs. Gandhi met Galbraith" is the supposed statement. An appreciation of the nature of such a statement rules out *this* move as well as ruling out the identification of his act with his causing the alleged event.[18]

I conclude from all this that Danto has not shown in any very clear and plausible way that the action of raising one's hat is *either* causing one's hat to rise *or* causing a certain performance. Actually, it seems that raising one's hat is a *basic* action. After all, do not the sufficient and necessary conditions of an action's being a basic action hold in regard to the action of raising one's hat? Does not this action seem to be an action which is normally and naturally performed in such a way that there is no other action whose performance causes the performance of the former action? In the same way as we *just raise our arm* without doing something else *first* by means of which we raise our arm, we *just raise our hat* without doing anything else *first* by means of which we raise our hat. Now of course when we raise our hat in the normal and natural way we first *take hold of* the hat. But of this two things must be said. First, we don't raise our hat *by* (just) taking hold of it in the way in which we (often) open a door by turning the knob and pushing: you can take hold of your hat as diligently as you want, but you will not *raise* your hat by (just) doing that. Secondly, and more importantly, your taking hold of the hat can hardly be said to be the *cause* (or a cause) of your raising your hat. Therefore, given the definition of a basic action, the action of raising one's hat is a basic action, just as surely as is the action of raising one's arm.

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[18] It must be said that Danto sometimes speaks as though a man's act of raising his hat *is* identical with the alleged event of which "The man's hat rose" is the supposed statement.

It might be thought that genuine cases of nonbasic actions should not be hard to find. Consider, in conclusion, the action that is stated in the statement "Francis was killing the snake with a stick." Francis is here being said to have been *doing* something, so we don't have here an example of an achievement (in Ryle's sense). It might be thought: Surely here we have a case of a nonbasic action. After all, is not Francis killing the snake *by* doing something else, say by *beating* the snake? And cannot her activity of beating the snake be said to be the *cause* of her activity of killing the snake?

The Answer to the latter question is No, and one clear way of bringing out why is that it will not do to say here that Francis was killing the snake with a stick *because* or *as a result of the fact that* she was beating the snake with a stick. It is important here to appreciate the fact that in this sub-case *killing the snake* is being treated as a *basic* action. To be sure, it is natural to say that Francis was killing the snake by beating the snake with a stick. Still, whatever it was that Francis was doing here *as a basic action*—and in Danto's view there *must* be a performance of a basic action in order for there to be a performance of a nonbasic action (see Thesis D2)—is here being said to be precisely the action of killing the snake (with a stick).

There seems, then, no compelling evidence in favour of the view that there are such things as nonbasic actions. It looks to me, on the contrary, that if something is an action then it is a basic action.

V

Interfaith Peace: A Commentary On the Nicene Creed

Del Lawhon & Paul Mays

In the present crisis in World History, there is much ado about the threat of Atomic Warfare and Policy of various State Departments; and among philosophers there is increasing concern with the "Meeting of East and West" in terms of Cultural Synthesis or syntheses, as the case may or may not be. But still, among theologians, even the most liberal, among all faiths, who have not become apostate, there is too little real thinking, and indeed, too much ignorance in the field that is usually termed Comparative Religion. While the Politicians, or rather the Statesmen of the world are trying to do something to "iron things out," the ordinary sort of Christian preacher is still trying to make converts to his particular interpretation of the Creed instead of trying to be a peacemaker in the already conflicting world of cold and hot war between the religions.

This essay is therefore meant primarily for Christians, but is offered also to those of other faiths who would like to know a little about what might be a way of reconciliation, even within their own traditions. Hindus and Buddhists for the most part are more tolerant than Muslims and Christians, but often they are less well informed, so that unnecessarily they take a defensive attitude. It is hoped, therefore that they will not take this as a concealed and false way of seeking their conversion, but rather as a means of finding—or at least of searching for—some more basic and fundamental Universal Truths, which, though not necessarily leading to the formulation of a World Faith all anew, may afford a view of what God has been trying to do. The Nicene Creed was the outcome of much deliberation, at a time not unlike our own, between all the basic Faiths of the world, with the exception of Islam, which came later, and may have even been a culmination in the development of the Arian party that was defeated by the Athanasians at that Council; the Roman Empire was on the verge of political collapse, but at the height of cultural and intellectual development. Hence it should not be surprising if, when properly re examined, much may be found that is needed in our own time. The Creed is not a weapon of conversion, therefore, but a formulation of basic and profound Understanding, if not of Revelation.

It follows :

> I believe in One God, the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth, and of all things visible and invisible.
>
> And in One Lord, Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, Begotten before the Worlds, God of God, Light of Light. very God of Very God, begotten, not made; being of one substance with the Father; by Whom all things were made. Who for us men and for our salvation came down from Heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary; and was made Man. He suffered also for us under Pontias Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; and the third day he rose again according to the Scriptures, and ascended into Heaven; from whence he shall come again to judge both the quick and the dead; whose Kingdom shall have no end.
>
> And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life; who proceedeth from the Father (and the Son) by some churches who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified; who spoke by the prophets. And I believe in One Holy catholic and Apostolic Church; I acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins; and I look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen.

Now : I BELIEVE IN ONE GOD :

First - *I* BELIEVE. Individual liberty of conscience is not denied, but is emphasized. Belief must be voluntary and personal. No type of conflict can coerce it.

Second : I *BELIEVE*. Not a matter of signing on the dotted line, or of being bound, under pain of persecution or excommunication, at a set of 'dogmatic' (the word dogmatic originally meant only *opinion* !) doctrines; rather an engagement with the Truth as best as it can be formulated in finite form.

Third : IN *ONE* GOD. Here is where the Historic Revolt of Mohammed is a great challenge still to us all. How many of us who think of ourselves as Monotheists still in the back of our minds have the conception that images, etc. of the 'heathen' are *false* gods —as though there could be any false God or gods ! Or, more seriously, how true it is in every nation or culture of the world, that it is always the *others* that are 'uncivilized', 'barbarian', 'heathen', 'underdeveloped', *Kafir*, untouchable, or what have you ! If there is only One God, moreover, why all the *stupid* objection to worshipping him equally in Church, Mosque or Temple? *Worship God wherever you can find Him!* This should be the First Commandment of any religion worth the name. Yet, even in our own time, how much blood has been spilt on the door steps of 'Holy' places! And even when, all too often, one sees a sign "All are welcome", one is *not* welcome because he belongs to the wrong race or the wrong faith or caste, or because one is not properly dressed.

Fourth: IN ONE *GOD*. A much handied word, which some people would like to do without. Neither Science nor superstition gives any substitute...It is often claimed, for example, that the Lord Buddha was an atheist. Nothing could be farther from the truth. He was rather a Great Reformer just as Jesus Christ, or Krishna or Mohammed were, seeking to put New Life into a situation that had degenerated on the one hand into superstition, and dried up into empty hypocrisy by the other.

Fifth: THE FATHER ALMIGHTY. From the world-wide perspective, this in popular Christianity is the basis of too much sentimentality. But systemmatically, it represents very much, True it is that there is really no more reason for considering God as father than there is for considering God as mother, or as neuter. The Mother concept is more common in the Asiatic countries, the neuter as more reasonable among scientifically minded 'moderns' as well as higher Hinduism. Brahman (not to be confused with Brahma), the personal or symbolic Deity who sits on the lotus coming out of the navel of Vishnu, being a term with neuter gender, scarcely translatable, except as Reality, or Being.

The important thing is that any full conception of Deity must include, even at the risk of anthropomorphism the *personal* aspect. It is much more reasonable to conceive of God as superpersonal rather than as impersonal, personality being defined as capacity for relationality. Some forms of meditation stress identification with God; the Ego must be expanded until it becomes the divine 'I AM'; others stress the Thou, before Whom the human ego bows in abject self negation; still others stress the Objective Truth, the 'Thatness' (*tathata* is the Sanskrit, Tao the Chinese term) of Deity. Certainly God be *at least* these, both in full conjunction and in dynamic differentiation; and sainthood correspondingly might be defined as the full realization, both in vision and in practice and prayer, that this is so and that a certain *familiarity* with God in all the possible combinations of these relationalities is not only possible but is enjoined.

In a word, God is Love: love of self, love of fellow-creatures—not just one's all-too-human 'neighbor' only, but all living things, for as science has shown so vividly, we are all only One Life in different forms, for which reason vegetarianism is highly to be commended, although even in eating vegetables one can devoutly reflect, "I am only eating another part of myself!" But it is all one Love, and that love is God; for which reason the word Almighty is added, lest in the familiarity the awesomeness and all-embracingness of the Love be compromised... All the technical theological arguments about the omniscience and omnipresence, etc. of God, which one finds in all religions, when treated in this light are simply melted away.

Sixth: MAKER OF HEAVEN AND EARTH, AND OF ALL THINGS VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE. One important issue that arises from this clause is that of the coincidence of Creator-Preserver Destroyer that one finds in the Hindu conception of the trinity of Brahma Vishnu Shiva. It must be admitted that traditional Christianity is weak here, having been influenced too much by the dualism of Zoroastrianism. Destruction as such is not evil, but can be a great good. The finite world as we know it is full of evil, perhaps inevitably; finitude is limitation, *avidva*, blindness, Ignorance; the 'world', according to some mythologies, was created, as it were, by seducing God out of His sovereign splendid isolation; or, more positively, by some theologies, as a sort of mirroring of His being, a shadowy projection out of Himself, which he can withdraw back into himself at any time He wills. At any rate, it must necessarily follow that if God can create, he can destroy as well; and who can tell which is the greater thing for Him to do? To say the least, science has not such replaced the various myths of Creation but has perhaps only elaborated them: 'Heaven' remains the symbolic word for the Infinitude, the Matrix of Relativity; 'Earth' remains the word for the finite, the limited range of mere human experience. Both, we believe, are full of His Glory, although few perceive that, because it is only through spiritualized vision that it may be opened to the human soul.

Indeed, there is also the tradition, especially in certain forms of Hinduism, that God created all things as a sort of sport, of *play*: He does (or did—timelessly, in non human dimensions) this *easily* and therein plays a sort of hide-and-seek game, revealing Himself in and through His Great Word in an enticing sort of way; the soul is His beloved, as well as his Creature and in order to increase her affection for Him, He hides Himself sometimes, even deeply within her when she seeks too outwardly in Nature when she seeks too inwardly. Or again, here is also the concept that Creation is *hard work* for God: He *suffers* when He creates, at least as much as an artist usually works from a painful excess of inspiration from which he desperately seeks relief; in a sense, he must even destroy himself in order to bring forth the work, which appears to come out of nothing, but really comes forth from his own Being. The *ex nihilo* issue is by no means a dead scholastic corundrum: science has not got to the bottom of it by any means, and theologies still find it a stumbling-block. The humanly conceivable relations of God-over-and-against Nature (dualism), God-identical with Nature (monism), or God-both-above and-in-Natur (pantheism) must somehow be harmonized, and both the dynamic and the static concepts must also be brought into reconciliation. It might be noted in this perspective that although Hinduism and Buddhism on the whole tend toward the monistic view as against the dualistic orientation of the Semetic religions; there are also the other theologies and theophanies and theogonies to be found in them also.

Seventh : AND IN ONE LORD, JESUS CHRIST, THE ONLY BEGOTTEN SON OF GOD. Now we come to the most "ticklish" issue. There is entirely too much foolish arrogance buried in much that goes in the name of missionary zeal to the "underprivileged", the "heathen" and "those who lie in darkness". It is high time that the hymn "From Greenland's Icy Mountains..." be discarded. Aside from the issue of whether Jesus really intended for his followers to become missionaries in the sense that modern organized protestantism practices, there is at least in almost every mission field a woeful confusion between the Christian Faith and Western European culture, the work of the early Jesuits in China, Japan and India being a notable exception, and an example to be followed. There are very few educated Hindus or Buddhists or Confucianists today who are not willing to acknowledge the place that Jesus holds not only in the history of Mankind, but even by comparison with Krishna, Rama, Siddhattha, Salegamuni, and Buddha, Zoroaster and the others. Jesus is not necessarily *unique*, nor did he ever claim to be; and indeed the others displayed some qualities and abilities which he did not: the Buddha had more nobility and depth of peace; Krishna had more complexity of character and aspects; Confucius was more successful in affairs of state; Mohammed in getting an empire started, etc. Jesus, it might be said moves more devotion to himself, as having more love, and as the conqueror of death. But relatively, in our present world perspective, these things are not so essential as the fact that in every age and culture, however separated in space and time, God has sent, as the Bhagaved Gita says, a Savior of men to put things aright—or to put it more precisely, He Himself becomes incarnate for the purpose. The view is not impossible that the only begotten Son of God is the same in all the Avatars, having at various times and at various places come down to enlighten the sullen faces of disillusioned souls caught in various disgraces. To say the least, the differences between the Avatars is not so important as their likeness, at least in their historical roles. Or, if this be too heretical for Christians (although it should not be when one considers that if Jesus could meet in person all the others—supposing now that they are different—certainly they would embrace each other with great love indeed, and not fight like their followers!) then at least there is in the Greek Fathers the doctrine of the *prototype*. After-all, if Moses, Melchizadech and David can be considered as "fore-runners" of the Christ, then why not the other Great Law-givers and Prophets and Avatars? Classify them if you will; but do not exclude them, or treat them with less respect than Jesus himself would have shown had he known of them; for one thing it must be remembered that they were all more or less Iconoclasts, and would be more inclined to support the heretics of our time than the orthodox—or at least the neo-orthodox, since all seem to have the basic attitude of coming "not to destroy but to fulfill". One could add that after all the creeds were formulated far too long after the life of Christ, and that they should be discarded or revised so as to make the Faith of the New Testament fit not only the Greek heritage but the other heritages as well; but when we begin to examine the other phrases of the Nicene Creed describing the Christ, we find something sufficiently universal that the issue of conversion can be minimized and much support for a reconciling perspective to take its place. Thus: Begotten before the worlds, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father... All these phrases, each deserving more detailed analysis than a popular essay like this can afford, could be almost reduplicated or at least approximated in the Upanisads, the Bhagavad Gita, the Gathas of Zarathustra, the Tao Teh King, the Mahayana Scriptures such as the Surangama Sutra, etc. There is, in short, at least the tendency in all theologies to associate the Avatar as closely as possible with the Primal Source of all reality: "By whom all things were made" seems to summarize them. The Mediator is not just a meditator: He incarnates the fullness of the Cosmic Music of the Spheres—the primordial sounds of OM and HARI which may be experienced after a little practice of Yoga in the Himalayas and perhaps elsewhere, which experience is accompanied with that interior light in the form of eidetic images or charismatic visions and a supramental sense of the Divine Oneness of all things, as well as the capacity to read the minds of others and to perform miracles—*siddhis* they are called in India, and are not so very uncommon—He fully *is* this level of reality which others experience only by participation. Again, we come to the fact (the word is not too strong) of One Reality: there can, in an a priori sense, be no duality in any Divine Being: ergo, if in any sense the Buddha and Krishna and Zoroaster and the others (Mohammed was more modest, although his Shia followers attribute virtual divinity to him, much to the consternation of the Sunis) were divine, they cannot be other than the Christ whose local name and-form was Jesus of Nazareth, the contemporary of Pontius Pilate, Philo of Alexandria and others.

Eighth : AND WAS INCARNATE BY THE HOLY GHOST OF THE VIRGIN MARY. In this clause Christians too often miss the Holy Ghost. The close association of the Blessed Virgin with the Holy Spirit is something which both comparative studies and yoga experience will verify. The usual nonsense about the actual virginity in the medical sense. as well as the wasted sentimentality about dignity of womanhood miss the basic and universal truth rather badly. As we noted above, the Semetic religions, and Western Europe generally (whence the science of Anthropology gets its bias, and Freud his stupidity about mother fixation, etc) are all too patriarchal in their anthropomorbic conceptions of Deity. Byzantine theology has done much better Any religion that is powerful enough to reach into the unconscious will venerate Her, whether the formal theology allows it or not. True it is that in the past Her cult has grown corrupted and degenerated into things shameful to mention; but that does not detract from the things that become possible when she is properly venerated. Again, She is not just Mary the daughter of Joachim and Anne, although that is her role in Christian history. In a word, She is the Activating Living Symbol of the psychic, the esoteric, which gives power (*shakti* is the sanskrit word, which has the connotation also of bringer-forth, of Consoru as well as Motherhood) and Vitality and richness and color to religion, putting flesh onto the dry bones of mere theologizing or puritanical moralizing. In India it is a common saying that Tantra (the cult in which She is most venerated) begins where Freud leaves off. In Chinese tradition she is the Tah that makes the Tao available to even the humblest In Nature She is symbolized by the Moon, jus as the Sun is the Symbol of the Son. Tradition attributes many aspects to her, both terrible and sublime. To use St. Paul's terminology, which has parallels in Sanskrit and other oriental languages. She is one who raises the somatic man through the psychic (which of course includes the erotic) to the pneumatic. by the same token whereby the pneumatic becomes embodied (not only *soma* but even *sarx*) in the Flesh; and this not just as an historical event. bu as a constant process in the soul who reaches the level of valid mysticism.

Ninth : HE SUFFERED ALSO FOR US UNDER PONTIUS PILATE, WAS CRUCIFIED, DEAD AND BURIED...Here also we have something rather universal, instead of unique. Scarcely any Prophet Avatar or has not suffered some form of persecution. It *might* be said that Jesus was a martyr in a *supreme* degree, but traditional piety perhaps has overdone the sentimental attachment to the cross, and the positive seeking of martyrdom also became a perversion from time to time. The cross itself as such, of course. is a sun symbol to be found quite universally; and the constant remembrance of Death is a constant source of strength in a system that is devoted to the Interior Way, Death (YAMA) being considered a god in the Hindu pantheon, and most Buddhist disciplines include meditation in a cremation ground or such places where Death is in evidence. And even as Christ, so we must pass through death before we attain the beatific vision. The Siddhi of the Hindu Yogi conquers death at a certain stage; he gains at least knowledge of when he must leave the body, and at a more advanced stage, having attained a certain oneness with God, even gains the power to leave his mortal body whenever he chooses. Whether Jesus had come to this through his association with John the Baptist and the Essence is relatively immaterial; it is rather important to note that although rare, it is not unique with him. The phrase *for us*, however, is important, and needs to be considered more carefully from the universal perspective. Buddhists are prone to consider profundity of peace as more important than suffering even of a sacrificial nature; and it must be admitted that at least as far as the human aspect is concerned, Buddha Sakyamuni does portray more serenity than Jesus, and in history on the whole it might be admitted that Buddhist societies have been less belicose than 'Christian' nations and empires. But on the other hand, Jesus' favorite greeting, especially after the Resurrection, was "Peace be with you !"; and that perhaps for the reason that his Agony on the Cross did have some quality of psychic purgation for all time. He suffered *for* us, we only suffer *in* Him. The Buddha taught the conquest or rather the *elimination* of suffering altogether; Jesus rather takes the evil out of it. Which is superior, who can say ? Rather, let's work together every day, in every way, divine and human to bring in the time of eternal Day !

Tenth : AND THE THIRD DAY HE ROSE AGAIN ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES. Here again, something not so terribly unique. In certain stages of Yoga discipline, the three-day cycle becomes quite important : One has to go through a death-like coma before one gains victory over the hindrances which the body makes on the spirit. Like schizophrenia, it is a condition which psychoanalysts need to know much more about, for after that, the attempt to return to "normal" living is not only injurious but futile. Only the Resurrection Life can follow; the body after that becomes only an optional instrument for God's work in the world. In the Bhagavad Gita, this is Arjuna's great Dilemma. The Buddha seems to have come through it at the time of his Enlightenment, the whole of his long life afterwards being like Jesus' after the resurrection, and his Final Nirvana more like Jesus' ascension than his death on the Cross. Many saints in all religions are compelled to live in feeble bodies, or have many characteristics that resemble insanity, and yet they are able to perform miracles, to pronounce valid prophecies, to give great peace to all suffering souls, both secretly and openly, or to create great literature and art or even systems of morality or cultural tradition which will prevail for the age that follows them. Living beyond the range of good and evil, so to speak, however, their danger always lies in pride or other abuse of their privilege. St. Paul's dictum, "If ye be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above" is paralleled by the Buddha's doctrine of the "Middle Path" (which, by the way, is quite another thing, contrary to much misinformed teaching, from the Golden Mean of the Greeks). The allegorical significance of Krishna's life after he moved to Dwaraka is too often missed in this perspective. Although he lived like any other king, with court and harem and army and all of that, this was only his "lila", his "play", his optional way of remaining in the Phenomenal world in accordance with the condition of the age, until *dharma*, right living, could be restored after the Great War in which everything (including psychic weapons more powerful than our modern atomic weapons) had been either destroyed or put to improper use...Thus, indeed, "according to the Scriptures" :—*all* of them, not the Old Testament only !

Eleventh : AND I BELIEVE IN THE HOLY GHOST, THE LORD AND GIVER OF LIFE...etc. in red letters, because this is the color appropriate to Him—or It, for in Greek the neuter gender is used, an evidence again of the close association with the Blessed Virgin. In Western Christianity, the Holy Spirit has been far too much neglected. The Eastern Orthodox Churches have done much better, and indeed the American revivalist sects, Pentecostal and others seem to have caught more of the Apostilic Reality involved. But again it is by no means something unique to Christianity, and indeed in some respects may be better understood because more experienced in the esoteric traditions of Asia and the Islands of the Southern Pacific. In Hinduism it is called *Antaryami* the Inner Controller, and most likely is the same as the "Mysterious Kundalini" of which yoga texts treat, being the Power by which yogis do their super-human (or better, supernatural, for these powers can be misused) feats, defying space and time, and leading towards and enabling others to attain the immediate perception of the Fundamental Unity of all things. In Buddhism, It might be found (though this is perhaps still a moot issue for scholar-mystics—but *not* mere philogists!—to investigate) as *Prajna*, the all-embracing intuitive consciousness out of whose and back into whose undifferentiated state all particularities proceed and return. In Platonic Tradition one may find Its operation (although not so completely) under the *theia mania* experience concept; and in what is now being termed the 'Perrenial Philosophy'. It is That by which the microcosm/macrocosm relationality may be directly experienced. The great objection of the East to Western materialism is based on this; and philosophy and science since Whitehead and the Existentialists should take heed indeed. The whole Universe is a *Living* Reality, affecting and effecting human consciousness in a way far exceeding the grasp of the senses or even the most delicate scientific instruments, which only extend the range of the senses and the mathematical faculties, although in a definite sense it may well be said that the achievements of scientific Research, which proceeds by intuitive leaps more than by the experimental tests by which new theories are 'verified', is also the Work of the Holy Spirit, whose ascending activity functions according to interpretive analysis, extending through the full range of the sound-heat light continuum on through the electronic range into Life and Love and spiritual Liberation or Enlightenment. It is for this reason, no doubt that so much neurosis is found in technologized civilization. Neglect of feasts and fasts which should be observed according to the astrological cycles and epicycles—indeed, the whole boast about the 'Conquest of Nature' in Modern Western Society—will inevitably bring its nemesis in catastrophe both personal and societal. Not that astrology can become a technical science either, for, by the same token, the astrologer must be a spiritual person who can perceive within the laws or norms of the Spirit's operation in our psycho-organic relation to the universe That Same Spirit of God which pervades all things giving them knowledge of the Voice of the Wisdom of the Most High, which is more intimately within us than our own very life-breath. Most of us will indeed die if we cease to breathe; it is only those who *really* have the Holy Spirit—and they are *very* few in our age—who can live on after their normal breathing has stopped. That the *Holy* Spirit is different from other spirits—for there are, as yet beyond the range of empirical science, other supra electronic forces (angels and demons), both beneficial and malignant, which affect our consciousness—can be realized only after one has experienced the full range of the erotic continuum back into its Divine Ground, from whence all virtues as well as all intuitive insights and aesthetic creativity proceed. It is only by the Holy Spirit, the Love which binds together the Father and the Son, making the Blessed Trinity a Unity, not just an empty intellectual speculation, but an analogy based on experience of the Mystics and Saints who have—or do—have the Gita as well as the virtue of Compassion or Charity—the Peacemakers for example, or the Prophets, whose is, to use the Quaker phrase, the *Power to change History*. Whence it is that we pray *to* the Father *through* the son, but *in* (the Power of) the Holy Spirit, even though the Holy Spirit is to be worshipped and Glorified together with them, for other spirits may *obsess* us or become our possession; but we are the possession of—we are possessed by—the Holy Spirit. Whence the controversy about the "double procession": Even the Gospels describe Jesus' experience of the Holy Spirit as descending upon him; even he did not possess It from the beginning. And the extent to which It can be passed on by Apostolic Succession is another issue which the Protestant Reformers realized all too well: It *knows no limitations*, as even St. Peter had to learn the hard way. Correspondingly, even within Hinduism and other traditions there is much controversy as to what extent it is an individual matter, as to what extent as well techniques and ceremonies and sacraments can "do the trick" (if we may risk an apparently irreverent expression). The Bhagavad Gita stresses *sva dharma* : Each person must find his own particular way: ultimately, in spite of temples and churches and priests and gurus (teachers) and confessors and spiritual directors and educational systems. The Holy Spirit chooses Her (Its) own instruments; and everyone must ultimately depend on Her (Its). Somehow, it is latent within all; and how It becomes active in some more than in others is a Mystery for all. But to say the least, if Christians would emphasize this part of their creed more fully and more explicitly, they would have a better way of making peace instead of war (whether actual or mental, cold or hot) with other Faiths. The True 'Church' is the Church Invisible and hence Catholic or Universal, or ecumenical; the Fellowship of the Spirit, and not any ecclesiastical hierarchy, although the world being what it is, these things are necessary and not to be despised, and the Reformer is therefore to be honored more than the apostate.

Twelfth : When the last clauses of the second paragraph and the last clauses of the whole Creed are put together in juxtaposition, namely, WHOSE KINGDOM SHALL HAVE NO END, and THE LIFE OF THE WORLD TO COME, some thing become clear that are not otherwise so obvious. The ascension, it was already noted, might be compared to the Buddha's Nirvana; and we might have noted also that Krishna's allowing himself, as it were to be shot by a fatal arrow in the right heel was only his way of answering the appeal of the Gods, Brahma being their spokesman, to return to heaven...and specialists in comparative mythology might find many other parallels. But the important thing from the present perspective is not the comparative aspects as such, nor again the already worn-out debates about the so called historicity of the Resurrection and Ascension. The important thing is the nature of the resurrection body; and here experience in the East helps very much. There is record in India of several great yogis and saints who at the time of leaving this world either left the body by withdrawing the soul out of the flesh and going out of the top of the head, witnesses observing a sort of radiance issuing forth at the time, or else simply vanished. body and all into the images of certain Deities, and of several others who could actually take their bodies apart, leaving limbs and head and trunk lying in different places, and later bringing them back together again. Such is the work of the Holy Spirit, both with the

Christ, and to be expected, according to both Christian and Muslim tradition at some future date for all the buried souls who have gained salvation. Such also, perhaps is the basis for the veneration of relics. The body of any true yogi or saint, regardless of his faith, will not decay or decompose; and it is interesting to note that the bodies of sadhus in India are not cremated ordinarily like the bodies or ordinary people, but either deposited reverently into some sacred river like the Ganges or properly buried, the tomb being referred to as his *samadhi*, and many miracles being reported at such places. Such saints (not to say the Avatars) are still with us in an uncanny sort of way, even though most of us do not have sufficient sensitivity to experience their presence or their power.

Thirteenth : Be this as it may, the eschatological orientation is also definitely universal. Not only Islam, but Zoroastrianism (the Parsis) and Hinduism and Buddhism look toward some Great Future Time or Event, whether or not by the appearance of some future Avatar or Boddhisatva (Kalki or Avilokeshvara), when Right will triumph finally and fully over wrong, and/or else the world will be destroyed or reabsorbed into 'heaven'. The cyclic view of time seems to prevail; and howsoever strange have been the times when people have in vain in the past with great excitement prepared for the "end of the world" our own present crisis bidding high for a final cataclysm, one may still take these as analogous to something very real, deeply buried in the collective Unconscious of Mankind. To say the least, one may take the attitude that "Well, it might actually happen"—and that quite aside of the astronomical and geological calculations of our scientists, for the universal feeling is that it will come suddenly, malgre Mr. Eliot's "not with a bang but a whimper."

Finally, as for the life of the world to come, we do have a dilemma to face, the metempsychosis view evidently enjoying a greater popularity numerically both in the past and at present. But even here, if Christians take only the Gospels, they will find Jesus himself almost as unwilling to discuss such matters at the Buddha; both seem to have had the attitude that it is more important to work for salvation than to speculate about the nature of existance after death—much less to engage in uncharitable controversy about it. Would that the world today had an Akbar, who invited friendly discussions from all, without allowing any to fall into the traps of others. Virtues are more important than beliefs—at least, such is the belief that seems most needed now!

VI

Policy Implications of School Superintendents' Attitudes Toward Community Advisement and Control

Harriet Talmage & Allan C. Ornstein

Purpose of Study

The study focuses on school superintendents' attitudes toward community input in determining school policy relative to four areas of school management: curriculum, student affairs, school finances, and personnel. It was assumed that community involvement in school policy entailed the forfeiture of the superintendents' perceived or actual decision making power. Therefore the superintendents' attitudes toward community participation (input related to advisement), it was hypothesized, would differ from their attitudes toward community control (input that determines school policy). Further, their attitudes about community involvement would differ on the four areas of school management inasmuch as some areas are traditionally regarded as shared responsibilities; others are perceived as central to the maintenance of the superintendents' power. A shift from advisement to control in these latter areas might upset traditional roles. In addition, the study examined selected variables that might influence attitudes: size of the school system, geographic setting, ethnic composition of the system, geographic location, type of community involvement practiced, sex of respondents, and ethnicity of respondents. The latter two independent variables were omitted later due to the small number of women and minority superintendents in the sample of school systems with student populations over 15,000. This was indicative of the composition of superintendents in systems over 15,000, as of 1973, and not due to the lack of representativeness of the sample.

Data Source

Superintendents' attitudes toward community advisement and control, the dependent variables, were measured by the *Community Participation-Community Control Attitudinal Inventory*. The 40 item instrument generated two total scores or scales, one for participation at the advisory level and one for control Both yielded for subscores or subscales based on attitudes on curriculum, student affairs, finances, and personnel. Internal consistency reliability applying the Spearman-Brown formula computed with z transformations produced correlation coefficients of .97 for advisory participation and .95 for control.

The names of school districts with student populations of over 15,000 were obtained from the *Educational Directory: 1972-1973 (Public School Systems)*, published by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. A letter of explanation and the inventory were sent to the 399 school districts in the United States and Puerto Rico. Of these, 232 inventories were returned, i.e., 58.1 percent. Although the percentage of returns is less than desired, the returns by geographic location are proportional to the actual number of school districts with populations over 15,000 in the four geographic areas identified in the study.[1] Of the 232 returned inventories, 215 were usable for data analysis.

Analytic Procedures

To test the hypotheses concerning differences in attitudes toward community advisement versus control generally, and in particular on each of the four areas of school management, t tests were performed. F tests were used to determine the effects of geographic location and type of community involvement practiced in the school system on attitudes towards advisement and control. To determine the relationship between the values of the independent variables (size of the school system: 15,000-49,999 and over 50,000; school setting: suburban and urban; and ethnic composition of the system: predominantly white and predominantly minority) and the superintendents' attitudes as identified on the 10 scales in the inventory, Pearson correlation coefficients were obtained. Stepwise multiple regression equations further analyzed the amount of variance accounted for by three independent variables (size of system, ethnic composition of system, and the school setting).

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[1] Geographic distribution of returned inventories: East, 16.1 Percent Midwest, 22.3 Percent; Southwest, 10 9 Percent; South, 28.0 percent; and West, 22.7 Percent. Geographic distribution as obtained from the *Educational Directory*: East, 12.5 Percent; Midwest, 22.0 Percent; Southwest, 13.1 Percent; South, 29.7 Percent; and West, 22.7 Percent.

Results and Discussion

It was observed that superintendents as a group held significantly more favorable attitudes (t=10 76, df=202, p<.001) generally toward community involvement when advisory in nature than when involvement implied control or power to determine issues. Significant differences also pertained when comparing attitudes between advisement and control on each of the four areas of school management (p<.001). The superintendents locked more favorably on community involvement in school finances than in the other three school management areas. They were least favorably disposed to community involvement, whether at the advisory or control level, on personnel concerns.

These findings are in keeping with the roles traditionally played by the community in advising or in determining school issues. The community has held varying levels of decision making power on school repairs, local tax questions, per pupil expenditure, and new construction, Recently, many state and federal guidelines for preparing proposals to obtain funds have insisted on community participation in the proposal development stage. Administrators appear more reluctant to involve the community in questions concerning proposal development at this point in time than in questions regarding local taxes, construction of new buildings, and per pupil expenditure.

Personnel issues have been zealously guarded by administrators in the past. They are protective of their rights to recruit new faculty, determine their fitness (evaluation), and to determine matters on promotion and tenure.

On curriculum questions, the attitudes were highly favorable toward advisement on development of the system's educational objectives and least favorable toward advisement on implementing the curriculm. The same obtained for community control on these two curriculum issues. Implementation tends to be associated with personnel prerogatives, therefore, less positive attitudes were consistent with responses on personnel issues.

The superintendents held strong attitudes on times related to student affairs. They were most favorable toward advisement and even control on matters related to reporting student progress and least favorable to invovement in matters concerning grouping and tracking of students. Again, on the latter matter, it appeared to infringe on personnel prerogatives.

Probing further to determine which independent variables may bear on the superintendents' attitudes, 20 analyses of variance were obtained, 10 related to geographic location (East, Midwest, South and West) and attitudes toward advisement and control, and 10 the type of community involvement practiced in the system nal) organizations, community advisory councils, action and others). No significant F's were observed.

ficant correlation coefficients were observed between the the school system and the superintendents' attitude toward y participation in curriculum decisions ($r=-.228$, $p<.01$), ents affairs ($r=-.245$, $p<.01$), and in personnel issues ($r=-.186$, $p<.05$). Negative correlations were interpreted to mean that the larger the school system the more favorable the superintendents' attitudes were toward community advisement on curriculum, student affairs, and personnel issues. However, on community control, the attitudes of superintendents from both large and small school systems were positively correlated with school finances ($r=.138$, $p<.05$). The positive correlation indicates that superintendents from large systems were less favorably disposed to the community's active involvement on matters related to finances than were superintendents from systems below 50,000.

Significant correlations were observed between the geographic setting (urban, suburban) and advisement on student policy ($r=-.143$, $p<.05$) and on control of finances ($r=.137$, $p<.05$). Superintendents of school systems located in the suburbs held less favorable attitudes toward community participation in student affairs than superintendents of city school systems. By contrast, superintendents of city schools were less positive toward community control of school finance matters than their suburban counterparts. The former finding tends to substantiate the La Noue[2] and Ornstein[3] studies that indicated increased involvement of community members from cities with large nonwhite populations in school affairs during the late 1960's.

There were no significant correlations between the ethnic composition of school systems and the superintendents' attitudes on community participation.

Stepwise multiple regression equations were employed to study the amount of variance that school size, ethnic composition, and school setting account for in the attitudes of superintendents in all four areas of school management. The analyses indicated that only a small amount of the total variance could be accounted for by size, ethnic composition, and setting. A large amount of the variance was unaccounted for in the independent variables selected for study.

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[2] George La Noue and Bruce Smith, *The Politics of School Decentralization*, Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath, 1973.

[3] Allan C. Ornstein, *Metropolitan Schools: Administrative Decentralization vs. Community Control*, Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1974.

These findings may be telling the researcher that school systems, regardless of such commonalities as size, system's ethnic composition, geographic location, and the other selected variables, are unique social systems. The superintendent, as he functions within a given social system, is relating and reacting to a host of local issues and interrelated variables that override any effects of size, location, and composition of student body. Nonetheless, citizens around the country want to be involved in their schools. During 1974, the Commission on Educational Governance under the auspices of the National Committee for Citizens in Education held public hearings around the country to explore issues related to the question : "Who controls the public schools ?" Citizens' input in decision making in public schools emerged as a central issue.[4] Therefore, in responding to the community for involvement in making decisions, the superintendents would do well to understand their own attitudes, study the particularities of their own school systems, and work together with community members to establish a process for extending the areas in school management that community members can contribute to constructively.

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[4] Shelly Weinstein and Douglas Mitchell, editors, *Public Testimony on Public Schools*, Berkeley, California: McCutchan, 1975.

VII

The Catalyst in Neo-Platonism and Christian Mysticism

What Indian Element catalyzed the thought and experience of Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus ?

Paul Gregorios

As far as pagon or non christian Greek thought is concerned, the 4th century was rather sterile. Byzantine civilisation was an attempt to amalgamate Greek classical, Latin classical, and Christian thought into one composite culture. Constantinople, established by Emperor Constantine in 326 A.D. and completed in 330 A.D., understood itself as the centre of a new great civilization—a Graeco-Roman Christian civilisation.

The new city incorporated the Old Byzantium, including its acropolis and its hippodrome and two theatres. These remained ever in tension with the architechturally splendid Christian Church, the Hagia Sophia. But precisely as this tension was gradually relaxing into mutual accommodation and even incorporation of the pagan into the Christian, a parallel tension had been developing at deeper levels—spiritually at first, but then latter more philosophically. This was the real tension that mattered at the heart of Byzantine Christianity.

This latter tension could best be symbolized as that between two saints — a pagan saint like Plotinus and a Christian saint like Antony, both, strangely enough, not Greeks, but Egyptians. Plotinus, born in Lycopolis of Egypt around 205 A.D , had died already in 270 A.D., but his influence was still pervasive in Byzantium in the 4th century. Porphyry, his Syrian disciple, had not only edited

Plotinus' Enneads and made them available to pagans who were in search of the higher life of true *philosophia*. He had written his own treatise *On Abstinence*, which was a manual of asceticism fundamentally different from that of Anthony as depicted by Athanasius in his *Life of St. Antony*.

When Antony was born (also in Egypt, around 251A.D), Plotinus was already a well-known teacher in Rome for 7 years. But a year before Plotinus died, Antony had left his home and possessions and had begun his spiritual pilgrimage, which lasted throughout the rest of his 105-year life, which ended in 356 A.D.

The Plotinian and the Antonine traditions of spirituality and asceticism were in fruitful tension with each other at the base of Byzantine society in the fourth century. The Plotinian was an aristocratic spirituality. Only one who had been trained in classical philosophy could become a philosopher. The Antonine was, on the other hand, a proletarian spirituality which made few demands on one's intellectual capacities and training. Anthony was a lower middle class farmer's son.

However the spirituality of the common people in the Byzantine Empire in the 4th century emphasized Christ as the Teacher, not as an ascetic. And as pagan scholarship came within the Church, not only in Constantinople, but also in Alexandria in Egypt, there was a demand for a more intellectually respectable interpretation of Christianity.

This too was provided by Egypt, but by that island of Greek culture inside Egypt, namely Alexandria. Here it was not the Plotinian ascetic tradition that was at the centre, but rather the intellectual tradition of Neoplatonism, shorn of its ascetic and theurgic elements, but baptized as Christian theology. The impetus first came from Origen, a true Egyptian transformed by Greek education, a massive genius, meticulous scholar and profound thinker. But Origen was too much of a genius and a thinker to interest the common people. Origen, whether he was a fellow student with Plotinus, under Ammonius Saccas or not, could never have been simplistic enough for the people, at least not as simplistic enough for the people, at least not as simplistic as his fellow-Alexandrian, the Presbyter Arius (ca 250 — ca 336). Arius was probably Libyan by btrth; but as he took up his mission of preaching at the Baucalis Church in Alexandria, his combination of asceticism, neat logic, and consistent theology drew many followers, despite the opposition of his ecclesiastical superior, that Romanizing Greek of Alexandria, Athanasius the Great. While Athanasius turned Antonine in his spirituality and wrote his *Vita Antonii*, which was so influential in the rise of western monasticism, it was the Presbyter Arius' refined neo-Platonist or Plotinian interpretation of Christianity that appealed the semi cultivated Christians of the Empire. Constantine's so Constantius opted for Arius against Athanasius. Arius represented the cultured pagan's type of Christianity, whereas Athanasius represented the crude spirituality of those who had left the civilised world for desert wildernesses and mountain crags.

And most — the vast majority—of Christian bishops supported Emperor Constantius in this choice, for they too came largely from a semi cultivated Greek background — at least in Asia Minor and the Danubian provinces. They were Romans of Greek culture, and Arianism became their religion, which was in harmony with the rather "well-filtered" Greek culture that they had imbibed and were patronising as the symbol of the new Christian civilisation, with Christ as Supreme Teacher and the Bishops as subsidiary teachers. Christianity was true *paideia* and the Bishops were the *Paidagogoi*, the true teachers.

But the struggle between Alexandria, the city built by Alexander in 330 B.C. and Constantinople, the city built by Constantine in 330 A.D. was part of the intellectual conflict of the time. Alexandria was a strange blend—of Pharaonic African, European Greek, and Asian Jewish thought and culture and spirituality—a magnificent amalgam when it was made in the 4th century BC, but already rotting by the 4th century A.D. It was the city of Plotinus and Philo and Origen — of Greek and Jewish and Christian thought. Constantinople, on the other hand, had its proximity to Persian and Chaldean as well as Greek and Christian sources, but it was never really an intellectual centre.

This paper would focus on two issues :

(a) What was the critical catalysing component of Alexandrian thought ?

(b) to what extent has this thought influenced the development of Christian thought ?

The second question is obviously difficult to answer adequately, as we shall soon see. But let us look at the first question first.

The five elements of Alexandrian thought and the catalytic sixth element

The text-books will always tell you that Neo-platonism was founded by Plotinus in Alexandria in the first half of the 3rd century. This statement looks to the present writer as somewhat carelessly formulated. It was hardly the intention of Plotinus to found a system of speculative philosophy called neo-platonism. Nor can Plotinus be seen simply as a reviver of Plato's thought in a new form. Plotinus' attempt was certainly not to make Plato fashionable again, after a period when Aristotelianism gained the upper hand in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Of course, Plotinus comments on Plato's writings as if they were Divine Scriptures of some sort. But Plotinus was certainly more than a mere commentator on Plato. Plato's academy had at least three and possibly five stages in its development, but Plotinus was not a leader of any of these stages.[1]

Plotinus, even according to Porphyry, his student and biographer, is metaphysically closer to Aristotle than to Plato. And his teacher, Ammonius Saccas, had shown that Plato and Aristotle were of the same opinion (*homodoxia*) on many metaphysical points. Philip Merlan, seeking to imitate Plotinus even in style, put it this way :

> "The notion of a Platonizing Aristotle implies a neo-platonizing Aristotle, if Plato, the way Aristotle understood—or misunderstood — him, was a neo-platonizing Plato himself. There is nothing new about a neo-platonizing Aristotle either."[2]

To put it differently, it is Plotinus who reconciles Plato and Aristotle; or even more accurately, the Platonism which Plotinus inherited was one profoundly influenced by both Aristotle and the Stoics. There was no Greek thought in Alexandria which was purely platonic, purely peripatetic or purely stoic. Plato's thought as corrected by Aristotle and the Stoics, was what one finds, with varying emphases, in a Cicero or a Marcus Aurelius, in an Atticus or an Albinus, in a Carneades or a Philo, and even in an Origen or Plotinus.

But these three Hellenic traditions, i.e. Platonist, Aristotelian, and the Stoic, each of which has learned from the others, did not by themselves form exclusive schools. Whether it is at Athens or at Alexandria, there were other currents that these three schools had to keep in mind — especially the Jewish philosophy of people like Philo, and the Christian philosophy of Clement and Origen. The five traditions thus remained in a boiling cauldron, stimulating and correcting each other, but never able to come to a single consensus accepted by all.

This is the situation at the beginning of the 3rd century A.D. especially in Alexandria. Into that boiling cauldron now came a sixth element, which eventually was to start a process of catalysis in all the five traditions. This catalyst, I believe, was Ammonius Saccas, about whom Plotinus could say "This is the one I was looking for" (*touton ezetoun*). Ammonius died at the age of 82 in 242 A.D A son of Christian parents, he later reverted to paganism, and not satisfied with any of the five traditions as they were in his time, found relief in what have been the Indian spiritual tradition. mediated to Ammonius either by Brahmins or by Buddhists who visited Alexandria.[3]

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[1] The five stages, first under Plato, Speusippus and Xenocrates; the second under Arcesilaus and Lacydes; the third under Carneades (214 — 129 BC) and Clitomachus (2nd cent. BC) The fourth under Philo of Larossa and Charmadas, a fifth established by Antiochus of Ascelon (ca 79 BC). Cicero (106 BC to 43 BC) mentions only the first two (*de oratio* iii : 18 etc); Sextus Empiricus (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, i:220) mentions the first three, but he mentions a view which holds to the five academies.

[2] Philip Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* 2nd ed. The Hague, 1960 p. 4.

Who was Ammonius Saccas ?

We have to guess what Ammonius taught, from the writings of his four prominent disciples — Numenius, Longinus, Plotinus and Origen, who certainly do not agree with each other on the most important philosophical points. Theodotus' *Scolia of Ammonius* and Porphyry's *Miscellaneous Questions* can hardly be relied upon in their present form. Willy Theiler calls Ammonius "the great shadow".[4]

The only definite thing we have is Porphyry's *vita*. Porphyry, who came to Plotinus when the latter was 59 and he himself only 30, could not get any details of the personal life of Plotinus, despite 7 years of close association. Among the facts he had gathered the most important is Plotinus' association and satisfaction with the teacher, Ammonius. Under Ammonius, Plotinus was able to study both Zoroastrian teachings and "the system adopted among the Indians".[5]

Porphry also tells us that three of the disciples of Ammonius, Erennius, Origen and Plotinus made a compact not to disclose any of the doctrines which Ammonius had revealed to them. Plotinus obviously never disclosed directly what he had learned from Persia and India, but wove them into his own system integrally.

Porphyry also quotes Longinus, who obviously regarded Ammonius as a Peripatetic, as a disciple of Aristotle. For Longinus, who gives an almost exhaustive list of all the philosophers of his time, Ammonius and Ptolemaeus were "the most accomplished scholars of their time, Ammonius especially being unapproached in breadth of learning". Longinus was writing obviously after Ammonius had died. Among those living, Longinus rated Plotinus and Amelius as the two greatest thinkers: "Only these two seem to me worth study".[6]

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[3] It is a pity that no Indian scholar with the necessary linguistic, philosophical and spiritual equipment has come forward to do the necessary research on Ammonius Saccas and his contacts with the Indian philosophical-spiritual tradition. H. Crouzel has a good essay : *Origene et Plotin eleves d' Ammonios Saccas in Bulletin de Litterature Ecclesiastique* 1956. pp 193 ff, and an attempted summary of Ammonius' teaching can be found in Willy Theiler's *Forschungen zum Neoplatonismus*, Berlin 1966 pp 1-45. See also his *Die Vorbereitung des* Neuplatonismus, Berlin, 1930.

[4] W. Theiler, *Plotin und die antike Philosophie* in Mus. Helv. 1. 1944. p. 215.

[5] *Vita Plotinii*, 3.

Longinus was undoubtedly the father of literary criticism, and his verdicts are balanced and based on deep perception. Longinus did not agree with Plotinus and openly says so Porphyry says Longinus did not understand Plotinus. But, for him Plotinus and his teacher Ammonius are the two most outstanding philosophers of his time.

Longinus did not regard Ammonius a Platonist; if anything, he regarded him as an Aristotelian. Ammonius was widely and deeply read in the Indian, Persian and Greek system of philosophy, as well as, no doubt, in Judaism and Christianity. What his nationality was, we have no idea. The statement that he was an Alexandrian an porter is but an unfriendly jest.[7] On the other hand, the hypothesis, now np longer defended, that Ammonius was a Buddhist monk,[8] can be regarded as no more than a clever guess.

Whatever be the national identity of this anonymous catalyst of Mediterranean thinking, he brought with him something new, which did not exist in the Greek way of thinking. It was this that attracted Plotinus to him, and it was this that made Plotinus different and outstanding.

The circumstantial evidence is very strong for the hypothesis that what was new in Ammonius and Plotinus was this Indian element. What precisely it was, which particular tradition of India it came from and by what means, it seems now difficult to judge.

Alexandrians began travelling to India around the first century of our era. Strabo, the geographer, says that about 120 ships sailed to India every year.[9] The way to India overland had been opened up by Alexander, soon after founding the city of Alexandria around 331/330 BC. The "conquest" of India and the defeat of Porus took place only three or four years later — in 327 B.C.

The sea route from Red Sea ports to India was fully opened up, however, only at the beginning of our era. Clement of Alexandria (ca 150-214 A.D) refers to the followers of the *Boutta*[10], and we know from other sources that Brahmins are present in Alexandria in the century. All wisdom from all parts of the world converged on the Museum in Alexandria — a Greek city in Egypt, the largest [illegible] city in the world (like New York today), the centre of all [illegible]an intellectual life, mid-point of a new trade route opened between Europe and the East, richly endowed by the Ptolemies with a university and a library of first rank in the world. It was a naval base for the operations against Persia, and the inheritor of the commerce of Tyre. It linked Macedonia with the Nile valley and supplied the grain for the Roman empire.

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[6] *Vita Plotinii*, 20.

[7] Rene Cadiou, *La jeunesse d' Origene*, *Paris* 1935, p. 184.

[8] J. Danielou, *IVeme Siecle*, note 59.

[9] See Strabo *Geography* : 2:5, and also BK XX.

[10] *Stromata* I:15

In this great cultural, commercial and intellectual centre of the world, the role played by Indian thought and spirituality has been intentionally minimised by western scholarship. The reason must lie in a fear, which nouveau-riche nations and cultures usually have, to acknowledge their debts.

There are, fortunately, some exceptions in Western scholarship. One of these is Emile Brehier of the Sorbonne, at one time the leading Plotinus scholar of the western world. And this is what he said, more than 50 years ago :

"We have believed, as one can see, that one has to direct one's vision much further beyond Egypt to make intelligible the thought of Plotinus; in going up as far as India, we have imagined Alexandria, as a recent writer has done, as having seen constantly passing or dwelling a cosmopolitan cohort: the small bronzes and the miniature earthenware statues help us discern the very diverse ethnic types... Greeks, Italians, Syrians, Libyans, Cilicians, Ethiopians, Arabs, Bactrians, Scythians, Indians, Persians... And we have also believed it was legitimate, and even necessary, to put forth, regarding the relations of Plotinus with India, a hypothesis which others more competent than us would perhaps investigate and verify"[11]

What is this element that is distinctively Indian in Plotinus? Clearly the idea of total union of beings with the One. Westerners speak about this as the 'mystical' element. The word "mystical" as used by westerners and by others who imitate them, is much too mystifying for me, one against which I am usually on guard. It is too quickly assimilated to the Spanish mysticism — of Teresa or of St. John of the Cross — or to the spirituality of Germany and the low countries to the north of Germany.

But the Indian element in Plotinus' thought for me at least, has to be traced, to the upanishadic view of the relation between Brahman, Atman and Jagat. Brehier is right in asserting that while it is through Plotinus that hellenic ideas penetrated the west, it is important to find out whether that hellenism was already integrated with a current of a different set of ideas coming from outside hellenism.[12]

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[11] E, Brehier, *La Philosophie de Plotin*, Paris, 1928 Intro: p. xviii — XIX. The recent writer cited is Victor Chapot in *Le Monde Romain*, Paris, 1927.

My paper must end here, with a general request that Brehier's challenge should today be picked up by a competent scholar, possibly an Indian scholar, who can delineate the Indian element in Plotinus, see how this element penetrated western thought and created what the west today calls "mysticism" and how the whole development of Christian thought and spirituality after the 3rd century has been profoundly pervaded by this Plotinian-Indian element.

Western Christians fondly imagine that Christianity is a semitic product, i.e. when they acknowledge that it is not western in origin. They have difficulty recognizing that the Greek element was integrally interwoven with it from the beginning, in the minds of Jesus and Paul. But it would be even more difficult for them to recognize an Indian element going into the classical Christian thought of the fourth century Byzantium, via Plotinus and Ammonius Saccas. But truth should eventually come out despite such difficulties.

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[12] Brehier, *op cit.* p. 109.

VIII

Adult Psychological Development : A Jungian Perspective

Daniel J. Hoy

Over the past ten years, adult developmental psychology has become increasingly a topic for the popular press, for researchers and for psychologists. Gail Sheehy's popularizations, first in *Passages* and then in *Pathfinders*, have been followed with increasing books and articles in the popular press such as *Transformations* and *A Different Voice*. Erikson, with greater detail, continues to reinforce the main outlines of his theory of development throughout the life cycle. A recent article in the *American Psychologist* by Irving Alexander explores the relationship between Freud and Jung and, from internal evidence, guesses at an adult development in Freud, theorized from a Freudian perspective.

Perhaps the single most popular published study of adult developmental psychology is the work by Daniel J. Levinson, summarizing his NIMH study, which spanned the period from 1968 to 1973. Levinson documents other theories of adult development, both western and eastern, contemporary and ancient. He admits to having been influenced considerably by the one Jungian researcher on his team of mostly Freudians in *Seasons of a Man's Life*, (1978). The present article works with Jung's own writing and shows some of the correlations between the work of Jung and Levinson; it describes the stages of adult life for Jung and indicates the place within that developmental pattern of Adlerian and Freudian psychology; finally, it describes resistances to full living of the first half of life, and how Freud, Adler and Jung's theories treat people in the various stages.

Levinson's Work

To put the area Levinson investigates into perspective, we need to take a brief overview of Jung's developmental work. C. G. Jung was one of the very first psychologists to consider adult psychological development. His position seems simple to some who characterize it merely as "the two halves of life," indicating an uncomplicated, dichotomous view of adult development. Jung does talk of the two halves of life, with childhood and youth comprising the first half and being like the dawn and morning times of life; afternoon and dusk comprise the second half of life's day. Within that external picture, however, he paints internal processes that are far from simple. Within them he makes ample room for, among other things, the entire approaches of the Freudian, Adlerian, personalistic, and ego-psychologists. Levinson's study, which may at first seem more complex than Jung's theory, actually shows only the skeletal system of Jungian theory.

Daniel J. Levinson's study of the stages of development is summarized in *Seasons of a Man's Life* (1978). Levinson sees twenty-year-long seasons of adult development starting roughly at 20, 40 and 60 years of age. Each of these three seasons (early, middle and late adulthood; or, the summer, fall and winter of life), is split into an introductory and a completion period, and each of these in turn has a preparatory transitional period. Consequently, Levinson sees twenty-year seasons, each of which is divided into four periods. It is as though we take steps of three to seven years in length, with the left foot giving us our transitional groundings, and our right foot first introducing and then completing the twenty-year cycles in four steps: transition, introduction, transition, completion — for summer, for fall and for winter.

Within that general framework is a wealth of material gathered through Levinson's study that we will at best be able to allude to. To put it into the perspective of Jung's psychology, we might say that the summer season represents Jung's stage of youth, the fall season ushere in the concerns of the second half of life, and winter is a full season in age, in the second half of life.

Levinson begins his study of adult development with the transitional step of the left foot out of childhood and adolescence. He makes the beginning of that step near age fifteen or seventeen at the onset and around age twenty-two as an ending of the transition into early adulthood. This is the age at which children begin to form conceptions of themselves apart from their families of origin, based on real-life experiences outside the home—the years, for instance, of college, military service, first full time job, young married life.

Although a young adult in this seventeen to twenty-two year old setting is often expected by others to pick out a career, Levinson's study reveals that the task of choosing a career actually extends throughout the fifteen year segment of the late teens to early thirties. Actually carving out that career for oneself extends throughout the entire summer season of life, being completed only near the fortieth year.

The summer and the beginning fall seasons of life, roughly up to age forty five, is the only time that Levinson claims to have documented, with much of his emphasis upon the worklife of men, since his study was a male-oriented study. There is an important transition between the first and second adult seasons, insistently documented by Levinson, that is of special importance in the way it lends strong support to Jung's conception of the beginning of the second half of life. The wealth of material in Levinson's summer season, which is the bulk of his study, is interesting both in itself and in relationship to Jung's assessment of the period of youth.

In summary fashion, Levinson characterizes the first season of adult life as entailing five major components of the life structure: forming and modifying a dream; forming mentoring relationships; forming and modifying career, occupation or role; the love-marriage-family component; and forming mutual friendships. He indicates that it is not practically possible to accomplish successfully even the major work on all five of these components during the summer season of life, and some will be barely begun then. At most, some will be underway and relatively stabilized at the very end of the twenty-year season that begins at age twenty and ends around age forty.

Levinson indicates that, as the fortieth year is in the environs, a change in orientation comes about. The entire realm of externalized projects—which Freud could well characterize as "work and love"—pivots to be seen from a new perspective.

> The Mid-life Transition ordinarily has its onset at age 40 or 41 and lasts about five years...the average age at termination was 45.5, the range 44 to 47. We doubt that a true Mid life Transition can begin before age 38 or after 43. (Levinson, p. 191).

At this time. the "job" climbing is about as high as it is going to go, at least at the meteoric rate that it may have gone, relatively, during the thirties. The raising children job is often in a new state. In any event, there is the recognition of the passing of the generations; one is no longer a "kid" or even an "up and coming adult". One is a member of the older generation in the eyes of the new group of adults who are getting married, entering the work force full time, in short who are entering fully into the summer season of their lives and who are young enough to be one's own or one's peer's children.

At mid-life transition, ideas are just beginning to press upon us that will grow stronger over the entire fall season. Ordinarily, we have been until recently comfortable with being "older siblings" to the new generation coming along; there was a sense of comraderie, a feeling that we shared the same things, a common past we [illegible] in a sibling generation. Now we are parent age to these young [illegible]ts. This puts a pressure-to-meaning upon the plans for one's life. The five major components that have been worked upon throughout the summer season are no longer the sole focus of most energies. The five components still have to be worked on, striven for, cared for, over the entire fall season of life But in addition to them, one now has a stressing, a pressure, on the aging adult in the fall of life. This additional pressure to find a meaning in life beyond the five major components can be fled, in a series of events trying to recapture youth that from the outside appears as the proverbial middlescence or mid-life crisis. Even where it is not obvious in external behaviors, making mid-life adjustments is a part of the mental and emotional make-up of the people in Levinson's studies.

Jung and the Two Halves of Life

This broad overview of the data found in Levinson's study corresponds to theoretical constructs in Jungian developmental psychology, and in Jung's psychology as a whole. The age-forty transition into middle adulthood in Levinson is a critical lifepoint that begins a gradual psychic change which becomes more pronounced the more a person grows into fall and towards the winter of life.

In his description of life as a daily coursing from dawn to dusk, Jung says of the two halves :

> Man has two aims : the first is the natural aim, the begetting of children and the business of protecting the brood; to this belongs the acquisition of money and social position. When this aim has been reached, a new phase begins: the cultural aim. (CW 7, p. 74, par 114).

The first aim, the natural aim, takes place during the first half of life and will be the major focus of this article. The second aim, the new phase that begins only when money, children, and social position have been reached, is the aim of life that becomes clear as the realization becomes ever more evident that life has no external goal that is lastingly satisfying, even though life demands that we pour our best energies into externals as a way of discovering who we really are.

It is the aim of this half of life, the second half, to make us more than just normal and adapted, which are the main thrusts of the half of life that is governed by nature; culture pushes us to the process of individuating, and nature to societal adjusting.

It is to discover this new phase, this second aim in life, that the specifically Jungian therapy evolved — the therapy of transformation, of archetypal investigation, of the "inner journey", of the psychology of the opposites, or of the search for the Self. At times Jung talks of the progress made in this second aim of life, in his own specific psychology, as though it could be viewed as a progress along certain predictable archetypal paths: from the shadow, next on to the persona, thence to the anima/anumus, on to the wise old man or wise old woman, and finally to the whelter of primordial images that surround the Self (CW 9ii, pp. 3-23, pars 1-44). More commonly, the archetypal journey is described as ideosyncratic and lacking the clarity of direction that this progressive listing of the archetypal figures suggests. In any case, it is this process, this grappling with inner images of the collective unconscious in an inner journey, that makes up, strictly speaking, Jungian psychology as conceptually distinct from Freudian and Adlerian psychologies.

Ordinarily, this archetypal orientation of Jung is treated separately from his conception of the stages of life. In the remainder of this article, the interrelations between Jung's conception of the stages of life and his own specific contributions to psychology will be in sharp focus. Not only are the tasks or aims of life quite different in the two halves of life, but the method of therapy for each is distinct. The aim of therapy in the nature half of life is extroverted; in the culture half it is introverted.

Youth: the Broadening Stage

We know that Jung is usually cited for his inner explorations of historical material in analysis, for his collation and documentation of the cultural life of the individual, seen against the background of all men in all ages. We might therefore think that the task-oriented assignments he identifies for the first half of life are only a Jungian concession to external necessity, a set of tasks that he thinks must be just gotten out of the way; a necessary evil. But this is not so. Jung talks of the inner development that these tasks cultivate, nourish and make possible. Without this preparation in the first half of life, there would be a lack, an abnormal growing, a stunting of the life process.

Jung sees the second stage of development, Levinson's summer season, as a time for broadening ourselves into social roles (e. g., CW 8, p. 392, pars 761-762). It is a problematic stage, for we must carve out for ourselves a profession, a role or a career as our main goal. Along with the problems that may result just from the more external attempts at attainment of career or professional goals, we may also be confronted with inner psychic difficulties of two kinds: either our sexual instincts (the Freudian orientation), or an inferiority feeling which comes from our being too sensitive to the outside world and its reactions to our as yet socially unformed egos (the Adlerian orientation). Additional difficulties result from all kinds of false assumptions about ourselves, "exaggerated expectations, under estimation of difficulties. unjustified optimism, or a negative attitude" (CW 8, p. 392, par 761)

The way to achieve a successful solution to the problems that thus confront us in the summer season of life is to achieve externally all that we are capable of achieving, to throw ourselves wholeheartedly into the world.

> We are forced to limit ourselves to the attainable, and to differentiate particular aptitudes in which the socially effective individual discovers his true self. Achievement, usefulness, and so forth are the ideals that seem to point the way out of the confusions of the problematical (i. e. the second, the summertime) state. They are the lodestars that guide us in the adventure of broadening and consolidating our physical existence; they help us to strike our roots in the world. (CW 8, p. 394, par 768-769).

Rather than follow any of the historical explorations of our inner life, we should throw ourselves wholeheartedly into our external life, Jung says. Recognizing our instinctual side, for instance, and giving it proper external due, is essential to our expansion in the summertime of life. The breadth of our experience will be determined only by the force of our inner drive to broaden our external lives.

> Obviously it is in the youthful period of life that we have most to gain from a thorough recognition of the instinctual side... Proper recognition and appreciation of normal instincts leads the young person into life and entangles him with fate, thus involving him in life's necessities and the consequent sacrifices and efforts through which his character is developed and his experience matured. (CW 8, p. 60, par 113)

In technical Jungian terminology, the work done to carve out a career and to feel comfortable and fit for that career is the work of the persona archetype. And the formation of a persona is always a considerable concession to the world" (CW 7, p. 193, par 300). It is a collective rather than an individualizing effort. We become "them".

The building of the persona, Levinson's greatest mass of detail, is an immense work, and one that requires all our efforts in the summer season. Our concession to the world is scarey, for through it we lose ourselves. We become what "they" demand. We wear the mask (persona) for others. We live for others and not for ourselves. Their goals become ours. We don't ask what our needs are from life, but throw all of ourselves into what life needs from us.

> Of course, to win for oneself a place in society and to transform one's nature so that it is more or less fitted to this kind of existence is in all cases a considerable achievement. It is a fight waged within oneself as well as outside...the ideals, convictions, guiding ideas and attitudes which in the period of youth lead us out into life, for which we struggle, suffer and win victories: they grow together with our own being, we apparently change into them, we seek to perpetuate them indefinitely and as a matter of course (CW 8, p. 394-5, par 771).

Without the inner development of character that allying ourselves to public institutions brings to us, we would be involved in the most painful kinds of experiences, just for lack of knowing what the world outside our families of origin demanded, and what it entailed. We have all encountered people who have not yet had their rough edges rounded socially, who are always at social odds with others because they have not dedicated themselves to anything meaningful outside of themselves :

> There are indeed people who lack a developed persona—"Canadians who know not Europe's sham politeness —blundering from one social solecism to the next, perfectly harmless and innocent, soulful bores or appealing children, or, if they are women, spectral Cassandras dreaded for their tactlessness, eternally misunderstood, never knowing what they are about, always taking forgiveness for granted, blind to the world, hopeless dreamers...They must learn to understand what society expects of them: they must realize that there are factors and persons in the world far above them; they must know that what they do has a meaning for others, and so forth (CW 7, p. 199, par 318).

When we get stuck in the summertime of life, it is because we have not journied far enough from our parents and into the world outside our families of origin. We fear losing ourselves, by commiting ourselves to society's demands in successful work. We get stuck because we are too closely tied to our pasts and have not forced ourselves into the new and untried. We are cooperating with life when we throw ourselves into the fray of the outside world —of love of career, of mentors, of social institutions on which we have to make our mark. Jung describes therapy for the young (at least pre-forty) and the relative ease with which they can be freed for work. This "therapy" can be done in an analysis or by oneself, by answering the external demands of life, of society, of our surroundings.

> For young people a liberation from the past may be enough : a beckoning future lies ahead, rich in possibilities. It is sufficient to break a few bonds : the life-urge will do the rest... If ever we succeed in liberating young people from their past, we see that they always transfer the images of their parents to more suitable substitute figures. For instance, the feeling that clung to the mother now passes to the wife, and the father's authority passes to respected teachers and superiors or to institutions. Although this is not a fundamental solution, it is yet a practical road.. In a young man the instinctual forces tied up in neurosis give him, when released, buoyancy and hope and the chance to extend the scope of his life. (CW 7, pp 60-61, pars 88-91).

Looking at the same phenomenon of our tasks of involvement with life during this stage of development, the only way we can achieve and conquer in the world is by total dedication to the principle that we are masters of our own destinies. As the case of young people whose imagos were tied up in an earlier stage and then were transferred into the outside world of work, the young person, to live well in this stage of life, must rely solely on his will power, on his sheer determination, to force all inner urges onto their appropriate external objects.

> It is of the greatest importance for the young person, who is still unadapted and has as yet achieved nothing, to shape his conscious ego as effectively as possible, that is, to educate his will. Unless he is a positive genius, he cannot, indeed he should not, believe in anything active within him that is not identical with his will. He must feel himself a men of will, and may safely depreciate anything else in him and deem it subject to his will, for without this illusion he could not succeed in adapting himself socially. (CW 16, p. 50, par 109).

This quotation is in direct contrast with Jung's indications of treatment in the second half of life, where he typically emphasizes the opposite. For people for whom life is in the past, Jung emphasizes all in them that is *not* will, and chides the older people for hanging onto the youthful ideal that they are masters of their own houses.

Second Half of Life

How long can we expect to live within this stage where we are primarily concerned with willing, with our own determinations? Until our life-forces reverse, and our life is more behind us than before us. One of Jung's descriptions is :

> people who have left a large part of their life behind them, for whom the future no longer beckons with marvellous possibilities, and nothing is to be expected but the endless round of familiar duties and the doubtful pleasures of old age. (CW 7, p. 60, par 89).

This is a rather surprising and even shocking answer on Jung's part. Ordinarily we read of Jungian psychology and imagine somehow that the wisdom of his works, the talk about the archetypal path to individuation, the uniting of opposites, are somehow played out in the midst of the daily passage through the world of career, family and external activities.

But though surprising, Jung's point is also clear. He seems to be quite strong in talking about his own psychology, his psychology of opposites, coming about only and appropriately, with the second half of life. The second half of life has its bare beginnings around the fortieth birthday, according to Levinson's empirical study, and between thirty-five and forty for Jung. For both, however, it is not fully present until much later. It begins "softly at first and then ever more perceptibly" (CW 5, p. 438, par 680), and achieves its fulfillment as full-time descriptive stage probably only at the end of the fall and into the winter season of life, when the vital processes begin to slow making it impossible to surge as before into life's activities.

In a context in which he also describes the gradual change of a man between forty and fifty-five, and then the sudden reversal of his personality at fifty-five back into a youthful state, Jung describes some of the possible initial signs during the fall season as follows :

> Often it is something like a slow change in a person's character; in another case certain traits may come to light which had disappeared since childhood; or again, one's previous inclinations and interests begin to weaken and others take their place. Conversely—and this happens very frequently—one's cherished convictions and principles, especially the moral ones, begin to harden and to grow increasingly rigid until, somewhere around the age of fifty, a period of intolerance and fanaticism is reached. (CW 8, p. 395, par 773).

When we are used to thinking about the specifically Jungian psychology as pertaining to the body of psychological knowledge alongside Freudian, Adlerian, other transpersonal psychologies, reality therapy, etc., it pulls one up short to read Jung's description of the requisite for one who is of the age to begin to experience from within the psychology of opposites.

> He has put this part (youth) of the road behind him with or without difficulty. He has cut loose from his parents, long since dead perhaps, and has sought and found the mother in the wife, or, in the case of the woman, the father in the husband. He has duly honoured his fathers and their institutions, has himself become a father, and, with all this in the past, has possibly come to realize that what originally meant advancement and satisfaction has now become a boring mistake, part of the illusion of youth, upon which he looks back with mingled regret and envy, because nothing now awaits him but old age and the end of all illusions. Here there are no more fathers and mothers; all the illusions he projected upon the world and upon things gradually come home to him, jaded and way-worn. The energy streaming back from these manifold relationships falls into the unconscious and activates all the things he had neglected to develop. (CW 7, p. 61. par 90).

In Levinson's terms, this person is one who has accomplished all the basic elements in the stage of youth: he has fulfilled his dream in a meaningful occupation or career in which he has labored long and successfully; he has worked out his love life and his friendships in those long-term relationships which are the proof of enduring commitment; he has lived out both sides of the mentoring relationship; he has spent his energy on the world through dint of will and commitment to the upsurging life-force.

He is ready to move into the specific stage of Jungian therapy only at this point, far into the fall of life and facing the onset of winter. To attempt to engage in specifically the therapy of the opposites, or the inner path of archetypal figures, into the inner rather than the outer world before this time is to risk violating the principles of the life stages by resistance to the demands of life.

Resistance to Youth's Demands

In a section comparing the first and second halves of life, Jung describes clearly the first half characteristics and warns about resistances during the first half of life to the ideals of upsurging life-forces.

> the libido...[is]...a ceaseless forward movement, an unending will for life, evolution, creation, such as Schopenhauer envisaged in his cosmic Will, where death is a mishap or fatality coming from outside... During the first half of life it strives for growth ... in youth the urge for limitless expansion often lies hidden under veiling layers of resistance to life. (CW 5, p. 438, par 680)

Just what those resistance to life are, Jung talks about in the following quotation, indicating once more that it is Freudian (pleasure) and Adlerian (power) difficulties that draw us away from life and back into childhood's limited horizons.

> If we try to extract the common and essential factors from the almost inexhaustible variety of individual problems found in the period of youth, we meet in all cases with one particular feature: a more or less patent clinging to the childhood level of consciousness, a resistance to the fateful forces in and around us which would involve us in the world. Something in us wishes to remain a child, to be unconscious, or, at most, conscious only of the ego; to reject everything strange, or else subject it to our will; to do nothing, or else indulge our own craving for power... The essential feature of the dualistic phase [i.e., youth] is the widening of the horizon of life, and it is this that is so vigorously resisted. (CW 8, pp. 392-393, par 764-765),

Even in our choice of a Jungian psychology that is doing no more than Freudian or Adlerian psychology in the summertime of life, we may be driven by an infantile and regressive power principle rather than by the desire to overcome external obstacles. "Hanging out with the Jungians" may be an attempt to build an inflation that is properly built in constructing a persona. The whole Jungian method of treating people in the first half of life is to involve them directly in life :

> Thus our task in handling a young person is different from the task of handling an older person. In the former case, it is enough to clear away all the obstacles that hinder expansion and ascent. (CW 7, p. 74, par 114.)

How could one come to Jungian therapy in the first half of life with an infantile and regressive power principle ? Easily, Especially in an Aquarian age in which there is public approbation for the two sides of the magus archetype (guru and student), one could come to Jungian therapy to talk the language and impossibly pretend the outcome of the psychology of opposites before one's developmental time, as though talking the words somehow made one old and therefore somehow preccocious. It is obvious, however, that it is the second stage will to power mouthing the words, and not a third-stage wisdom living them. "When I underwent my enantiodromia two years ago," or "my uniting of the opposites went like this," or "I used to think that before I underwent the mystical marriage," are dead give always that we are not hearing a person talking about Jung's vital inner process that saves the second half of life from meaninglessness. We are rather hearing a person-inflating, or a psycho babbling of Jungian terms by one who should be dedicating him/herself to success in the externals appropriate to the summer and fall of life: love, dream, career, mentoring, friends.

Jung indicates how it comes about that, through inflation, we assume at the beginning of analysis (or, by extension, by the mere reading of Jung's works) that the knowledge itself that sets us free to work upon the world, that this psychological knowledge, is itself the goal of therapy (CW 7, pp. 34 and 141, pars. 41 and 224). This is a common inflation in the beginning of therapy, and for anyone viewing the entire process from an external point of view.

Jung is even more explicit in his letters about the way in which the power of the images inflate the ego. The ego becomes confused with the Self and spins itself unreal fantasies of grandure. "My dream record is my main claim to fame" or "the journals of my inner life are my main work" are common adolescent statement clocking a fear of risking oneself through dedication to the demands of the first half of life.

> Every person who possesses even a modicum of intelligence and the necessary educational urge will, after thorough reflection on his experiences during the analytical treatment of his neurosis, hit upon trains of thought which agree in a remarkable way with the religious ideas of all times and peoples. The neurosis brings the unconscious nearer to the surface... The danger of having this kind of consciousness is that you are drawn away from your own individual tasks in the real world and wafted into an inferior irreality where you only make demands and no longer want to achieve anything. It is all very fine when you discover what sort of parallels the unconscious-made-conscious has in the history of the human mind. But this discovery remains a useless fact as long as it has no effect on reality. It is even harmful because, as I have said, it alienates you from your own reality... And then he [i.e. you] will build a theory that everything morbid comes from this blockage, and this theory is correct. But it is not a theory that applies to the world as a whole ... It applies only to a person who, like a neurotic, goes on uselessly vegetating and spinning fantasies. His fantasy activity would have a meaning only if he were capable of transforming into action the insights gained from contact with the unconscious. (Letters, i, p. 105).

Jung is even more clear about the fact that he sees that young people will want to perform intellectual feats of daring-do, using his second-half of life psychology. They will use it for perhaps a first-stage, childhood will-to-power trip to convince themselves or others that they do not have to expond, to labor, to ascend through losing themselves in successfully mastering the world around them. Or, especially among those in the helping professions, they may somehow attempt to throw off verbalizations of Jungian second half of-life material; the words ring as hollow and inferior irrealities, as spun fantasies, rather than as the contacts with the unspeakable numen, the ultimately real force in life. It is an overblown ego talking, and not an acknowledgement of the Self.

When talking about the psychology of opposites, Jung indicates exactly why people in the first half of life cannot live the concepts of the second half of life—the concepts of culture rather than nature.

> What I am saying here is not for the young—it is precisely what they ought not to know—but for the more mature man whose consciousness has been widened by experience of life. No man can begin with the present; he must slowly grow into it, for there would be no present but for the past. A young person has not yet acquired a past, therefore he has no present either. He does not create culture, he merely exists. It is the privilege and the task of maturer people, who have passed the meridian of life, to create culture (CW 10, p. 132, par 272).

Nor, of course, does this quotation mean that a person is able to attain this knowledge when once "over the meridian", meaning over the midpoint of life in years lived. The knowledge comes only with a total despairing of the ultimate meaningfulness of the five tasks in the summertime of life—and also only after one has thrown him/herself totally into those five tasks of mentoring, dream, career, lovelife, friendships, and submitted totally and completely to being formed and moulded into their image. This is the concession that is made to the formation of the persona, which is the Self working its way out in the first half of life. In any of its forms, "the experience of the Self is always a defeat for the ego" (CW 14, p. 546).

Jung, Freud, Adler

Jung contrasts himself with Freud in that Freud "depreciates the unconscious and seeks safety in the discriminating power of consciousness", whereas Jung wants to reestablish a connection and cooperation with the unconscious. But when he says this, Jung is talking only of people in the second half of life. The ideal for people in the first half of life is to be will-full, to know everything about themselves, to "seek safety in the discriminating power of consciousness", as Freud advocates.

> Young people, who are very far from knowing who they really are, would run a great risk if they obscured their knowledge of themselves still further by letting the 'dark night of the

> soul' pour into their immature, labile consciousness. Here a certain depreciation of the unconscious is justified. Experience has convinced me that there are not only different temperaments ('types'), but different stages of psychological development, so that one can well say that there is an essential difference between the psychology of the first and the second half of life. (CW 4, p. 331, par 761-762).

Jung leaves no doubt that he sees Freud and Adler as being concerned with problems of summertime, of the first half of life :

> The neuroses of the young generally come from a collision between the forces of reality and an inadequate, infantile attitude, which from the causal point of view is characterized by an abnormal dependence on the real or imaginary parents, and from the teleological point of view by unrealizable fictions, plans and aspirations. Here the reductive methods of Freud and Adler are entirely in place. (CW 7, p. 59, par 88).

And he also leaves no doubt that Freud and Adler cannot help in the therapy of the second half of life :

> But once the parental transferences and the youthful illusions have been mastered, or are at least ripe for mastery, then we must speak of these things. We are here outside the range of Freudian and Adlerian reductions : we are no longer concerned with how to remove the obstacles to a man's profession, or to his marriage, or to anything that means a widening of his life, but are confronted with the task of finding a meaning that will enable him to continue living at all—a meaning more than blank resignation and mournful retrospect. (CW 7, pp. 73-74, par 113).

Conclusion

In a pithy statement, Jung focuses the purpose of his specific psychology : "The aim of individuation is nothing less than to divest the self of the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and of the suggestive power of primordial images on the other." (CW 7, p. 174, par 269). The reaction sometimes is, "Good; let's avoid persona things, start dreaming and get to good old Jungian work!" We have totally misunderstood his statement, in this case. We have to be wrapped in the awesome primordial images of the collective unconscious for the second half of life process to continue; and we have to have spent the first half of life wrapping ourselvs tightly in the persona to even have the process begin.

Until we have totally spent ourselves moulding ourselves to the world, and then have had all the external tasks of summer time and fall dry up affectively and become meaningless, we will be in the ambience of Freud and Adler. In our decline in the well-achieved external world, when we come to therapy not to conquer but to surrender, we are entering the Jungian realm. There are dangers in the developmental stages in each half of life, which Jung sums up succinctly : "Juse as one man may disappear in his social role, so another may be engulfed in an inner vision and be lost to his surroundings". (CW 7, p. 146, par 233).

If Jung is right, by being clear about the differences in tasks and kinds of therapies during the differing stages of life, we can at least avoid some obvious developmental failures.

IX

Some Fragments of Indian Logic

H. M. Joshi

Introduction

Indian Logic can well be said to be the corner-stone of the systems of Indian philosophy. Beginning with the Nyaya system of Gautam, the logic of Nagarjuna, that of Samkaracharya, logic of Madhva, Navya-Nyaya system of Gemgesha to the logic of Infinite in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, the rational logical thought and methodological system assume several significant aspects. In present article I propose to deal with a few aspects such as these of mediate inference, the problem of universal, issue of negation, certain inductive methods involving the problem of causation and justification of induction and the issue of validity of knowledge.

To begin with it may be said that Nyaya logicians have adequately distinguished between proof as means of demonstration and proof as rational articulation of belief and conviction. It is generally believed that logical argumentation attempts to express the validity and proof of certain doctrines and properly conceived beliefs. This is a half truth in the sense that it is not the function of logical argument to create a belief in certain person but it is its function to lay bare the rational content into clear form. Logical argument is the cogent form of a specific belief and conviction. Of course, it has got its psychological aspect of explanation and elucidation. It is seen in the Pararthanumana of Nyāya. The distinction between Swarthanumana and Pararthanumana brings out the truth of double nature of inferential process. It is psychological as well as logical. The criticism that logical inference and argument persist in "psychologism" as levelled by Husserl and other phenomenologists in modern times cannot be levelled against Nyāya philosophers who lay down five steps of syllogistic inference with a specific view of explanation of an argument to another person. It is, however, true that later on in Vedānta system of philosophy the five stepped syllogism was reduced to three-stepped one; however, the essential belief has been sustained.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ILLUSTRATION IN NYĀYA

In the third premise of Nyaya syllogism it is required to be shown at least one material illustration of the general proposition laid down which is known as Vyāpti. It is for instance, Ram or Mahanasah; fire in the kitchen. This is usually said to be the unique contribution of Nyaya Logic with regard to the issue of relationship between Deductive and Inductive Logic. I propose to show in present article that even though a specific illustration is found to be absent in laying down of general major premise of formal Aristotalian syllogism and that of universal and Existential quantifier in Modern symbolic Logic it is not necessary and indispensable to provide an illustration of general and universal proposition. Of course it is true that an abstract generalization is shown its relevant concrete particular in the world. But it does not make it indispensable for a general proposition to get it substantiated with material illustration in the external world. This is not to underrate the uniqueness of Nyaya logic but it is said so in order to point out the uniqueness of abstract universal concept. When it is said that humanity implies mortality or "smokeness implies Fireness" (implication of the Vyapti given in Nyāya syllogism) and its universal quantification as $(x)\ (Hx \rightarrow Mx)$ or $(x)\ (Sx \rightarrow Fx)$ it is shown that universal as such has nothing to do with existence as such.

Method of Induction

The illustrative inductive step in syllogism leads Nyaya logicians towards the search of causal uniformity. The propounding of Kevalanvayi, Kevalvyatireki and Anvayavyatireki methods in the search of cause adequately shows that although the negative proposition is conspicuously absent in deductive syllogism it is dealt with here in inductive investigation. The joint method of agreement and difference shows that one can infer the contrapositive, that is the negative of subject as well as predicate in valid manner. $x \rightarrow y$ from this premise one can infer legitimately $y \rightarrow \ x$ which would be its full contraposition. An affirmative judgement passes through the course of negatives and subsequently arrives at an affirmative judgement with negative subject and predicate.

Nyaya syllogism is at times shown to be defective on account of having all its propositions as positive. As a rejoinder it may be pointed out that in the process of obversion in Aristotalian immediate inference and the rule of double negation in modern symbolic Logic one can legitimately observe the role of negation to support affirmation and hence the relativity of negative and positive judgement.

Besides this, negative illustration and opposite argument have been insisted upon in Nyaya with regard to treatment of fallacies.

Principle of Negation

In the fallacies of Sādhāraṇa and Asādhāraṇa Savyabhichāra and Satpratipaksha the opposite and negative instances are looked into and thus far negative judgement is considered. In order to establish a specific generalization the negative instances were sought. In Buddhist logic the negative instance and negation of Reality have been elaborately dealt with. Nagarjuna has propounded the doctrine of Chatushkoti. The concept of Chatushkoti as propounded in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism refers to the nature of phenomena and noumenal (Parinishpanna or Paramartha Satya) reality. The question is whether either of them could be described as either SAT or ASAT or both SAT and ASAT or neither SAT nor ASAT. The four standpoints are denied in regard to the absolute reality Paramartha or Shunya, because it is Nishprapancha or transcending all characteristics. They are denied because they are, according to Buddhism, simply irrelevant in this connection. While the Buddhist attitude towards Chatushkoti is that of denial, the Vedanta Chatushkoti primarily consists in the affirmation of these four positions regarding Brahman or Absolute Reality.

Negation has not remained an empirical concept only but it is considered in relation to principle of existence also. In its treatment of metaphysics it is found especially in Vedanta that negation is not an ultimate category to determine Reality. It is partly logical and partly metaphysical. Negation is not verbal entity only but it is indication of non-existence also. However, the category of Abhava has shown that a specific thing does not exist in relation to certain positive thing or entity alone.

Causal Uniformity :

Having dealt with the problem of Universal and negation we will now observe the question of causal uniformity in Indian philosophy. The concepts of Purvavat, Sheshavat and Samanyatodrishta show adequately that Nyaya thinkers had acknowledged the rules of hypothetical affirmation (known as Ponendo Ponens) (pp) and negation (known as Tonendo Toneus) (TT) as well as the uniformity of Cause and effect. The process of inference depends upon the formal implication as well as material observation of instances. The concepts of Purvavat and Sheshavat do not show the plurality of cause and effect—only if they are improperly applied to events•but they lay down the possibility of valid causal relationship.

Of course the causal view of Nyāya Darshan is defective as it does not take into consideration the fact of inherence of effect into that of cause. However, its view of perception is quite significant.

The distinction between indeterminate and daterminate perception is worth considering as it makes adequate room for error in perception. Prof. H. H. Price in his "Thinking and Experience" distinguishes between "Primary Recognition" of a thing and "Secondary Recognition" of a thing. If for instance, one recognises something one can see as white, that is primary recognition because one is not taking what one can see as a sign of anything further. If one recognises something as snow or salt then that is secondary recognition because one is talking what one can see as a sign of something further.

Problem of causation or causality is the touch-stone of scientific method and induction. In Indian philosophy mostly all the systems have propounded their views on the nature of relationship between cause and effect. Pratityasamutpada, Arambhvada, Satkaryavada, Parinamvada, and Asatkaryavada have been some of the prominent views regarding causality. It is with reference to causation that problem of relationship between two things, entities and phenomena is intimately connected. In Vaisheshika philosophy nature of Saṁyoga and Samavāya has been discussed. Sankara's criticism of the nature of samavaya category is a testimony to the application of logical criterion of self-consistency to the quality and relation. The charge of indefinite regress against the category of Samavaya is logical criticism of its validity.

Causal relationship involves essential, accidental property, entaliment and inherent quality being attributed to the case. Cause is not the supreme subject to which predicates in the form of self, world and human mental and physical activity are applied. Causal relationship is applied to events of physical, natural and mental order. They are supposed to be contingent, mutually reciprocal, inherent and external.

Jain philosophers hold causal relationship as constituting of novel and yet real and independent features of objects. Causal category in Jain philosophy is ultimate in the sense that nature itself is plural and that it is involved in several complex relations and autonomous phenomena.

Jain concept of Syadvada points out of the probable character of knowledge. Judgements of common parlance and rational understanding are not absolutely certain. They are valuable to the extent that they express controlled reality and independence of objects. There is a sense in which the judgement of communicative rational thought is unspeakable. Eventhough it may sound paradoxical, yet the judgement commits of existence as well as non-existence, expressibility and non-expressibility.

Cause and Effect as Implicit

Samkhya philosophers hold that cause is implicitly ingrained in effect and this is how effect is the explicit expression of that which is contained within the matrix of cause. This view has a bearing upon the nature of ego and intelligence as being involved in material particles such as subtle particles (TANMATRAS). Implicit containment of mental category and evolute brings about the inherent relation between matter and mind. It is usually supposed that logical categories are objective and that they are imposed upon the subjective apparatus of human self. This would make logical category an alien factor detached from organic human life.

Samkhya philosophers have resolved this problem of alienation by making intelligence and ego as implicit in the development of nature. Theory of attributes (Gunas) in Samkhya makes intelligence an evolute of nature and therefore the impact of mind upon matter becomes natural. The problem as to how that which is material in the external would becomes mental and conscious in brain and mode of knowledge is solved by Samkhya by the relation of inherence of objective category within material entity.

"ARTHĀPATTI" as Source of Knowledge

In correspondene with a specific fact or "datum" found in the external world it is thought to be essential to presuppose and postulate a principle for without such a postulation the fact would not be cognised and explained. As it is said in Poorva Mimansa that Devadatta who is fat and does not eat during day-time: therefore he must be eating during night-time. Such an inference of idea and concept is warranted by experienced datum or phenomenon. Logic is said to be an examination of validity of principles and knowledge of external world. Knowledge consists not of principles alone but those of facts and values also. In this context new concepts and categories of logic are explored and made possible. Just as I pointed out earlier with relation to Purvavat. Sheshavat and Samanyatodrishta anuman that they are meant for the explanation of the relation between facts. Of course, there is a ground for speculation and unknown possibility, however,, one can relate the fact with the general principle and reality. This shows the way in which a concrete fact can be found to be related with an abstract principle of thought. Categories of Logic and principles of philosophy are not just speculations but they are warranted by certain significant data and experienced facts in the world. In the praman of Arthapatti the principal factors of causation such as invariability, unconditionality, identity, consistency and class-membership are found to be legitimate.

VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

As regards the nature of validity of judgement Poorva Mimānsa puts forward the view of self-validity or intrinsic validity of judgement as against the externally dependent validity of knowledge.

O y dispute the truth or the degree to which validity can be g ed by the position held and the judgement itself. However, th hod of showing this type of validity has an important advantag f propounding its own sufficient reason for the truth of the posi on. Unless the rival propounder or system shows the falsity of it he truth stands established. The rival may be led to absurd cons quences too in which case also the position held so far is proved. In case of opposition the showing of absurdity of consequences the method proposed has a similar reference to the method of RAA (REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM) in modern symbolic logic wherein by supposing the opposite (for instance P) the contradictory proposition (P & P) is arrived at and therefore the original judgement or position is proved to be true.

To prove a specific piece of knowledge as valid would require a definite and abiding object and criterion in connection with which the piece of knowledge becomes valid or invalid. Now the question is whether the supposed object is really abiding and valid. Is it an external criterion or an internal criterion ? If it is external, it would lead us further and probably we would be constrained to go in a blind alley. If on the other hand the criterion of validity is internal it is supposed to have the capacity to express within itself. Self-validity means that whether circumstances and conditions leading to the inception of knowledge are lying within itself, within the subject, thing or phenomenon.

At any stage of the affirmation of knowledge it is the knower or the self that must assert that the knowledge is valid. Although the object which is supposed to be true and valid is apparently outside the self. Yet it is the self within who puts a mark of truth and validity upon it. In the doctrine of Paratah Pramanya held by Nyaya-Vaisheshika the stamp of self upon the piece of knowledge is not accounted and therefore it leads to further regression. Whereas in the doctrine of Svatahpramāṇya it is the self which recognises and accepts the truth found in the objective piece of knowledge.

When Descartes, for instance, perceived the truth of ideas and objects "clearly and disntinctly" then he asserted them to be true and objective. To cognise the truth of objects by self may seem to be subjective, however, it makes knowledge and validity essential and complete.

Of course this is not to underrate the value of Paratahpramanya which significantly insists upon external conditions and circumstances of objective things. Unless the objects are not adequately gathered and brought to light they cannot be cognised by intelligence which is indeed the self.

Connotative View of Vedanta

As regards the nature of relationship between Brahman, Individual and world Vedanta thinkers in general and Śaṁkara in particular have adopted connotative view of the judgement. When qualities of substance are related and their identity is expressed in varying manner in content of truth and falsity of rest of the terms it is held to be connotative view of judgement. For instance with regard to the relationship between individual self and Brahman there are three views held in different schools of Vedānta, viz., (i) Bheda (ii) Abheda and (iii) Bhedabheda. The divergence of view centres round the meaning of self and Brahman. If Brahman is perfect and All-knowledge, consciousness and Blissful than individual cannot be so in the same sense. Judgements regarding Brahman are tautologous. Therefore the conditions of world and ego (Jiva) which are imperfect are held to be contingent and at times contradictory.

Such a view regarding the nature of subject-predicate relationship has its obvious defects. However, the connotative view is a reflection of Reality being articulated in thought and experience. Logical ragour perceptible in Śaṁkara's theory of Māyā is the result of law of contradiction implied in the relationship between Brahman as subject and rest of the essences as predicate.

It is true to say that logic is instrumental for the metaphysical view held by the philosopher in Indian philosophy. Of course, Navya-Nyaya has attempted to consider the problems of validity of inference and knowledge independently of the background of metaphysics. However, most of the systems in Indian philosophy have a specific metaphysical outlook and commitment which is attempted to be indicated in logical reasoning. To discuss the view of Navya-Nyaya would be a topic for another paper.

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X

Existentialism and its Convergence with Religion

S. K. Singh

Existentialism is a revolt against the diverse complex political situations of the world during the two great wars as well as against the major systems of philosophy which rarely pay any attention to the uniquely personal concerns of individuals. Historical events, particularly wars, showed disregard for the feelings and aspirations of individuals. Philosophy for the most part dealt with the technical problems of metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology in a general objective manner without paying any attention to the personal concerns of the individuals. And technology, which arose as an aid to man, forced men to fit their lives into the rhythm of machines. Everywhere men were losing human qualities and were being converted from 'subjects' into 'objects', from an 'I' into an 'it'.

If wars overwhelmed men in spite of their frantic efforts to forestall such calamities; if philosophy talked in abstract general terms; if technology removed much of the human dimension of existence by harnessing men to machines; and if religion, the traditional source of man's sense of worth and meaning, was itself suffering from the critical impact of reason and science, existentialism was bound to be born and so it did appear as one of the major currents of thought.

The existential philosophers are concerned about conditions and quality of the existing human individual. They focus their attention on man's existence by superseding the tall claims of reason and mere mechanisation of life. They try to restore man's lost freedom an responsibility by giving to man his central place in the universe. They bring forth the problem of man in the forefront and stress man's concrete existence, his contingent nature, his personal and responsibility.

No aspect of man's existence has been more pervasive and influential than his religion. Religion comes out of life and cannot be divorced from it since it exists not in doctrinal propositions but in man. Religious questions do not arise in mind spontaneously. Rather, they have their origin in the limiting situations of human life, e.g., alienation, suffering, death and so on. Through an analysis of the conditions of man's life we gain insight into the way the human predicament is implicated in religious thought. If men did not feel guilty, they would not require divine forgiveness. If they did not experience enslavement to the vicious cycle of desire, suffering and death, they would not long for blissful stage of liberation. The bewilderment evident in religious problems, such as, why do the innocent suffer? Why do the evils seem to triumph? is not only bewilderment of human mind, but also of human spirit.

Religion is not only a formalistic affair. Religious questions are not supposed to take conceptual or ritualistic form since they are expressions of man's response to the nature of his existence. The problems of religious life have an unavoidable existential foundation. Religious concern issues from lived experience. Soren Kierkegaard, thus, renounces a barely formalistic or ritualistic conception of religions and also repudiates the Hegelian conception of it which is direct consequence of his panlogism. An unreflective Church-goer is a Christian by virtue of his being a member of a particular community. His christianity is only superficial. It does not belong to the core of his personality. Similarly, the religion of a Hegelian rationalist who regards abstract thought as ultimate reality is also a depersonalised religion. The attempt of Germany's greatest speculative thinker, Hegel, to capture all reality in his system of thought by ignoring the most important element, namely; existence, made Kierkegaard his critique. According to Hegel, the supreme reality is the Absolute which is the unity of a system of categories. The Absolute, which is eternal and immutable, reproduces itself as a system of objects in time strictly in accordance with the laws of the Hegelian the dialectic. The life of man, whose essence is thought, is also controlled by the rigid laws of the dialectic. Man's personality is simply reflection of the Absolute. He cannot have, therefore, real freedom at all.

In opposition to Hegel, Kierkegaard maintains that individual cannot be described in generalities or be reduced to mere category of thought. Hegel's philosophy falsified man's understanding of reality because it shifted attention away from the concrete individual to the concept of universals. It called upon man to think the Absolute thought instead of being involved in decisions and commitments.

But Kierkegaard asserts that mind does not move from one stage of intellectual awareness to another through the process of thinking, as expounded by Hegel, rather the movement itself is channelized from one level of existence to another through choice, will and act. The individual person is a pure subject and is quite unique in nature, Decision of man is genuinely religious only when it transcends the universals and objective and becomes individual and subjective. Unless a man approaches the religious questions with personal concern he cannot really know what they are about.

Religion must have existential background, otherwise it would be an empty shell. Religion is not a subject-matter of our discussion. 'To be' and not 'to know' should be the main motto of our life, if we want to be truly religious. Man is religious not by observing rituals of his religion or by being versed in theological literature, but only by passionately embracing the teachings of one's prophet and by realising them in his life or by living in contact with God, which transforms his whole life. When religion was denied this rightful place in man's life, it became an empty shell and there was existential revolt against this hollowness and mechanisation of life which preceded the advent of existential philosophy. Paul Tillich says that break down of the religious tradition was the important factor for the uprisal of existential philosophy. There was a great existential movement in Germany in the nineteenth century because of the massacre of religious tradition "under the impact of enlightenment, social revolution, and bourgeois liberalism".[1] Disbelief in God and religion because of the critical impact of rational and scientific thought served as an important factor for the development of existentialism. For, belief in God had been the traditional source of man's sense of worth, meaning and moral guidance. "Atheism had become an important cause of the problems that gave rise to existentialism, since the break down of religious tradition of Europe greatly aggravated the growing sense of life's worthlessness and meaninglessness".[2]

On the other hand existentialism could not gain ground in England because there was no break down of the religious tradition. "England is the only country in which the existential problem of finding a new meaning for life had no significance, because there positivism and religious tradition lived on side by side, united by a social conformism which prevented radical questions about the meaning of human "Existence". It is important to note that the one country without an Existential philosophy is that in which during the period from 1830 to 1930 the religious tradition remained the strongest. This illustrates once more the dependence of the Existential philosophy on the problems created by the break down of the religious tradition of European continent".[3]

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[1] Paul Tillich, Existential Philosophy, Journal of History of Ideas, Vol. 5, 1944, p. 66.

[2] Samuel Enouch Stumpf, *Socrates to Sartre* : A History of Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 455.

Here a question arises : Why has existentialism made a greater impact on religion than any other contemporary trend of philosophy? The attitude of positivists and analysts towards religion is chiefly negative, because they are empiricists without religious experience. The positivists regard experience as the only criterion of judging everything to be true or false. On this criterion they reject religious and theological statements. Analysts apply the principle of verification, which says that a proposition has meaning only if it can be verified, at least in principle. Religious and theological statements cannot be verified even in principle and hence they are rejected as meaningless. Existentialism, on the other hand, is very important school of philosophy from religious and theological point of view because the existentialists are not concerned with abstract doctrines or systems that clash with religion, but with human predicament, his present state of mind, his inner history, his anguish. They reveal that our crisis in the last resort is the crisis of man; that a basic disturbance exists in his relation with fellowmen, with world and with God; and that this crisis apparently starts as a religious crisis and remains so at bottom. They describe these phenomena of central interest to any human being, i.e., the obstacles an individual experiences in becoming a self, how he loses his personal identity in a mass society, how he could become a self, how he is dominated by feelings. These problems, though sometimes described in secular terms, are of immense religious significance. Even where the existentialists lead to atheistic conclusion, it is of great importance for religion inasmuch as they, unlike complacent modern thinkers, are honest enough to voice their sense of despair which is widespread in our world. By doing so the existentialists give the problem for which religion may supply its revelatory and spiritual solution. On the other hand, religion also serves as a solace to the existentialists who are facing tragedy without any hope of salvation In the state of hopelessness and doubt it is religious faith that provides hope and certitude to a man. Religious faith is like the oasis of desert for the man who is on the breaking point in face of hopelessness and doubt. A man, in the existential vein, should not be too preoccupied with his freedom, his struggle, his inner conflicts to shut off from fruitful relation with society and God. For, existentialism is chiefly valuable as an antidote, but poisonous as an exclusive diet. "Existentialism cannot serve as a self-sufficient philosophy. Its chief value is that of a corrective. By clearing away philosophical underbrush it brings us face to face with urgency of ultimate questions. But it does not answer them".[4]

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[3] Paul Tillich, Existential Philosophy, Journal of History of Ideas, Vol. 5, 1944, p. 68.

There are, as a matter of fact, some points of convergence between existentialism and religion, which make them quite friendly and cooperative. In the first place, existentialist modes of thinking prove extremely useful for religion in warning us against the objective and detached attitude of science which leads to dehumanization. The existentialists insist that in connection with ultimate matters it is impossible to lay aside the impassioned concerns of the individual. In search of ultimate truths the whole man and not only his intellect is caught and involved. His emotion and his will must be aroused and engaged so that he cannot only see the truth but also live it. The subjective standpoint, thus, puts the individual with his commitments and passions in the very centre of picture, whereas objective point of view takes a man as far as possible from passions and feelings. Subjectivity, for the existentialists, is the guiding force, the starting point of all our activities in life. Man can never transcend the basic structure of subjectivity. Truth has no significance apart from man's concrete situation. It cannot, therefore, be gained by detached analysis. This is why the existentialists defend subjectivity and uniqueness of man. This defence is urgently needed due to the growing threat of abstract rationalism which has its roots in the widespread and uncritical appreciation of science. Religion has its place in our life only when subjectivity and uniqueness are preserved.

In the second place, existentialism has much to offer the religious believers by making them acquainted with guilt, anxiety, despair and nothingness. In religion we want to win over these dark forces. Existentialism not only acknowledges and analyses these dark forces but also helps religion to face them effectively and courageously. Religion also, in turn, extends its revelatory answers to the existential questions. Religion gives revelatory answers to the questions which arise out of existential situations. Religious ideas do not arouse response from man if they are not in some sense relevant to the circumstances of his existence. It is for this reason that religious answers conform in content to the existential questions arising out of the human situation. A man is not likely to respond to answers which have no bearing on his life. This is what Paul Tillich explains in his 'method of correlation'. He says "Revelatory answer is meaningless if there is no question to which it is the answer. Man cannot receive answer to a question he has not asked. Any such answer would be foolishness for him, in understandable combination of words..."[5] Man poses questions out of his existential situation and gets revelatory answer formulated by theology. God speaks to the human situation, against it, and for it. In existentialism we find predicament and question, and in religion we find the suitable solution and answer.

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[4] D. E. Roberts, *Existentialism and Religious Belief* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 4.

In the third place, faith, the cornerstone of religion, is given very important place in man's life by the existentialists. Existentialism is a protest against all forms of rationalism which obstruct the natural growth of religion. Hegel, the priest of rationalistic idealism in his time, was severely criticised by Kierkagaard for his rationalism. Kierkegaard was trained in Hegel's philosophy at the University of Copenhagen without being impressed by it. When he heard Schelling's lectures at Berlin, which were critical of Hegel, Kierkegaard agreed with the criticism. If Hegel, said Kierkegaard, had written the whole of his Logic and then said that it was merely an experiment in thought. then he would have been certainly the greatest thinker who ever lived, but as it is, he is merely comic. Hegel's attempt to confine all reality in his system of thought made him comic for Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard took an unequivocal stand against the assumption that construction of a logical system is the only way to reach the truth. He took a passionate leap to faith. His philosophy, as a matter of fact, was an adjunct to his religious faith.

The fourth important point of convergence between existentialism and religion concerns the question of human freedom. Freedom of will is the sine qua non of religion and morality. If a man is not free in his action, he is not responsible for what he does. Determinism demolishes the edifice of morality and religion. Denial of human freedom leaves no scope for man's religousity. Existentialists revolted against major systems of philosophy, historical events, and rise of technology which regarded man as a cog in the big machine having no freedom to decide and choose. They unanimously suggest the illumination of human existence where he can make his choice, his decision as a free and responsible individual. Existentialism restores to man his central place in the universe, his active participation in life as a free and responsible individual. "Existentialism is a passionate return of the individual to his own freedom, in order in the unforlding of its process to extract the significance of his being".[6] Some religious existentialists go on to suggest that genuine human freedom is discovered only by relinquishing man's effort to run life all by himself, and by finding highest blessedness in communion with God.

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[5] Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II (London: James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1957), p. 15.

[6] Roger Troisfontaines, *Existentialism and Christian Thought*, translated by Martin Jarret Kerr (London: A & C Black, 1950), p. 25.

The enormous progress of science and technology has brought about a situation in which new weapons endanger the very existence of man on this earth. But this progress is not matched by a corresponding rise in responsibility. On the contrary, human responsibility was never at such a low ebb. Thousands of people are killed on roads, millions die in concentration camps. Nobody really seems to care. People talk of elimination of the concept of responsibility from legal practice because of the obvious difficulties in assessing the degree of responsibility in specific cases, but they do not notice that the very future of mankind depends on the inflexible sense of responsibility of the rulers. A single irresponsible dictator may unleash a third world war which would mean inevitable end of homo-sapiens. Thus, to rouse the conscience of men and to remind them their responsibility is certainly an existential problems of the greatest practical significance and, at the same time, it is a religious problem of ultimate concern.

Book-Reviews

Mitchell Aboulafia : *The Self-Winding Circle : A Study of Hegel's System*, pp. 108, Warren H.Green, Inc,, St.Lousis, Missouri, U.S.A. Price $ 14.75 (1982).

Professor Mitchell Aboulafia, the author of this book is in the Department of Philosophy, University of Houston at Clear Lake City, Houston, Texas. The author says in his Preface about the book 'a work whose object is to provide a compact overview of the whole of Hegel's system, for those who have some familiarity with Hegel's thought.' He further says 'that we will be investigating in addition to the dialectic of the finite and infinite, the relations in between temporality, Nature and the development of spirit, in order to bring out the inherent unity of the system.'

Two elements from the core of the study: the dialectic of the finite-infinite and development. This work is organzied in a manner similar to Hegel's Encyclopaedia : Logic, Nature, Spirit. It moves from the abstract determinations of Hegel's dialectic to the more concrete categories of finite and Absolute Spirit. The whole book is divided into five chapters : I. Method II. Finite and Infinite—In Abstract Form. These two chapters may be viewed as an introduction to the method and content of Hegel's Logic; they seek to develop the relation between the finite the infinite as logical determinations. The Third chapter Time as Abstract Externality addresses the character of temporality in the Philosophy of Nature. The fourth chapter Finite Spirit involves key issues in the Philosophy of Spirit, such as the historical development of human beings and the relationship between the development and Hegel's concept of time, Finally, the fifth and the last chapter. The idea of Philosophy investigates the realm of Absolute Spirit by examining on the finite and the infinite are joined in the Idea of Philosophy.

This is one of the unique books based particularly on Hegel's published writings and his lectures which is regarded as the "heart" of the system, The author has very ably provided for those who have background in Hegel's philosophy, a systematic treatise to enable them to acquaint with Hegel and his main philosophical concepts.

Prof. Aboulafia deserves our congratulations in bringing out such a nice book on Hegel which will enrich all philosophical libraries and advanced students of Philosophy. It is indeed a nice addition to Hegel's already published work by scholars all over the world.

G. N. Mishra : *Ontology*, pp. 168, published by Rekha Mishra, Mun. Block A-2-1, Torca, Carazalem, Goa 403002, Price Rs. 40/— 1982.

The author of this work Dr. G. N. Mishra is Head of the Department of Philosophy, Dhempe College of Arts and Science, Panaji, Goa, Foreword is written by Dr. N. V. Joshi, Retd. Prof. of Philosophy, Ramnarain Ruiya College, Bombay University and by Dr. Sanagam Lal Pandey, Professor and Head Department of Philosophy, Allahabad University.

The author in this book attempts to examine the merits of Ontology to serve as the fundamental discipline in Philosophy. Dr. Mishra has examined ontological problems under new perspectives. His main emphasis is on the problem of individuation. Ontology is the systematic study of being. The author has very ably presented the history of ontology with special reference to the west.

The whole book has been divided into 9 chapters ; besides Foreword, Preface, Bibliography, Index of Authors and Index of subjects : The chapters are : 1. Beginnings of Ontology 2. Early Ontology, 3. Counterfeit Ontology : Realism 4. Counterfeit Ontology : Idealism 5. Bypassing Counterfeit Ontologies 6. Existentialistic Ontology 7. Attacks on Ontology 8. Problems of Ontology and 9. Logical Analysis of Individuated Existence.

Dr. Mishra has very ably presented in a simple and clear style the concept of ontology as developed in the West in the history of thought. He has mentioned in his bibliography the names of 86 important publications which he has consulted in writing this important work. This bibliography will prove of great worth for the students of philosophy who wants to do further reading in Ontology. It is indeed a good introduction to Ontology. The author wise and subject wise index has added to the utility of the book.

V. V. Nalimov : *Realms of the Unconscious : The Enchanted Frontier*, pp. 320, ISI Press, Philadelphia, (U. S. A.) Price $ 29.50. September 1982

The author of this remarkable book is a Russian Scientist who has several books to his credit. The main books being: *Faces of Science* and *In the Labyrinths of Language : A Mathematician's Journey.* These books are equally provocative as the present one. The book was originally written in Russian and has been translated into English by A. V. Yarkho and edited by Robert G. Colodny and is well illustrated by V. S. Gribkov.

In his present book Prof. Nalimov examines the world of the "unreal", the domain of the human imagination. In his brilliant exposition he has tried to synthesize elements of semantics, science, and mysticism into a startling new views of how the human mind perceives the world. According to the author, the study of the unconscious covers all manifestations of consciousness not encompassed within logic. Broadly defined, that means all features of the consciousness which cannot be assimilated or simulated by computers.

Prof. Nalimov using the major concepts of mathematics, physics, linguistics, psychology, psychiatry, history, philosophy, culturology, anthropology and theology develops a theory of the unreal. Its methodology is borrowed largely from Physics as Nalimov says... Physics has in the course of its development...taught us to explain the incomprehensible comprehensible by the much more incomprehensible. His experimentation includes attempts to re-create in human subjects altered states of consciousness typifying past cultures.

The whole book is divided into five sections : Part I Language : which is further subdivided into : 1. Probablistic World-Exit into Another Culture 2. Free Will in the Probabilistic World 3. Probabilistic Approach to the Description of Evolution of Texts 4. The Language of the numerical Vision of the World in Ancient Times. Dialectics of the Discrete and the Continuous in Plotinus's Tractatus 'On Numbers 5. On the Metaphoric Nature of the Language of Probabilistic Concepts. Part II Time is subdivided into: 6. Time: A Dialogue with a Metaobserver 7. Time as a Grammar of Texts of the world. Comparison of Contemporary ideas on Time with Plotinus's 'On Time and Eternity' 8. Metaphoric Nature of the Concept of Psychological Time. Present momentness of the Past and the Future, Part III Nothing is subdivided into: 9. Semantic Vacuum as the Analogue of Physical Vacuum, Comparative Ontology of the Two Realities : Physical and Psychic. 10. How can we Contact Semantic nothing ? Part IV Experiment, has been subdivided into : 11. Meditation 12. Symbols 13. Experimental Study of the Unconscious : Revelation of Semantic fields underlying worlds of everyday language. 14. An Experience of Meditation Hermeneutics and 15. On the Roads of Time. And lastly Part V Remarks on the World Holisiticity is subdivided into : 16. Belief in Reincarnation as a Projection of the Idea of Human Participation in the Indivisible Integrity of the World. 17. Science and Religion—Is there room for the Complemantarity Principle ? and 18. Dialectics of the Open End (Comments on What has been said above).

Prof Nalimov has revolutionised the whole concept of unconscious in his recent book which will change the entire thought process which are fundamentally different from the old existing views. The whole book is provocative, stimulating and entirely different from our own concepts. Philosophers, Psychologists, scientists, and scholars of many types will be able to revise their existing knowledge [illegible] Nalimov deserves our congratulations on giving us new insigh [illegible] the existing knowledge about unconscious. This book will a [illegible] readers from all fields of learning.

I

Unity of Truth and Pluralism in Society

G. Verbeke

Some years ago I had the opportunity of visiting the old city of Jerusalem: a guide showed me the various geographic areas and provided some information about the people living there. Walking around I saw the Armenian area with the beautiful old church, the jewish district with the synagogue that was rebuilt, the islamic part with the splendid dominating the surrounding countryside, the Greek orthodox quarter with the famous Golgotha church and finally the Catholic section with some important religious houses. After this survey the guide drew the conclusion that religion is very divisive. Located at the top of a hill, this ancient city has become an image of the present world. Living together within the frontiers of a small area, various groups of people are deeply divided in their religious convictions. A contemporary French Philosopher, Gabriel Marcel, wrote a theatre play entitled "The broken World" (Le monde casse): there is indeed a profound disagreement among men about some basic aspects of life, not only about religion, but also about philosophical problems, political questions, economic matters, social issues, about topics like wealth and poverty, peace and war. This disagreement not only opposes various countries against each other, it is present within the community of the same country, even within the same family: members of the same family may belong to different political parties, adhere to different religious groups or profess a kind of agnosticism or atheism. This variety of opinions and convictions is not new: looking at the world population as a whole, one notices not only a great number of languages, but also quite a lot of different views, ways of life and civilisations. What is new, is that people at the present day have got an increasing awareness of these differences. When various groups of people were more separated from each other, locked up within the boundaries of their ethnical community, they scarcely were conscious of the differences existing among men. Due to a growing mobility and a more intense traffic between countries and continents, there is now a keen awareness of the many clashing opinions which divide mankind.

This multiplicity of views, even regarding the most essential aspects of life, raises an important philosophical problem: why don't people agree with each other, at least on important issues ? It is easy to reply that everybody is influenced by the education he received, the tradition to which he belongs, the civilisation area in which he lives. This answer however does not solve the question, it only removes it : why this variety of philosophical and religious opinions ? Is there more than one truth ? Looking at the history of thought as a whole, various interpretations of this diversity have been suggested. One may at least distinguish five different explanations : relativism of knowledge and truth, universal scepticism, the theory of double truth, the doctrine concerning the historical nature of truth and dogmatism. Wanting to explain the divergence of opinions among humans, we have to face immediately the same divergence with respect to the interpretations themselves of this lack of agreement: as a matter of fact this absence of consensus has been explained in different ways. Let us have a critical look at the various attempts which have been made in order to solve the crucial problem of our divided world.

The multiplicity of truth has been maintained by some philosophers in the past. In classical antiquity the relativity of all knowledge has been proclaimed by some sophists: according to Protagoras, man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not[1]. What is true for one individual would not necessarily be true for another. Pirandello, a contemporary Italian writer, composed a theatre play treating this topic : everybody has his own truth (Chacun sa verite). Obviously the background of this theory is that truth refers to knowledge and knowledge to individual subjects. The concrete situation of knowing subjects is so different, that it must issue into opposing views, equally justified if one takes into account particular circumstances from which they arise. After all the sophists refuse to recognize more truth value to one view than to another, since various opinions have to be judged in the context of each knowing subject. Each individual is the maker of his truth, which is valid although it is not participated by other people. It has often been claimed that consensus is a criterion of truth: the Stoics v.g. insisted very strongly on this aspect. If some doctrines are generally agreed on, they must be true: since the divine Reason is immanent in the world, the majority of mankind could not consent to error[2]. As to the sophists, they rather emphasized the individual character of truth, which is not necessarily shared by everybody, it bears the individual mark of the knowing subject.

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[1] Diels-Kranz, *Vors.*, 80 Protagoras, B 1 (Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152 A); cf. *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, by K. Freeman. Oxford, 1948, p. 125.

We have to look more closely at this theory. Truth we are talking about, is indeed human truth, it is connected with individual subjects wanting and endeavouring to disclose the true nature of reality. Each individual has his own approach and deals with all kinds of questions from his personal viewpoint. In moral matters too, everybody has his own conscience and tries to find out what is good in the changing situations of life. The questions however is whether truth is merely individual or also supra-individual: if it is connected with human existence, doesn't it reflect the ambiguous character of the knowing subject? Man is not locked up within himself, within the narrow frontiers of his own being, he is openness to the world and to other subjects. To exist "in the world" does not merely mean that each human being is located in a particular place of the universe, it implies that man is orientated towards reality outside himself, and particularly to other subjects. The capacity of speech involves the possibility of communicating with other individuals; feeling of love and sympathy also show that man is by nature directed to co existence with other subjects: according to G. Marcel to exist means to co-exist. This possibility of communication, dialogue and discussion implies that there is a common goal to be attained, a common truth for which all human subjects are in search. In the famous myth of Plato's *Phaedrus* human souls take part in the great expedition to the plain of truth: it is not easy for humans to follow the gods and to reach the top where they will contemplate authentic reality. Many of them lose their wings and fall back on the earth, because they were unable to dominate their irrational powers withdrawing them from their aim. Those however who overcome the many obstacles of the journey, meet together with the gods at the same spot, they contemplate true reality, they sit down at the table of the divine beings and drink immortality. Plato firmly opposed the relativism of the sophists: in his view there is only one truth, it is a common goal for all thinking minds[3].

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[2] Within the framework of Stoicism consensus is a decisive criterion of truth; the soul of each individual is a particle of the immanent divine Reason. Hence it is impossible that all men ever could agree on what is false. The number of sages is very limited: under the influence of their emotions and passions, people may go astray in particular cases and make all kinds of mistakes. But a universal agreement on what is erroneous, would be totally incompatible with the optimistic Stoic view on the development of the world.

From a philosophical viewpoint one could hardly maintain truth to be merely individual, it is both individual and universal, one and multiple. It is universal because the formal object of thought is being: all propositions, either negative or affirmative are related to being, whether this term is explicitly mentioned or implicity present. Whatever we affirm or deny, concerns being: in a sense every act of thinking deals with the same topic, viz. being. Man is a metaphysical animal because during his whole life he never stops considering being. According to Avicenna the notion of being is the first one that flows from the active intellect into human soul: it must be the first because it is the basis and the source of all human thinking[4]. One of the most characteristic features of this notion is that it is transcendental (in the language of Heidegger, it is "umgreifend", encompassing): it involves everything, nothing is outside being, whatever exists is included in being. If man is always concerned with being, that means that in his thinking he takes a viewpoint that is beyond each particular viewpoint: in a sense man is always dealing with the totality of reality, because using constantly the notion of being, he does not exclude anything from it. Even when he considers directly a particular object only, he is actually concerned also with a horizon that involves everything. All human minds meet each other within the same transcendental horizon: so the truth of one individual could not be quite different from that of his neighbour, because they are both dealing with the same encompassing object. There is however a sense in which truth is multiple, insofar as it is connected with the unique uninterchangeable condition of innumerous individuals: these subjects are constantly invited to confront their views with those of other people in an open and free encounter (ein liebender Kampf, in the language of K. Jaspers) to correct and improve their opinions and, if possible, to come closer to each other on the way to a consensus. Thus human truth shows the ambiguity of existence, which is both individual, temporal spatial, as well as openness to other subjects and to whatever exists.

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[3] In Plato's view truth must be unique, since it is connected with the existence of transcendent Ideas, which are uncompounded and immutable: v.g. there is only one idea of justice and it remains always the same. Truth is attained insofar as an individual is able to contemplate authentic reality. In this respect some individuals may be more capable than others, but this difference does not affect the uniqueness nor immutability of truth.

[4] Cf. *Avicenna Latinus*, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I-IV. Edition critique de la traduction latine medievale par S. Van Riet. Introduction doctrinale par G. Verbeke, Louvain Leiden, 1977, p. 32+—36+.

Another solution proposed with respect to the discrepancy of human views is that of scepticism. The most radical kind of scepticism consists in denying formally the possibility of ever attaining truth. This viewpoint however involves some kind of selfcontradiction, since it is based on a categorical statement, asserting that truth could never be reached. Most of the sceptics therefore take a more cautious stance, they simply refuse to consider any opinion as being certain; there is such a variety of clashing views, that none of them could be regarded to be trusty and certain. They may offer some degree of probability, but nothing more: instead of firmly sticking to some views and repudiating others, man should learn to live in a climate of uncertainty. According to the sceptics it is useless to want certainty; everybody has to accept his human condition and has to free himself from this restless search for absolute truth: only when he does so, he will live in peace (ataraxia), since he will not overestimate his own capacities nor those of other people. Also in the field of human behaviour and activity man has to be satisfied with probable arguments: there may be more reasons in favour of a particular course of action, but whatever arguments are put forward, they will never supply full certainty. This attitude has been adopted in antiquity by Pyrrhonism and has been developed in the writings of Sextus Empiricus: the famous doctrine of epoche or suspension of judgment is the immediate consequence of this view: man should withdraw from any firm consent to a particular judgment.[5] At some stage of his intellectual development saint Augustine has been deeply influenced by this philosophical trend: in his *Contra Academicos* the author faces the problem of scepticism and expounds the reasons why he rejects this attitude. In the 16th century too scepticism was represented by several authors of whom the best known is Montaigne: he is a typical case since he converted from Stoic dogmatism to Pyrrhonian scepticism.[6] One could mention also Francis

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[5] Sextus mostly argued against the Stoics, whom he criticized for being dogmatists. What kind of dogmatism did Sextus intend ? It was the Stoic theory of knowledge according to which man is able to reach certainty, he should not always refrain from formulating a judgment. According to the Stoics kataleptic knowledge, starting from sensible experience, actually grasps true reality. Thanks to language i.e. thanks to verbal expression, man is also able to ascend to a higher level of knowing, viz. to the level of understanding.

[6] Cf. F. Strowski, *Montaigne*. Paris, 1931, p. 146 (cf. *Essais*, II, 16 17 18); p 155: "Ainsi la penetration, la finesse, la souplesse et l' intelligence de Montaigne lui interdisent le dogmatisme". According to Strowski, the scepticism of Montaigne is a kind of "libre pensee", which is not at all incompatible with religion (p. 180).

Pico de la Mirandola, Cornelius Agrippa and Sanchez the Sceptic.[7] Some important works of Sextus Empiricus had been translated by Gentian Hervet and Robert Estienne and published in Paris in 1569.[8] As to Rene Descartes he also starts his philosophical inquiry with a universal doubt: of course this doubt is a methodical one, it is intended to be overcome. In Descartes's view it is actually avoided by the certainty everybody has concerning his own thinking activity.

Could scepticism offer a valid solution to our problem: the disagreement among men about even the most essential topics? Some facet at least of scepticism could hardly be rejected: if there are so many opposing theories and views, man has to be very cautious and careful before giving his consent to a particular statement. It is necessary to take into account all aspects of a topic before being able to draw a conclusion and in many cases of practical life the adopted stance will be grounded on probable reasons only. Quite obviously human life frequently develops in a climate of uncertainty: we have to take decisions and we mostly couldn't predict all the consequences of our acts. Even the most important initiatives of human life are taken with a sharp awareness of uncertainty. And yet when people are divided about political, social or economic matters. one could not conclude from this fact that there is a variety of opposing truths. Man mostly has to rely on some probable reasons put forward from a limited viewpoint. The question however remains whether doubt ought to be universalized and extended to all areas of knowledge and situations of life. One of the arguments developed in favour of scepticism is indeed the divergence of views: Sextus already points to this fact and concludes that all those opinions are equivalent. Hence man has to withdraw his consent and suspend his judgment: the reason for this suspension is that all those views are equally valid or invalid. There is no decisive reason to adhere firmly to one of them rather than to another[9] This way of arguing could not be accepted: even if there is a multiplicity of views, it doesn't follow that they all are equally valid. One may be more justified than another: actually there is in the course of history a constant progress of knowledge. Many opinions of the past have been shown to be erroneous and were definitively repudiated. All sciences, and also philosophy, have made important discoveries: in the field of medecine v.g. the progress that has been realised, is very considerable. About 900 years ago Avicenna wrote his ***Canon of Medecine:*** in the 12th century it was translated into Latin and has been for centuries extremely influential in the study of medecine at European universities. But during the last century the progress of medical research has been so important that students in this field now hardly know the name of Avicenna. Also in many other areas discoveries were made and they represent a definitive enrichment of our knowledge. With respect to philosophy too, nobody could reasonably believe that the theories of the first Ionian philosophers are equally valid as our contemporary philosophy of science. Of course, scientific hypotheses and theories are constantly improved and corrected, but this does not entail everything in the field of science to be questionable.

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[7] Cf. F. Strowski, *Montaigne*, p. 175: the author points to the fact that Montaigne borrows a large number of texts from Cornelius Agrippa (*De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum. Declamatio invectiva*). These quotations actually originate from Francis Pico della Mirandola (*Examen veritatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis christianae disciplinae*).

[8] This publication included the following works: Sextus's *Adversus mathematicos* and *Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes*; the *Life of Pyrrho*, composed by Diogenes Laertius and Galen's *Contra Academicos et Pyrrhonios*.

[9] Sextus endeavours to distinguish his view not only from the Stoic doctrine, but also from the teaching of the Academics: these latter state man to be incapable to attain truth. Such a statement is dogmatic and has to be repudiated. A sceptic does not maintain that he does not know anything, he simply wonders what he knows. So the sceptic position is devoid of any dogmatic belief.

Besides it is not true that man when he agrees to live in uncertainty, will find peace of mind. Truth and certainty correspond to the deepest aspiration and tendency of a human being, particularly when the meaning of life is at issue. Man wants to know what he is and what is the meaning of his existence: he wants to know how to behave in life, how to act towards other humans and towards the material world. Regarding all those questions man wants certainty, not doubt. Of course man should be conscious of his limited capacities: instead of clinging to his views as if they were definitive truth, he should be willing to come back to them and to put them into question. That is the way in which progress is realized in science and philosophy: the most harmful people in this respect are those who live without problems, who never question the views they have, who don't learn anything from their contracts with others. Consciousness of our limits however does not coincide with scepticism: the possibility of reaching truth is not denied, what is rejected is a simplistic dogmatism that springs from an unawareness of the many obstacles preventing man from attaining truth. In this sense man should accept to live in a climate of uncertainty.

In the course of history it has been maintained that something might be true within the framework of a particular discipline, and not true when considered from the viewpoint of another branch of learning. Consequently something might be true in one discipline whereas an opposing view would be true in another. The viewpoints that are at stake are mainly those of science, philosophy and religion. A typical example in this respect is the debated question of the eternity of the world. In Aristotle's view the world exists from eternity, since neither motion nor time could ever have started: being a passage from potency to act, every motion refers to a previous one. If supposedly everything were unmoved, movement could never start: in order to begin, the so called first movement would require a prior one, some change in the existing world that makes that motion possible. In this way one has to go back indefinitely in the series of antecedent causes. The same obtains with respect to time: each beginning of time implies a before, some previous time; an instant is always located between a past and a future, a before and after.[10] Some medieval philosophers have maintained this arguing of Aristotle to be irrefutably valid from a philosophical viewpoint: according to them it is philosophically true, although we know by divine revelation that the world was created by God and had a beginning.[11] It may be added that according to contemporary science the beginning of the world, understood as the explosion of the primitive atom, dates back to a particular time in the past. Those who accept the possibility of clashing truths, are compelled to adapt this notion : in their view truth is the coherent and logical conclusion of a particular way of arguing. Starting from the presuppositions of Aristotle, one will inevitably reach the same conclsion about the eternity of the world. That does not mean this conclusion to be true from a more universal viewpoint. Other questions of this kind are the freedom of human will and the immortality of the soul. P. Pomponazzi stated that the freedom of will is incompatible with divine omnipotence, at least from a rational viewpoint, but it has to be accepted on the basis of divine revelation.[12]

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[10] Aristotle expounds this doctrine at the beginning of book VIII of the *physics*, where he makes an attempt at explaining as fully as possible the becoming process that occurs in the world: although this process never started, it could not exist without being caused. In Aristotle's view one must accept a first mover, who as a final cause produces the whole evolution of the cosmos.

[11] Among the doctrines censured by the bishop of Paris in 1277, we find the following sentence: Quod naturalis philosophus debet negare simpliciter mundi novitatem, quia innititur causis naturalibus et rationibus naturalibus. Fidelis autem potest negare mundi aeternitatem, quia innititur causis supernaturalibus (nr 90). Within the framework of the philosophy of nature one has to accept the eternity of the world; from the viewpoint of faith he may however reject it, because he then appeals to supernatural causes.

[12] *Petri Pomponatii Mantuani libri quinque de fato. de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione*, ed. R. Lemay. Lucani, 1957, p. 202: Rationabilior igitur videtur Stoicorum opinio opinione Christianorum; p. 221: Quare Stoici videntur magis convenienter respondere. Sic itaque mihi videtur esse diecendum in sequendo Stoicorum opinionem, quamquam ut in sequenti libro dicam, haec opinio sit falsa, quoniam religioni christianae quae verissima est adversatur.

The problem raised has to do with the relation between reason and faith: is it possible rational thought and divine revelation to result into a different truth ? This question has been put forward already by Philo of Alexandria, who belonged to a Jewish community in Egypt and was penetrated by hellenistic civilisation. Under the influence of Stoicism Philo explained biblical texts using an allegorical method of interpretation. In this view there is only one truth: there must be an agreement between biblical revelation and philosophy. Hence the constant effort of this author to demonstrate the consensus between the Bible and Greek thought.[13] The same question arises again at the beginning of the christian era: when intellectuals converted to christian religion, they wanted to know whether a non-christian philosophy could contribute to understand and explain the content of faith. The issue was whether a synthesis between divine revelation and Greek philosophy was possible. Some christian writers, like Tertullian, Tatian and Hippolytus, opposed that kind of amalgamation: according to them no harmony is possible between pagan thought and the message of faith. The most influential christian authors however favoured this synthesis: St. Justin who was born near Samaria and later moved to Ephesus already incorporated Greek thought in the heritage of the christians. According to him the ancient hellenic sages were indebted to the Old Testament The author firmly stresses the unity of truth: each element of truth is a seed of the divine Logos, who is Christ; all people who have thought and acted rationally and rightly, have participated in the divine Logos.[14] Clement of Alexandria in the 2nd century also adopted a very positive stance towards pre-christian thought: in his view christianity is the fulfilment of the values already included in Greek literature and philosophy; in a way Greek philosophers may be called christians before Christ, they were justified by their philosophical inquiry.[15] What philosophy did in the past, it may achieve it also in the christian era: in Clement's view rational thought is a preparation leading to christian belief it may help unbelievers to discover the truth of the Gospel. Besides philosophy is useful in view of the defence of faith, provided however that it remains within the frontiers of its specific role: it should never be identified with wisdom, it is the servant of wisdom. Is there anything beyond faith ? The answer of Clement is positive: there is still a more profound penetration of truth, which he calls "gnosis"; the highest degree of wisdom that a human being is able to attain. Anyhow Clement firmly maintained the unity of truth, a disagreement between divine revelation and philosophical truth should be excluded. A similar stance has been taken by Origen of Alexandria: he frequently uses Greek philosophy, in order to explain his christian belief. The author has to deal with the attacks of Celsus: this writer pointed to the ideas and doctrines borrowed by christians from philosophy, particularly from Plato. Celsus stated Christianity to be nothing more than a whole of doctrines springing from Greek philosophers. In this context Origin criticizes the behaviour and teaching of representatives of ancient thought.[16] The same attitude concerning the relation between reason and faith is also maintained in the works of the Cappadocians.

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[13] *Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*. ed. A.H. Armstrong. Cambridge, 1967. Part II: *Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought*, by H. Chadwick, p. 138: Philo's work is an elaborate synthesis, or at least a correlation, of biblical revealed religion and Greek philosophy, mainly cast in the form of an allegorical commentary on *Genesis*.

[14] H. Chadwick, *Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought*, p. 162. Philo also maintained the Greek philosophers to be indebted to the Pentateuch for their wisdom (p. 139).

[15] H. Chadwick, *Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought*, p. 170: God who gave the Old Testament as a tutor to bring the Jews to Christ gave the Greeks philosophy for the same purpuse.

As to medieval philosophers, they mostly endeavoured to realize a harmony between their belief and philosophy. According to Alkindi the mission of philosophy is similar to that of revealed truth, although there are basic discrepancies between the two:[17] in this respect the viewpoint of Alkindi is different from that of Alfarabi, Avicenna, Ibn Tufayl, Avempace and Averroes. According to this last author, who was very influential also in the West, truth could never contradict truth, revelation could never disagree with rational truth.[18] As to Al-Ghazali he did not deny the unity of truth, but he opposed philosophy because it shows too much confidence in reason.[19] Medieval philosophers and theologians in the West also tried to realize a harmony between their belief and rational inquiry.

The most delicate question however remains : to what extent the content of religious faith is liable to be rationalized ? Will at some future stage the message of faith become totally rational ? It is difficult to answer this question: presumably a full rationalization

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16 H. Chadwick, *Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought*, p. 184 : Philosophy is a valuable preparatory discipline for revealed theology.

17 M. Cruz Hernandez, *La Filosofia Arabe*, Madrid, 1963, p. 38.

18 Cruz Hernandez, *La Filosofia Arabe*, p. 279: Pero para aquellos, que tienen dotes intelectuales suficientes "il razonamiento filosofico no nos conducira a conclusion alguna a lo que esta consignado en la Revelacion divina, *porque la verdad no puede contradecir a la verdad*, sino armonizarse con ella e servirla de testimonio confirmativo".

19 Cruz Hernandez, *La Filosofia Arabe*, p. 118.

of divine revelation will never be achieved, because a human mind is finite, whereas divine perfection is infinite. By means of his natural capacity man will never be able to grasp and explain the fulness of the divine perfection. Hence there will never be a total parallelism between the results of rational investigation and divine revelation.

The question may be asked whether the diversity of views does not originate from changing historical situations and circumstances. If truth is temporal, if it is linked to the concrete conditions of a particular historical context, it must inevitably change from one period to another. According to Merleau-Ponty truth is always historical, it could never be absolute.[20] Let us consider a concrete example. It has been largely accepted in antiquity and even later that human beings are not equal by nature, that some of them belong to a higher level of perfection, whereas others hardly participate in the characteristic power of man, viz. reason. This widespread opinion was embodied in the organization of society: a political community was composed of free citizens, and a great number of slaves, incorporated in a family in which the head was invested with a despotic power. An outstanding philosopher like Aristotle agreed with this social structure: he taught that there are indeed various levels of humanity, according to the degree in which individuals participate in rational activity.[21] In his view some human beings are unable to conduct their life according to reason, their degree of rationality is too low, they rather move on the level of the irrational powers of the soul. In other words they are able to perceive instructions from other people and to execute them, but they are incapable to direct themselves in the changing circumstances of life. Our author is not astonished about this hierarchical structure of mankind: this kind of subordination is present everywhere in nature, already within the human soul itself. Direction belongs to the rational faculty, whereas irrational movements have to be subdued to the guidance of reason. The same criterion of rationality is also applied to other groups of society: barbarians hardly participate in rational activity, they represent a very low level of humanity, which is illustrated by their practice of anthropophagy and homosexuality. Women also are put on a low rank in the hierarchical structure of mankind, because they are mostly driven by their emotions, not by reason: in Aristotle's view emotions should not be totally suppressed, but they have to be moderated and guided by the rational faculty. Finally there is the group of children and youngsters: in our author's view reason develops slowly and gradually, its activity is always based on experience. Intellectual knowledge originates from experience and is constantly nourished and supported by sensible perception. Dealing with the study of ethics Aristotle declares that young people are not fit to attend lectures on moral subjects, because they lack experience. So young people also are on a rather low level of humanity. These ideas were widely accepted in antiquity, until a radical renewal was launched by the Stoics at the beginning of the 3rd century B.C.: according to them all human beings are equal by nature, Greeks and barbarians, men and women, free citizens and slaves. This teaching is directly connected with the Stoic doctrine of the divine Logos, who permeates the whole cosmic organism: every human soul is a particle of this animating spirit. Hence all individuals are equal since they all participate in the same divine principle.[22] This theory was at the origin of a complete renewal of society, but because it was so different from previous conceptions it penetrated only slowly into the reality of life. The first step was a more human and benevolent attitude towards slaves; it lasted however a long time before slavery as a social institution was abrogated.

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[20] M. Merleau Ponty clearly rejects the absolute character of expressed truth (les enonces, l'acquis, la parole parlee): contingency is the birthplace of all meaning, which could never be separated from the ways in which is expressed. Cf. *Phenomenologie de la perception* Paris, 1945, p. 456: "La contingence ontologique, celle du monde lui meme, atant radicale, est au contraire ce qui fonde une fois pour toutes notre idee de la verite". Language produces the illusion of eternal truth, but makes it at once impossible (Cf. R. C. Kwant, *De fenomenologie van Merleau-Ponty.* Utrecht Antwerpen, 1962, p. 125).

Could one conclude from this survey that what was true before Stoicism, became false afterwards? Did truth radically change from one period to another? In the history of philosophy there are many instances of this kind. Dealing with the problem in his book *Histoire et Verite* P. Ricoeur states that it is totally misleading to consider the history of thought as a series of quite different views concerning the same eternal questions,[23] According to him there is no adequate typology of philosophical doctrines expounded in the course of history; because the teaching of a philosopher is always connected with his own unique questioning. Not only philosophical theories evolve and change, but the questioning itself bears the mark

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21 I recently wrote a contribution on these various levels of humanity in Aristotle's view: it will be published very soon in Athens in a *Festschrift* in honour of Professor J. Vourveris (*Les degres d'humanite et le sens du progres chez Aristotle*).

22 Cf. G. Verbeke, *Le Stoicisme, une philosophie sans frontieres*, in: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt*. I. *Von den Aufangen Roms bis zum Ausgang der Republik*, Vierter Band. Berlin-New York, 1973, p. 3 42.

23 P. Ricoeur, *Histoire et Verite*. Paris, 1955, p. 57: "L'histoire de la philosophie n'est pas une collection de solutions variees (solutions typiques) a des problemes identiques".

of [illegible] individual thinker. So it is not correct to claim that there are [illegible] the course of time a limited number of solutions to a fixed number of problems. Each philosophy is a coherent and organic whole developing from a central intuition. In this sense truth is both temporal and supratemporal: being connected with knowledge, it is the goal that is pursued in the endless efforts during the course of time in order to disclose reality. All those efforts belong to the concrete situation of human beings, who question reality in their own way and from their own viewpoint. Each philosopher has his unique questioning; what he wants to discover is not exactly the same as what his predecessors were searching for: so each solution has to be judged in light of the problem that was put forward. As to the problems themselves they mostly issue from a historical context, with respect to our previous example it is obvious that the question asked by Aristotle about the degrees of humanity was not exactly the same as the Stoic problem concerning the unity of mankind.

But although the situation of each individual is closely linked to the time in which he lives, each human subject searching for knowledge wants to discover truth that is valid for all thinking minds of all periods of history. If a subject states that something is or is not, that means that it will always be true that it is or is not. Even if the fact under consideration is contingent and passing away, it will always be true that it was or was not. Of course the same event may be interpreted in different ways at different stages of history, but even then it remains true that the facts occurred. If different interpretations of historical events are presented in a coherent way, they all may disclose some aspect of truth: by confronting those various interpretations one may reach a more global encompassing intuition of reality. So it would not be correct to accept that each period of time has its own truth, which may be totally different from another period: truth is not merely historical, it is also suprahistorical.

Taking into account the ambiguous nature of truth, which is both individual and supra-individual, historical and supra-historical, one has to conclude that nobody is entitled to enforce by compulsion his own truth on other individuals. Truth does not belong to an abstract world, to a transcendent area, it is closely connected with the activity and inquiry of each thinking subject. The most characteristic feature of a human being is thought: in this respect man differs from other animals. Thinking represents the proper dignity of a human being: for this capacity more than for any other man has to be valued and respected by other individuals. Each person has the responsibility of his own thought: it was a commonly accepted axiom already in Roman law that "nemo cogitationis poenam patitur" (nobody may be inflicted penalty for his opinions).

Some acts may be punished because they are incompatible with peaceful life in society: but it belongs to the most personal responsibility of an individual to search for truth in a free, open and undisturbed atmosphere. It is a heavy duty and severe responsibility of a thinking subject to pursue the search for truth in an honest way and without prejudice.

But what then about the different views represented among men? Should all members of a political society be compelled to profess the same ideology in order to promote the organic unity of the group? That would be incompatible with the dignity of a person, who is responsible of his views and convictions; it would also be irreconcilable with the spirit of a free democratic society, which should be tolerant regarding different social, political and religious opinions. This viewpoint is not new: it has been strongly vindicated already in 17th century by John Locke and Benedict Spinoza. Among the orations of Themistius we find an inauthentic one (it was published by Andreas Duditius) addressed to the emperor Valentius and dealing with the variety of religious convictions. The author praises the emperor for having decided that everybody may profess the religion which he considers to be acceptable and which may contribute to the tranquillity of his mind. Compulsion in this respect would be against divine and natural law. Moreover variety of views stimulates fruitful discussion among people and may be the source of further development and progress. These ideas could indeed be attributed to Themistius: as a prefect of Constantinople under the reign of Valens in the second half of the 4th century, he adopted a tolerant attitude towards the christians.

Let us try to clarify this notion of tolerance which is indeed so important in our contemporary society. Tolerance does not coincide with scepticism: it does not imply that all opinions are considered to be equivalent, nor that it is impossible to attain truth. The basis of tolerance is not a kind of indifference towards human views and convictions, it is on the contrary the expression of a deep respect of each individual and of his personal responsibility in this most important activity, the search for truth. Each man is to a large extent responsible of his opinions: there are of course many influences which in the course of life are exercised on a human existence, such as hereditary factors, family education, social and cultural environment, personal contacts with other people, readings and study, all those influences are gradually assimilated and integrated in the personal reflections and initiatives of a subject. In a sense man is responsible not only of what he is doing, but also of what he is thinking, of the views he accepts.[24] In his ethics Aristotle strongly emphasized this aspect with respect to moral judgments: only a moral man is able to discover what is good in a particular situation. Other people are generally misled by their passions and emotions. The most basic responsibility of a human person is related to the search for truth: this yearning is naturally present in each individual, but it has to be developed and exercised. If everybody is responsible of his opinions and views, this responsibility has to be respected by other people. Compulsion in this field would be equivalent to the negation of human dignity and personal responsibility. Everybody has the duty of helping other people in their search for truth, but in a spirit of openness and free discussion.

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[24] The question may be asked whether an individual may ever be allowed to cling to all kinds of errors and false opinions. If

Tolerance does not mean that the unity of truth is dropped. One may be very tolerant towards other people and their opinions, without abandoning the unity of truth. If human existence is really co-existence, truth will be the result of a common effort and constant research: looking at the history of thought, one easily notices that progress in knowledge is made thanks to a constant co-operation. Even if many discoveries may be attributed to some outstanding scholars, they are not merely the work of an individual, since each individual is largely to the education he received and to the society in which he lives. Tolerance means that a subject does not consider himself to be the only depository of truth, but that he recognizes the dignity and efforts of other men. Moreover if a particular doctrine is enforced in a compulsory way, it will not be incorporated nor assimilated in the life of those individuals who were constrained to accept it. Increase of knowledge in an individual may be compared to the assimilation of food: like food has to be integrated in the unity of a living organism, so new knowledge should be incorporated in the patrimony that a subject has already acquired. That means a process of gradual assimilation and integration, which is only possible when an individual freely consents and endeavours to make a new element of knowledge to a personal conviction.

Is tolerance only a pragmatic solution for a society that is actually pluralistic? Since people who belong to the same society have different opinions about all kinds of important matters, it would be impossible for them to live together in the same community without being tolerant towards the views of their fellows. This is

there is only one truth, why not by all means bring everybody to accept this truth? This problem is indeed a delicate one: as we already emphasized, truth is one and multiple, temporal and supratemporal. The question is not whether an individual is morally allowed to adhere to error: it is quite clear that he is not. But the question is whether he should be constrained to drop his opinions and to consent to others. To this question our answer is negative, because that kind of compulsion is incompatible with the dignity of a person and the freedom of a democratic society.

certainly true, but the basis of tolerance is deeper: it is linked to the ambiguous character of truth, which itself springs from the ambiguous nature of human existence. Truth is individual and supra individual, because man is by nature self consciousness, but also openness towards other subjects: this openness not only includes the possibility of dialogue and discussion, of mutual understanding, but also feelings of sympathy, friendship and love. Because truth could not exist without being related to individual subjects, to their intellectual activity and all the efforts they undertake in order to make progress, it ought to be the result of free development.[25]

And yet the variety of opinions should be overcome inasmuch as it is possible in a free and open society. There is something unsatisfactory and harmful in the profound divisions existing among men: they frequently prevent individuals from co operating with each other in the framework of the same community. Moreover if truth is not only individual but also universal, it must be a meeting place of all humans: the goal that has to be pursued is a common agreement of all men on the same truth.[26] It is a kind of common duty and responsibility, put on the shoulders of all thinking subjects, to contribute to this universal agreement, Each human life has to be a piece of truth, an effulgence of authentic knowledge, that favours the gathering of all human beings in a universal agreement in the plain of truth.

In his *Ptotagoras* Plato presents a mythical narrative about the most primitive stage of mankind.[27] At that time men did not live together, they were spread all over the earth and were often attacked and killed by wild beasts. And because they lived separately, they were unable to protect themselves against the attacks. Finally they decided to gather and to ground cities. But these political communities did not last: they soon collapsed as a result of all kinds of discord and disagreement, internal oppositions and clashes. So all efforts to ground lasting political communities were unsuccessful.

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[25] In this respect one could hardly agree with M Merleau Ponty, who believes that violence might be a necessary step on the way to a more humanitarian society (*Humanisme et terreur*. Essai sur le communisme. Paris, 1947).

[26] P. Ricoeur, *Histoire et Verite*, p. 71: the author deals with the notion of being, which is of fundamental importance with respect to truth. In his view being means openness: "l'etre est cet acte qui, precedant et fondant toute possibilite de questionner, fonde la mutualite des intentions philosophiques les plus singulieres". The author also tries to disclose the meaning of the expression: "j'espere etre dans la verite" (I hope to be in the truth) and he explains it as follows: "Je pense que la fonction de cette esperance est de maintenir le dialogue toujours ouvert et d'introduire une intention fraternelle dans les plus apres debats". (p 72)

[27] Plato, *Protagoras*, 320 C — 323 a.

At the end the gods deliberated about this disastrous situation: mankind was threatened by total destruction, if humans persisted living separately. The gods came to the conclusion that something was lacking in the equipment of men, so that they were unable to live peacefully together. As a result Hermes was sent to the earth to enrich each individual with two supplementary divine gifts: the sense of justice which means self respect and respect of others. This complement added to the human equipment was very effective: from that time onwards all kinds of societies were founded and men were able to live peacefully together. Using the language of Plato's myth one could include tolerance, which is ultimately based on self-respect and respect of the dignity of others. This respect is constantly present in the dialogues of Plato: the central actor of these philosophical dramas is mostly Socrates, who leads the discussion in which many kinds of people take part. The topics are very important and usually related to moral issues. Socrates never enforces his own conviction on his fellows who accept to talk with him, even if they vindicate the most erroneous theories as e.g. Trasymachus and Callicles. Each dialogue is penetrated by a profound veneration of personal human dignity, it is a splendid instance of tolerance.

II

Some Notes on Philosophy of Science East and West

Del Lawhon & Paul Mays

INTRODUCTION

Since the publication of Joseph Needham's *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge University Press, London, 1956) and of Rene Taton's *Historie Generale des Sciences* (Presses Universitaries de France, Paris, 1961) and *The History and Culture of the Indian People* (edited by R. C. Majumdar, et al., published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1964) we are likely to see a new turn in East-West Studies. We may no longer deal so facilely with the "Myth of the Mystical Orient" or the Myth (for so it has been demonstrated to be in frequent articles and books by Prof. Charles A. Moore and others) of the Materialist West; no longer the myth that in Greece and Greece alone did scientific mentality have its birth and initial growth; no longer do we see science as limited to Western Civilization alone.

It is true, admittedly, that Science, to some extent in the perspective of 4,000 years of the History of Civilization, has gained a lead in Western Europe and now in the USSR and the USA; it is even more true that Technology, which is not to be confused with Science, has undergone many revolutions even in the last 100 years, primarily under the leadership of Europe; and with the sponsorship of American financing and Soviet Socialist economics, technology has almost come to the place where almost nothing is to be considered impossible, given the financing and organization. This makes one wonder whether the reason that Europe did get ahead in Science and Technology in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries was not *economic* rather than philosophical or religious or sociological. That hypothesis is not the subject of this paper however.

Rather we wish (1) to explore the theoretical foundations of an adequate philosophy of Science, and (2) to investigate whether they were not present in India and China with vividness no less striking than in classical Greece; and (3) on the basis of this, we shall make a few observations concerning the developments of Science in China, India and western Europe (the Islamic countries, Japan and Byzantium being considered for purely arbitrary reasons, beyond the scope of this paper) in the medieval period; (4) we shall risk some random speculations concerning further developments in the non-European countries between 1600 and 1900; and finally, (5) we shall make some estimations concerning the prospects of the advancement of Science in the excolonial areas and some correlary speculations concerning the possibility of finding valuable contributions to the further advancement of post-Einsteinian Science from the non European Sources.

I. Foundations of Philosophy of Science

There is no absolutely valid reason, from the perspective of Universal World History, or of absolutely impartial Science, why we should take a modern western European philosopher as our initial authority. But, since it is necessary to make a beginning somewhere, and since, whether we like it or not, it has unfortunately become standard procedure to accept modern western European standards and judgments as the common denominator in Comparative studies, let us hear what Ernst Cassirer says are the basic aspects of an adequate philosophy of Science. Thus, in his *Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*, after reviewing, in Chapter IV (on the Concepts of Natural Science) a goodly portion of the history in Europe of the development of the notion of what actually does constitute natural science, he concludes, as follows :[1]

> The concept of natural science and "reality." The real methodological interest of the construction of the concepts of chemistry lies in the fact that in it the relation of the universal to the particular is set in a new light. The consideration of the physical concepts and methods allows only one side of this fundamental relation to appear clearly. The goal of theoretical physics is and remains the universal laws of process The particular cases, in so far as they are taken into account, serve only as paradigms, in which these laws are represented and illustrated. The further this scientific problem is followed, the sharper becomes the separation between the system of our *concepts* and the system of the *real*. For all "reality" is offered to in individual shape and form, and thus in a vast manifold of particular features, while all *conception*, according to its function, turns aside from this concrete totality of particular features. Here is again revealed the antinomy that found its first striking expression in the System of

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[1] Ernst Cssirer : *Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*, Open Court Publishing Company, 1923 p. 220.

Aristotle. All knowledge seems to be knowledge of the universal, and is only fulfilled in this goal; while true and original being does not belong to the universal, but to the individual substances in the dynamic succession of their realization. The historical struggle, that took place regarding the Aristotelian system during the middle ages and far down into modern times, are for the most part to be explained from this point of view. The conflict of "nominalism" and "realism" represents only a further development of the problem, already latent in the first beginnings of the Aristotelian metaphysics and theory of knowledge.

In other words, reduced to its basic motivation, and purpose, Science, ancient, modern, medieval, East, West, North, South, or what-have-you, has no more than the object of the increase of human-kind's *knowledge*—knowledge about himself, about the fellow creatures on this planet, knowledge about this planet itself, knowledge about what surrounds him in the infinitely great, knowledge about what surpasses him in the infinitely small; and, finally, knowledge that can be derived from setting up relational patterns between these bewildering fields. What then distinguishes what is now called *scientific* knowledge from any other knowledge or field of activity in human culture and civilization ? This question, perhaps has been answered as clearly and precisely by Jacques Maritain as by anyone in *Degrees of Knowledge* (Scribner's Sons, New York, 1959, p. 47) :

> The scientist proceeds from the visible to the visible, from the observable to the observable (I mean "to what is at least indirectly observable"; I do not mean "to what is always able to be pictured or represented in imagination.") For the imagination represents things as they appear to use in our scale of large dimensions, that is, as possible objects of full and continuous observation. But the moment the scientist passes to an order (the Atomic order) in which the very possibility of full and continuous observation of phenomena is eliminated, he passes from a world of objects imaginately representable to a world of objects without any imaginable form. Such a world is unimaginable by default, or "privately".
>
> The Philosopher proceeds from the visible to the invisible, I mean to what is *of itself* outside the order of sensible observation (for the simple reason that the principles which he reaches are in themselves pure objects of understanding and not objects of sensible apprehension or imaginitive representation. Here is a world unimaginable by nature, or negatively).
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> Since they have utterly different formal objects, other principles of explanation, diverse conceptual instruments, and, on the part of the knowing subject himself, quite distinct intellectual virtues or discriminating lights, the domain proper to the sciences do not overlap. No explanation in the scientific order will ever be able to displace or replace an explanation belonging to the philosophical order, and vice versa. One would have to be very naive to imagine that recognizing, on

> the one hand, and immaterial soul in man, and studying, on the other hand, the glycogenic function of the liver or the relations between idea and image are two explanations that both belong to the same field and run counter to each other.
>
> Truth to tell, scientific explanations do not reveal the very being of things. Since they explain only proximate causes or even that kind of formal cause which is the conformity of phenomena to mathematical law (and such more-or-less arbitrarily constructed entities fashioned as a support for this type of law, they can never satisfy the mind. For the mind will always, and necessarily, raise questions of a higher order and strive to penetrate into the purely intelligible.

In support of Maritain's thesis here, we could bring in many other authorities in the modern west, such as Reichenbach, Carnap, Capec, David Lewis Miller (University of Texas), Milton K. Munitz, even Poincare and Einstein, to mention only a few. Merely a sketchy survey of the developing Philosophy of Science at the turn of the mid-twentieth Century in the west will reveal many controversies indeed, about what is "Science" and its relations to other fields of human enterprise. We cannot, however be diverted into that. Nor on the other hand must we, at first at least, dive off the deep end, before we learn to swim, and proceed, and some tend to do so, to construct an apologetic for the advaita system of philosophy, or for Vijnanavada, merely on the basis of the recognition that before we can be sure of empirical knowledge of the world we must have greater knowledge of the knower and of the function of the "mind" —whatever that may or may not be. Rather our manner of proceeding shall be more modest. From a general survey, we fairly accurately conclude that in the modern West (or any other Scientific circle), Science comprehends primarily the following Factors :

(a) systematic, conscious and deliberate observation, not random, undirected sense-impressions.

(b) a genius for classification, measurement and critical evaluation.

(c) systematic, preferably syllogistic, logic.

(d) a system of indisputable, or at least workable, set of postulates (e.g. or "laws", as they are more generally called), two objects of radically different natures, cannot co-exist in the same place and at the same time, unless their natures are such that one be timeless and spaceless (in which case, according to most definitions of thing or object, the timeless and spaceless being would not be an 'object').

(e) a theory of causation.

(f) a mathematics sufficiently developed to a level of sophistication sufficient to handle very complex bodies of data.

(g) a willingness to experiment (provided, of course, that the experiment does not annihilate the experimenter, or for that matter the whole human species, completely, even though this has now become possible).

(h) a willingness to revise convictions in accordance with conclusions arrived at as the result of observation and investigation.

(i) a capacity for non-visual imageless thought, both synthetic and analytic.

(j) keeping of accurate records.

By contrast, it might be added, Technology. but not Science as such, adds another, the *will to gain control*. Science is motivated by the will to *know*, to *explain*, to *understand*; Technology is determined to "conquer" nature; Science is content to *study* nature. That again does not primarily concern us now, but it is good to keep it in mind in the background, since much confusion seems to be abroad in "East-West" thinking concerning this distinction.

The above list is, by the way, only representational; it is not intended to be exhaustive or conclusive.

Now : What do we find in India and China in this regard : Can we say that India and China had a philosophy of science, and/or a scientific philosophy (there is a very important distinction here, since a philosophy of science might be one in which the judgment is made that 'scientific' philosophy should be subordinated to, or integrated with other types of philosophy in order to arrive at a complete world-view, whereas most 'scientific' philosophies, at least since Ernst Mach and others in the positivist and mechanist tradition of modern Europe and many in the pragmatic tradition in the USA, have tended to claim that the specifically '*scientific*' world-view and manner of proceeding should dominate everything, from the restructuring of musical harmonies to the practice of going to the Museum of Science and Industry instead of the local parish church on Sunday morning—not to mention the proper method of feeding infants and of courting the spouse who is the best typist !) ? But again, before we get entangled in the *Sociology* of Science in the modern USA, let us ask, *Did India and China have as many of the above requirements for scientific development as classical Greece and medieval Europe ?*

II. Science in Classical and Medieval India

A. Historical Survey

The answer is, emphatically, yes. We shall not depend on secondary sources. Rather, just as Cassirer and Maritain cannot get along, even in the 20th Century, without Democritus and Aristotle, so we may expect philosophers who have been influenced by what is well-known as the Hindu Renaissance, to be equally proud of Nyaya and Vaisesika, of Sautrantika and Vaibhashika and Jaina systems, both in their classical formulations and in their medieval elaborations; we may expect that philosophers who are still wondering whether Euclid is not still necessary for "practical" purposes, even after the validation of non-Euclidian geometries for theoretical purposes. to be equally proud of the fact that the calculus and zero were invented in China and India almost a thousand years before they came into popular use in Europe, and even more proud of the fact that according to some authorities the spherical nature of the earth was scientifically postulated first in India long, long, before the Muslims. the so-called "Arabs", transported that knowledge to the Iberian Peninsula; and there are many, many other similar historical facts which many East-West philosophers have overlooked, in their eagerness to vindicate the myth of the mystical or "spiritual" East.

Parenthetically, there is nothing at all which requires that a scientist, or for that matter a philosopher of science, be a *materialist*. As a matter of fact, if we rely on statistical averages, East, West, North, or South, (or all around the middle), it will be found that the greater number of scientists in World History have been either mystics or Idealists in their philosophical predilections. The late 19th Century in Europe produced a few who were an exception to this rule, and we should not be led astray by that. Even a quick glance at the table of contents of Taton's *Historie Generale* will vindicate this statement. This does not necessarily mean, however. that mere numbers make materialism or idealism or mysticism *true*; it merely lessens the probability that *dogmatic* mechanism is *correct*. But that does not concern us, at the present.

First, then, let us take a look at the Indian sources. Of these, first, since it is widely conceded that the science of nature is geared so completely to the doctrine of atoms, that one cannot easily think of a physical science without the presupposition of an atomic theory of some sort or the other, and since it is too widely believed that in world history, Democritus is the *only* prime source of this doctrine, let us examine what C. D. Sharma has to say about *atoms* in his *Indian Philosophy* :[1]

> Let us now consider the Vaishesika theory of Atomism. Unlike the Sankhya-Yoga, the Nyaya-Vaisesihka believes in the doctrine of Asatkaryavada which means that the effect does not pre exist in its cause. The effect is a new beginning, a fresh creation. Of course, it presupposes a cause. But it is not contained implicitly in the cause nor is it identical with the cause. The doctrine is also known as Arambhavada or Paramanukaranavada. We find that the material objects of the world are composed of parts and are subject to production and destruction. They are divisible into smaller parts. By this logic we have to accept the minutest particle of matter which may not be further divisible. This indivisible, partless

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[1] C. D. Sharma : *Indian Philosophhh: A Critical Survey* (Barnes & Noble paperback, 1969/62, p. 171f.

and eternal particle or matter is called an atom (paramanu). All physical things are produced by the combination of atoms. Creation, therefore, means the combination of atoms in different proportions and destruction means the dissolution of such combinations.

The material cause of the universe is neither produced nor destroyed. It is the eternal atoms. It is only the atomic combinations which are produced and which are destroyed. These combinations do not form the essential nature of the atoms nor do they pre exist in them, hence the Nyaya-Vaishesika advocates of Asatkaryavada.

These atoms are said to be of four kinds—of earth, water, fire, and air. Ether or akasha is not atomic. It is one and all-pervading and affords the medium for the combinations of the atoms. The atoms differ from one another both in quantity and quality. Each has a particularity of its own and exists as a separate reality. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air differ in qualities also. Their qualities too are eternal The atoms of water possess touch, color and taste. The atoms of air are the finest of all and have the quality of touch. The atoms of fire possess touch and color. The atoms of earth possess touch, color, taste, and smell. Besides these all atoms have velocity, number, distinctness, etc. The qualities of compositive products are due to the qualities of the atoms. The atoms possess the primary as well as the secondary qualities. They are said to be spherical or globular (parimandala). They are co-eternal with the soul and are the material cause of the world. They are inactive and motionless in themselves. During dissolution, they remain inactive. Motion is imparted to them by the Unseen Power (adrsta) of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) which resides in the individual soul and wants to fructify in the form of enjoyment or suffering. They are supra-sensible. The atoms combine in geometrical progressions and not in arithmetical ones. They increase by multiplication and not by mere addition. When motion is imparted to them by the Unseen Power, they begin to move or vibrate (parispanda) and immediately change into dyads. A dyad is produced by the combination of two atoms. The atoms are its inherent cause; conjunction is its noninherent cause; and the Unseen Power is its efficient cause. An atom is indivisible, spherical and imperceptible. Three dyads form a triad (tryanuka) which is great (mahat) long (dirgha) and perceptive. And so on by geometrical progression till the gross elements of earth, water, fire and air arise.

The Vaisesika atomism agrees with the Greek atomism of Leucippus and Democritus in regarding the atoms as the indivisible, partless imperceptible and ultimate portions of matter which are eternal and are the material cause of this physical universe. But further than this there is hardly any agreement. Leucippus and Democritus maintain only quantitative or numerical differences in the atoms and regard them as qualitatively alike. The Vaisesika maintains both quantitative and qualitative differences in the atoms. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air possess different qualities. Secondly, the Greek atomists regarded atoms as devoid or secondary qualities, while the Vaisesika regards them as possessing secondary also. Thirdly, the Greek atomists were essentially active and motion was inherent in them, but the Vaisesika regards the atoms as essentially inactive and motionless. Motion is imparted to them by the Unseen Power. Fourthly, the Greek view held that atoms constituted even the souls and the Vaisesika distinquishes between the soul and the atoms and regards them as co-eternal distinct entities, each possessing a particularity of its own. Fifthly, the Greek view was materialistic and the evolution was thought of as mechanical, while the Vaisesika view is guided by the spiritual and moral law and the later Vaisesika frankly admit God as the efficient cause.

The Jaina conception of the atom, like that of the Greeks and the Vaisesika regards it as one, eternal and indivisible unit of the material elements. But it differs from the Vaisesika view and agrees with the Greek view in that it maintains no qualitative differences among the atoms. The atoms are all homogenous and become differentiated into heterogenous elements by different combinations. Moreover, the Jainas do not regard the qualities of the atoms as permanent, while the Vaisesika does.

Those who wish to investigate this theme further may find it worth while to check the *Vaisesika Sutras*, as translated by Nandalal Sinha, N.A.B.L., published by the Panini Office, Allahabad, 1923 in the *Sacred Books of the Hindus Series*, notably, Sutra I:1,4, pl 8 ff. It is probably best to go back to the original Primary Sources, because as with Democritus and the other pre-Socrates, the superstructure of interpretation that has been built upon these original statements is more often than not far out of proportion to the original foundation. But perhaps this will be enough to be convincing that India has had the legitimate foundations of indigenous scientific development just as much as classical Greece in particular and the West in general has had.

However, this being only a single particular instance, we may also cut some corners by offering a schematic arrangement of the *pramanas* in Indian philosophies. (See table, appendix I) It will be noted that there is no more universality of agreement among the various schools than there is now. Just as the positivists do not agree with the Whiteheadians, and the neo-Scholastics do not agree with the Positivists, and the Dialectical Materialists do not even agree among themselves, and the existentialists tend to get disgusted with the arguments as such and attempt to resort to other modes of philosophizing than by argumentation, so in Classical India, as well as in Classical Greece, there was not only a wide range of opinions, but a very wide variety of topics concerning which they *dis*agreed.

We might only subjoin that if the *freedom to disagree* as a prerequisite to the *spirit of open inquiry* is a necessary prerequisite to a "scientific" world view, then classical India was certainly at least as well qualified as was Classical Greece.

Thus, the table of pramanas (those who are unfamiliar with the terminology may consult the *Dictionary of Philosophical Terms*[1]), of course, is exaggeratedly schematic, and should not be taken literally without checking back for details in at least the text of Das Gupta's 5 volumes. However, it is hoped that it will partially dramatize the fact that essentially the same controversy about what should be accepted as valid knowledge in order to be *scientifically* acceptable was being revived in the first several hundred years of Indian Philosophy as has gone on in other cycles of the global history of philosophy. Adequate discussion of the possible implications could detain us considerably but we must still move on.

What about the later developments in medieval India (if we may be permitted to superimpose (the periodization of European history made popular by modern secular Western scholars) ?

Alas, too few, even of those writing in the field of Comparative Philosophy, have adequately explored the continuing developments after Sankara. We cannot, of course, do that in this paper; that is not within our chosen limitations. But it is perhaps not amiss to suggest a possible fresh approach to the History of Indian Science and Philosophy, namely this : It is just possible that there is a strange parallel between the *separation* of science and philosophy in the medieval period in India as well as in Europe ? Just as between Sankara and Lokamanya Tilak most of those who have been presented to us as philosophers were primarily interested in theological problems, although in their commentaries and in their formal logics, they did pay considerable attention to other matters as well, so in Europe, those between—let us say—Ansolm and Kant (or more dramatically, perhaps, Ernst Mach) were interested at least as much in theological problems as they were in actual laboratory science or the practice of medicine or the actual classification of the herbs growing in their own backyard.

On the other hand this does not mean that the sciences made no progress. Quite the contrary, there were some new discoveries—although scientific "discoveries" have frequently been no more than that, and hardly "scientific" except in so far as their significance later to the further development of some science or other became recognized—and several new inventions, and considerable continued observation, predictions, and even new theories advanced in various parts of the medieval world. For the most part, in the 11th and 14th centuries the Islamic scientists were admittedly in the lead, but China was very close in second place, and sometimes, as in the case of the mariners compass and the invention of movable type and its use on paper for printing, and in the star charts and records of sun-spots, China trudged on ahead a bit. We shall see more of this anon. India, admittedly, during the medieval period did not make the great strides that others made, but there was not complete stagnation by any means.

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[1] Published in Madras by the Tirupati Devasthanama Press, in the Vankateshvara Oriental Series (or by checking through the index in Das Gupta's five volumes).

Perhaps it is better to consult our authorities, lest we overstate or understate our claims. As evidence that the connection between philosophy and science was not completely broken, we have the following from the medieval Jaina *Syad-Vada Manjari* of Dri Mallisenasuri (fl. cir. A. D. 1292, translation of F. W. Thomas, Academie-Verlag, Berlin 1960.), (p. 121f): (the content is the refutation of the Lokayatas, the radical empiricist-materialist school) :

> Moreover perception also derives its authority merely from non-divergence from practice. How otherwise is there not precedencee in a cognition of wares applies to a mirage mass, as possessed of practical efficacy for bathing, drinking and plunging ? And why is it not simply on the ground of the non-divergence from practice approved in regard to interference and scripture also, which are evoked by way of words for marks connected with objects ? If it is said, "they are without provedness because they are seen to also divergent (so mistaken)"; since on part of perception also we see failure of authority when through the defect of faulty vision, etc., it attaches to a pair of moons, there follows a universal want of authority. If it is said, 'That is an illusion of perception', the same can be said in the other cases also. except for partiality. And, as thus a systematizing of entities by mere perception is unaccountable, the contentions thereon bases, negating soul, merit and demerit, a future world, etc. are simply without provedness. Likewise must be rejected also the contention, approved by the Nastikas, concerning thought as physical, and to this effect the author of the Dravyaalamkara...says, "Nor is this like the power in the parts of intoxicants of causing dizziness, etc.; because it is not observed in each separately. And if it is not manifested, there is establishment of a self. If it is said that 'I, attention arise from them when evolved in the form of (living) bodies', then evolution as body also. if it is merely in these physical elements. is not occasional; but. in other, it would be simply the self. If it had not cause. there would be no restriction of place. etc., and it would take place even from a dead man. The accessory condition of food, etc., is present also in a sleeper, etc., nor is there origination of that, (if it is existent), because of the consequence of again and again; and, if not actualized, there is contradiction of the recognized 'practical efficacy'. And if it does not exist, being void of all potency, how can it be the agent of its origination, because of the consequence of another

> also (doing the same) ? Therefore attention is not a product of the physical. 'Whence then is its a rising when one rises from sleep ? Because on account of non self-consciousness there is (in sleep) no intelligence.' No ! Because of recollection of what has been experienced in the waking state, while the non consciousness is through the impediment of sleep.—'how then is there injury to the intelligence upon injury to the body ?'—That is not unequivocal because there is purity of intelligence even on the part of one who has a body infected by leprosy, etc. and with absence of injury there is variety of mental sated, since we see difference of pleasure, etc. and in case of mental injury by sorrow, etc., we do not see bodily injury. And without an evolving thing there is not the origination of the effect. Nor is it merely the physical elements that so evolve, because they belong to a different species, since we do not observe hardness, etc. (in the soul). Only atoms are liable to a gross state in the form of being apprehendible by the sense-organs; and genus, etc., of such are observed. Therefore attention is not an attribute of the physical, or a fruit of it. Also that Your Worship criticizes is a mark of it; and this self is self conscious. If physical things were so, 'I am fair' etc., would be extrovert, but not introvert, because of being begotten by external organs. And on the part one who does not admit the validity of inference even a negation of the self is unattainable. If attention should be an attribute and a fruit of physical things, there would be observation (of it) in every case: or else origination from a dissimilar." This is the meaning of this verse.

Now admittedly if we compare this with a treatise by any 20th century writer in the philosophy of science of any nationality, then we may find it slightly crude and dense, even though the basic essentials are present, e.g. critical appraisal of cognitive processes, including perception, psychosomatic factors in valid and invalid perception, problem of observing relation of consciousness to atoms, etc.

However, chronologically such a comparison would be unfortunate, if not completely unfair. We should rather seek for a comparable passage from some European philosopher of the same century, such as Roger Bacon, with whose works we must assume that the reader is familiar, in order not to become too prolix in this very sketchy survey. Or, if one wishes to pursue the topic in a more generalized historical account, one may review, in Taton's *Historie Generale des Sciences*, the section in vol. I, pp. 535-560. And even then one might be misled if one were completely ignorant of the specifically scientific developments outside the scope of "philosophy" as such. For this field, in brief resume, we turn to the *History and Culture of the Indian People* under the general editorship of R. C. Majumdar. Thus in vol. III of that work we have the following paragraphs (p. 321) :

Varahamihira, who flourished in the 6th century A. D., has preserved in his Panchasiddhantika some account of five astronomical works which were evidently regarded as authoritative in his own time. These five works or Siddhantas are referred to as Pitamaha, Romaka, Paulisa, Vasishtha, and Surya. The first of these belonged to the pre-scientific period, but the other four show a more advanced stage of thought and spirit. It has been urged by some that all these four indicate a knowledge of, if not based upon Greek astronomy. This seems undoubtedly true of the second and third, for though Romaka need not be taken to refer to the city of Rome itself it certainly alluded to the Roman empire in a general sense. The Paulisa is most probably derived from the name of Paulus Alexandrinus. It is to be noted that both these refer to the meridian of Yavanapura. The Surya Siddhanta, even in the revised form in which we have it is said to have been revealed by Surya to Asura Maya in Romaka. This may be regarded as an evidence in favor of its western origin or at least Greek influence. Thus there cannot be any reasonable doubt that the indians had knowledge of Greek astronomy and were profoundly influenced by it. This view is supported by a careful examination of the contents of these works and also by various considerations.

Although we possess some texts bearing the names of the five old Siddhantas, they are all later than Varahamihira's time, and evidently revised versions of the older texts, if not altogether new works under old names. The original texts, whose contents are noted by Varahamihira, may be placed between A.D. 300 and 500 though some of them are perhaps still older.

Varhahamihira refers to several other astronomers such as Lata, Simha, Pradyumna Vijayanandin, and last but not least, the famous Aryabhata. Of these a few works of Aryabhata alone have come down to us such as *Aryabhatiya*, *Dasagitika-sutra* and *Aryastasata*[1] Aryaghata was born in Saka 389 (A. D. 476), probably at Kusumapura or Pataliputra, and his Aryabhatiya was composed in A.D. 499. He was the *First to treat Mathematics as a distinct subject* (italics ours) and dealt with evolution and involution, area and volume, progressions and algebraic identities, and indeterminate equations of the first degree. Aryabhata *was also the first to hold that the earth was a sphere and rotated on its axis* [italics ours]. and that the eclipses were not the work of Rahu *but caused by the shadow of the earth falling on the moon*. Both of these views were rejected and severely condemned, as indeed they would have been in Europe before the 16th century or so, by later astronomers like Varahamihira and Brahmagupta. Aryabhata also arrived at a "remarkably accurate" value of *pi*, vix., 3.1416.

One of the most important features of Aryabhata's mathematical system in his unique system of notation. It is based on the decimal place-value system, *unknown to other ancient peoples* [italics ours], but now in use throughout the civilized world... On the whole Aryabhata deservedly occupies a very high place among Indian astronomers and has had many followers and commentators.

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[1] They are available in the University of Chicago Libraries, some of them in translation. See also, *The History of Hindu Mathematics* by B. Datta and A. Singh (Lahore, 1935).

The next in order of time comes Varahamihira. He takes the Saka year 427 as the basis for calculations, so that he may be said to have flourished towards the close of the 5th century A.D. ... He has given us no less than six works on all the three branches into which he divides the Jyotish-sastra, viz., Tantra (astronomy and mathematics), Hora (horoscope) and Samhita (astrology). His astronomical work *Panchasiddhantika* has been mentioned before. His work on astrology, *Brhatsamhita*, is an encyclopedia of useful information in various branches of knowledge, such as movements of heavenly bodies and their effect upon men, geography, architecture, construction of images, excavations of tanks, laying out of gardens, special characteristics of the different classes of women and animals, jewelry, augury, marriage, etc. ... The next writer whose works are extant is Brahmagupta whose Brahmasiddhanta was composed in Saka 550 (A.D. 628). His other well-known work *Khankakhadya*, still very popular in the non-Western system of education among orthodox Hindus, was very probably composed in Saka 587 which taken there as the base for calculations. He also seems to have composed the *Dhyanagraha* in 72 verses in the *Aryameter*. "Brahmagupta's work covers very briefly the ordinary arithmetical operations, square and cube roots, rule of three, interest, progressions, geometry, including treatment of the rational right-angled triangle and elements of the circle, elementary mensuration of solids, shadow problems, negative and positive quantities, cipher, surds, simple algebraic identities, indeterminate equations of the first and second degrees, in considerable detail, and simple equations of the first and second which are briefly treated, special attention is given to cyclic quadrilaterals."

In the next period of Indian History—and it cannot be sufficiently emphasized how important the *historical* perspective is in Comparative studies — we do not find any sensational advances in the physical sciences, but again we do not find stagnation or retrogression either. Thus, from Vol 4 in the same series, we have the following (p. 199): In mathematics, we read of Sridhara who had written to *Lilavati* of Bhaskaracharya. He is perhaps the same as the author of the *Ganitasara* who is referred to by Mahavira in his *Sarasamgraha*. The date of this letter can be fixed at about A.D. 850...But the most important author of this age is Aryabhata II, the author of the Aryasiddhanta...Aryabhata II cannot be much earlier than A.D. 966. Among other writers of the 10th century may be mentioned. ...[1] More interesting and important than the rest is, perhaps, that on the *Brihatsamhita*, a study of which is calculated to give its reader a good idea of the history of this

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[1] We omit the list although it is as impressive as any similar list for Europe or China in this period of World History.

> science in India in the earlies stages. This commentary was composed in Saka 888 (c. A.D. 966). The only other work that remains the same as that referred to by Bhattotpala, so that *Kalyanavarman* must be earlier than the 10th Century A. D. On the strength of the fact that he calls himself Vatesvahe is said to have lived in the last quarter of the 9th Century A D. But from internal evidence of the *Saravali* itself it appears that in A.D. 966 Bhattopala revised the original work of Kalyanavarman which at that time was about 300 years old. It would therefore seem to belong to the 7th Century A.D.

Of course, in this survey we are not including medicine and other sciences. That constitutes a field only slightly better explored than the history of mathematics and astronomy. The same may be said of architecture. In these fields one gets the impression that there was continued advance after the Muslim conquest of India; but unfortunately, although most of the "Arab" mathematics and philosophy of science and indeed, most of the actual astronomical knowledge was probably *Hindu*, e.g. Indian, in origin, there was a decline in scientific pursuits among Hindus during the Moslem domination of India. The "arabs"—mostly *Persians*, by the way,—did continue to make further advances, both within India and outside of India, particularly at Bagdad, Isfahan and Delhi. Tourists are beginning to be familiar with the astronomical observatories in Delhi and Banaras and Rajastan as well as with the Taj Mahal and other popular attractions; although less sensational in appearance, they were historically of considerably more significance in the advancement of civilization. They were not, indeed, as advanced as the Chinese of the same period for the most part; but until the time of Galileo, mathematics and astronomy in Europe (both western Europe and Byzantine) was *definitely inferior* to that of India and China. We shall soon be concerning ourselves with China, but first, we must not omit, in all honesty the following citations from volume 5 and 6 of the same series; thus, volume 5, (p. 328) :

> First in point of time comes the *Trisati* of Sridhara (eleventh century). but the most important treatises on Mathematics are the two chapters entitled the Lilavati and the Bijaganita in the *Siddhāntaśiromani* of Bhāskāracharya (twelfth century). The from of the Lilavati is quite unique, since a beautiful maiden is addressed by the author. As regards contents, it is based on the earlier works of Brahmagupta and Sridhara and deals with combinations. The Bijaganita forms the most complete and systematic work on Algebra.
>
> On Astronomy we have the *Rājamrigenko*, ascribed to Bhoja, and the Bhasvati of Satananda, both belonging to the eleventh century. Two chapters of *Siddhāntasiromani* viz. the Grahaganita and the Gola, are the most valuable writings on Astronomy. The *Karanakutuhala* was written by the same

author a little later. As in Mathematics, so in Astronomy, no scholar contributed anything of importance after Bhaskaracharya.

That is, until after readjustments had been made under the invading Muslim rulers, who deprived the Hindu Maharajas of their wealth, and therefore the poor scientists had to resort to other pursuits in order to survive. Military victories almost always mean retrogressions in the "pure" sciences, although they may stimulate temporary and desperate spurts of advance in technology, but that is a different matter. It is rather "strong medicine" to assert that just as the triumph of Christianity in the Mediterranean may have hindered progress in the sciences, so the triumph of Islam in India retarded the advancement of science in India; but the hypothesis does not lend itself to further investigation before re-evaluation. At any rate, the process is not so simple in either case as all of that, since, needless to say, after the conquest, the newcomers, perhaps in accordance with a pattern similar to Toynbee's "challenge and response schematism", as in both cases stimulators of new synthesis.

The tracing of this new synthesis in the case of India is beyond the range of this paper. It is enough to note the following entry from volume 6 of this series, (p. 489) :

> After the great Bhaskaracharya no one seems to have taken real interest[1] in astronomy. Bhaskaracharya's grandson Changadeva founded a school in 1205 to study his work. but it seems to have been interested in astrology. *Suryasiddhandtavivada* or *Vasanarnava* by Madanapala is a commentary on the Suryasiddhanta. Two works of not much importance are the Tithyadipatra of Makaranda (15th century) and the *Grahalaghava* of Ganesha (16th century).
>
> On an older astrological work is based the *Vidyamadhaviya* of the early 14th century. More interesting than this is the *Jyotirvidabharana* (16th century), an astrological work wrongly ascribed to Kalidasa, the author of *Sakuntala*. etc., which mentions the nine jewels adorning the court of Vikramaditya. Works on Muhurta gave suspicious moments for ceremonies, marriages. journies. etc. Under the Arabic and Persian influence however. were undertaken the later Tajikas like the one by Nilakantha (A.D. 1587) in two parts—Samjna and Varsha-tantra.

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4 i. e., no one writing in *Sanskrit*. It may be that works in the *vernaculars* may yet turn up with considerable worth-while content. Just as in the same period in western Europe, Latin continued right down to the time of Leibniz and Newton as the language of science and philosophy, so in India with *Sanskrit*; however, the fact that the vernaculars were being used increasingly in both areas from the 14th century on into the present, has not yet adequately impressed "East-West" scholars. At least, such is my subjective impression, subject to revision after further research.

B. Relation between Science and Philosophy during these periods of Indian History

In the light of such historical information, then, we are faced with a rather at first shocking question, "If Science was there, and if, indeed, some advance was made in the physical sciences as well as in herbology and medicine—and, to avoid prolixity, we have skimmed over vast oceans of other possible materials—in which it is easy to demonstrate that advance was made—then why did it have so little effect on the philosophizing of Hindu India after the post-Buddhistic Hindu Counter-reformation initiated by Sankaracharya? The easiest answer may be made in the form of a counter-question: *Why did it not in medieval Europe*? Perhaps the *scientists* in *both* areas were the 'radicals', the innovators, the *true* "philosophers" from the standpoint of 20th century values, and not the Saints and Acharyas, who were bound by Tradition which it was suicidal to try to break away from in both cases, to make commentaries on commentaries on commentaries in order to—yes, even as in the 20th century in both areas, in order to "get published!" All scholars are always invo'ved in the *Sociology* of knowledge, whether we are dealing with Science, Philosophy, Art, Religion, or what-have-you. Nevertheless, this is not a completely satisfactory answer, enticing thought it may be. We only submit the *possible* hypothesis as an answer, that in both India and Western Europe, between the time of Sankara and Gangesha, the Navya Nyaya logician, we have an historical development remarkably like that in western Europe between Anselm and Occkham! And I further subjoin that in both cases Science and the philosophy of science were going hand-in-hand, dialectically, making way for other things. The basic movement, is it not, is away from infatuation with unspeakabilities and transcendentals and absolutes and denials of difference, to the *full affirmation of the logic of difference* in the later Madhavas[1] and the *definitely positivistic* trends in Navya Nyaya logic (as much, at least, as in Nicholas of Autrecourt and Occham and others)?

Finally (for these periods of the History of Indian Science and Philosophy at least), we submit that although it is not absolutely necessary that a philosophy of science be anti-metaphysical, and it is certainly not absolutely essential that it be a 'positivistic' philosophy, nevertheless, for those who do believe that this is true, there is plenty of unexplored material not yet in any European language. The science of *Vyakarana*—loosely, Semantics, but more properly, *logical analysis in* almost precisely the same sense as that used by Carnap, Ayer, and others! Ramachandra Sharma Pandey at Banaras was overjoyed when introduced to Carnap, not because it was any radical liberation from Tradition, as the typical aggressive "westernizer" might pre-suppose, but for the very reason that at long last he had found a logician in the West who was finally catching up with what has been an advanced Science in India—indeed in his own ancestral heritage—for many hundreds of years! And at long last, we have now a most heartily welcome publication which opens this field to the English-reading public, namely the *Philosophy of Logical Construction*: *An Examination of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivisms* (etc.) by Professor Satkari Mookerjee (Nalanda Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1963.) We also have the article, "Contraposition in Indian Logic" by J. F. Stall in *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* (Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Stanford University Press, 1962).

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[1] For this history, we have such works as vol. II of *A History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature*. and, of course, Ingals' still not sufficiently known *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyaya*. But unfortunately for the *full* history of the modernization of Indian philosophy and science between the 17th century and Lokamanya Tilak and Dayananda Saraswati, we do not yet have an adequate historical survey. Until this research has been done (and, we reiterate, it must perforce include a survey of all the literature in all the vernaculars) judgement should *be withheld*!

Thus, while we cannot possibly begin to do it within the limits of this article, we rejoice that perhaps a "counterpositive" is opening in the field of interpretation of that vast and varied field called "Indian" philosophy. We suggest that the commentaries on the Brahma Sutras, as well as the works of Abhinava Gupta and Appeya Diksita, Vijnana Bhikshu and many others as yet, no doubt, to be rescued from oblivion because they were bold enough to write in the language of the people rather than in the language of the pundits, coming historically between Madhusudana Saraswati and Dayananda Saraswati—we suggest indeed that almost the whole history of post-Sankara philosophizing be restudied from the standpoint of the advancement of science, both in conjunction with and in occasional opposition to, Hindu Mysticism. We suggest likewise that the relation of philosophy of Science and metaphysics be restudied in the context of its *historical* settings, scientifically, and not vaguely and at random, with particular attention to the degree to which advance was hindered by military wastage and devastation of Hindu Muslim warfare, and by economic exploitation and military aggression on the part of the Europeans, who did *not* promote the further advancement of science in India until it was almost too late, even though they used Indian wealth, gained by "shaking the pogada tree," for the advancement of science in Europe. These are strong words to some sensitive souls, but sometimes history administers strong medicine to cure difficult maladies.

In the future centuries, will India regain her position of *leadership* in mathematics and astronomy, medicine and other sciences, as well as in "Yoga"?—and not India alone, but all the ex-colonial areas or better still, perhaps in cooperation with UNESCO, all may join in the *supra*national or *global* enterprise of the advancement of science? No one may dare to predict. But at least, perhaps some hindrances to progress will be removed if only scholars and philosophers both Inside and outside of India will more openly recognize that the "image" of Bharat Mataji includes jewelry that is the product of an advanced and rapidly advancing Civilization, as well as a halo of mysticism and magic. India can *modernize without westernizing*, therefore; and once this is realized, spiritual integration *will be easier*. And, in what is more, India may yet make still further contributions to the further development of philosophy of science everywhere!

III. Philosophy of Science in China

A. Historical Survey

In the case of China, we may be considerably more brief. The work of Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, as we intimated in the introductory paragraph, is revolutionizing some of the old stereotypes concerning the lore of Chinese or "Oriental Wisdom". But more than that, since the Chinese Revolution of which, according to some authorities, the Communist "Take over" is only a continuation (although we fully recognize the sharply controversial nature of this debate) the whole history of Chinese Philosophy is being redically recast with a completely different set of values in mind than those which have motivated the old-style western Sinologists. Even Fung Yu Lan is cooperating under Marxist auspices in the *re*-writing; and we yet have to see what the end-result will be. Hou Wai Lu's *extremely* brief *History of Chinese Philosophy* may be a presage of what is to be expected from the Mainland, and the results are not so discouraging as one might expect at first. The same philosophers for the most part (at least until the late 19th Century) are reported, but from a different point of view. Some propagandistic elements do come to surface occasionally, especially when it comes to emphasis on the social role of some philosophers, and on those who in any sense may be called 'revolutionary', or those whose works were suppressed by the prevailing regime. But one of the striking characteristics of this re-writing is a fresh emphasis on *scientific* achievements. The second volume of Carsun Chang's *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*, in its own way, even at the cost of exaggerated interpretations in some places, is hardly less revolutionary in many aspects. In general, the *realist* tradition of Chinese Philosophy, as the *realist* tradition in Indian Philosophy, is receiving constantly more attention both by Chinese themselves both inside and outside of China[1]

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[1] See bibliography in *Scientism in Chinese Thought*, 1900-1950, by D. W. Y. Kwok, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1965.

Again, this is not necessarily 'scientific' in itself, since in China as elsewhere, many who were idealists in metaphysics and indeed, many Taoists whose ways bordered not only on the mystical but on the magical, also conducted some genuinely scientific experiments, and the developments of the doctrine of elements according to varying combinations of Yin and Yang and the five elements may be said to have at least as 'scientific' as the development of the doctrine of atoms in classical Greece and Classical India. But as with the history of European and of Indian Philosophy, the *historical* element needs more and more to be scientifically emphasized, so in Chinese philosophy, we trust that the reader has long since become accustomed not to think in terms of finding much more likenesses between Mencius and Chu Hsi and Wang Yang Ming and Yen Yuan and Tai Chan than between Plato and Aquinas and Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. Historical developments *have* made a difference, a tremendous difference. Fortunately, since the publication of the second volume of Fung Yu Lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952) we were beginning to appreciate these historical developments a little more keenly; and now, with the publication of Wing-tait Chan's *Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, we cannot escape condemnation if we become too careless in exaggerating some supposed "General Characteristics" in "Chinese" Philosophy. It is therefore with a sense of extreme caution that we proceed into the material to follow.

But, aside from this *Historical or developmental* factor, which enables us to take more readily into account the great and wide *variety* of Chinese philosophies, we have yet to see an adequate juxtaposition of the history of *Science* in China with the History of Chinese *Philosophy* aside from the work of Joseph Needham.

As one vivid example, if one looks, even under the indexed entries, for the record of Chu Hse through the four volumes thus far available, one is startled with the impression that here is by no means a "medieval" recluse, nor, for that matter only an able public administrator, but actually a *scientist* also in his own right, who had several inventions to his own credit.[1]

Another example—an excellent Ph D. Dissertation topic for someone indeed, who has a sufficient knowledge of the Chinese language!—is the history of the use of the term 'investigation of things' (*ko wu*) throughout the long and involved history of Chinese philosophy. It is controversial enough to determine whether even Chu Hsi himself used the word always consistently; it is strange to some, but only natural to others, that Wang Yang Ming used the same term in quite a different sense. But it is one of the many tangled threads of controversial issues upon which the intricate tapestry of the relation between Chinese *philosophy* and Chinese *Science* may in the near future be rewoven with even more brilliant effects than in the past.

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[1] see *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 472.

These, of course, are only random introductory remarks, More specifically on the one hand, it must be admitted that syllogistic logic did not develop as early in China or with the same degree of sophistication, in spite of Hu Shih's attempts to demonstrate the contrary, as it did in India and Greece. It must be likewise admitted pointedly, that for good or not-so-good, the theory — or, now, but only now in the post-Einsteinian world, in which the actual existence of "atoms" is beginning to be doubted, shall we call it the *myth* of the atom ? (not all myths being evil things, but often very convenient, it must be remembered)—of atoms did not enter China, to the best of my knowledge, until after the introduction of the Buddhist Sutras wherein the doctrine is discussed.[1] But on the other hand, it seems to me no less 'scientific' to think in terms of 'yin and yang' than to think, as Plato and the Pythagoreans did, in terms of 'odd' and 'even'. Nevertheless it was not until Tai Shen developed this doctrine into a system in many ways not completely dissimilar to the doctrine of substance in the Cartesian and Spinozistic manner, that yin/yang theory really began to take on its full possible *scientific* significance. The transitions through many centuries in terms of these more abstract theoretical speculations, however, did not delay the practical development of Science as such.

Again, it does appear that we are in a position to offer the hypothesis, for future verification or rejection or partial and qualified validation, that for the most part there is some parallel development, and perhaps integral organic relation between the progress of philosophy and the advancement of science in China as elsewhere. If anything, in China, it may well be that practice actually got ahead of *theory*; but it may well be, likewise that such a judgment may come, not from scientific observation, but from uncritical indoctrination according to the stereotype of the Chinese as the "practical" Chinese. In making new explorations, and especially in setting up schematic correlations, we must be doubly on the alert, lest in dodging a snake, we plunge over a precipice !

We could continue at length point to many other factors in the "classical" Chinese philosophies (e.g. up to the period of the Han Empire's greatness and highest expansion) which tended towards the further development of Science. The technicalities concerning the philosophy of *causation*, for example, seems not to figure prominently in early China as in India and Greece;[2] but the 'natural' tendency toward Naturalism (not as a *cult* or a creed), without complications about puzzles like those of Unmoved Mover or Creation ex nihilo, did not no doubt tend toward a more 'scientific' atmosphere for philosophizing. And there were many other similar rather perennial characteristics which were congenial to scientific progress, and indeed to genuine inventiveness, unhindered by dogma of an established creed, although not always encouraged by entrenched bureaucracy. Indeed, it is often difficult, in Chinese history, quite as much as in any other part of the world, to distinguish which is 'han' and which is 'agg'. Concept and precept, theory and practice, invention and discovery, Vision and investigation, seem to go hand-in hand dialectically in China as well as anywhere else. If these pairs are, in essence no more than examples of yin and yang[1], so much the better for this aspect of Chinese Science and Philosophy. At any rate, where they conjoin, there is fruition, and where they get out of balance there is either stagnation of revolution until the natural harmony is restored. But these are still only general comments on what may be observed even at random in examining the available materials in European languages. Let us, before we become unduly bold or exaggeratedly original, listen to what Needham has to say by way of Summarization. In vol. IV, Part I, he has paused in the middle of his Grand Design, to make the following observations (p. xxiii ff) :

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[1] See Needham, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 80, 194, 372-374.

[2] On this point, see Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples : India-China-Tibet-Japan*, East-West Center Press,

> In optics the Chinese of the Middle Ages kept empirically more or less abreast of the Arabs, though greatly hampered in theory by the lack of that Greek deductive geometry of which the latter were the inheritors. On the other hand they never entertained that peculiar Hellenistic aberration according to which vision involved rays radiating from, not into, the eye. In acoustics the Chinese proceeded along their own lines

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Honolulu, Hawaii, 1964. For theories of causation in Indian Philosophy, see *sub indice causation* parinamavada, vivartavada, satkaryavada, etc., in Das Gupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* (all five volumes should be consulted). Also see C. D. Sharma's *Indian Philosophy : A Critical Survey*, Barnes & Noble, 1962. as well as Sinha's *A History of Indian Philosophy, sub indice* (Vol. II) Causation, Calcutta, 1952.

[1] See for example Fung Yu-lan's exposition of Tai Chen, Vol. II, p. 651 ff and Wing tsit Chan's *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 709 (Princeton University, 1963). Here Yin and Yang already begin to become 'scientific' principles and not merely matters of idle speculation. Even the communist writer Hou Wai-lu in his *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1959) p. 73, says that Yen Yuan held that matter is the original substance or cause of all things. (See also Needham, *A Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. IV, p. 28 f). For more modern application of philosophy of Yin and Yang in scientific fields see *The Ambidextrous Universe* by Martin Gardner, New York, Basic Books, 1964.

> because of the particular and characteristic features of their ancient music, and here they produced a body of doctrine deeply interesting but not readily comparable with those of other civilizations. Inventors of the bell, and of a great variety of percussion instruments not known in the West, they were especially concerned with timbre both in theory and practice, developing their unique theories of melodic composition within the framework of a twelve-note gamut rather than an eight-note scale.[1] At the end of the 16th century Chinese mathematical acoustics succeeded in solving its solution of equal temperament just a few decades before its solution was reached in the West. Lastly, Chinese investigation of magnetic phenomena and their practical application constituted a veritable epic. Men were arguing in China about the cause of the declination of the magnetic needle, and using it at sea, before Westerners even knew of its directive property.

And he continues further :

> As for the discoveries and inventions which have left permanent mark on human affairs, it would be impossible even to summarize here the Chinese contributions. Perhaps the newest and most surprising revelation...is that of the six hidden centuries of mechanical clockwork which preceded the clocks of 14th century Europe......It still seems startling that the key invention of the escapement should have been made in a pre-industrial agrarian civilization among a people proverbially supposed by bustling nineteenth-century Westerners to take no account of time. But there are many other equally important Chinese gifts to the world, the development of the magnetic compass, the invention of the first cybernetic machine, both forms of efficient equine harness, the canal lockgate and the iron-chain suspension bridge. The first true crank, the stern-post rudder, the man-lifting kite—we cannot enumerate them all.

These, of course, are primarily in the domain of *physics*. In astronomy, as we shall presently see, the developments are even more remarkable. But here he makes an observation which is notably trenchant, and gives us all a sharp warning (p. xxv) :

> At the beginning of a recent popular florilegium of passages on the history of technology one comes across a citation from the 8th century Taoist book *Kuan Yin Tzu*, given as an example of 'oriental rejection of this world and of worldly activity'. It had been culled from an interesting essay on religion and the idea of progress, well-known in the thirties and still stimulating, the author of which, led astray by the old rendering of Fr Wieger, had written : 'It is obvious that such beliefs can afford no basis for social activity and no incentive to material

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[1] We have made no mention of Indian Music and its theory, but it was and is more elaborate in both melodic line and rhythm patterns than either Chinese or Western: and the science of musical instruments—well, even the violin and piano may be traced back to Indian Ancestors !

progress.' He was, of course, concerned to contrast the Christian acceptance of the material world[1] with 'oriental' other worldliness, in which the Taoists were supposed to participate. Yet in almost every one of the inventions and discoveries we here describe the Taoists and Mohists were intimately involved. As it happened, we had ourselves studied the same *Kuan Yin Tzu* passage and given parts of it in translation at an earlier stage; form this it can be seen that Wieger's version was no more than a grievously distorted paraphrase. Far from being an obscurantist document, denying the existence of laws of Nature (a concept totally unheard of by the original writer) and confusing reality with dream, the text is a poem in praise of the immanent Tao, the Order of Nature from which space and time proceed, the eternal pattern according to which matter disperses and reassembles in forms ever new; full of Taoist relativism, *mystical but in no way anti-scientific* (italics ours) or anti technological, on the contrary prophesying of the quasi magical quasi-rational command over Nature which he who truly knows and understands the Tao will achieve. Thus upon close examination, *an argument purporting to demonstrate the philosophical impotence of 'oriental thought', turns out to be nothing but a figment of occidental imagination* (italics ours).

> ......It would be much more honest to say that while the social background of Hellenistic science and technology can be taken for granted because it is quite familiar to us from our school days onwards, we do not yet know much about the social backgrounds of Chinese and Indian science, and that we ought to make efforts to get acquainted with it.

Further down, Needham continues (p. xxviii) :

> China to Europeans has been like the moon, always showing the same face—a myriad peasant-farmers, a scattering of artists and recluses, an urban minority of scholars, mandarins and shopkeepers. Thus do civilizations acquire 'stereotypes' of one another. Now, raised upon the wings of the spaceship of lingusitic resource and riding the rocket of technical understanding (to use an Arabic trope), we intend to see what is on the other side of the disc, and to meet the physicists and engineers, the shipwrights and the metallurgists of China's three-thousand year old culture.

In Volume III, Needham had already written the following, in the context of Chinese astronomy (p. 458 ff) :

> ......It will be now be abundantly evident that the Chinese contribution to the development of astronomical science was a very remarkable one...we may mention : (a) the elaboration of a polar and equatorial system strikingly different from that of the Hellenistic peoples, though equally logical; (b) the early conception of an infinite universe, with the stars as bodies floating in empty space; (c) the development of quantitative positional astronomy and star-catalogues *two centuries before*

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[1] St. Bruno and Guigo the Carthusians would groan in their graves if they could have heard of this !

> *any other civilization* of which comparable works have come down to us : (d) the use of these catagories of equatorial (i e. *essentially modern*) coordinates, and a faithfulness to them extending over two millennia; (e) the elaboration, in steadily increasing complexity, of astronomical instruments, culminating in the 13th century invention of the equatorial mounting, as an 'adapted torquetum' or 'dissected' armillary sphere; (f) the invention of the clock drive for that forerunner of the telescope, the sighting-tube; and of a number of ingenious mechanical devices to astronomical instruments; and (g) the maintenance for longer continuous periods than any other civilization, of accurate records of celestial phenomena, such as eclipses, novae, sunspots, etc.
>
> ......We often hear of 'the Greek genius for enquiry—the desire to know not only the facts, but the reasons for the facts' *but this is surely a false antithesis*... If, like all Chinese science, Chinese astronomy was fundamentally empirical and observational, it was spared the excesses and aberrations, as well as the triumphs of occidental theorizing. But clearly it requires a much more important place in the history of science as a whole than historians have been wont to give it.

It is indeed unfair to compare Chinese physics with Indian mathematics, and classical and medieval Chinese and Indian astronomy together with *modern* (not to say 20th century) western philosophy of science. And yet, we fear, that is precisely what has been going on far too much in some areas of East-West Studies. We do not intend to sanction or perpetuate the tendency by virtue of our limiting this paper to the classical and medieval periods of India and China. Even within these fields, we could expand very much more. For example, in the section on Mathematics (vol. III, p. 150ff) Needham has not limited himself to China only, but has happily taken the liberty of expanding considerable into all the full range of comparative studies in the perspective of World History.

Presently, we shall point briefly to some efforts to restore the balance in the modern world such as was more prevalent in the medieval period than since the era of European exploitation, which we trust has come to an end with the development of the United Nations and UNESCO. But first, we cannot easily pass by the quotation from the Chang brothers (cir. 1033 to 1108) which we submit near the close of the section on Mathematics. Needham (p. 164) :

> Again someone asked Chhange-I-Chhuan, 'In observing outer things and in searching into the self,should one look back into oneself to seek what has already been seen in things ?' (He replied) : 'There is not need to put the matter in this way. The external world and the self have one single great pattern in common; as soon as "that" is understood "this" becomes clear. This is the Tao of the union of the internal and the external. The scholar should try to observe and understand all Nature—are one extreme the height of the heavens and the

thickness of the earth—at the other, why a singly (tiny) thing is at it is ?

Somebody else said : 'In extending knowledge, what do you say to seeking (the pattern of the world) first in the "Four Beginnings" (ssu tuan) ?' (The philosopher answered) : 'To seek them in our own nature and passions is of course simple and near at home. but every (blade of) grass and every tree have their own patterns, *and these must be investigated.*

'A wide knowledge of the names (and properties of birds, animals and trees) is one of the means of reaching an understanding of pattern.'

IV. The Present Scene

These passages ought to be sufficient at least to refute the notions that only in Greece did Science have its origins and foundations for all human history. In this paper we cannot possibly trace the full development of scientific endeavor and of philosophies which hindered or encouraged that development in western Europe, India and China during the period of European hegemony, out of which has come the habit of thinking in terms of "east" and "west", nor the inter-relations of India and China between themselves and in relation to the Muslim countries and the Shamanist elements of pre-Muslim and pre-Buddhist Central Asia, although these topics have been sadly neglected, both within the range of the development of adequately scientific world-views and in other regards also. Therefore it is hoped that we shall be pardoned if we plummet from the classical and medieval setting right into the contemporary scene.

The materials, of course, are abundent. We cannot possibly survey them adequately in such short compass. Perhaps then, at the risk of being brutally arbitrary, we should simply acknowledge that a very wide range of attitudes prevails in the West as well as in India and China, and. without trying to give an adequate representation of each of these attitudes, tender the opinion that even though their statistical popularity may vary in different regions of these three Areas, and indeed among different segments of the populations of these three Areas, the full range will be found everywhere.

A. China

There are those who, shocked by Hiroshima and similar events, have confused the military control of technology with Science as such, and have despaired completely of the Myth of Progress, and, in so far as they are seeking to be scientific at all, are desperately seeking to strengthen the Social Sciences as a last gesture to save mankind from total annihiliation in a third World War. There are others, at the other extreme, who believe that the whole world is entirely too bound up in the past, and who remain intoxicated by the tremendous strides made in Space Technology, in the Science of

Communications, Transportation, and other fields, especially since the invention of the electronic telescope and microscope. There are those who believe that each Civilization and Culture will have something distinct to offer and that therefore, while accepting the best from the outside everywhere—as for example, the adoption of some Aryurvedic remedies by the American Medical Association, and the incorporation of the effective elements in Calchemico's Neem toothpaste; the revindication of acupuncture in Chinese medicine; and the recent interest among Western psychiatrists in Zen, the admission of thc necessity of intuition in order to open the mind to new hypothesis, which reason must correct; and the determination by India to use atomic power for peaceful purposes, such as the generation of electricity for widespread distribution at cheap rates among the village population. Professor Raman and many other Indian scientists have made major contributions, both in theory and practice, to the advancement of Science itself; and, accordingly to some reports, at least, it will not be long before Mainland China equals and perhaps even surpasses the western countries in technological production and in many branches of theoretical science. There are those, then, who may be most correct, who believe that national differences must be minimized in scientific fields. Science as such remains neutral as far as ethnic and religious ties are concerned. Science is Science the world around, just as sound is sound and the ground is the ground !

B. The Contempory Scene Today

Therefore for our concluding points, we might take the following citations as indicative of a new global alignment, even though they might not meet with universal support from their respective constituencies or colleagues. Certainly Reichenback would hardly agree with Agnes Arbert and probably Malkani would not understand the full implications of the mathematics of the Raman effect. Likewise, what we read in Hajime Nakamura's *The Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples* (notably pp. 167-170 and 191-195) is difficult to reconcile with the specifically scientific recommendations even of Tchang Tchetong (French transliteration), whose *K'iuen-hip p'ien* (published at Shanghai in 1909) contains rather vehement exhortations to get on with building of railways, scientific improvement of agriculture, modernizing the military, bringing minerological potentials up to maximum efficiency, etc., etc.

And even more dramatically and realistically, the following Document with the title *Regulations on the Organization of the Department of the Chinese Academy of Science* makes one wonder whether while some American scientists are casting a wishful eye at the (no-longer-existing) "Mystical Orient" in a faint hope that therein by some miraculous means, they will find an escape from their epistemological difficulties—one wonders whether the Asian countries may not regain their former *superiority* in Science. Thus (from *Sciences in Communist China*, edited by Sidney H. Gould, published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D. C., 1961[1]) we read :

> I. The Academic Council may establish academic departments to direct academic activities in their respective fields. These departments shall operate under the direction and supervision of the Academic Council.
>
> II. The department shall direct related research institutes, special committees, special research teams, and investigation teams.
>
> III. The departments shall have the following functions :
>
> 1. Supervising the development of science and studying ways and means of promoting scientific research.
> 2. Guiding the various institutes in making plans (annual, five-year and long-range plans); giving guidance and assistance to research and institutes which do not belong to the Academy, and coordinating the work of the institutes of the Academy with the work of other institutes.
> 3. Organizing research institutes of their own, and undertaking projects with the cooperation of the other departments as well as institutes outside of the Academy.
> 4. Reviewing the research work of its various institutes; hearing reports on the activities of the institutes; and making recommendations on scientific research in schools of higher learning and other institutes.
> 5. Organizing periodic symposia or academic conferences to which delegates from other institutes schools of higher learning and government agencies should be invited.
> 6. Reviewing and evaluating the findings of the research institutes under their jurisdiction and making recommendations for further economy and the cultural life.
> 7. Evaluating the performance of the research workers under their jurisdiction and granting academic awards and other honors.
> 8. Supervising the training of graduate students and junior research staff members in the institutes under the respective jurisdiction.
> 9. Organizing and supervising the publication of important research reports and journals of its institutes.
> 10. Handling other matters at the request of the Academy.
>
> IV. Organization of the departments ;
>
> V. Department Committees shall meet twice a year revised... to once a year...and its standing committee shall meet once a month. If necessary, the director of a department may call for special meetings of the department.

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[1] The document was promulgated in 1955.

VI. In accordance with the unified plans of the Academy Council, a department shall make annual and quarterly research plans to be submitted by its director to the department committee meetings or its standing committee for approval. Annual plans shall be approved by the Academy of Sciences.

VII. Each department shall make reports on the work of its institutes to the Academy Council. Such reports should be made at least once a year.

VIII. In performing its duties, a department shall, if it is possible, consult other organizations and scientists outside the Academy.

IX. This regulation shall become effective upon approval by the Academy.

Although this document does not give any treatise of the dialectics of epistemological problems as they effect the capacity of the human mind to conceptualize sub-particle activities in the atom, and that without visual images, it certainly does show evidence of a philosophy of science that is vigorous and hopeful, and full of determination to go ahead and *solve* problems, rather than seeking "mystical" escapes from them.

There is also another organization, bearing the title, the All-China Association for the Dissemination of Scientific and Technological Knowledge.

C. India

The same patterning of problems applies to India. It is undeniably true that there are many who still believe, and with good reason, that by re-interpreting the *doctrine of levels* (the *mithya*, *pratibhasika*, *vyaviharika* and *paramarthika*, the illusory, the practical, the theoretical and the transcendental) Classical Advaita can still make some positive contribution to the ordering of the relation of science, philosophy and Society. But there are others—and an increasing number in the generations growing up since the British yoke is gone, and that dark shadow of spiritual alienation which compelled external initiation of the Europeans while the inner heart remained rooted in ancient Hindu (and Muslim and Jaina and Buddhist, and Syrian Christian and Parsi) Tradition, so that integral progress of the whole psyche was not easily possible—there is an increasing number of younger generation philosophers and scientists and engineers in present-day India who are frankly and justifiably rebellious. They no longer merely want to be completely what they really are: *Chinese*! But this does not mean that they must be medieval obscurantists. Feng Yu Lan has gone over to the Communists. M. N. Roy went *through* the Communists [illegible] them behind, and became a modern Indian humanist-realist. O[illegible]ed other modes of—shall we say, *scienticizing*—some insisting that some forms of materialism is necessary to the advancement of science, others[1] still believing that science should retain its essentially *humanist* orientation, lest it become pushed into mechanistic apothesis of military technology and, through tyranny, stifle creativity. Thus, in 1940, not long after M. N. Roy had ceased to be a Communist, (the book, however was revised in 1951) he wrote, in his little volume, *Materialism* (Renaissance Publishshers, Ltd., Calcutta, 1951), (p, 206) :

> The declaration of pseudo-scientistic scepticism, agnosticism and modern idealistic philosophy, that we do not and cannot know more of the external world than its reflection upon our senses, that objective truth is beyond our reach, leaves the way open for the old prejudices to creep into cramp the human spirit. Since "scientific" thinkers themselves admit the inability of sensual knowledge to include the whole truth of the universal being, who is there to dispute the claims of the advocates of revelation, inspiration and religious experience?
>
> This question naturally arises if we take the oracle of the pseudo-scientific mystics as decisive. But the natural sciences do not allow us to take their idealist wisdom for granted. Objective truth, that is, the truth about the Universe as it exists by itself, outside of our sense-perception, is no longer an illusion category. The natural sciences have proved that it is knowable, the evidence being that we know more and more every day. Once it is established theoretically, not on the basis of speculation, but of human practice, that for explaining the Universe, there is no necessity for assuming a Noumenon behind phenomena, that the Universe itself contains all the data or its explanation, offers us the key to the endless knowledge of its being, the dealers in divine wisdom, spiritual inspiration and occult knowledge find it difficult to vend their glittering trinkets. That has been done by modern materialism which is the outcome of scientific thought ever since the days of Democritus corroborated by the positive knowledge of the same.

Of course, M. N. Roy is thinking here primarily of the physical sciences, and indeed, in his later writings he became more specifically humanist[2] rather than crude *materialist*. But this does not mean that he or others since him who are alive and aware of the problems that must be solved and the real issues that must be faced in a realistic way, regardless of what one's philosophical predilections may be, are willing to compromise their rejection of "arm chair" mysticism that results in no practical good for humanity. There have been revolutions in the physical and biological sciences as well as in politics and religion and even in art and architecture, which affect *all* mankind *equally*, leaving no longer such sharp differences between "East" and "West" as previously in the Kipling period.

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[1] Radhakamal Mukerjee, for example, whose *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* remains thus far unparalled for integration of humanist perspectives.

[2] Meanwhile, we might remind ourselves that although most Marxists call themselves humanists; by no means is it true that all humanists are not Marxists. Meanwhile, it does appear to be true that most ex-Communist do remain liberal humanists.

It is in an attempt to "square up" with these problems that we find, in the little Report volume, *Problems in the Third Plan, A Critical Miscellany* (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1961) the following expression of determination and concern (p. 187 ff):

> Since Independence, with the advent of large-scale development in engineering and industry under the Five Year Plans, there has been a growing need for advanced studies in engineering, so that engineers could acquire much higher qualifications and thus be capable of creative thinking and productive enterprise. In course of time, these highly qualified engineers could assume responsibility for all major designs, fabrication and construction and thereby save this country from undue dependence on foreign countries for know-how, equipment, machinery and personnel, particularly in vital fields. Post-graduate courses in various branches of engineering had, therefore to be introduced and increasing emphasis laid on engineering and scientific research.
>
> The pattern of the old curricula is also undergoing a change ...Since Independence, there has been in India an awareness of these world trends and a growing realization that without such advanced training and vigorous research in engineering and basic sciences, this country cannot catch up with and keep abreast of the technologically more advanced nations of the world. It is this realization that has underlined the importance and urgency of advanced training and research engineering. Rapid advance in national welfare will only be possible through the development of natural resources and industry. Such development will require in increasing measure a large resevoir of talent for high scientific thought...The first essential will be to create an atmosphere in which fundamental research can flourish. Fundamental research is the fountainhead of science, pure applied.
>
> To place advanced engineering education and research on a firm footing, it will be necessary to give the technical teacher and the research worker opportunity, social status, prestige and remuneration equivalent to those available in alternative professional or administrative services...
>
> According to an American authority, modern basic science and research in America came of age only in the 1930's. For more than a century till then it derived its intellectual sustenance from Europe. During the last 30 years, America has made tremendous strides in scientific and technological research. The history of scientific and technological research in the USSR is not very different. It came of age somewhat later, but in many fields, it already holds the first position. In this

age of productive partnership with nations of the world under the auspices of the United Nations, India with its enlightened policies, can look forward to its scientific and technological research attaining maturity and contributing to national welfare and world knowledge in the not distant future.

D. In Lieu of Conclusion

To add anything to the above would be like starting up an American jitterbug contest as the conclusion to a performance of a classical Karnatic *raga* on the Vina. However, such a conclusion is not inevitable. America and the USSR—and we might add, many other sections of the arbitrary divisions of humanity according to arbitrary geographic lines—are not only just *growing* up. They are *opening* up. There is much more possibility now of open inter-communication between "East" and "West", between new and old, between timid and bold, between materialisms, and idealisms, Indian, Chinese, Byzantine-Russian, Islamic, Judeo-Christian in the western mode, and modern secular-western and modern universal-secular philosophies, etc., etc., than there ever was before in the history of mankind. It is hoped that the philosophers, if they must remain in their 'ivory-towers'—and there is a use for 'ivory towerism' also in an age which is becoming pathologically anxious and even jittery about everything from electric toothbrushes to sputniks to Mars and on around the sun in a comet-like orbit—will at least in the future learn enough languages so that when they turn on their halicrafter radios, they can at least distinguish between modern Japanese jazz and classical liturgical music, and like wise between more cheap propaganda and genuine scientific information and above all, between cheap murder mysteries and good science fiction.

In other words, although Science, East, West, North, South (and also in the middle!) old and new and in the future, does demand a large measure of *objectivity*. I doubt very much if Science will be able to eliminate subjectivity entirely. There is at least one scientist, Agnes Robertson Arber (*The Mind and The Eye, A Biologist's Standpoint*, Cambridge, 1954), who does not even think this would be in the least desirable. She is genuinely open-minded. She is not dogmatic about the myth of "scientific" Greece or the destiny of the 'scientific' west to dominate the 'mystics' of the 'Orient'. She, as philosopher, is just as much at home with Plotinus and St. Augustine and with Mencius, Suzuki, the medieval mystics of Europe and Bertrand Russell and latest in everything. She would probably disagree with M. N. Roy's zealous espousal of materialism as necessary to the advancement of science as vehemently as she would reject the notion that the Universe is an egg that hasn't hatched yet! And, as a matter of fact, all over the world, we trust we shall soon, provided that we can scientifically, prevent another war of annihilation, see and hear of more like her all over the world. We cannot adequately report on this book in this paper, but it might be an easy not to rest on, if we conclude with the following characteristics observations from her book (p. 67) :

> The 'correspondence' doctrine of truth seems at first sight to be a simple copy-book maxim, easy to apply; but its apparent simplicity is due to its deficiencies. One of these is that it emphasizes unduly the objective side of truth, thus suggesting a hard-and fast separation between the object and the perceiving subject. The subjective aspect of truth cannot, however, be ignored with impunity. No truth is truth for any man until he has rethought it for himself; it has, indeed, been argued that truth is not truth at all, except in so far as it is the living experience of a mind. The Chinese philosopher Mencius—who was almost exactly contemporary with the first great European botanist, Theophrastus—voiced the same idea when he said, 'Having in-itself is called true".

That "having-in-itself" is not too far removed from Kant's ding-an-sich; it is had until there is transformation imageless; it is Reality. And *That Thou Are*, O Svetaketu !—believe it or not !

Nevertheless, in the 20th century the Realist tradition tends to predominate everywhere. China, and India and the West together have awakened, and are no longer languishing in medieval obscurantisms; and, although there are survivals of the former eras, and, indeed, there are survivals of medievalisms in all cultures—and not all of them foolish or obsolete—these are receiving decreasing support. As economic and social conditions—thanks to the development of the social sciences and to the works of the United Nations commission on decolonization—improve, it is to be expected that the other sciences will again gain their proper place after a period of cold storage as a result of European imperialism, both in the minds of philosophers and in the marvellings of the masses.

APPENDIX

Table of Pramanas (Means of valid Knowledge)

	pratyaksa (sense perception)	anumana (inference)	sabda (verbal testimony)	anupalabdhi (non-perception, non-cognition)	upamana (analogy)	arthapatti (implication)
Carvaka	**	0	0	0	0	0
Jaina	*	*	*	+	+	(confusion) see Tatia*
Sunyavada (madhyamika)	*	*(+)	0	0	0	0
Vogacara (Vijnanavada)	*	+	0	0	0	0
Sautrantika	*	+	0	0	0	0
Vaibhasika	*	+	0	0	0	0
Nyaya	*	**	*	0	*(+)	+
Vaisesika	*	+	+	+	+	0
Sankhya	*	*	*	0	0	0
Prabhakara	*	0	**	0	*	*
Kumarila Bhatta	*	*	**	*	*	**
Sankara	0	0	*	+	+	+

Key : *=Yes, +=Qualified, 0=No.

*Tatia, Nathmal, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, Banaras, Jaina Cultural Society, 1951.

III

The Is|Ought Gap and the Open Question Argument

Thomas A. Wilson

In *Principia Ethica*, G. E. Moore claims that ethics is primarily concerned with two kinds of questions. The first question is what things are good in themselves; the second is to what things these are related as effects. The second question presupposes the first, and in order to answer the prior question a clear notion of good in its moral use must be obtained.[1]

"The good" refers to that which is or is thought to be the ultimate goal of the human being. Good without the definite article is "...a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought... (p.21)" It is also "...a property of certain natural objects..." yet "... 'good' itself is not a natural property (p. 41)."

Moore equates "indefinable" with "unanalysable" (p. 17). For a term to be definable or analysable it must not merely have a meaning, an account of how the term is used, but must also be subject to a description of the real nature of the object or notion denoted by the word or term under analysis, and this can only happen if the object or notion in question is complex (p. 7). His example of such a definable term is "horse." A horse has many different properties and qualities which can in principle be enumerated and which stand in determinate relations to each other, these relations too being enumeratable (p. 7).

"Yellow" is his example of a simple term, for yellow cannot be explained to anyone who does not already know it (p. 7), and it is a notion out of which definitions are composed (p.8). In the following passage, Moore claims that good, like yellow, is simple and indefinable :

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[1] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1959; First edition appeared in 1903), p. 27. Further references to this work are contained in brackets in the body of my text.

> 'Good' ...if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word. The most important sense of 'definition' is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense 'good' has no definition because it is simple and has no parts (p. 9).

Before considering his notion of a non-natural property and his reason that good is simple, I wish to point out that Moore's notion of definition is not indisputable. In the *Euthyphro*, at 6d-e, the Platonic Socrates seeks an ideal or standard by which all unholy things are unholy and all holy things are holy. Euthyphro asserts that what is pleasing to the gods is holy and what is not pleasing to the gods is unholy (6e-7a). The dialogue ends in failure, however, for neither Socrates nor Euthyphro is able to determine whether what pleases the gods does so because of its holiness or whether that which is holy acquires its sacred character because it pleases the gods.[2] The failure of Socrates and Euthyphro to arrive at an adequate notion of holiness stems from the indefinability of the term. Indefinability, therefore, is not necessarily a mark of clarity.

As to Moore's characterization of good as a non-natural property, he develops no special sense of property and so presumably has in mind the same meaning as Aristotle :

> A 'property' (*idion*) is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a property of man to be capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he be capable of learning grammar, he is a man.[3]

Good is a non-natural property, in Moore's view, because it cannot be imagined as existing by itself in time On the other hand, a natural property is one of the parts of which an object is composed and is not a mere predicate attached to the object (p. 41). Later in his career, Moore modified this view to say that a property is natural if its employment describes the object, and good is incapable of being descriptive when it is used in the moral sense.[4]

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[2] Plato, *Euthyphro*, after Lane Cooper in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961; Fifth printing, 1969). 169 185. The Stephanus page references are in the body of my text.

[3] Aristotle, *Topica*, after W. A. Pickard-Cambridge in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York : Random House, 1941; Twenty-third printing, 1971), Book I, Chapter, 5, 102a17 21, p. 191.

Moore's earlier distinction of properties into natural and non-natural is inconsistent with Aristotle's account, for Aristotle's example quoted above refers to an activity which will, but does not yet, exist in time. An infant, for example, if he or she is normally healthy, is capable of learning grammar, but usually will not exercise this capacity in the form of fully articulated speech until the second or third year of life. Moore could reply that this capacity, as distinguished from its exercise, is now in being in the infant. If this is true, though, Moore would have to say either that this capacity is non-natural in, say, the six-month old infant, for it is not yet discernible and so not yet a part of the infant, or that this capacity, if natural, can only be said to be a property during or after the second or third year of life, for it is only then that the capacity to learn grammar can be attributed to any given human being as a component part.

Moore's later view, that a natural property involves a description of the object asserted to possess it, while it eliminates the difficulty with dispositional terms troubling his earlier view, begs the question of whether good is a natural or non-natural property by assuming without showing that if a term is normative it cannot at the same time be descriptive. Even if Moore is right on this point, however, he is faced with the problem of saying that good in its moral use is normative and that it is a property, albeit a aon-natural one. The contradiction in saying these two things is that a property describes its subject whereas, in Moore's view, a non-natural attribute does not do so.

Although I have implied that normative and descriptive terms are not mutually exclusive, I believe that there is an Is/Ought gap and that Moore's open question argument is correct, though not for the reasons he thinks. The justification of these conclusions is the burden of the rest of this essay.

I shall consider two positions which I take to be the dialectical extremes of the Is/Ought controversy. One position is that the descriptive or ontological use of good is primary and that the moral use of good is constructed from this primary use by analogy. The second position is that the moral or normative use of good is completely autonomous (not derived from or grounded in one's ontological picture of the world) but that the moral good may be actualized in the world,

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[4] G. E. Moore, "A Reply to My Critics," in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois : The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., 1942; Third edition, 1968), p. 591.

Neither of these two approaches, in my view, succeeds in relating is and ought. There is a third option, however, based on the insights of Eastern thought, which offers the hope of bridging the Is/Ought gap. Now for the discussion itself.

The naturalistic fallacy argument of Moore is, I think, mistaken. He states it as follows :

> It may be true that all things which are good are *also* something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not 'other,' but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness [p. 10].

The naturalistic fallacy argument is shown to be correct, Moore thinks, by the open question argument, which holds that if good is defined as anything other than itself, such as pleasure, the object of desire, or that which we (human beings) desire to desire, it may always be significantly asked if that other thing is good [p. 15].

Underlying both the naturalistic fallacy and open question arguments is the notion that good in its moral sense is logically prior to the instrumental sense of good, the sense in which good means "conducive to an end," such as the goodness of a knife for cutting, a baseball pitcher for striking out opposing batters, and the like. Suppose, however, that one adopts a Thomistic perspective and maintains that a sense of good other than the normative is primary. What happens to the naturalistic fallacy and open question arguments then ? To discover the answer, an examination of such a theory is in order.

Robert W. Schmidt holds that every action is undertaken for an end. The goodness of any action, in any sense of goodness, derives from the goodness of its end. The end, however, is not good in the same sense in which an action is good. The goodness of the end is what he calls "ontological goodness." By this he means that the end is good because it exists and can contribute something to another existent being that is not perfect—perfect here meaning complete.[5]

Ethics is a special context in the sense that its end and actions are particular. The end of ethics is particular not in the sense that it is one end among others, but rather in the sense that it is the ultimate or overall end of man, for by reason of this end a person is held to be good in an unqualified sense—a good person as opposed to a good runner, a good surgeon, or what have you.[6]

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[5] Robert W. Schmidt, "Moral Good and Ontological Good," *The New Scholasticism* LII (Summer 1978), 421-427, p. 422.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 424.

In order for the end of ethics, namely the good in the moral sense, to be ultimate, it must be the highest or greatest attainable by man, not subordinated to any greater good. The highest and most comprehensive capability in the human being is the intellect. The intellect can apprehend universal characteristics of things, or being. The end of ethics, therefore, must be intellectual and have being [7]

The goodness of actions is characterized as follows in Schmidt's Thomistic perspective :

> The only end determinative of moral goodness is man's ultimate end. An Action conducive to this end is morally good. An action deviant from it, contrary to it, or a barrier in its way, is morally evil. *This* end does justify means to it; i.e., the actions that lead to it derive their moral goodness from its goodness and are made good by this positive relation to it. As a consequence, there can be no question of a morally evil action being made good by the fact of its being used as a means to man's ultimate end. Any action that is effective in attaining man's ultimate end is by that fact morally good. In this context, and in this one alone, it is true that 'the end justifies the means.' Moral goodness depends upon and *is* judged by the goodness of this end.[8]

The end of ethics is ontologically good. The goodness of moral actions, actions conducive to this end, is derivative in the sense that it can be understood only as being dependent on the end.

On Schmidt's view, the nrturalistic fallacy cannot arise, for good in the moral sense is defined by means of good in the ontological sense. Similarly, the open question argument cannot arise, for it cannot be significantly asked whether that which is conducive to the ultimate end of man is conducive to that end if the end itself is good ontologically. The limitations of Schmidt's view can be seen in an examination of the Is/Ought gap, which originated in the following passage of Hume :

> In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is* and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.[9]

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[7] *Ibid*., p. 424.

[8] *Ibid*., p. 425.

[9] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888; Reprint, 1949; Work first published in 1739), pp. 469 670.

Hume does not say in this passage whether it is the appearance of the copulations "ought" and "ought not" in the conclusions or in the premises which surprise him. If he is surprised at their occurrence in the premises, then what I take him to be implying is that this occurrence requires that ought or ought not be a conclusion of some previous stage of a moral theory in order to be justified in its use as a premise in a later stage. If, on the other hand, it is its use in a conclusion, when it has not appeared in any of the premises of the present argument or as a conclusion in any previous argument of the present moral theory, which surprises him, then his explicit statement, that it is inconceivable how this new relation can serve as a deduction from those entirely different from it, refers directly to such a conclusion.

This seeming inconceivability of the deduction of ought or ought not applies to any given argument of all systems of morality hitherto met with by Hume. All of the premises and/or conclusions from which this mysterious deduction is made are either propositions which establish the being of a God or propositions which concern human affairs. If one assumes, as I do, that propositions which concern human affairs are propositions which characterize actions, then propositions which characterize the concept of good *per se*, whether these characterizations be moral or ontological, are outside the scope of Hume's analysis.[10]

Schmidt's Thomistic perspective has significant implications for the Is/Ought gap of Hume. If the moral goodness of actions depends on the ontological goodness of the ultimate end of man in the sense that only insofar as an action conduces to this end can it be labeled morally good, then the quality of the action depends on the quality of the end toward which it is directed and the Is/Ought gap is closed The gap is closed not by means of derivation considered as a conclusion deduced from premises, however, but rather through derivation by means of analogy, a family resemblance one might say, between the end of man and actions which lead in the direction of this end.

The Is/Ought gap is not yet closed, though, for even Schmidt is right (and his position is consistent, at least) there still remains the problem of ascertaining the ultimate end of man. Schmidt's position yields some attributes of this end, but it produces no definition, no specification, of this end. A definition and a demonstration of the correctness of the definition offered are the two items which, if successful, would effectively close the gap.

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[10] For a comprehensive survey of current discussion of the is/ought question, see Kai Nielsen, "On Deriving an Ought From an Is: A Retrospective Look," *The Review of Metaphysics* XXXII (March 1979), 487 514.

Many such definitions have been offered throughout the history of ethics. Happiness as a life in accordance with reason for Aristotle, salvation for the Christian tradition, and the beatific vision of God as a specification of this salvation for Aquinas are some of the more famous examples. Purported demonstrations of the ultimate end of man, however, have so far been unsuccessful. The reason for this lack of success is not attributable to is and ought being different in kind as concepts but is, rather, attributable to the limits of human knowledge.

With Kant, I believe that knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience. The functioning of the five human senses is rendered into cognitively significant information, or intuitions, by means of the "pure forms of all sensible intuition,"[11] space and time. As forms, space and time are properties of the mind rather than of objects and events in the world. Space and time are forms of *intuition*, however, because all objects are perceived or imagined as being in space and all events are perceived or imagined as occurring in time. Space yields to the human consciousness percepts such as color, shape, here, there, and the like; time produces an intimate ordering of such percepts into notions such as now, before, after, slow, fast, and so on. This ordering is intimate in the sense that it is experienced as opposed to being merely thought or concluded.

The concepts of the understanding, the categories, are the forms by which thought organizes percepts and their orderings into objects and events. The most important of these concepts is that of cause and effect, for it is this category which provides universality and necessity in the relation of subject and predicate in any causal proposition, and universality and necessity, as properties of the category of cause and effect, are not intuited.

Reason, the third major division of the mind in Kant's system, is the faculty which organizes propositions or judgements, the fruits of the categories, into systems of knowledge such as science, history, theology, and so on. Just as the understanding contains twelve categories, so the reason contains three ideas: the soul, the world, and God. These ideas are part of reason because, by organizing propositions into systems of thought, reason tends to make a totality or completeness out of a collection of propositions which may be either infinite or indefinite, but which in any case cannot be known to be complete. Completeness in any system of thought, e.g. physics, would require that each and every proposition belonging to that system be not merely statable but stated, and it cannot be asserted beyond doubt that all the propositions of physics, for example, have already been articulated.

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[11] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929; 1965 edition; First and second editions appeared in 1781 and 1787), A 39, B 56, p.80.

When reason acts on categorical propositions (e g., All A is B) and relates them to the thinking subject, the result is the idea of the soul. When reason acts on hypothetical propositions (e.g., If A then B) and relates them to appearances, the result is the idea of the world. Finally, concerning this process, when reason acts on disjunctive propositions (e.g., Either A or B, but not both) and relates them to all objects of thought in general, the result is the idea of God. Although Kant defends the notions of the soul, the world, and God on other grounds, his point here is that *as ideas of reason* they are illusory. These notions are illusory because knowledge, properly so called, applies not to things as they are or might be in themselves, independently of the mind that knows them, but rather to appearances; that is, objects and events as they are, or might be, *experienced* by human beings. Thus the understanding rather than the reason is the realm of knowledge.

My purpose in adumbrating Kantian epistemology as set forth in his *Critique of Pure Reason* is to point out that any notion of the ultimate end of man must be like Kant's ideas of reason in the sense that this end cannot be related to objects of possible experience because it contains no intuitions. That this must be the case is indicated by the notion of ultimacy, which seems to require a complete, finished life for the determination of this end by any given moral agent. Also, if the ultimate end of man is good in the ontological sense, as Schmidt maintains, the transcendence of this end, its existence without any accompanying intuitions, becomes explicit.

It can now be seen why Moore's open question argument remains open; why the Is/Ought gap is not closed. Concerning any proposal for the ultimate end of man, it may be significantly asked whether it is good because the ultimate end of man cannot be known, in Kant's technical sense of knowledge. Therefore, there is always room for doubt as to whether wisdom, happiness, virtue, or any other proposed specification of the ultimate end of man is good. The problem with Schmidt's Thomistic perspective is that although his argument is compelling if one considers the ultimate end of man purely *formally*, it is subject to the Kantian objection given above once a *content* for this end is specified.

The Is/Ought gap is not closed because the ontological component, the Is side of the gap cannot be given a specific content beyond all possibility of doubt. Since the relation between is and ought is either identical with or analogous to that between end and means, the inability to specify a content for the Is side results not only in the Is/Ought gap, but also in the experiential emptiness of the Is/Ought relation.

Kant himself attempted to solve this problem by making good in its moral sense a manner of acting, willing according to universalizable maxims, rather than the object of willing.[12] The difficulty with this position is that since knowing must, for Kant, be based on intuition, and since maxims of action cannot be based on intuition if they are to be universal (for each intuition is a particular), either the determination of maxims of action is not knowledge, or moral knowledge is a different kind of knowledge from knowledge of the natural world. Kant chooses the latter conclusion, but in order to make the case that moral knowledge and natural knowledge are different in kind he is required to invoke an activity of God.

Kant's claim that the experience of human moral choices is evidence for the existence of God, the moral argument for God, is well enough known, but his claim that the existence of God is a necessary assumption for moral knowledge is so rarely commented on that it bears repeating here :

> ...[N]ot only since I am justified in thinking of my existence as that of a noumenon in an intelligible world but also since I have in the moral law a pure intellectual determining ground of my causality (in the sensuous world), it is not impossible that the morality of intention should have a necessary relation as cause to happiness as an effect in the sensuous world; but this relation is indirect, mediated by an intelligible Author of Nature.[13]

The Author of nature is brought in to provide the individual moral agent with the material content of moral knowledge, just as intuitions provide the material content of natural knowledge. In making this argument, Kant the moral philosopher subjects himself, perhaps unwittingly, to the criticisms of Kant the epistemologist. Kant fails to show how maxims of action formulated by the reason are any less illusory than the soul, the world, and God as ideas of reason. To use the presence in the reason of an idea of reason, which in his own characterization is illusory, in order to ground moral maxims; that is, to make them applicable to the empirical world, is circular in the light of his moral argument for God and empty of content in the light of his view of human cognition as set forth in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Furthermore, to posit the cause of moral maxims as existing in the noumenal realm, the realm of things in themselves, and its effects as existing in the phenomenal realm, the realm of nature, fails to show how cause and effect, as a category of the understanding, can have even a partial employment in the noumenal realm. Kant's attempted solution to the problems entailed by the Is/Ought relation thus fails.

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[12] ——, *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. Lewis White Beck Indiana-polis : The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956; Original appeared in 1788), 60, p. 62.

[13] *Ibid.*, 114-115, p. 119.

Is there no way to bridge the Is/Ought gap, even in principle? My answer is that there is not, within the realm of natural knowledge as understood in the Kantian sense. There is another kind of purported knowledge which could, if it is valid, bridge the gap. It is religious or mystical knowledge and is knowledge only by analogy with the Kantian sense of the term. Religious or mystical knowledge, as distinguished from religious belief and practice, is an awareness of ultimacy not mediated by intuitions, concepts, or ideas. It can be acquired only by experience and cannot be completely expressed but rather must be hinted at or inferred from its soteriological concomitants in ordinary experience. Its articulation understandably varies widely, but the assertion of religious knowledge is common to the five major world religions : Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.

A major difference among these religions is that in the two non-Semitic traditions, Buddhism and Hinduism, religious knowledge is affirmed as part of their respective orthodoxies. On the other hand, in the Semitic (in origin or inspiration) religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, religious knowledge, though not always or necessarily heretical, is not affirmed, or at least not stressed, as part of their respective orthodoxies. Even in these orthodoxies, however, the notion of a transcendent being (the Lord of Hosts, God the Father, or Allah) revealing itself in the phenomenal realm, the realm of history, is sufficiently mysterious to qualify as religious knowledge if this revelation is experienced by the knower.[14]

Not having had such an experience, I cannot pronounce upon the possibility of religious knowledge. If such knowledge can be attained, however, it is the only way, for one who accepts a Kantian view of natural knowledge, of bridging the Is/Ought gap and of answering Moor's still open question, though the answer would have to be experienced rather than completely expressed.

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[14] For an interesting starting point for the consideration of religious knowledge. see Ninian Smart, "Mysticism, History of," in Volume 5, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards *et al.* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), 419 429.

IV

Religious Humanism of Dr. Mohammad Iqbal

V. C. Narayana Das

Ever since the European Renaissance humanistic trends have made their appearance in philosophy in various ways and means. As a result, today we find a number of humanistic philosophies, such as Pragmatic Humanism, Scientific Humanism, Secular Humanism, Marxian Humanism, etc. Man's over-confidence in his reason and in the power of modern science and technology had often led him to reject or explain away the religious dimension of his reality. Consequently we find many of the humanistic systems look upon religion as an obsolete phenomenon. However, there has also been a number of thinkers who were fully convinced about the importance of religion in the context of man's realization of his *summum bonum*. Thus attempts have been made both in the West and in the East to formulate humanistic philosophies rooted and grounded in religious values. The philosophy of Dr. Mohammad Iqbal is a typical example of this trend.

Dr. Iqbal could rightly be regarded as a prophet of self-affirmation of man in an age which tends to explain away the worth, dignity and significance of human reality as a unique individual. It is a strange fact that, in spite of humanity's marvelous adventures into the mysteries of the universe and the glorious achievements in the fields of science and technology, the individual man finds himself to have been rendered insignificant. The scientific explanation of human reality quite often tends to reduce man to the level of a machine, depriving him of his essential freedom and dynamism. Iqbal was fully convinced that religion was the only force which could become the medium or man's salvation. But unfortunately, today the same religion which was the source of inspiration and the trusted custodian of his higher values for ages, seems to withdraw its consolation. On the one hand traditional beliefs are seriously questioned by the modern scientific culture, and on the other hand, religion itself seems to have robbed man of his unique individuality, and freedom. When God alone is considered as the absolute reality, man's existence turns out to be apparent. The idea of man as a free unique being is inconsistent with an absolute pantheism. The absolute idealism in the West and the vedantic monism in India, according to Iqbal, exemplify this trend. Islam was no exception to this widespread tendency. Thus some of the Sufi Saints, in their own way, developed a pantheistic philosophy of Islam, as in the case of Ibnul Arabi and his followers who made a vigorous attempt to demonstrate that the ultimate meaning of the Unity of God preached by prophet Muhammed is nothing else than the absolute identity of God and the world.

Iqbal's problem had taken its origin from this sad state of affairs. After completion of his formal studies, his chief concern was to discover the real cause behind the maladies that beset the various Eastern countries like India, Afganistan, China and Persia. He realized that the root of the whole problem could be traced to the various systems of life negating religious thought in the East. He found these to be philosophies which exalts such negative qualities like self-negation, self-abasement self renunciation and slavish mentality. They tend to demoralize man by teaching him to escape from the realities of life rather than challenging and guiding him to conquer obstacles and to live cheerfully and successfully. Instead of inspiring man to cultivate richer life and higher values in his earthly existence itself, they pretend to prepare him for a glorious life after death. Iqbal says that almost all major religious thoughts originated in India are essentially ascetic in nature. Just as Nietzsche saw the degenerated christianity to be the root cause of the evils of European man, Iqbal accuses the self-negating philosophies of India to be responsible for her tragedies.

In fact, according to Iqbal, Islam is a religion which emphasizes practical and dynamic aspects of human life. But when it came into contact with the Greek, Indian and such other pantheistic elements, Islam too lost its purity and power. As a result of this the religion of Islam which was essentially monotheistic has been misrepresented and misinterpreted as a pantheistic ideology by a number of Sufi thinkers. Thus the transcendental personal God as revealed in Quran has been substituted by a pantheistic deity. The logical outcome of such a misinterpretation is that God alone exists. From this point of view, human life turns out to be a mere illusion leaving nothing worth striving for. A religious philosophy of this kind can ultimately serve only to create a mass of impotent and inactive men.

Thus Iqbal laments, "far from reintegrating the forces of average man's inner life, and thus preparing him for participation in the march of history. it has taught him a false renunciation and made him perfectly contented with his ignorance and spiritual thraldom".[1]

Having thus discovered once for all the cause of the maladies of his fellow men, Iqbal sets forth to communicate the true remedy in accordance with his own vision. The various aspects of his philosophy are found in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, and in the two volumes of *Letters* (*Iqbal Nama*). However, it was primarily through his poetical works that Iqbal tried to communicate his message. *Asrar-i-Khudi* (*Secrets of the Self*), *Rameez i-Bekhudi* (*Mysteries of Selflessness*), *Javed Nama* (*To Javed*), *Zabur-i-Ajam* (*The Testament of Iran*) and *Baug-i-Dara* (*The Caravan Bell*) are the most prominent among his poetical works.

According to Iqbal, "it is only by rising to a fresh vision of his origin and future, his whence and whither, that man will evantually triumph over a society motivated by an in-human competition, and a civilization which has lost its spiritual unity by its inner conflict of religious and political values."[2] One must first of all realize his own worth, individuality and uniqueness. It must be affirmed that life is real and not mere illusion. Man is not an illusion or a fragment of some universal entity. It is only by being convinced of the importance of self-hood (*Khudi*) and by leading a life of self-affirmation, self development and self-expression that a man can rise above the ills that have been caused by the various factors such as pantheistic religion and scientism. Iqbal emphatically declares that "the moral and religious ideal of man is not self-negation, but self affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique."[3]

In fact, the whole philosophy of Iqbal is based upon his view of individual self (Ego) as a centre of will and energy. For him, the whole universe is a dynamic reality with a life of its own. The world apprehended by senses and intellect tend to reduce it into a static object. But, as Bergson had pointed out, reality as such could be rightly grasped only by intuition. Intuition it to us as a continually changing, developing and growing entity. Further, according to Iqbal, there is a perpetual rise of selfhood in the whole universe. Thus he says that every object possesses an individuality, and that each of them occupies a definite status in the scale of life in accordance with the degree in which it develops its individuality and gains mastery over its environment. "What then is life ?" Iqbal answers the question for us: "It is individual: its highest form, so far, is the Ego (Khudi) in which the individual becomes a self-contained exclusive centre."[4] Sharply disagreeing with the English Neo-Hegelians Iqbal asserts, "All life is individual, there is no such things as universal life. God himself is an individual. He is the most unique individual."[5] Individuality attains its highest development in man and becomes personality.

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[1] Sir Muhammad Iqbal : *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Delhi, 1975, p. 187.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 188.

[3] Muhammad Iqbal : *Secrets of Self*, translated by R.A. Nicholson, New Delhi, 1978, p 16.

The existence of individual self (Ego) according to Iqbal is an indubitable fact. His argument in support of the reality of self is very similar to that of Descartes and points to the fact that even when one feels his self to be an illusion, he can immediately reflect upon the truth that it is he who has the illusion and as such his own self must be real in order to doubt its own nature. This self is the principle which organizes all the activities and experiences of the individual, into a single unity. Iqbal rejects every view that holds body as a principle which opposes soul. Both body and soul, according to him belong to the same system, and they are interrelated and interdependent aspects of the individual being. He tells us that this is the clear teaching of Quran.

Iqbal points out that Quran emphasizes the uniqueness and individuality of man. It reveals three significant facts about man.[6]

(i) man is chosen of God
(ii) man, with all his faults, is meant to be the representative of God on earth
(iii) man is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril.

It is quite clear, therefore, that all ideologies which try to explain away the reality of man and his physical environment are based upon false assumptions. Iqbal criticizes a number of Islamic thinkers also for their lack of understanding about the true nature of man and his universe. The material world is there as a real environment, but it is no hindrance to the realization of human ends. It is rather the medium for the self to realize its manifold potentialities. The ego has to be confronted with a non-ego, because it is only through this confrontation that the self grows and develops. Iqbal sees life as a forward assimilative movement, and as such it removes all barriers in the way of its onward march. The essence of life, for him, is the continual creation of desires and ideals. As the *Secrets of the Self* reveals,

> "We live by forming ideals,
> We glow with the sunbeams of desire !"[7]

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 15.

[6] Muhammad Iqbal : *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 95.

[7] *Secrets of the Self*, II: 321-322.

The self produces out of itself all physical and mental capacities by which it equips itself to overcome all obstacles on its way to the realization of maximum freedom and development.[8]

While emphasizing the uniqueness and intrinsic worth of this Ego, Iqbal does not forget the fact that it is finite. Thus he points out three implications of human finitude as revealed in the Quran. They are as follows :

(i) The ego has a beginning in time, and did not pre-exist its emergence in the spatio-temporal order.

(ii) There is no possibility of return to this earth

(iii) Finitude is not a misfortune. On the contrary it points to the irreplaceable singleness of the individuality with which the finite ego will approach God who is the infinite Ego.[9]

Iqbal points out that, in spite of his finitude, man has a glorious destiny according to Quran. Man is destined for freedom and immortality. Partly free and partly determined by his enviornment, he attains more and more freedom by the removal of obstacles in his way to self-realization. Fuller freedom is attained by approaching God who is absolutely free individual.

The development of human personality consists in his gradual progress in self possession, uniqueness and intensity of his activities as an individual self. The ideal of Islam is perfect manhood endowed with freedom and immortality. Every man is a candidate for personal immortality and freedom. The path leading to the realization of this ideal is a life of faith and action. The secret of the self consists not in self-renunciation and self abasement, but in the dynamic self-affirmation through the forward assimilative movement of the Ego. Though man is physically and spiritually a self-contained centre, he is not yet a complete individual. The degree of his individuality depends upon his nearness to God. One who comes nearest to God is the completest person. But this does not mean that he is finally absorbed in God. On the contrary, such a person absorbs God into himself. Iqbal says that this goal can be achieved by developing the following positive qualities.

1. Love (Ishq) :

Love has been defined by Iqbal as the desire to absorb and assimilate. Hence love for an individual means the assimilation and absorption of the qualities in that person. In this sense, the love for God means the creation of the attributes of God in oneself. The individual becomes more and more free and unique by his devotion to Him who is absolutely free and unique individual. Thus the highest form of love is the creation of higher values and ideals, and constant endeavour to realize them.

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[8] "Nose, hand, brain, eye, and ear,
Thought, imagination, feeling, memory and understanding
All these are weapons devised by life for
self preservation.
In its ceaseless struggle"
Ibid, II: 303-306.

[9] *Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam*, p. 116.

2. Supreme indifference to the rewards (fakr) :

In the usual sense *fakr* means poverty. Thus *fakir* is one who lives on the aims and favours of others. But Iqbal uses it in the sense of unselfish actions or *nishkamakarma*. The *fakir* works for a noble cause without any expectation or regard for the reward it can offer. He is not concerned about the values of ordinary men, such as wealth and fame. This quality enables the individual to work for the good of others. According to Iqbal the only goal of a perfect man or *fakir* is the conquest of time and space, i.e., the attainment of highest degree of freedom and immortality.

3. Courage

The progress of the ego depends upon the courageous encounter with difficulties. It is courage which enables man to strengthen his character and manifest his inner potentialities. A courageous man would strongly believe in his own standard of values even when things go wrong and all fellowmen become antagonistic.

4. Tolerance :

Tolerance for the views and manners of other people is an essential quality of a strong personality of high order. While tolerance exalts personality and brings peace and happiness, intolerance leads to quarrels and degeneration. "The principle of ego-sustaining deed" says Iqbal, "is respect for the Ego in myself as well as in others."

5. Lawful Acquisition :

This quality urges man to live only on things and ideas acquired by one's own efforts and struggles. In the *Secrets of the self* we are told that God loves a man who earns his living, but

> "Woe to him that accepts bounty from anothers table.
> And lets his neck be bent with benefits."[10]

6. Creative and original activity

Iqbal believes that everyman is potential for creative, dynamic and original activity, One's progress depends upon the realization of this inherent capacity. Imitation obstructs the realization of individual potentialities and render the man inactive. Further, it is the creative potentiality which is the divine element in man, and which raises him above all other creatures. Iqbal, therefore equates those who ignore this aspect of their personality with infidels.

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[10] *Secrets of the Self* IV: 467-468.

While trying to cultivate these positive qualities, one must also take care to avoid all counter influences which block the strengthening and development of his personality. Fear, dependence on others, slavishness and all forms of pride in racial or familiar superiority are are real hindrances to the enhancement of human personality.

According to the *Secrets of the Self*, the evolution of self towards its perfection passes through three stages, viz., obedience to the divine law, self-control and divine vicegerency. Obedience of the divine law begins at a stage when it is done in a mechanical and unconscious manner. Gradually one began to do it consciously leading to the stage of self-control. Through life of self control, the ego progress towards the stage of perfection, when one could serve as God's representative on earth. Iqbal calls this stage as the stage of supermanhood which according to him is the "Goal of life's caravan."[11]

Iqbal gives a very important place for society in the evolution of man. For, according to him, self development is possible only in association with other selves. The man who aims at perfection must work in cooperation with others and endeavour to bring about the kingdom of God on earth.

It is noticeable that Iqbal, through his emphasis upon the reality and importance of the individual, presents us with an integral philosophy of man in his own unique way. As a staunch defender of man's central position in the scheme of things he is a great humanist of the present century. But unlike many Western humanistic thinkers, Iqbal was fully convinced of the spiritual or transcendental dimension of human reality. Hence we may, perhaps, regard his philosophy as a spiritual or religious humanism which in many ways resembles to the True Humanism as expounded by Jacques Maritain in the West.[12]

The superman or perfect man (Momin) of Iqbal's conception reminds us of the superman of Nietzsche. But the spiritual and social considerations of Iqbal's perfect man seems to have no place in Nietzsche's superman. Iqbal can never share Nietzsche's atheism and contempt for the ordinary man. He does reject the herd morality and ascetic self-renunciation. But the essential message of Iqbal to the contemporary world consists in his challenge for a dynamic self realization through an active affirmation of one's own self in perfect submission to the will of God.

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[11] "Man kind are the cornfield and thou the harvest,
Thou art the goal of life's caravan."
Secrets of the Self IX: 956-957.

[12] Jacques Maritain. *True Humanism*, London, 1954.

V

On the Logico-Methodological Analysis of Research on the History of Genetics

Svezha Valova-Apostolova

It seems it would not be out of place to emphasize as regards historiographic research in genetics that it is extremely important nowadays to promote by all means the intensive development of the logico-methodological analysis of the phenomena, concerning inheritance and heredity. These phenomena comprise two major periods of development—a prescientific period (before Mendel) and a scientific period (after Mendel), throughout which genetics evolved as an independent science. The scientific period is believed to consist of two sub-periods—the first one is classical genetics, including Mendelism and the chromosome theory of heredity, while the second one is the period of contemporary molecular genetics. The period before Mendel has been called pre-scientific in this paper since it is believed that only after Mendel did the knowledge of heredity become consistently scientific. Naturally, the author is aware of the arbitrary character of splitting in two periods (a pre-scientific and a

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1 The author is aware that varying definitions of one and the same term may be one of the sources of gaps in scientific communication. This issue has been so pressing that particular attention is centered on it in some publications (cf. Kvastad, N. Semantics in the Methodology of the History of Ideas. Journ. of the history of Id, Jan-March. 1977, v. XXXVIII, N 1; Berkov, V. F. Terminological Imprecisions as a source of problems in science. in 'The Logic of scientific research, Sverdlovsk, 1977 (printed in Russian). This paper, however will not discuss extensively terminological definitions, since it is assumed that certain solutions to the problem might be found in the text itself.

scientific one) any knowledge concerning living organisms. Here, however, our primary consideration centers on the definition of the nature of 'science'.

Beside other things, the approach in logico-methodological analysis that I have in mind should involve seeking out such regularities and laws, which are inherent to the development of scientific thought (and which no doubt exist).

Therefore, the following reasons should be taken into consideration :

The object of biological investigations are the living organisms. Let this object be called 'biological form of the movement of matter'. The object of genetic research—the leading science in the field of biology—(including some theoretical considerations of inheritance phenomena in the pre-scientific period) is part of this 'biological form'. It is the part concerning inheritance, heredity and variability phenomena. These phenomena should be regarded as objective and real, or they may be arbitrarily termed as 'reality of the first order'. The regularities, manifested by them are reflected in the principles, theories and laws of the science of genetics, while the interconnections, the properties and relations of these phenomena are revealed in the notions and categories of theoretical genetics, In that way, the 'primary theorization' of the 'first order reality' is being carried out.

On the other hand, the objects of research in logic[2], in philosophy or in the dialectics[3] of the history of genetics are in the principles, theories, laws and concepts, mentioned above. They may be arbitrarily called 'reality of the second order'.

In that way a theoretical validation of another theory is carried out, or in other words 'a secondary theorization' is under way, (which is sometimes called 'metatheorization'). Thus, it is the purpose of the theoretical background and the objectives set out by a theory to find out regularities and laws in the development of the theoretical knowledge concerning inheritance and heredity phenomena.

It must be particularly emphasized that we are not in the least trying to invent non-existent regularities and laws and impose them upon science; what we are concerned with, is to seek out and establish laws and regularities that do exist in the real and tangible development of scientific knowledge. To construct a priori artificial logical matrixes and partition the history of genetics in carefully pre-arranged pigeon holes is not our purpose at all.

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[2] The term logic is defined as the succession of interrelated and interacting phenomena.

[3] i.e. the science studying movement, development, mutation and inter-relation of objects.

The central importance of this analysis lies in the general theoretical and philosophical approach, carried by all of us, either explicitly or implicitly, which determines our point of view as scientists. This is the methodological role played by the viewpoint of the individual, which is actualized throughout the process of cognition and the reorganization of reality. There it plays a pronounced methodological part.

This point is proved by the results of the logical, methodological and philosophical general research, the larger part of which is in the field of research in physics. Some of the viewpoints can be found in the comparatively small amount of research in the history of biology, and some in the very scarce body of literature, dealing with the history of genetics.

Specialists in philosophy, logic, methodology and the dialectics of science are probably acquainted with the few publications containing some elements of logico-methodological analysis of genetic knowledge[4]. Such works will not be discussed in this paper.

What I would like to comment on is a recent paper by Garland Allen, named: Mendel and 19th century mechanistic materialism : Its influence on genetics in the twentieth century.[5] In this paper the author seems to have a specific approach towards the analysis of laws and he lays emphasis on the influence of mechanistic materialism on the development of corpuscular (atomistic) views on heredity and more particularly on Mendel's theory of inheritance.

In this connection I would like to argue that such justified inferences concerning the methodological influence of certain philosophic doctrines on the historical development of inheritance theories or on external influences should be accompanied and go hand in hand with scientific efforts to crystalize the innate development of genetic theories and their inherent mechanisms. Research should center on investigating the regularities and laws of development of science and their nature.

One should raise the issue whether these laws could be classified as pertaining to some general or specialized philosophical theory ? Could it be assumed, for instance, that it is justified to term the progress, the changes and the development of theoretical knowledge as the 'dialectics' of the inheritance theory and respectively name the development of genetics as the 'dialectics' of genetics ?

Why do I insist on the necessity of finding out and revealing these laws and regularities ? One of the reasons could be to find an answer to the problem of whether biology could be considered as an independent science (with the theory of genetics in the lead at present); or should it be reduced to the position of being considered as just another branch of physics,

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[4] e. g. cf. works by A. Kaplan, I. Frolov, M. Ruse, D. Hull, A. Rapoport, S. Pastushniy.

[5] The paper was presented for discussion at the International Symposium in memoriam of Gregor Mendel on 'The past, present and future of genetics', held in Brno in 1982.

Another reason is to rationalise the present stage of development of the theory of inheritance against the background of its complete theoretical and historical development, since the explanation of its present state of being can be found within the boundaries of its historical development.

Some other objectives of the research are the heuristic and the prognostic ones, since the gaining of further knowledge and accounting for certain regularities is a prerequisite for prognosticating the future development of genetics.

The points which are to be discussed in the paper are structured around two main issues. The structuring seems to be the result of a logico-methodological approach.

The first is connected with Mendel's theoretical work. In my opinion, his scientific work in the field of genetics has at least four aspects.

One of them is the empirical, the specialized scientific approach, in which the most essential point is the use of rigorous scientific experiments, with precisely defined conditions and control samples; then, follows the calculation out of a huge body of statistical data and the accumulation of numerous experimental data, which enabled him to work out reliable average values of the statistic analysis. Furthermore, his use of symbols should be pointed out as well.

The second aspect is the theoretical one. Its most prominent feature is the hypothetico-deductive method. Contrary to being pointless and haphazard, Mendel's experiments were always elaborately planned beforehand, according to a hypothesis devised or deduced from the context of the existing scientific thought at that time. (The context of that period pointed to the existence of discrete particles, a fact, corroborated by his own experience.). Other prominent features of the theoretical aspect are the clearly oriented investigations, which resulted in finding out the law of hybrid development.

It is this clearly oriented search, which gave rise to the idea of hereditary gifts and endowments by the method of idealization and by abstracting the common characteristic features out of a single phenomenon. In terms of present day scientific jargon, we can say that he had devised an ideal object, a theoretical construct, which had for its referent an object of real existence, in that particular instance the object was heredetary gifts and endowments.

The process of idealization in Mendel's work is a transition, a leap from the empirical to the theoretical, based on statistically worked out regularities. It should also be taken into consideration, that he introduced rigorous conditions for formulating and validating the laws established by himself and by other scholars. This is an important point for the problem of theory verification.

Thus, it can be argued that the laws and regularities, found out by Mendel are not purely empirical, but theoretical, as well. They are deduced from the empirical and expressed in terms of the symbols, used in theoretical writings.

The third aspect is the methodological one. It is connected with the prognostic strength of Mendel's theory, establishing the discrete nature of inheritance, contrary to Darwin's inheritance blending.

The atomistic nature of Mendel's philosophical and methodological hypothesis[6] can only be proved in an experimental way. As regards the problem of scientific experiments, Mendel explicitly maintained the view that it was impossible without rigorously conducted experiments and only through speculation to have found out the law of 'hybrid development'.

The fourth aspect deals with the influence of the spiritual and intellectual atmosphere throughout Mendel's perion, rich in various ideas and concepts, either fully or incompletely established on the range of his activities and particularly upon his work dedicated to establishing the scientific foundations of genetics.

The second issue I would like to discuss is the conflicting and contradictory nature of the history of genetic scientific thought which has acted as a stimulus for its development.

Throughout the whole history of genetics there are clearly delineated periods of reign, either simultaneously or at different times of mutually exclusive theories, which being in continual conflict and contradiction, have obviously complemented each other in a number of ways.

For instance, very soon after rediscovering the laws, previously established by Mendel, it was observed that a number of hybrids exhibit phenomena which cannot be accounted for by the law of free combining of the genes in the hybrids' descendents. However, finding out the cause of these phenomena, namely the blending of the genes, localized in one and the same chromosome, does not refute Mendel's theory. On the contrary, it further supports some of the conclusions drawn by Mendel and can be considered as a turning point in the further development of the theory of genetics, since it clarified the interrelation between Mendel's law of inheritance and the process taking place during the formation of the sex cells within the period of fertilization. Thus, the foundations of the chromosome inheritance theory have been layed.

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7 This was discussed by G. Allen in the previously mentioned paper

During the same period (the beginning of this century), some other phenomena were discovered, which at first glance seemed to refute Mendel's theory. These were, for instance, the inheritance of certain features only from the mother's side. Further research in direction, however, helped to clarify the cause—the existence of genetic information not only in chromosomes, but in other cell organelles like the mitochondria, the plastids, as well as the cytoplasme.

These findings resulted in formulating the theoretical laws of extrachromosome inheritance—the concept of 'genome', 'plasmone' (extra-chromosome genetic information), etc. These concepts, in turn, disproved the idea that it was the monopoly right of the nucleus to carry the inheritance information. That theory was beginning to gain popularity at the time. Therefore, its refutation marks an important stage in the development of the chromosome theory.

These results, combined with the data of the molecular structure of the genes helped to clarify the contradiction, which seemed to be prevalent, although it later proved to be a fictitious one, between the notions of differentiation and integration of structures and the processes pertaining to inheritance. We have in mind the principle of differentiation and integration, according to which the nucleus and respectively the chromosomes, the cytoplasme, the ribosomes, the plastids, the mitochondria and the other cell structures, although having various specific functions (with the nucleus and respectively the chromosomes carrying the central genetic function) are always in a relation of unity and interaction. Otherwise, they wouldn't have been able to carry out their genetic function in the integral microsystem of the cell if this relation did not exist. The same principle accounts for each separate component of the cell structure.

By way of example, we can say that each chromosome is structurally and functionally different from the rest of the chromosomes but at the same time each chromosome realizes its specialized function as a component of an integral unit—the genome and the whole cell.

However, this notion is complementary to the chromosome theory; It does not refute it.

The development of scientific theories concerning inheritance and heredity phenomena abounds in conflicting views on a number of basic problems in genetics. Some of the arguments have been going on and on for a very long time, for instance, the relation of the epigenesis and the preformation with reductionism and integrationism in the explanation of inheritance as a biological phenomenon.

The conflicting nature of scientific knowledge. where some elements are being refuted, while others validated and confirmed can be regarded as a stimulating force throughout the whole development of genetics.

At the end, I would like to draw your attention once again to the opinion expressed at the beginning of the paper. I believe that historicogenetic research can yield more significant results if more attention is centered on the logical and methodological analysis and if throughout the complete analysis some general philosophical considerations are constantly kept in mind.

VI

Religion and the Contemporary Ethical Issues

K. Wilson

A word about the key terms may better sharpen the discussion on the topic. An analyses of religious consciousness and religious manifestations (institutions) by Philosophers of Religion resulted in the acknowledgement that no particular view of religion is all-exhaustive. For, religion is understood in different ways at different times depending upon the differences in cultures. Radically divergent views have been expressed in the ancient, medieval, renaissant and post-war periods which in broad general terms laid stress on feeling, faith, humanism and contextuality respectively. On the one hand, religion is presumed to be the *summon bonum* of life. It is accepted, on the other hand, as the supernatural means of redemption. Sometimes, it is described as a product of human imagination. At other times, it is deprecated as the opium of the poor, a handmaid of the exploiters. Occasionally, it is viewed also as part of culture. One can in broad general terms describe religion as that experience of man which is claimed to have been related to whatever is called the divine. When man attributes things to the divine, he becomes a religious being. It is therefore, the reported divine dimension in man that constitutes the religious realm. Normally religion is dealt with as though it exists independent of man. Quite often, we hear people saying that religious people may go wrong but not the religions. Thus, people tend to confer upon religion an element of infallibility. I propose to maintain that religion cannot be thought independent of religious beings and apart from human context. It may be an institution or a system or a phenomena or consciousness.

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In all these manifestations of religion, human beings have their place and role. When therefore, we use the term 'religion' we mean not only the scriptural matrix of organized religions but also the understanding, interpretations and manipulations of those scriptures by religious beings.

Ethics has to do with the behaviour, customs and actions of man. Sometimes, It is called the study of human conduct and at other times, it is described as the study of good. It is also viewed as a realm of application of faith or thought. The classical, the medieval and the modern ethical positions are under-scored by political, religious and humanistic overtones. Normally, actions of man come under the jurisdiction of ethics only when the rightness and wrongness of that action become the object of human inquiry. There can be no such a thing as an individuals internal ethics except in the sense of conflict in conscience. But even this has to do with something other than the person afflicted with the issues. Ethics has to do not merely with what a person does but what he does in relation to other human beings and its influences on others. Like religion, ethics too has undergone radical changes as changes took place in the conditions of man. It also is social in its scope. The term contemporary can reasonably be described as post-modern or recent. It is symbolic if not symptomatic of scientific temper, technological advancement and atomic adventurism. Expressive of these ingredients are the assertion of values such as autonomy, freedom, human unity, universalism, interdependence, self-help etc. Implicit in these assertions is a loss of faith in the supernatural and mythological world-views. Briefly stated, it is the scientific way of understanding and authenticating the truth that dominates this age.

The present world is acclaimed as having come of age since people, by and large. get things done without having to refer to what is generally called God. It is as though we are witnessing the celebration of the destabilization, if not the oblivion of traditional views of religions. Vahanian, a French thinker observes 'Once a no man's land, today it has become a no God's land'. Words of this nature party reflect the temper of the times. Contemporary man prefers to work out his own solution. Hence, the contemporary world is described also as a post-religious world. This phenomena gave rise to radical changes in the standards of ethics also. eg., What was yesterday appreciated as right is today deprecated as wrong. eg., Capital punishment. Like wise, what was yesterday considered wrong is permitted today as right. eg., abortion. As the world views change, change in the ethics too is effected. Formerly, religiosity was accepted as a passport for being recognized as good. Today, it is the humanity that is acknowledged as the criterion of morality. Let us now focus on the nature of ethical issues that are peculiar to this age and see the extent to which religion could contribute for their solution.

Ethical issues come to the surface either in term of rationality and irrationality, religion and irreligion, human and anti-human, scientific and non-scientific etc. They also emerge on the basis of ideological differences such as capitalistic ethics of the First World, the socialistic ethics of the Second World and the mixed ethics of the Third World. Contemporary ethical issues can broadly be divided parts. viz., (a) the academic and the existential.

(a) Academically contemporary ethical issues are spread far and wide. They range from questioning the traditional ethics, offering alternative way of viewing ethics and to altogether denying ethical dimensions to actions. These academically oriented ethical issues started exercising their influence on the reflective world since the beginning of this century. Whether the basic moral concept is good or right, is subjective or objective, whether the basis of value is cognitive or conative, whether it is the problem of language or of verifiable facts, are some of the crucial academic ethical issues we are called upon to wrestle with. In the controversy on the basic moral concept the ethics of value clashes with an ethics of duty. The ideal-utilitarians (good) advocate the former and the deontologists (rises) the latter. Is ethical good, absolute or relative ? Normally idealists hold the former and the existentialists maintain the latter. Regarding the subjective or objective nature of ethical good, the subjectivists argue that the ethical good consists in one's feelings of pleasure or in one's judgement of approval. Whereas, objectivists maintain that good exists in something outside the agent and that the ethical good is brought into being by the agent choosing the thing; but the object chosen is not made good by the agents thought, feeling or desire for it. Even within subjectivism there arose a controversy between conative and cognitive schools of thought. The former holds that desire is the basis of value whereas the latter maintains that the basis of value is feeling. A still more radical departure is witnessed in the theories of emotivists who assert that ethics is a problem of language. It is the ethical definitions which should be the objects of inquiry. According to emotivist, ethical concepts are unanalysable and no eriterion exists to test their validity because they are pseudo-concepts. The prime function of the ethical predicate, good and bad, right and wrong, is purely emotive. They express feeling about acts or objects but make no assertion about them. Truth exists only in logical, mathemetical and empirical statements. Religions may lend some direction in coming to grips with these issues but they are oftentimes found helpless.

On the existential plane several ethical issues have emerged challenging and provoking the contemporary thought world. Alienation oppression, dehumanization, population explosion, threat of nuclear war, casteism, social discrimination, organized international crimes against humanity, tyranny of bureaucracy, communicational manipulation such as lack of truth in advertizing, unionism without work ethic, privileges without responsibilities, short-cut achievements and the partnership of religion in the malady of the modern world, are some of the existential issues that humanity faced today. Now the question is who to decide what is right and what is wrong in these matters ? Here the influence of the traditional religious institutions is not so significant. The real arbitors, i.e., the agencies such as the political and technocratic forces, which are entrusted with or taken upon themselves the task of sorting out such issues are the ones which decide matters today. But they have neither time nor that disposition to consult the 'sacred texts' and the divinized gurus except to perpetuate their hegemony. It is as though matters of God are resolved by recourse to scriptures, and problems of human beings are solved through human instrumentality alone. Thus, the jurisidiction of religion on contemporary ethical issues, is brushed aside if not relegated to background. In this context, it is discovered that organized, institutionalized religions themselves act either an part of these forces or atleast influenced by those forces. Whatever it is, ethical issues are today decided not necessarily by religious forces but primarily by economic, political and technocratic forces. What kind of things to be produced, what kind of things to be consumed, when to go to a movie and when not, how many children should we beget and when to implement birth control—in all these matters religions remain passive. Matters such as justice and equality, freedom and responsibility also are decided upon by forces other than religions. Further we also witness a marriage between political realities and ethical theories. Societies are fed either with capitalistic or with socialistic or with communistic views of ethical standards. Human self-understanding in the modern world owes primarily to these compelling realities. The concommitment culmination of this predicament is the negation of religious presuppositions. The hegemony of religion and its power to influence the character of the people is now either doubted or questioned. The credibility of religions in the solving those issues is challenged more by positivistic, humanistic, existentialistic and scientific forces which also resulted in (a) the negation of metaphysics, (b) the acknowledgement of the sacredness of the material world, (c) the stress on the here and the now etc. It is as though the criterian of ethical standard is shifted from heaven to earth, from God to man. Today, religion is so subjected to humanistic examination that it is as though the utility, the rightness and the relevance of religion hinges on whether or not it is grounded in humanism. The question that modern man faced today is not whether man is religious but whether religion is human enough to humanize the inhuman and the sub-human world. What is questioned today is not so much the religiosity of man as the humanity of religion. The greatest and distinctive ethical issues of the day is the morality of religions themselves in solving human crises. For, either religious forces remain indifferent to human problems or allowed themselves to be used for exploiting human beings. It is also found that religious dogmas are used by the inhuman and oppressive forces to perpetuate their crimes against humanity. It is the utter failure of religions or the religious consciousness and its vulnerability in being used by vested interests that became the ethical issues peculiar to contemporary world. Thus, religion itself became the progenitor of contemporary ethical problem.

One wonders whether there is no alternative between affirming and negating religious presuppositions and the concommitant ethical teachings. The following are suggested as some of the best possible alternatives. (a) Re-vitalizing the traditional religious ethics, by sharpening and intensifying them. (b) Re-interpreting the traditional religious ethics to suit the present world (c) Developing morality out of science or scientific world to meet the contemporary ethical challenges. Perhaps the last one sounds more reasonable and practicable. For, religious ethics is normally uncompromising. It does not take into consideration cultural plurality. Secondly, re-interpretation of religious scriptures to suit the present world is like pouring old wine in new bottles. Hence, the desirability of the third one. What can be the meaning of this venture ? It simply means a call to analyse and articulate the existential problematique of the contemporary world and to develop ethical norms out of the present context.

No age is less alive to its responsibility towards humanity. Ours does not in any way lag behind in this dimension. For that matter, no particular age can be credited as having a monopoly of all wisdom. In each age, and at every stage, human race wrestled with the dominant ethical issues and it has evolved the ethical solutions which in its view are the best possible ones. Today, new winds are blowing, and new waves are rolling, new life-styles are emerging and new cultures are flourishing. All these naturally call for a new ethics In the ultimate analysis, that one has of man, nature and the reality in its totality. The burden falls on us to decide whether a man is just a thing as the mercy of laws and forces independent of him, or a creative human being, or a spectator in the drama of God. Ours is a small but fast, autonomous but interdependent World. Today, we need an ethics which can meet the scientific temper and cosmic ambitions of the age. It should aim at human unity, fraternity and survivability. May be, the present day philosophers are called to come out of their ontological ivory towers, be wide awake, read the lines on the walls, and offer a new ethics and therefore a new future. This cannot be achieved by fleeing away from the present in preference to some golden past or by taking a leap to some golden future but only by facing the technological and existentialistic trends of the age. In the final analysis man is the answer and can therefore develop an answsr to meet the challenges of their contemporary world with or without any reference to religious traditions.

VII

Paul Tillich's Concept of Ultimate Reality

Priti Sinha

What is being ? This is the fundamental question of philosophy. "This is the question which brought philosophy into the world. Philosophy has from time immemorial asked the ground of what is; with this question it has begun and with this question it will end"[1] According to Paul Tillich the basic question of theology is the question of God and the basic question of ontology[2] is the question of being. Philosophy, according to Paul Tillich, is interested in being as being or it has to know being as it is in itself. A mathematician knows being as qualified, a biologist as living but "A metaphysician professes to know being as common to or involved in, whatever anyone else knows or can know"[3]. Ontology tries to investigate the nature of being; and God is the answer to the question involved in being.

According to Paul Tillich the ontological question of being itself arises from the notion of possible non-being. Every finite object participates in non-being. To be finite means to be conditioned by time. Being-in-itself is not conditioned by non-being. Man participates in being and yet he is involved in non-being. "Being limited by nonbeing is finitude". "Being is the beginning without a beginning, the end without an end. It is its own beginning and end".[4]

For Prof. Tillich Infinity is not a constituting concept but a directing concept. It directs our mind to realise our unlimited potentialities but it cannot establish infinite. "Infinite is finitude transcending itself without any a priori limit".[5]

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[1] Francis J. Vadakethala, *Discovery of Being*, p. 16.

[2] Paul Tillich, preferred the word ontology, Since the connotation of the term metaphysics makes it use precarious

[3] Gerard Smith. Lottie H. Mendzierski, *The Philosophy of Being*, p. 1.

[4] *Systematic Theology*. Paul Tillich, Vol. I, p. 187.

God, according to Paul Tillich, is the name for that reality which concerns us ultimately or unconditionally. This ultimate concern is independent of any condition. It is total concern, Whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes God for him. There are three possible relations between the ultimate concern and the preliminary concern (a) the first is the relation of mutual indifference, (b) in the second, the preliminary concern is elevated to ultimacy (c) in the third relation, the preliminary concern is the vehicle of ultimate concern. In the first relationship the ultimate concern is deprived of its ultimacy, the second relationship results in idolatory. In the third relationship the preliminary concern becomes the bearer or the vehicle of the ultimate concern and there is no conflict in them. This ultimate concern answers the question involved in finitude.

This 'ultimate concern' points to two facts, on the one hand, it is not possible to be concerned ultimately with something what is not concrete, on the other hand, ultimate concern transcends the finite or concrete concern in order to be the answer to the question implied in finitude. This conflict between the concreteness and the ultimacy of the religious concern is, according to Paul Tillich, the basic problem of every doctrine of God.

Gods, according to Paul Tillich, are not objects within the context of the universe. In the history of religion we may find ample evidence of human efforts to participate in divine power and to use it for human purposes. They try to gain favour of God through magic or prayer or mystical participation. Man cannot talk of God with the spirit of detachment. This is the 'Give and take' relationship. Thus the image of God bears all finitude. And according to Paul Tillich, this finitude should be transcended. He opines that the tendency towards ultimacy fights continuously against the tendency of concreteness. They embody the true and the good.

According to Paul Tillich, to say anything about God except that he is being itself or the power of being is 'symbolic not literal'. To quote Wieman, "His ontology demands the separation and opposition of existential being and essential being. Essential being is what all existence ought to be. Actual existence is opposed to what it ought to be"[6]. Infinite being cannot be described as it transcends all descriptions, Every determination points to some limitation. To say God is being-itself is non-symbolic statement. All concrete assertions are symbolic as they use the segment of finite

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5 Ibid., p. 191.

6 Intellectual Foundation of Faith, p. 81.

experience in order to say something about Him. According to Tillich, "Religious symbols are double edged. They are directed toward the infinite which they symbolize and toward the finite through which they symbolize it. They force the infinite down to finitude and the finite up to infinity. They open the divine for the human and human for the divine".[7]

God according to Paul Tillich, is holy. Holiness is the nature of God and not His attribute. Other things are holy in aesthetic or emotional sense. The holy can be expressed only through secular for it is through the finite alone that infinite can express itself. And sin is a state, according to Paul Tillich, in which the holy is separated from secular struggling with each other and trying to conquer each other.

He does not agree with R. Otto's or Schleiermacher's phenomenological interpretation of the term holy. The description of holy as numinous interprets holy as the presence of divine and holy as mysterium indicates that the holy transcends the subject-object structure of reality. Tillich shows interdependence of the meaning of holy and the meaning of divine and their common dependence on the nature of the ultimate concern. Holy is not there used in moral sense.

God is not 'a-being' for Tillich but 'the being'. 'A-being' means being among other beings. God is not even 'the highest being' as even superlative becomes diminutive when applied to God. All such confusions may be avoided if God is understood as being-itself or the ground of being. It points to the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting non-being. For Prof Tillich there is no gradation or participation between the finite and the infinite — there is "an absolute break", "an infinite jump".

Undoubtedly man can think of God only in the terms of categories of substance or causality. Spinoza adopted the first while Leibnitz preferred the second ground. Christianity, according to Tillich, prefers the category of causality. But causality is used here not as a category but as a symbol. And in this case the difference between causality and symbol disappears. He is the cause of the entire series as well as the substance. There is no difference between 'Prima-causa and ultima substantia'. Both mean the creative and the 'abysmal ground' of being. In this way both naturalistic pantheism based on the substance and rationalistic theism based on the causality are overcome. God must be approached cognitively through the structural elements of being itself. This makes him a living God, who can be man's concrete concern.

God is living not in an ordinary sense but in the symbolic sense. There is no difference between potentiality and actuality in God. God lives as he is the ground of life.

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[7] Systematic Theology, Vol. I., p. 240.

God is called a person 'not in finite separation but in an absolute and unconditional participation in everything'. God is the ground of everything personal and that he possesses the ontological power of personality. "He is not a person but he is not less than person". Personal God is a confusing symbol for Tillich. In contrast to Neitzsche, who identifies the two assertions that God is spirit and God is dead, Tillich says that God is the living God because He is spirit.

The divine creativity, according to Paul Tillich, is not different from divine life. 'God is creative because he is God', Creation does not happen to God rather it is identical with God. Creation is not related with a story which took place in history, rather it is the basic description of the relation between God and the world. If creation is a past event, the question may naturally be asked, what happened before creation ? Creation is really transformation. God creates man and gives him power to transform himself and his world. God is primarily and essentially creative.

Immanence and transcendence — both are spatial symbols. God is immanent in the world as its permanent creative ground and is transcendent to the world through freedom.

Creation has no purpose beyond itself. Tillich rejects outright the Calvinist's theory of the glory of God as the purpose of creation, as He is Himself the sole cause of glory". He does not secure glory from his creation. He does not agree with Lutheran theology also which admits 'communion of love with his creature' as the purpose of creation. Tillich opines that the purpose of creation should be replaced by the telos of creativity', — i.e., inner aim of fulfilling in actuality what is beyond potentiality and actuality in the divine life.

The divine power is expressed symbolically by the term omnipotence, omnipresent etc. Luther and Calvin interpreted omnipotence as the divine power through which God is creative in and through everythings in every moment. But Prof. Tillich has objection against such interpretation as "it suppresses the transcendent element in God's omnipotence. It is more adequate to define divine omnipotence as the power of being which resists non-being in all its expressions and which is manifest in the creative process in all its forms".[8] He further says "with respect of time omnipotence is eternity with respect to space, it is omnipresence, and with respect to the subject-object structure of being, it is omniscience".[9] He has interpreted these words in his own way. God is omnipresent in 'his creative participation in the spatial existence of his creatures'. Omniscience shows God's spiritual presence. It is the ground on the basis of which a man believes that reality is open to him.

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[8] Systematic Theology, Vol. I., p. 273.

[9] Ibid.

Christ, for Tillich, is not a historical person as it is absurd to say that the infinite power of being could exist in the form of a man. Tillich speaks not of Jesus and not of Jesus Christ but of Jesus as the Christ, meaning Jesus as pictured in the New Testament. Nobody knows the actuality of the man Jesus.

The address of God as 'My Lord' includes fatherly element but address as Father in Heaven includes Lord element. Tillich says that the Lord, who is not the father, is demonic, the father, who is not the Lord, is sentimental. Theology has erred in both directions. The symbol 'Lord' and the symbol "Father" complete each other. This is true theologically as well as psychologically. God as only Lord or only Father cannot be man's ultimate concern. The feeling of God as father evokes gratefulness, sentimentality, reverence and naive confidence. The concept of God as Lord only evokes a justified revolutionary resistence. Tillich advises the theologicians to interpret the symbols in such a way that a creative correlation can be established between them. These are not opposite sentiments. Often we start with meditation but end in prayer to God as Lord or Father, conversely we start with prayer and end into a contemplation of the mystery of the divine.

Prof. Tillich has no doubt about it that arguments for the existence of God are failure. Both the concept of existence and the method of arguing are insufficient. God is not existent reality, he is being itself. There is no difference between essence and existence for God. The arguments for the existence of God "neither are arguments nor are they proof of the existence of God". These arguments analyse the human situation in such a way that "the question of God appears possible and necessary." There is an awareness of God implicit in the question of God. This awareness is the consequence of the arguments for it is a necessary presupposition. These arguments only point out the question of God implied in the finite structure of being. It is not a matter of reason but of revelation.

We find much affinity between Paul Tillich's concept of Ultimate Reality and Sri Aurobindo's and Sankara's concept of Ultimate Reality. All the three thinkers believe that Ultimate Reality is the Absolute and not a personal God. They differentiate God from Being. Like Sri Aurobindo, Paul Tillich too says that being itself includes both static and dynamic, both rest and becoming, 'becoming as an implication of form.'

Like Sankara he says that all descriptions of God are religious symbols. He comes closer to Upanisadic concept of Neti, when he says that all descriptions are but the ways we relate ourselves with God. Infinite is all inclusive. It cannot be distinguished from what it is not. He is the ground of the structure of being. Though Prof. Tillich's approach is "Biblical. Christocentric and critical" he does not get Biblical support as Christian God is a creator God, a personal God. He does not face the problem of reality as boldly as Sankara does. His God is being-itself. He has never mentioned it is conscious or not. Still there is fundamental insight in his thinking. He has opened a new vista in the field of Christian theology.

Book-Reviews :

Michael Harrington : *Decade of Decision* : *The Crisis of the American System*, New York : Simon and Schuster, 1980, pp. 354, Price $ 11.95.

Michael Harrington, Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, has written a work that critically depicts the present structural condition of the American economy.

It is Harrington's position that the 1980's represent a period consummate for ideological change and economic reconstruction. Presently, we exist in a era where former innovative neo Keynesian prescriptions are ineffective in curing aggregate problems, and the naturalistic "free market" is dominated by the "visible hand" of large, self-serving oligopolies. Hence, Harrington suggests, it may be an appropriate time for citizens and policy makers alike to examine our static socioeconomic reasoning, reflect upon our present and past domestic policies, and attempt to develop more benevolent social plans for the future.

Countering the "Conventional wisdom" of orthodox economic discourse, Harrington predictably attributes most of our present economic woes to the price-setting, profit chasing activities of corporate capitalists. Stagflation, for example, is not a temporary phenomenon that can be necessarily alleviated by reducing inflated federal spending: While it is always fashionable to decry socially wasteful government spending (particularly for low-income groups) and simultaneously acclaim the expurgating virtues of competitive capitalism, Harrington is quick to illustrate that our economy is far from being pluralistic and that state spending is not disproportionately channeled to the economically indigent.

The steel industry (as well as other major industries) has a history of receiving state "bailouts" and tax breaks designed to stimulate investment and profits. In point of fact, our economic system (state capitalism) is structurally designed to benefit the centralized economic interests of corporate firms. Furthermore, if one is still retaining overzealous allegiance to free-market, laissez-faire thinking, one is either unaware of the real inherent, structural determinants of collective capitalism or consciously attempting to rationalize the rewards that accrue to minority corporate factions. Thus, in a contradictory way, "business...is torn by ideological allegiance to free enterprise principles which must be systematically violated if late capitalism is going to work" (p. 311). Furthermore, "in one part of their mind...corporate leaders believe that every intervention of the government into the economy is a desperate threat to their well-being even though forty years of experience prove the contrary (p. 110).

In addition to critiquing our present understanding of economic matters, Harrington devotes much attention to the issues of income distribution, unemployment, poverty, education, and urban problems. Topically, Harrington also attempts to understand the prevalent antigovernment ideology that works in a practical way to advance narrowly defined business interests and which concomitantly casts "a spell over those social classes and groups whose objective interest is anti-corporate and sometimes even consciously so" (p. 111).

In conclusion, it is correct to note that this work is more reflective,and, perhaps, more indicative of an alternative paradigmatic position than it is a practical, political outline for socioeconomic change. Neverthless, Harrington's *Decade of Decision* is an insightful book that accentuates the valuational dimension of economic thinking and. furthermore, disputes popular attempts to think shallowly about vital economic concerns.

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Henry O. Thompson, (Monoreligionism) editor, *The Global Congress of the World's Religions*, New York: The Rose of Sharon Press, 1982, pp. xvi+365, no price indicated.

The thesis of my essay is what I have always preached among my students, namely: since the world's religions have many elements in common — and these are very important — and since they also differ in many respects—and these are usually insignificant—we must emphasize those beliefs that unite the peoples of the world, instead of stressing the minor doctrines that tend to be fissiparous. This is what I mean by *monoreligionism*, or a universal faith encompassing common elements, while *polyreligionism* incorporates everything, including divisive convictions.

Recently, while reading James Boswell's *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (1791), I was quite "upset" to realize that, in 1763, the author of the *Dictionary of the English Language* did not only "steal" my idea, but he also dared express it more eloquently: "Sir, I think all Christians, whether Papists or Protestants, agree in the essential articles, and that their differences are trivial, and rather political than religious" (Chapter V).

Dr. Thompson's impressive volume both demonstrates and illustrates the same thesis most admirably. Of course, readers familiar with the editor's writings (*Prayer for Today's People*; *Approaches to the Bible; Archaeology and Archaeologists; Hidden and Revealed; Mekal*; and so on) will not be surprised to find a fabulous treasure of data and ideas in this book.

The work itself constitutes the fourth volume of the proceedings of the Global Congress of the World's Religions. More specifically, the contents consist of stimulating discussions and papers by internationally known scholars who attended various global and regional meetings in Seoul, India, Islamabad, Miami, and so forth. The history of the Global Congress, as well as its goals and methods of attaining them, will be found in the first 64 pages of the book. Later on (pp. 141-143) in response to comments and questions by Dr. Ismail al Faruqi, a distinguished professor of Islamics, there develops a partial but lucid synopsis of goals and means. Some of the former are: to bring humankind into awareness of their Creator's presence, to promote the universal message of peace and justice taught by all the religions of the world, to combat the forces of materialism and secularism, to learn from other religions, to cooperate with the peoples of the world, and so on. Some of the means are: lectures, meetings, dissemination of literature, exhibits of books and art objects, artistic performances, individual contacts, exchange of visits, and so forth.

In this part of the book, as in all other sections, the editing is excellent—I found only a few typographical and other errors here and there. But, perhaps, every minor comment made at the meetings should not appear in the volume. Participants, for instance, could instead be asked to supply a written synopsis of their comments, which would eliminate most errors. Contributors could also be provided with galley proofs of their papers, which would diminish the editor's work and reduce the number of mistakes. On p. 56, for example, Deacon Petro Bilaniuk, of St. Michael's College in Toronto, repeats the widespread fallacy that *dialogue* means conversation between *two* persons and that, instead, we should have *polylogues*, namely, conversations among *many* people. This error was also made many years ago by a famous sociologist in the *American Sociological Review*, in which journal I later explained that *dia* means *through*, not *two*, and that the *Decalogue* did not involve a conversation between *one* Moses and *nine* Jehovahs! I made an analogous statement at the Miami meeting of the Global Congress, but a typographical error distorts the meaning of my comment (p. 60). Still, as I have already indicated, the editor has done a marvelous job, and he does explain the few errors most satisfactorily: "audio tape recordings," "speakers talking too softly or too quickly," and so forth—one should further mention the spectacular polyglotism of all meetings !

At any rate, the editor helps the reader considerably with the short Preface to the volume. I only wish Dr. Thompson had also written a brief Conclusion to close his important book less abruptly.

It is absolutely impossible to summarize and evaluate adequately the many first-rate papers that appear in this original volume; for the contents are incredibly rich, their presentation expert and scholarly, and the style sparkling and scintillating. In fact, even when the authors and discussants disagree, they never fail to emphasize, quite §convincingly, the vast and awesome importance of religion, which emerges as an almost instinctive force. It is no wonder, then, that I was reminded of Georg Lichtenberg's famous statement in his *Aphhrismen*: "*Der Glaube an einen Gott ist Instinkt, er ist dem Menschen naturlich, so wie das Gehen auf zwei Beinen*" ("Belief in a god is instinctive; to mankind it is as natural as walking on two legs").

One of the contributors, Dr. Gordon Melton, insightfully observes that interfaith activities have usually "tended to minimize the actual differences between religions...The more broadly based arena for agreement and affirmations tend [*sic*] to be over shared questions and concerns rather than beliefs" (p. 187). Part of this religious heterogeneity may be explained by the so-called *religio loci*, or the religion of the place, namely, the feelings generated by the sacred associations of a locality. Accordingly, Dr. Osborn Scott states : "It is a very formidable task, bringing groups together" (p. 107).

More optimistically, Dr. Seshagiri Rao, who employs the Hindu approach to combat interfaith conflict. informs us that "there is a move from mutual recrimination to religious conversation" (p. 192). Then, more poetically, he lets two blazing thunderbolts descend with the flaming fury of hope from the Oriental Olympus of the sublime *Bhagavad Gita* : "Whatever form one desires to worship in faith and devotion, in that very form I make that faith of his secure ...Even those who are devoted to other gods and worship them in full faith, even, O Kaunteya, worship none but Me" (p. 196).

Dr. Archie Bahm, in his "Stages in the Development of Interreligious Attitudes," says that the "attitudes of each person as he becomes acquainted with other religions often change" (p. 199). (This statement may not sound very enlightening, but Dr. Bahm hastens to add an astounding model consisting of 13 stages involved in such change : ignorance, curiosity, intolerance, accommodation, encounter, inquiry, softening, dialogue, modification, cooperation, partial emergence, progressive synthesis, and world religion.

Dr. David Kalupahana, an internationally known philosopher and Buddhist expert, discusses religious harmony through Buddhist humanism. Once of his sagacious conclusions is that "it is possible for man to change his future provided he is able to understand this complexity of conditions [those in life from birth to death and in rebirth, including human action, as analyzed in the Buddha's theory of Karma] that determines it" (pp. 215 216).

A most interesting study of religion and art is presented by Dr. Lois Ibsen al Faruqi, who explains that "in an artisitc presentation of a religiously significant message, content is expressed through sensory means rather than through conceptual, cultic or social data. This artistic reinforcement of the message has come to be known as 'symbolic expression,' since it is a sensory representation of something not immediately evidenced to the senses" (p. 235).

Finally, the grandeur and splendor adorning the ambitious and alliterative title of the editor's own essay, "The Cosmic Covenant," are retained by the text itself. Indeed, Dr. Thompson's paper is scholarly, well documented, encyclopedic, and inspiring. Continuing Dr. Seshagiri Rao's optimism, he begins his cerebral essay with these words: "The religions of the world are sometimes known more for their parochialism than their universalism. In a day when the world has become a 'global village,' it is worth looking again at the universal elements" (p. 320).

Such universalism, combined with religion's vitality, resiliency, and continuity, can only recall Sophocles's triumphantly expectant and exultant utterance : "Take courage, take courage, my child; Zeus is still great in heaven, Zeus who sees and directs all things."

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I

The Contentlessness of Physicalism

Joseph Wayne Smith

In this paper I will argue that the account of the physical presented by J. J. C. Smart in two recent papers[1] conflicts with the doctrine of Naturalism; and not only this, but some of the ontological commitments which physicalism makes are repugnant to that nobel "materialist" tradition running from Luecippus, Lucretius, Hobbes to central state materialism, all of whom make statements such as "man is a vast arrangement of physical particles" and "tables are nothing but clouds of molecules". I do not claim that a *formal* contradiction exists here, since I have neither the time nor energy to undertake the thankless task of formalizing all the issues in question; nevertheless the argument can be (hopefully) developed in natural language to be sufficiently clear and persuasive. Let us see.

In the first part of the argument, I will isolate from Smart's article "The Content of Physicalism" what in fact he takes the physical to be. This account is produced by Smart to avoid a problem which he believes physicalism faces. On this basis, I will then outline why this account seems to be in conflict with our pre-analytic understanding of *both* the doctrines of naturalism and materialism. At the point at which I have developed my central thesis, I will turn then to Smart's thoughts about the ontological status of Occam's razor to provide further substantiation for the claims made here.

I

In the paper "The Content of Physicalism", Smart is concerned to rebut the claim that physicalism is, if not an absolutely contentless and trivial thesis, then certainly an "empty doctrine". Physicalism as a theory about biology and the mind might be believed to be problematic because "if present day physics is insufficient for the understanding of biological or mental phenomena, this will simply mean that physics must be extended, probably by the postulation of new forces" (ibid, p. 339). Why does Smart believe that this is problematic? The answer is not explicitly given in the paper. I conjecture that the reason may well be that Smart believes that physicalism should be an empirically falsifiable thesis, as should a general physicalist ontology. But I need not sift through Smart's writings to substantiate this point: from a logical point of view I grant the truth of this assumption for sake of the argument and proceed.

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[1] J. J. C. Smart, "The Content of Physicalism", *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 28, 1978, pp. 339-341; "Is Occam's Razor a Physical Thing ?", *Philosophy*, Vol. 53, 1978, pp. 382-385.

Smart accepts that there most likely will be radical changes in physics in the future, but denies that such changes would be of any relevance to the mind-body problem. Consequently he ties "physicalism" to contemporary physics for the purposes of the mind-body problem. However it is well known that Smart has attempted to construct a rigorous hardline physicalist metaphysics, in which the world contains nothing more than those entities designated by the individual constants of a physical theory and those properties and relations designated by the property predicates and relational predicates of a physical theory. For the purposes of general metaphysics, Smart *relativizes* the idea of the physical to the going physics of the day (ibid, p. 340).

Physicalists would wish to say that all which exists in the world is that which physics tells us. Given Smarts's *ontological relativism*, however, it seems that we run into a major problem. Once upon a time, the history of science tells us, Aristotelian physicists believed in the existence of many entities that the contemporary "materialist" would find repugnant. At least some such Aristotelians attributed minds to the basic stuff of the world and in general saw in the world a *Telos*. Many centuries ago God had a grand place in the universe, as Creator and sustainer of the world and its laws. They were the bold and lusty days when Theists who were natural scientists did not hide behind "Wittgensteinian fideism" cloaks, but came out in the open and declared with great vigor that the causal powers of God should not be ignored by physicist and cosmologist. The point to be made from this fanfare is that the physics of the day at some times in the history of science has an ontological commitment to minds and gods.

But this is the *history* of science. Scientific realists believe that today we are in fact much closer to the truth than the clumsy ancients, that current scientific theories (excluding the social sciences of course) are approximately true. Moreover it seems that there is little space left to place a "God of the gaps" nowadays, since our theories are so comprehensive — or so they tell us. No physicist today would attribute to mentality basic ontological status. If at least some did, we will have major problems in deciding what in fact was the current state of physics".

Alas such problems exist. For example the contemporary "Scientific Creationists", those of which have been concerned with undermining contemporary physics and cosmology, have joyful embraced the possibility of taking into account the causal powers of that Supernatural individual constant — the Deity in cosmological models. and have once more attempted to explain the laws of nature (e.g. the conservation laws and the second law of thermodynamics) with reference to God's will. Suppose, given the current crisis of Western capitalism, such a movement grows to astronomical proportions. We have witnessed massive religious revivals in recent years, especially in the Islámic world, where fanatic Church leaders decide what shall be taught, and who shall live and who shall die. It not only is a logical possibility, but is (unfortunately) an empirical (but perhaps improbable) possibility that the current state of the twenty first century physics may be accurately described as one which has been reduced to Theology; where matters in the foundations of physics are relevant questions for Theology. This is at the very least a logical possibility.

Smart and myself, let us imagine, exist in this world of the not too distant future, albeit jobless, and we reflect upon the state of physicalist metaphysics. What Smart must say is that physicalists must now recognize that the infinite, omnipotent, spiritual, immaterial God of the Christian scriptures is a physical object. After all, this is what all contemporary physicists will admit in this world. All the "naturalists" are either dead or jobless. From a sociological point of view, there would seem to be no reason not to conclude that theological concerns are central to issues in the foundations of physics. Note, that physics in such a world seem to be doing at least *some physics* as we know it: however, instead of searching for quarks as a basis to build the world they appeal to some aspect of the Divine. There may well be a return to the elaborate apriori reasoning of the Continental Rationalist tradition as a legitimate part of such foundational research.

According to Smart's criterion of the physical, we must admit the Deity as a physical object. If we are relativists about our ontological commitments in the sense that it "is physics which informs us of the ultimate constituents of the world",[2] then we accept both the logical and empirical possibility of being forced to accept paradigm case immaterial and spiritual entities as being physical objects. Note that we have no reason to reject this consequence by arguing that a theologically based physics would be wrong. As physicalist we decide upon what exists in the world by appeal to physics, do we not ? And in this process we may use Occam's razor to slice off entities whose existence need not be postulated for the purpose of theoretical explanation. But what if there was room for a "God of the gaps" ? It is a possibility admitted by Smart in his acceptance that radical changes most likely will occur in the foundations of physics—in microphysics and cosmology. Given Smart's criterion of the physical, various institutional and social structural changes in society and the university may lead us to situation where all physicists of a society maintain that the postulation of God is *necessary*, so appeals to Occam's razor could not be made.

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[2] J. J. C. Smart, "Is Occam's Razor a Physical Thing ?", ibid., p. 382.

The point to be made is this : Smart's relativism leaves us utterly at the mercy of the theoretical whims of the physics community. He says nothing about the rationality of this community, nor does he assess the "metaphysical tenability" of the information of physics: as a naturalistic-epistemologist he cannot do this since physics stands as the criterion itself for deciding ontological commitments and he would be involved in a contradiction if he suggested an alternative criterion whilst still holding to the thesis of physicalism. Consequently to avoid such implications Smart would need to abandon the very account of physicalism which he has presented.

Against this it may be argued: why not accept God as a physical object, if this is a commitment which physicists believe that needs to be made ? Of course this is in fact a philosophical thesis which needs to be examined on its own merits. Our discussion here is explicitly concerned with the implications of this consideration for the physicalist *weltanschauung*. Why in fact do I maintain that a physicalist who makes an ontological commitment to God is making an incoherent commitment ? I believe this is so because such a physicalism is in tension with both "naturalism" and our preanalytic understanding of what "materialism" is. Let us unpack these intuitions.

Naturalism is the doctrine, according to another leading physicalist, D. M. Armstrong, which asserts "that reality consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system",[3] and indeed that nothing else exists except objects within this system, involved in causal relationships. Moreover the naturalist takes the spatio temporally system to be *causally* closed, that whatever changes are observed within the spatio-temporal system are caused by other events within that system. It is generally admitted that the Judeo-Christian God, or at least the one which philosophers argue about is outside the spatio-temporal framework. The problem now is that physicalism, at the very least as a logical possibility may commit us to accepting God as a physical object. But God is the paradigm case of an object outside of the spatio-temporal frame. Physicalism and Naturalism are hence inconsistent.

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[3] D. M. Armstrong, "Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy", *Philosophia*, Vol.8, No.2-3, Nov. 1978, pp. 261-276 (citation p. 261).

The inconsistency could be removed by Smart by rejecting Armstrong's account of naturalism which seems to be the most popular, and certainly the most precise account available. But I do not know of what an alternative account would look like, which captures the cultural spirit of our pre-analytic intuitions about the doctrine of naturalism. One could of course utterly reject the task of defending naturalism. This however would seem to be a rejection of the motivating purpose of books such as *Philosophy* and *Scientific Realism*,[4] and would surely be the most implausible strategy to escape this inconsistency.

Such a strategy is also implausible when we reflect upon our pre-analytic understanding of "materialism". Surely there is something drastically wrong with a thesis which allows the logical possibility of God being a physical object, or the logical possibility of mentality being taken as an unexplained primitive by physics.[5] It

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[4] J. J. C. Smart, *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963).

[5] The physicalist M. Levin, *Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979), pp. 60-63, seems to accept this possibility. Indeed it is difficult to see how the logical possibility of taking mentality as a primitive can be avoided given that the *Copenhagen* interpretation of quantum mechanics took QM to really be about human experiences, or more precisely that there can be no autonomous quantitum physical occurrences, but only observer (and by this they meant human observers) dependent quantum occurrences. (cf. for a discussion M. Jammer, *The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics* (Wiley, New York, 1974).

Levin himself regards this conjecture as utterly unreasonable given what we know about psychological properties. These he points out, are properties of things with complex nervous systems. However such a defence is ultimately circular because it appeals to premises which a panpsychist (cf. G.G. Globus, "Mind, Structure, and Contradiction" in G.G. Globus, G. Maxwell and I. Savodnik (eds.), *Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry* (Plenum Press, New York and London, 1976), pp. 271-293, would reject. Consequently Levin's argument seems ultimately question begging.

Regardless of this, the mere logical possibility of Gods, Mind and Numbers and other Transcendental entities being regarded as phy-fails utterly to explicate what generations of philosophers have seemed to meant by "the material".

To this, the physicalist such as Smart will no doubt cut the Gordian knot. It will be argued in reply that whilst almost everyone has equated "physicalism" and "materialism", such an equation is to be rejected. Smart has in fact recently done this.[6] I turn now to the context in which this has been done in debate with Peter Glassen.[7] This pathway leads us into further difficulties, and I will conclude by rejecting Smart's account of the physical.

II

The Smart-Glassen debate is of interest to my central thesis here, insofar as Glassen has driven Smart to make a precise statement upon the question of abstract reference. Glassen argued himself that considerations of Occam's razor could not constitute reasons for believing in the identity thesis of mind and brain. It is *not* this issue which I am interested in here (Glassen's particular argument I believe fails but this is tangential to the argument here) *but* rather the question of the ontological status of Occam's razor itself.

Smart accepts that Occam's razor is an abstract entity.[8] He claims that whilst it is not a material object, It is a physical object

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sical raises those difficulties which I pointed out in the text. This is for the simple reason that we are attempting the logical explication of a term and our concern is with the logical implications of proposed analyses, not merely with the question as to whether these implications are true or false. This seems to be standard analytic procedure.

[6] J. J. C. Smart, "Occam's Razor a Physical Thing" op. cit. note 1, p. 382.

[7] P. Glassen. "J. J. C. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor", *Philosophy*, Vol. 51, 1976, pp. 349-352.

[8] Robert Elliot, "Materialism and Occam's Razor", *Philosophy*, Vol. 54, pp. 233-234 has argued that Occam's Razor is a belief, and consequently a brain state. His argument appears to be as follows :

(1) Occam's razor is a methodological principle.
(2) To believe that Occam's razor is a satisfactory methodological principle is to be believe that theories must be constructed in a specific way.

Therefore

(3) Occam's razor is a belief.

The argument is invalid and in any case would not be accepted by Smart (cf. Note 6, p. 384). What is identical to a brain process is a belief about Occam's razor, but it does not follow that the content of a belief is identical to the brain process. Premises (1) and (2) give no support at all to premise (3). We can see this by a counter example. Consider my belief about Meinongian objects such as round squares: there are no round squares. According to the identity theorist, my belief is identical to a brain process. But

—in particular a set theoretical entity. Smart believes that mathematical entities not only are required by physical theory, but he believes that reductionist programmes attempting to eliminate such entities, or reduce them to something materialistically respectable have failed. He is therefore an unhappy and frustrated platonist, like Quine. So it seems that my claim that physicalism is a radical departure from materialism would in fact be accepted by Smart. Does my entire thesis now collapse ? I think not.

A problem still remains about the consistency of physicalism with naturalism. Such platonic entities are outside the bounds of the naturalist's spatio-temporal framework. For the naturalist, mathematical entities are ontologically as problematic as God—with the added twist that given the assumption of the failure of nominalism, they are indispensible for the healthy working of the physicalists beloved physics: no differential equations, matrix algebra or group theory, no physics.

How might this problem be solved ? Armstrong has also been deeply troubled by this problem. Armstrong differs from Smart in believing that causal efficacy is of central ontological importance in matters of ontology. Perhaps Smart's "physicalist" brethren may be of assistance to him here.

Armstrong[9] believes that for ontologies which make reference to Transcendental entities such as God, the Absolute, Spirit, Geist, Numbers and so on, face a crushing dilemma which can be produced by the naturalist: are such entities capable of causally interacting with the spatio-temporal system ? Armstrong then goes on to argue that many of the entities postulated by "Transcendentalists" face logical and conceptual problems in being described as being in causal interaction with the spatio-temporal framework, such entities including Platonic forms and Cartesian minds. Physics and Occam's razor gives us no reason to postulate anything else beyond the spatio-temporal framework. Yet physics requires mathematics, and mathematics has not as yet been reduced to physics. What can Armstrong do? he does precisely this :

> "...I suggest, if the Anti-Naturalist fails to endow his transcendent possibilities, numbers, classes, etc. with any this-worldly powers, then they explain nothing. We must insist against him, that statements about possibilities, numbers, classes, *etc.* be given a this-worldly interpretation" (ibid., p. 267).

But Armstrong confesses that he does not have any satisfactory "this-worldly" account of mathematical entities, but that the practical

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it cannot be that a round square is identical to a brain process because there are no existing round squares. Elliot's argument then is invalid.

[9] D. M. Armstrong, op. cit. Note 3.

access of mathematics should, he asserts without argument to guarantee this" (ibid., p. 267). Armstrong then concludes his discussion as follows :

> "It seems, then, that the anti-Naturalist who nevertheless admits the existence of a spatiotemporal reality must try to endow his extra entities with power to affect that reality, on pain of making his postulate atiose. Yet, in the present state of scientific knowledge, it seems implausible to endow these entities with such power. *I conclude that we have rather good reasons for accepting Naturalism*" (ibid., p. 267, italics added).

This argument is peculiar, since the premises, *interpreted correctly* contradict the conclusion. This dilemma in fact faces the *naturalist*, equally as much as it faces the anti-naturalist. Armstrong in fact has conceded that :

(1) Physics requires mathematics and its array of abstract entities as well as :

(2) It is only reasonable to postulate the existence of mathematical entities and other cases of abstract reference if causal power if attributed to these entities.

However he also concedes that such a postulation is unjustified in that they "do not *bring about* anything physical in the way that genes and electrons do" (ibid., p. 266). So given Armstrong's causal principle we infer :

(3) It is unreasonable to endow mathematical entities with causal powers.

Premise (2) and (3) are inconsistent, and I have documented that it is Armstrong, not merely the anti-naturalist which is committed to this inconsistency. Armstrong is therefore not justified in concluding that we have good reasons for accepting naturalism: we have the best possible reasons for *not* accepting naturalism as Armstrong sketches this view.

Hence Armstrong cannot satisfactorily deal with the difficulties which face Smart, for his position is itself inconsistent. It is time to sum up this argument and close.

III

It has been argued here that Smart's account of the physical has consequences which render it inconsistent with the doctrine of naturalism, and which show that it is an inadequate explication of our pre-analytic idea of "materialism". What impact does this metaphysical have upon Smart and Armstrong's identity theory of mind ? Idealistic philosophers will be dismayed to learn that this thesis escapes completely unscathed from the attack hereupon Smart's account of the physical and Armstrong's account of naturalism. All that they need defend, is the thesis that sensations are contingently identical with brain processes, to preserve an identity theory of mind.

I can see no way of extending these criticisms to that claim. Nevertheless physicalism as a grand metaphysical doctrine is inconsistent with the naturalist orientation of such thinkers,[10] and we have seen further difficulties facing Armstrong's account of naturalism.

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[10] Smart himself is unhappy about his platonistic commitments, but he does not see any logical problem involved in this for his entire system of thought. He believes that they do not give rise to "nomological danglers" because they are postulated by fundamental physical theory itself. This phrase "nomological dangler" is vague, but seems to mean something that "that not open to causal explanation with reference to the laws of basic physics". However this is precisely the problem which arose in our analysis of Armstrong's encounter with mathematical entities. In the absence of any satisfactory nominalist mathematics, because physics (especially "hard core" theoretical physics such as relativistic quantum field theory) requires mathematics, mathematical entities are by logical necessity, nomological danglers. Since, given these assumptions any physicalistic reduction of mathematics will involve mathematics and hence be circular. To this Smart will not doubt grasp the nettle, (having cut the Gordian knot already) and maintain that this sort of nomological dangler is legitimate since these nomological danglers are required by physics whilst *qualia* for example are not. At this point however, physicalism really seems contentlessness, trivial and supported by an *ad hoc* and question begging argument. No *reason* is given here why one should accept this exit strategy rather than reject physicalism, and the reply consequently will satisfy only the converted, certainly not those independent seeks of truth who will not accept doctrines which are inadequately defended.

II

The Case of Buddhist Nominalism

Shyamali Sanyal

In the context of this paper, I should like to establish the view that the Buddhist philosophers propounded a case of nominalism. The term 'nominalism' has been defined variously. Following Nelson Goodman's lead, it may be said that the nominalistic world is a world of individuals, and nominalism consists specifically in the refusal to recognize classes; that abstract entities do not exist; that whatever exists must be construed as an individual. A nominalist should refuse to construe anything as a class; and he makes the distinction of entities, without a distinction of content. The nominalist would deny further that the two different entities can be made up of the same entities.

Since nominalism describes the world as composed of individuals, therefore to explain nominalism we should not explain what individuals are but rather what constitutes describing the world as composed of them. So to describe the world is to describe it as made up of entities no two of which break down into exactly the same entities.

In the following paragraphs, I shall argue the case of Buddhist nominalism along Goodman's line of thought.

The problem regarding the status of universal is quite vexing. 'Universal' denotes the common feature or quality shared by many individuals belonging to the same class, e.g. to know this particular animal as 'cow' one should know that it has that common quality, viz, 'cowhood', which is shared by all the animals so-called and henceforth, under the class 'cow'. This status of universal can be stated variously according to the position one holds that of a realist, of a conceptualist and a nominalist. According to the realist, universals have real existence. As opposed to conceptualism and nominalism, realism means that universals residing in the particulars have their independent reality, whereas conceptualism and nominalism hold that universals do not have any independent being. According to the conceptualist, these exist only in the mind, whereas Nominalists hold that these are nothing but names. Everything which exists is particular; universals are simply the fictions invented by a mind which cannot cope with unlimited variety and is content to take similarity for identity.

Buddhists uphold the above version nominalism. Their nominalism is known as '*apoha-vāda*'. 'Apoha' literally means removing, negative reasoning, excluding all things not coming under the category in point. That is when we describe something negatively, it is known as '*apoha-vāda*'. E. G. if we have to describe an animal as a 'cow' this job may be done only by reasoning negatively that it is not a non-cow, i.e. it is not a horse, not an ass, etc. In course of reasoning negatively we come to the conclusion that since the entity described is not non cow, therefore it is a cow. This description of 'cow' is nothing but a name given by our imagination. Since the name is a figment of imagination, it cannot be ultimately real. At the most one can say that it is empirically real. According to Dignāga, only *svalaksanas* are real. These are known by perception. *Svalaksanas* are nothing but the particulars, point instants given as perceptual data. A particular thing, is a 'this'. But in respect of any particular thing, one can always ask 'what it is'. The nominalists say that the concrete particularity of a thing (its *thisness*) is all it really is, and everything about it (its *whatness*) is only in our imagination.

The *apoha vāda* is based upon the Buddhist's presupposition of universal momentariness. Since everything is momentary, the real, *svalaksanas* which we perceive can exist only for one moment. The next moment there would be another *svalaksana*. Then how should one explain *sāmānyalaksana* as well as the continuity of an existing object? The Buddhists argue that to exist is to exercise Arthakriyākāritva, i.e. causal efficiency. The momentary alone *is* there momentarily, it alone can be casually efficient. And about the continuity of an existing object, the Buddhists state that the things in the two moments of our cognition are only *similar* and that we mistake them to be the same. In other words, all recognition is erroneous since similarity is mistaken in it for identity. The continuity is often explained with the example of a lamp burning throughout the night. The flame of each moment is dependent on its own condition and different from that of another moment which is dependent on other condition. Yet there is an unbroken succession of the different flames. Concepts, according to them, are unreal, since they do not function casually. According to the Naiyayikas, universals are real, apart from the particulars which they co-here with. This relationship between the universal and particular is termed *samaveta* relation. But Buddhists point out that if this were the case, then why did we perceive from a long distance a cow, not as a cow but merely as an instance of *Sattā* or the universal of being (i.e. as a barely existing something) and not the substancehood (*dravyatva*), the cowness (*gotva*) and other universals also similarly inhering in the selfsame distant objects ?

The main point of polarisation over the issue of the reality of universals between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas lie in their respective theories of perception. Naiyāyikas hold that the universals or sāmānya can be known through perception, by *savikalpaka pratyaksa*, whereas Buddhism do not categorize *Savikalpaka* under *pratyaksa*. Therefore, according to the Buddhists, universals are known only by the imaginative function of our minds, i.e. it can be inferred but never given as a data of perception. A *sāmānya* does not have that much of reality which a *svalaksana* has, yet it cannot be said totally unreal, since it depends for its existence on the particulars, it is nothing but the conceptualized particular. As has been said earlier, it is not real in the ultimate sense, but it is empirically real. It is quite correct to say that the terms in which we intellectually characterize what we know in sense-intuition are all general; if we say that this is round, or it is red, we are describing it in terms which are potentially applicable to any number of other objects of the same class. And the universal character of the predicates remains even when the subject of our thinking is highly complicated. It should always be remembered that nominalism follows from an empirical outlook. According to this theory, knowledge is a compound of sense and thought and if thought is necessarily universal, sense may equally be said to be necessarily particular. Dignāga was first to point out that it is in sensation i.e. in perception that we grasp the particularity (*svalaksana*) of things and this remains true even though we cannot find intellectual terms to do justice to that particularity. He makes a clear-cut distinction between *svalaksana* and *sāmānyalaksana* and their means of cognition. We can then say that each individual exists in its unique particularity and what separates them from other things and constitutes their uniqueness we cannot explain, since every attempt of explanation makes use of general terms. Now the question arises—how can we explain the category of difference (*viśesa*) ? Or, how can we explain the apprehension of things as being associated with other characters as when it is said, 'this is a qualified thing or this is its special character ?' Now, it is obvious that a special character of a thing is its difference (*viśesa*) from others, but it does not establish any qualified character and the difference (*viśesa*) itself again is not separate from entities that are differentiated. It is the negative character of *apoha* of an object, that the cow is not non-cow. It is not true that in perceiving an object we perceive it also as different (*viśesa*) when a cow is perceived as not non cow, then its unique nature is only grasped, and only in linguistic usage we can say that it is not non cow. Therefore the category of difference (*viśesa*) is only a mental mode which has never come to us directly in perception. Therefore, according to the Buddhists all universals or *sāmānya* are known only in their negative character; no universal can be apprehended by itself. In this view, there are no abstract general concepts, it is only the individuals that stand as universals and only their specific individual characters are for the time being wiped out of the mind.

Thus, the Buddhists establish nominalism by *apohavāda*. They say that since the datum of perception is absolutely characterless unspeakable and indefinable, these, by their power of *arthakriyākāritva* make possible all the determinable relations. These by their very nature stand as differentiated from other entities of different characters and can assimilate to such other entities having like characters. Buddhists only try to explain that no conscious process of assimilation, discrimination or association of diverse kinds can take place.

Their main point of argument regarding the non existence of universal is that, how a class-concept may remain constantly the same, when all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly changing. (It follows from their presupposition of universal momentariness). If class-concepts are said to inhere owing to specific qualities, e.g. brāhmanism in a brāhmin, it may be objected that a person is still known as a brahmin, even though he acts clearly in a non-brahmanical way. Therefore, for various reasons, it is not possible to admit any class-concept.

As against the Naiyāyikas, who uphold the realistic position, Buddhists say that a cow is known from the fact that it is not a non-cow. If the specific individualization of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another and so on adinfinitum. No *sāmānya* can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impression of past experience of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to extend objects. The thinkers of the Vedanta fold also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know *sāmānya* or *jāti* as a separate substance. So it discards the notion of *sāmānya*. But the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophers point out that negation of non-cows is a negative perception (*Abhāvātmaka*) *Pratyaksa* whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, (*bhāvātmaka*) *Pratyaksa* which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negative theory or the *apoha* theory of the Buddhists. Therefore they admit *sāmānya* as having separate reality.

Thus according to the Buddhists universals are subjective constructions or logical fictions. These are nothing but the names which we give to certain particular objects as shorthand for the series of particulars. Corresponding to these names, we cannot say that there are actual real objects. Herein lies the importance of their *apoha* theory. Ratnakirti in his *Apoha Siddhi* has stated that words denote neither positive objects nor negative ones. The positive meaning is not a consequence of the negation of other objects any more than the negative meaning is the consequence of the positive denotation. The simultaneous cognition of the positive and the negative sides. All determinate objects have a positive nature which excludes others.

Buddhists do not accept any relational statement to be real. In a relational statement, the knowledge apprehends the relation between the qualificand and the qualifier. e.g. the statement' I know the jar' means that 'I am the knower of the jar. Here we find a kind of relation between 'I' the qualificand with the knower of the jar', the qualifier. This relation is known as the relation of identity and here the statement is a relational statement which is not accepted by the Buddhists. These are nothing but the ideal construction of our mind. All relation, as Kant would say, are the forms which our mind imposes on the given elements to make them into objects of knowledge. In determinate perception, we twist the real out of its shape and so it is said to be invalid. Kant, however, denies the possibility of indeterminate perception by which the Buddhists mean the barely unrelated, momentary, real particulars. E. g. Kant's famous statement — "Perceptions without conceptions are blind and conceptions without perceptions are empty". Dignāga dismisses all knowledge of substances, qualities and actions as false. The outer objects are momentary and so cannot be known.

It follows, therefore, from the above account that according to the Buddhists, words or names refer to objects which are not real, like *svalaksanas* because these are admixtured with imagination. And this is the characteristic of *sāmānyalaksana*. If it be asked that words do not signify any real object, what then is its significance ? Buddhists reply is that the connotation of words is but a subjective idea, a mental image, which however is hypostalized as an objective reality existing in its own right independently of the thinking mind. As a subjective notion and a mental image, it is positive, but as it has an exclusive reference by implication and as this negative implication gives the verbal import, its distinguishing charac'er, its real significance is always designated as a fundamental negation. It should always be noted that negation is only a logical pre-supposition and is not psychologically felt in the first presentation. This was first pointed out by Dignāga, words have a synthetic and comprehensive import but as particulars are alone real in Dignāga's school of thought, and as particulars are absolutely distinct and discrete without any connecting link or nexus, the universal of the Realist was equated with a negative concept and not any positive fact. A concept or universal is possessed of a definite content, therefore it is naturally demarcated from other concepts and this negative aspect is regarded as constitutive of its individuality and significance. It is *apoha*. The connotation of the word is then subjective in fact and objective in content. Here lies the nominalistic attitude of the Buddhists. The question then naturally arises — if it is subjective then how can it be communicated to others ? Buddhists reply is that it is through language that it can be communicable to one another, which however are fictitions representatives of reality.

So far I have tried to explain Buddhist theory of nominalism. Let us now examine how Buddhists have strengthened their position by criticizing Nyāya theory of Universals.

The concept of universal (Sāmānya) has been defined by the Naiyāyikas as — "*Nityatva sati anekasamavetatvam*". i.e. it is an eternal and timeless reality, existing in many by the relation of inherence (samavāya). It is known by the determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyaksa*) : As we have already seen that the Buddhists do not admit this definition as well as this mode of knowing *sāmānya*..

Secondly, Naiyāyikas have made a distinction between *sattā* and *astitva*, by pointing out that sattā or existence is being the highest universal, which extends over the greatest number of objects, and whose main function is 'Synthesis'. It subsists only in the first three categories of substance, quality and action. Other categories are not classed under sattā. these have merely *astitva*, meaning thereby that it is not the case that these are non-existent but they are said to function as if, they are existential objects of cognition. The difference expressed by 'as if' here is only that one is perceivable and the other is conceivable. Anything contingent or destructible, anything that can bring forth merit or demerit, is an existent fact (sattā), while others give us eternal entities i.e. these subsist permanently, Therefore according to them, to exist means to be a particular instance of the universal of existence; and the relation between the particular instance as an existent to the Universal which is *Sattā* or Being in general, is the relation of *Samavāya* or inherence. It is the participation in the universal existence or Sattā which is eternal. According to the Buddhists, to exist is to exercise causal efficiency is to produce effect and since the momentary alone exercise causal efficiency, whatever exists is momentary. Therefore for the Buddhists, 'existence' is momentary, whereas for the Naiyāyikas 'existence' is eternal.

Now according to the Naiyāyikas there are no universals of universals therefore *being or existence* as a universal is itself no instance of a higher universal of *Being* and is therefore devoid of *Being*. How can *Being*, the Buddhists argued, which itself has no being be a source of being to the particular instances which are subsumed under it as a universal? Further, a Being itself devoid of being is an obvious absurdity.

Nor can it be said, as the Buddhists point out, that universals, inherence and ultimate differentials have a different kind of being, a *svarupa—sattva*, or intrinsic being which is equivalent to their svarupa or distinctive content. Such a hypothesis postulating different kinds of being for different categories of objects will mean confusion worse confounned.

Further, is *Being* as a universal present everywhere or only in its particular instances. If it were present every-where different things of experience would be confounded together. If however the universal be present in its proper subject only, then the question arises—Does the universal inhering in a particular thing such as a jar get attached to it when the jar is made or not attached? If it is attached then the universal must be supposed to have moved from the already existing jar to the newly made jar which will mean that the universal is a moving thing and therefore a substance. If however, the answer be in the negative; then the universal cannot move to the newly made jar, and, therefore, the latter is non existent. Again, when the jar is broken to pieces and ceases to exist, does the universal survive it or cease to be or move to any other place? On the first supposition, it will be a universal without a particular instance, on the second, the universal will cease to be eternal, on the third, it will be a substance as a substance of motion which is contrary to the Nyāya-Vaisesika view.

But how then are we to explain our experience of one in the many? According to the Buddhists, such experience of one common character appearing to pervade different particulars is nothing but *sārūpya* or similarity among the different particulars in respect of exclusion of the other (*anya apoha*).

Buddhists point out that according to the Naiyāyikas existence (sattā) is the *parājātl* highest universal and is an inherent common character of all the categories. Therefore, in so far as a cow or a horse is a substance, it has existence or sattā as its inherent character. Therefore the negative judgement "a horse is not or a cow is not" etc. amounts to manifest self-contradiction : for this is the same as saying that the cow which is inherently existent does not exist. Contrariwise, when we say that the cow exists, our judgement becomes a tautology, for it amounts to saying that the inherently existent exists or that 'that to which existence belongs as an eternal inherent character exists'.

Further, if the universal, as the Naiyāyikas say, be an inherent eternal character of its particular instances, then in so far as one and the same particular is an instance of two or more universals, e.g. in so far as a cow is an instance of the universal of substance (*dravyatva*) and again an instance of the universal of sattā or being and also an instance of the universal 'cowness' (*gotva*), it becomes the seat of several universal i.e. a case of over lapping universals or *jati samkara*.

Thus we find that the Buddhists succeeded in establishing their views successfully. Their nominalism is justifiedly inherent in their theory of Universals.

NOTES :—

1 N. Goodman — "A world of individuals" in *Contemporary Readings in Logical theory*, ed by Copi and Gould. Macmillan, New York. London.

2 W. H. Walsh, *Reason and Experience*. Oxford.

3 D. N. Shastri, *Critique of Indian Realism. A Study of the conflict between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga School.* Agra University. Agra. 1964.

4 Raja Ram Dravid, ***The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy***. Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, Patna, Varanasi.

5 S. N. Das Gupta, *Indian Idealism*. Cambridge, 1962.

6 Satkari Mookerjee, *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*. Motilal Banarasidass Delhi, Patna, Varanasi.

7 S. K. Maitra, *Fundamental Questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic*. University of Calcutta, 1974.

8 "*Tallaksanantu nityatva sati anekasamavetatvam*". *Siddhanta Muktavali* commentary on *Bhāsāparichheda*. Karika No-9.

9 *Tathā coktam—Vyakterabhedastūtyalvam Saṁkaro thānavasthitih Rūpahānirasam-bandho jāti Vādhaka-samgrahah* 11 — ibid.

10 Ratnakirti — *Aposiddha*.

11 "*tatra kalpanāpodham abhrantam pratyaksam*"—*Nyayabindu* tikā.

12 N.K. Smith: *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Macmillan, London.

III

Some Reflections on the Kantian Weltanschauung

Del Lawhon & Paul Mays

Whether the core of the system of Immanuel Kant can be found in his own works as much as in the cultural milieu in which he worked, and the Weltgeist which he expressed, it would seem that the most essential characteristic of his world view lies in the *spirit of autonomy* upon which he would like to establish all human enterprise. In the terminology of Paul Tillich, it might be said that he faced *heteronomy*, but did not reach *theonomy*. In this, he may have escaped hybris, but he did not reach into the Divine which encompassed him. His 'Copernican Revolution', declaring man to be a "citizen of two worlds" nevertheless strives to proclaim a certain *Declaration of Independence* for man in both worlds. Man need no longer appeal to any authority, must no longer look forward to fulfillment of prophesy; the eschatological perspective is no longer essential, except in a modified hope that Reason will prevail. He needs no more mystical effulgence to open the Divine to him, nor may he be content to view himself as a composite microcosm. Rather, although Kant does try to defend himself against any naive anthropomorphism, feeling no anxiety about man in his great capacity to reason, faith itself for him becoming all too reason like, his zeal for *architechtonic structuring of reality*, and his unquestioned confidence in the inherent validity of intrinsic principles as such, leave him rather enclosed within his own discipline, excellent and freely chosen though it may be. Even his designation of human freedom remains too well defined. He is more interested, or at least was until he read Rousseau, in mapping out the relation between freedom and duty than in liberating man for creative spontaneity. This, of course, came later in the Romantic Movement, but it may not have been possible without the classical compression to which Kant brought his age, as to the fulcrum of a funnel; but he did not anticipate this flowering, although in his Perpetual Peace he did look forward to a unified Humanity as others before had done.

Thus, the categorical imperative, like the *a priori* and the thing in itself, remain for him fixed stars, as it were, in his all-too Newtonian universe. When one feels insecure in our present day swirl of probabilities, crises and complex conjunctions of cultures, it is good to go back to Kant to check up on the efficiency of our rudders. But to expect and secure mooring is almost too much. On the one hand, he had no fatal encounter with the Nothing: he had no dark night of the soul, no reason for despair, his was an age of unlimited confidence, *human* confidence, pietistic in its religious mode and humanist in its secular positivism, neither needing pious consolation nor yet placing glorification of Almighty God (who to him is nevertheless the Ens Realissium) above all human needs. The moral law is within, ontologically, independently, not revealed theologically. And it is a *fixed principle*, not an awareness of a process. It is for him a prescribed perogative; not the interrelatedness of the Antaryami, the Holy Spirit, not the Giver of all Gifts, but the static focus of necessity whereby man must admit in faith his limitations not the opening to Grace and Glory. Kant and *jen* but not *Te*. His sneering betrays him completely, he must have everything brittle and precise. The field of sociology of ideas was not yet open to Kant, nor did he have full access to the Buddhist metaphysics of momentariness, malgre his great innovations in anthropology and psychology. He knew nothing of man's need of transformation; and too much bound by his own schematizing of antinomies, he persisted in thinking categorically, rather than dimensionally or dynamically. He *reached* the "that by which all else is known" of the Upanishads, but did not quite realize what it was. He could not quite enter the compressed convergence of the I, the thou, and the *that* in the indescribable (anirvachaniya) Ground *Brahman*. He still fought shy of the *turiya*, the contemplative node of qualitylessness, from which both finite and infinite, 'absolute' and related can be compared. He made the distinctions, but he never quite became 'assimilated' (in the Bonaventuran sense of appropriative identification) to that, whereby he might observe himself in the act of distinguishing. And above this, he misses the Openness of the Tao, the Pure latency behind the fluctuation of the *Yin* and the *Yang*, which are not antinomies in the Kantian sense, but engendering nodes in the polarization (rather than polarity) of reality into livable forms. Bergson had something of this. and his critique of Kant, especially on time—Kant more or less specialized time, being a quantitative rather than a qualitative thinker, in spite of his effort to appoint the limits to both quantity and quality. Bergson's critique remains quite salient. But above all, by comparison with St. Bonaventura, to whom the hierarchical *analogy* which follows after the analytical *assent* and the analogical ascent, Kant remains a philosopher of man in all his uncertainties, not an instrument of Divine manifestation. Dilemmas and 'as ifs' still circumvent him. Duty is not elevated into Divine Charity. Even Freedom remains *man's* Freedom, a shere *ought*, not the igniting of the spark of divinity, not the restoration of the *Imago Dei* which alone can lead man beyond "philosophy" to sanctity, wisdom from above, and Beatitude. Humanist Englightenment was his prerogative, not the 'irradiation' of supercelestial *claritas*. Kant remains the philosopher of polarities, without quite realizing the full implications of that consciousness whereby he could discern these. Precision presides over perfection for him, which merely remains for him a possibility, not an open door. He failed to find the *valid thirds*.

Or, in Jaspers' terminology, Kant tried too hard to handle transcendentals without facing transcendence. He tried to encompass everything, but did not realize the greater Encompassing which has given the world the dynamism of history whence has come the worlds prophets and avatars as well as its philosophers.

Humanism, in a word, prevails. Judgment and Revelation, as well as the movements of the Weltgeist are still closed to Kant; or at least it is still man that must make judgments about prophesies, not the God of the ages determining the destiny of man and all things, that is, what we have observed in regard to the Critique of Practical Reason applies even more to the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. It is, of course, scarcely an aesthetic work. Only rarely does he rise to little flourishes of genuine "inspiration". But the question is whether he got beyond inspiration. Perhaps he did; but, to use a common metaphor, did he not throw the baby out with the bath, or kill the specimen in the act of dissecting it.

He never experienced *Angst* it seems serene and sedate, methodical to the very end, he was not moved beyond his fondness for critical acumen, and remained all too bound by his own schemata. Thus, in treating of the sublime, he only *viewed*. He did not *enter*. He did not *praise*, but was content to back of and ask whether praise was "good taste". He viewed the mountains, and deeply moved, called them serene, but was not keen for the Glory of God which may be taken as a third level above both beauty and the sublime, in a way that no longer allows the supersensible to be taken as a logical possibility, but by affording a certain union of Observer and observed, in the ontological as equated with the Divine, of which the supersensible is only one existential attribute. Genius produces great works, even making new symbols; but the saint whom Kant considers more from the moral than the aesthetic orientation, bridges the gap between the 'world' and the Freedom and Finality which are inherent in the nature of God as Love. Genius experiences ecstacy, but rapture belongs to the saint, no longer viewing and enjoying, but reviving and radiating something of the Beatific vision, which is the consummation of the aesthetic as well as the intellectual and moral. Kant was content to given *assent*, but he did not ascend. He apprehended, still logically, the *totality*, but he did not get absorbed into any of the effulgent radiations of which totality is an attribute. He remained a fulcrum of the Humanist Enlightenment, not the recipient of the Heavenly Illumination. He never became a homo viator, to use the language of Gabriel Marcel.

Both from the standpoint of St. Bonaventura and from that of Indian Aesthetics, this is true. However, it must be said in his favor that his amazing detachment left him in full power to observe both the view and the viewer and the action of the human mind in the critical act of judging both. In this act of judgment, he could see that there is more than merely the human mind involved, but still was insistent on retaining the systematic perspective, even though if he had been sufficiently consistent, he would have had to admit that this would lead him beyond system altogether. Man judges whatever he views, that is the nature of his taste, his enjoyments; he reflects, perceives that there is the super sensuous aspect of his experience, conceives that there is a close relation of his experience to what ought to be experienced, as well as to the structures of his ways of knowing. Reason again has to admit its finitude, but still tries to sit in judgment over its own limitations.

Kant thus remains rather at the center, critically, but remains existentially unchallenged and unchallenging. He speaks of the virtue of holiness, but does not go on to the beauty of Beatitude. He is content with Freedom autonomously judged, but does not go on to that Fruitio Del which is possible only after an anagogical ascesis. Beauty, the sublime and the glorious are in strict analogical relation. The ontological basis of aesthetics is unavoidable, until the perspective of Universal analogy merges into the *analogia entis*, in sort of pyramidical structure. A flower is beautiful because it is like the sun or the moon; these in turn are like the universal order governing the whole microcosm/macrocosm reflexivity; and these in turn are beautiful because they 'illustrate' (in the literal sense of giving luster to) the interior working of the Deity.

The whole universe thus becomes a 'symbol', an ontological embodiment of the otherwise transcendent 'Infinity of Infinities' to use a phrase common to Bruno and many other Platonists. Kant on the other hand, remains too analytical. He speaks of 'mere' analogies of symbols as all-too logically considered alternatives to logical formulations as such, rather than as the two-way channels of communication of the operation of grace and Glory which are the existential means of participation in the Divine. St. Bonaventura for example would have us behold, or hear and sing, in everything, something of the Holy Spirit's operation. He thus ascends, from beholding a cloud in color, or even a somber cloud, to a direct *beholding* of the divine operations. A somber cloud may symbolize the curtain that conceals the vision of God from the terrestial senses, but holds in latency the life-giving moisture that can assuage the frames of passion; a bright cloud, the revelation, elevation and translation of the divine and supercelestial Light (not merely the supersensible, mind you : St. Bonaventura takes this for granted, and goes much further up the Mount of Vision) that is the ineffable existential link between the soul and the Being of God. Thus he would never be content with the Kantian autonomy, but would have us conformed to the divine Harmony, reformed by the divine charity, and transformed by the divine Clarity into the superessential Unity, which is not just the Kantian supersensible viewed from the standpoint of man, but the/spiritual bond linking the persons of the Blessed Trinity in an aesthetic pattern that complements the Anselmain, greater than with a transparency of interrelatedness wherein the Unity of the Cosmos is sublevated into the Uncreated Unity of God. For this inspiration must be complemented with aspiration and suspiration, until there is complete consummation of the ll into the one, towards which Kant reached; St. Bonaventura arrived there, and was allowed to abide, as it where, leaving only enough of his earthly frame behind to catch some reflections for the sake of communication, thus in the upward ascent which Kant would try to square off with other dimensions. But the emanational aspect of 'Creation', whereby Nature is not just the realm of the operation of law but the interpenetrative manifestation of that Intelligence which is the Logos governing, ordering and making ruddy (erubens) all particulars with ardent desire to return to that whence by participation they derive their *ratio essendi*. The highest turn in the Aesthetic a Arch is thus the architypal subtility of the interrelation of the dynamic, static, and the primordially passive.

In a word, for St. Bonaventura, the function of Analogy is the analogical retracing of this descending order of Manifestation; and there is really not any valid perception or enjoyment of Beauty, of the Sublime, or of Glory except through the operation not so much of human reason ballancing off the subjective and objective, but of Holy Wisdom, the appropriative spiritual principle that operates not subjectively but adumbrating, from within, a certain quation or to use Scheler's phrase, coengendering of man and God. Nothing short of theosis befits the soul who is privileged to behold the Beauty of God in His Creation, in meditation, the operation of His Intelligence in consideration, the sublimity of His effulgence in rapture, and His own Appearance (as in the Incarnation as well as in supernatural visions and voices) in Divine Contemplation, which then is infused, and no longer a matter of mere human effort...Always trilogies, not mere antithesis and synthesis, harmoniously echoing the interrelatedness of transcendence, mediation and immanence in the Godhead.

Kant, by contrast, still caught in his analytical antinomies, can only point towards an a priori : Finality from which, if only he could put his finger on it, man could attain a perspective of universality whereby he could *think* what he is not able to perceive. He discretely avoids superlatives; but does he escape hybris ? He would balance aesthetic taste with the moral *must*, and correlate them both with the cognitive necessity of comprehending totality; but he does not reach into Unity. Does it not remain for him unfathomable and only *possible* ?

From the Indian point of view, we can see somewhat of the same thing. There is always a sharp contrast made between merely human happiness which suffers alteration with pain, and the divine Bliss (*ananda*) which is unchanging and eternal, which is equal with *cit* and *sat*, conscious-and being. All art must embody or show forth something of the latter, although in Indian aesthetics systematically considered there is the theory of the *rasas* (a term which means taste, emotion, ('juice',) which range through the erotic continuum, sadness, hatred, satire, humor etc., which, though apparently simple in themselves, are cultivated in Indian drama to such a degree of refinement, that they cease to be merely human movements of the soul, but oscillations in and out of that Ananda. They are made possible by what is termed the *hiadini sakti*, a manifesting fruitional 'power' that is of God. At first this seems to resemble Kant's theory of genius, which is closely related to his theory of *Geist* and *Seele*; but th distinction is quite clear on closer examination. Then *hiadini sakti* is the downward enabling power of the Divine, which is the feminine aspect of every individual, Shiva, the patron god of the arts (superascetic, though He be otherwise) being often depicted in hermaphroditic form, although there is also Saraswati, who is equally the goddess of learning and the fine arts, while Kant's Geist and Genius are more related to Nature and innate talent in the artist from the 'worldly' point of view. For this reason, the very possibility of a separation of 'sacred' and secular art was never considered in India. The best drama, as well as sculpture, however exotic, is really intended to arouse the dialectic of the aesthetic and the ascetic, out of which the Divine is, as it were regenerated. The temples are often ornamented with figures which are at first grossly erotic, then refined, then furiously demonic, then sublime, pointing toward the imageless direct contemplation of the *jnana yogi* who has transcended all the panorama of the sensuous show, and sits in full control of super-normal power even to destroy or create much that is not with, in the comprehension of ordinary people. The *bhakta*, on the other hand, will employ every possible nuance of art in his devotion to God, as may be seen for example, in the Sukhmani of the Sikh canon, or Tagore. Neither the jnani nor the bhakta (and it is the bhakta that makes the artist, not vice versa) is concerned with the faculty of judgment, because they dwell in the saksi consciousness, the egoless 'witness' self whose locus is that Unity which is beyond the opposites. That is Absolute Reality, (Brahman) itself, which *is* the ground of the unity of the supersensible towards which Kant is always pointing, made available by the logic of identity rather than the method of analysis in the case of the jnani, and by the *cit shakti*, the ascending power of cosmic consciousness or Supermind in the case of the Bhakta, by a logistic of identification which affords immediate insight into any or all reality, and of which it might be said that Kant's thing-in itself is an abstraction. This is considered as absolute, eternal, unchanging and unchanged, beyond the reach of artistic portrayal, although one tradition, the Southern Vaishnava, tends toward a more theistic interpretation of it, and creation as Maya is taken not so much as merely illusory as the artistic *play* of God, more in the spirit of Schelling than of Kant. In this tradition the dedicated and properly institute image—and all Indian art should approximate this ideal according to the older canons-becomes more than a mere symbol, but an actual *embodiment* of the Deity.

The Buddhist views, on the other hand, stress momentariness, and the moral is taken as primary to the ontological, the aesthetic being almost completely subordinated to the ascetic, although of course some very great art indeed did develop under Buddhist patronage. Joy is considered as the lowest scale of the Buddhist scheme of attainments in the psycho spiritual development. The immediate insight into metaphysical principles comes a little after midway, and the exercise of the Boddhisattva's Compassion, which includes the supranormal powers and is not therefore more Christian charity, follows; then, finally the Dharma Megha, the 'Great Cloud of Virtue' in which virtue and ontology coalesce in a suffusing renewal of the psychic forces that affect a whole age or culture. A certain *cultivation of vacuity* is the fulcrum of this scale, a vacuity, however, from which a dynamic awareness or mindfulness is always available. Nothing is considered the grasp of the novice, if he follows the prescribed disciplines. If the Buddhist turns artist, he must work from this vacuity, in a purely intuitive way, acknowledging no other canon. Nothing could be more directly opposite to

Kant, who sought the absolutely great in the ideal of beauty and was as much at home in such a state of latency as a typical American Mechanic would be in a theological seminary.

On the other end of the historical perspective, looking backwards, Karl Jaspers critique of Kant is perhaps as apt in the aesthetic as in the epistemological field. Kant's supreme *sanity* certainly remains a healthy antidote for much of the prismatized art and propagandistic 'criticism' that passes under the name of existentialism and Marxism. Jaspers, of course puts more definitive structures on Reason than Kant, and is aware of our much greater encompassing, And art comes not so much as classic and considered cultivation of taste as a sort of desperate need of communication in the face of Transcendence. The anxiety, lest there be no Finality, motivates the need of form as a means of preservation of the 'Soul' in chaos and a guard against the demonic which threatens man in the form of technological excess. Art should not follow psychoanalysis, but preserve its own canon, as a gesture of freedom of spirit which is primordial, and should not be allowed to become either ugly or mechanized. Thus, in a sense the primordial replaces the a priori; but it still needs reason to preserve it from descent into the crude and primitiue. Reason is ancillary, but as necessary as the brain is in interpreting the heart's elan for the Enduring and the Eternal. Philosophy remains the queen of the arts, but without the enrichment of the artistic spirit, it runs the risk of the positivist fallacy which in being too 'objective' soon 'peters out' in the denial of all value, even the valuational presuppositions that have motivated the merely humanist confidence in the perfectibility of man. Art thus remains normative, mediating the vast underglow of the irrationally subjective and the devastating impact of Concern. For this, to Kant, we must return. For Kant achieved a perspective such that Beauty is symbolic, but in its own independent right, self-subsisting, linking not the known and the unknown so much as joining all the loose ends of what we should like to know or are willing to believe. If one is willing to make the shift away from the indulgent enjoyment of the aesthetic experience, and instead of being completely consumed by it, to behold critically the experience as well as the experienced, he will find that idea therein takes its secure middle role, embodied in its own analogy, needing no apologies, no theological secrets or psychological supports, nor demanding as pure reason does, an apparatus for its comprehension. Even the moral becomes clarified and ennobled by the sublime.

The cluster of grass
With, alas,
One blade broken
Is sufficient token
To teach me all I need to know :
All things grow
Make a show
Fade, or crass
Become. But the picture's *there*.
Light, meaning, I *see*, and dare
To praise : *This* has spoken.

Addendum

To the possible objection that we have underestimated Kant's *greatness*, it may be replied that was by no means our intention. He remains at the *center* still, integrating our thought and will. If he was not a theologian nor a mystic, if he did not reach all the way out and up from this titantic centrality, he remains supremely comprehensive. It may be largely a matter of language: he got no apocalyptic vision, but his synoptic insight is scarcely paralleled in human history, rivalled only, perhaps, by the neo-Confucianists in China and Madhava, not to be confused with Madhva in India, or Averroes in Islam. He knew no need of images or mythologies, but reconstructed Truth as such in its barrenness as systematically as might be, reconciling the realm of experience with the perspective of the limits of experience, both actual and possible, which he leaves reverently as an area not lightly to be invaded by man. Perhaps in our own era even this will have to yield : The cracking of the sonic barrier may be only the prelude of the invasion of new possible realms of space-time; Heisenburg indeterminacy may be only the prelude in physics to the opening of unheard-of potentials in the human psyche; the more cataclysmic meeting and inter-merging of cultures demands a more comprehensive synthesis a priori, and the moral imperative has become a *necessity*, not a *mere must*; and above all, while the externalization of the evolutionary cycle of conquest of Nature comes to a peak, perhaps some new transmergeance into new realms of interiorization and involution. For until both tendencies are brought within human control, mankind will not have achieved the fullness of Destiny that is alloted to him. But even in this, the Kantian architectonic method, with its inexhaustible openness, should still prevail.

Some further remarks, from the Critique of Pure Reason. The usual approach to Kant, of course, is in the same order in which he wrote the Critiques. But if one comes back to the Critique of Pure Reason after finishing the two, and takes his *critique of the inner sense* from the standpoint of comparative studies, the result will be quite rewarding. (TD. D Weldon's analysis is being used as an aid in this). In exploring this region, Kant comes much closer to the Sankhya-Vedanta than to any European tradition that had preceded him. In the latter there is a hierarchy, however, of the outward and inward senses, the *antahkarana*, the common "clearing house" for the inner faculties, the various levels of the mind, *Buddhi manas citta*, the first being the cogitative and/or calculative faculty; the second, the reflective and/or reflexive, in which the "cosmic" consciousness and the individual mind is joined; and the third being the 'Divine' consciousness in which the *analogia entis* is completed, *sat* and *cit* being and consciousness with ananda, bliss that exceeds mere human happiness, being the primary attributes of Brahman. *Citta* is the function of *cit*. But there is also the *saksi* consciousness, the *witness* self which joins the individual soul, self (jivatman) and Brahman, in its *capacity to observe* both the outward and the inward phenomena, however 'noumenous' or 'illusory' they may be. There is considerable discussion in the various commentaries on the Brahma Sutras about the latter, whether this *capacity to observe* on the part of the human mind is itself *actually identical* with Brahman, or only *representatively* so. But in them all, the *saksi*, as the point of union of being and knowing, constitutes the fulcrum between *Maya* and *Brahman*. Further, in the Sankhya, time and space (*kala*, *dik*) come in direct hierarchical order after Mahat, the cosmic matrix or matter, the Ahankara, the Ego, which is said by some to be a cosmic principle, and not a mere psychological integer: after which in the final position is the duality of Prakrti (prime matter) and Purusha (the Person or soul), the latter being passively in the observational position, and the former being active, 'dancing' for the enjoyment of Purusha. The Vedanta, of course, sublates this duality to the unicity of Brahman. It may readily be seen that the Vedanta, no less than Kant, can be forced into a merely idealist or realist or (in the usual sense) monist interpretation. Shankara and Kant stand alone in the 'critical' position, the latter exhausting reason in its attempt at investigating the non empirical, the former showing from above, as it were, the inadequacy of 'mere' reason to deal with more than its own level of operation. In either case the non-empirical self is demonstrated as necessary by the dialectic, although in the Vedanta this Self is taken as necessarily self-proved, as being the locus of all proving and disproving, and as being immediately or *appropriately* experienced in yogic meditation, everything else being dialectically eliminated but the method of *neti neti* (not this, not that). For Kant, on the other hand, it is brought in to provide the competition of his architectonic, to complete and resolve the antinomies in a purely *intellectual* mode, although no one knows except from a few anecdotes what Kant's private method of meditation behind his philosophizing may have been.

Now, in this perspective, the question arises whether Kant really got beyond the *antahkarana*, *buddhi* and *manas* levels of consciousness. Did he reach into the *citta* and *saksi* ? As for the Ego, it is certainly patent historically that he left a large opening for Fichte to fill in latter on.

On the one hand, Kant does have a Unity of self-consciousness, although it is still embodied in the phenomenal world. This can well be construed to be more parallel than subjective idealism of the Vijnanavada Buddhist school which Shankara rejects. There still remains that by which this may be observed. Again, in both, the problems of God, Freedom and Immortality are subordinated to a critique of absolute reality (Brahman) (Bhagavan) of which "God" is a symbolization or *pratika*. and in relation to which the various arguments in regard to substance and causation, permanency and change may be treated as ancillary. However, in this orientation Kant wanted to establish metaphysics as a science, validly operative in its own right. Evidently he thought it to be necessary. Shankara on the other hand (and Ramanuja and Madhva; although Vallabha and Baladeva tend to reject systematic metaphysics and resort more to apologetics instead), although expert at the art, treated metaphysics as also ancillary and almost optional to any other method of inquiry, provided that the subject have the prerequisite ascetic inclination. Again, this is possible to him because the ultimate self, (Jivatman) which is taken as *identical* with Brahman, it for him the initial orientation, and not the necessary compliment, however ultimate, as is the case with Kant.

For the thinking self to Kant is still undelivered from the subject-object dialetic, caught in a strange predicament of asserting tautologies concerning itself, or else of falsely reifying itself in order to make judgments about reality, both outward and inward, with which it must deal. To Shankara, on the other hand, this subject-object relation is sublated by an apophatic ontology in which observer and observed coalesce in the act of the veil of ignorance being removed. Unity therefore does not have to be "introduced" as Kant must try to do; it only has to be demonstrated as beyond proof or disproof, the hindrances being removed by yogic discipline.

However, this Brahman is not ' beyond experience", as it is in Kant, for it is the necessarily inherent identity (as distinct from tautology) of the *that by which* experience becomes possible and the *that by which* one can make the false judgment that anything could be "beyond experience". For in asserting that this is the ultimate beyond experience, one implicitly asserts that one really *is* that which is beyond the experience ! There is only the veil of ignorance, inadequacy of Self-knowledge whereby one may distinguish self (ahankara) from Self (Atman). to be removed by a non-logical psycho-spiritual transformation rather than by an intellectual operation.

By this same *reduction to identity*, Shankara seeks to demonstrate that the inner sense (*Saksi*), is not just a *perceiving faculty* as it would seem to be the case with Kant, but *is* the essential Self, not merely doubly reflexive, but witnessing the process of reflexivity at the same time. The inner sense, again, *is* that immortal Source of Spontaneity (the Ananda, the bliss that is identical with Being and consciousness) and the non-dual thread of self-identification whereby all dualities, inner and outer, active and passive, delusion and reality. etc., can be discerned as being only what they are, participatively real, but separately illusory. Shankara, however is careful not to *assert* the strictly monist fallacy, lest this last distinction be lost. He carefully says *non-dual*, because the Unicity can be only indicated by negation, not described positively because any attribution would compromise its shere unicity. Even the Sat-cit-ananda is only such a *figurative* ascription for him although Ramanuja objects that even a negative description carries a positive force by implication.

There is no necessity, in other words, for Shankara, for "synthesis", because both antinomies must be *eliminated*, not *reconciled*.

It is what is left after this *elimination of contreity* (not, mind you, merely Hegel's *negation of negation*, which leaves a lacuna of finitude unbridged, his Absolute being only *an* absolute after all, not the absolute reaction to that which is beyond both being and becoming, affirmation and negation, that is the "Shining, the imperishable Brahman, the self manifest, the one only without a second". But once the Light of this Beatific Vision dawns, there is nothing else to know, because That is that by which all else is known, by which one distinguishes between relative and absolute, finite and infinite, eternal and perishing.

Therefore no 'fundamental unity of apperception is needed, for the Unity *is* the Self which observes the apperception as correlative with perception in its conjunction with the unity. Both apperception and perception, in short are equally subject to the illusion that there is a separate 'ego' actively at work. The true Reality is the non-illusory self (Atman) which is ultimately known only by Revelation after both involution and evolution come to rest, and the Eternal becomes self-manifest. Then Space and time become reversible, as it were, once this active phenomenal ego is submerged or elevated into the unqualifiable, uncaused and uncausing Brahman. Then one "sees"; then one "knows"; then one "becomes" that which he sees and knows. Then he is no longer bound. Thence there is no return. This 'Revelation' which takes the form of either illuminating Universal Analogy or, paradoxically, negation of all analogy, breaks forth, however, only after both intuitive understanding and synthesizing analysis breaks down.

IV

Some Misunderstandings About Indian Philosophy

K. N. Upadhyaya

India has perhaps the longest continuous history of philosophy—over five thousand years—and yet it is generally ignored by Western philosophers as well as by some contemporary philosophers of India trained almost exclusively in recent movements of Western philosophy. Most of the Western writers of the History of Philosophy make no mention of Indian or Eastern philosophy and yet justify the title of their work as History of Philosophy. They usually presume that there has never been a genuine philosophy in the East. Oriental philosophy is simply a misnomer. It is only a few careful philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, who use such titles as *A History of Western Philosophy*. Despite the publication of a number of works on the History of Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan, S. N. Dasgupta, J.N. Sinha, M. Hiriyanna, C.D. Sharma, S.C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, P. T. Raju and others, some serious doubts and reservations about the nature of Indian philosophy still prevail concerning the question whether Indian philosophy is worthy of philosophic consideration or is merely a subject of antiquarian interest. On the one hand, there are some who consider Indian philosophy as the cradle of the philosophic wisdom known to man and on the other, there are critics who reject its very claim to bonafide philosophy.

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1. K. Satchidananda Murty observes: "It is a curious thing that Sanskrit contains no word "philosophy". In Arabic also this seems to be the case, and owing to the influence of Greek civilization, the Greek word itself seems to be accepted by the Arabs, and "philosophia" is now an Arabic term." *The Indian Spirit*, p. 132.

This ambivalence is mainly on account of the fact that firstly, there is some ambiguity about the use of the term "philosophy" and secondly, there are some serious misunderstandings about what is called "Indian philosophy." In order, therefore, to determine whether Indian philosophy is a genuine philosophy we have first to clarify (at least tentatively) what is meant by philosophy and then to see whether in the light of the general character of philosophy, Indian philosophy qualifies for this title. We shall critically examine the reasons owing to which Indian thought is said not to deserve the title of philosophy. If we find that Indian thought satisfies the generic features of philosophy as much as its Western counterpart, we can discuss whether there are some distinctive features of Indian philosophy over and above the generic ones which legitimize its title as Indian philosophy along with some other philosophies under the rubric of global philosophy. In the light of the general trend of Indian philosophy, we shall then make some brief remarks concerning its possible future prospects.

Do we have a definition of philosophy which is universally accepted ? The answer is no. If we follow the lead of etymology, and take philosophy to mean "love for knowledge," it does not seem to solve our problem. Many questions pertaining to the nature. method and object of this knowledge remain unanswered. Perhaps the safest way to proceed in this matter is to follow established usage and admit that kind of pursuit as philosophical which is so recognized by usage. But there is not just one kind of usage even in the West. One may say that Plato and Plotinus, Bradley and G. E. Moore, Thomas Aquinas and A. J. Ayer cannot all be put under any one philosophic umbrella. Often when we try to decide what philosophy is, we actually prescribe what philosophy should be. In other words, the question of the nature, method and aim of philosophy is itself a philosophical question and the answer varies with one's philosophic standpoint. It seems, therefore. difficult (even prejudicial) to spell out the specifics of philosophy in a neutral way which would be acceptable to philosophers of all persuasions. But since we want to have some ground to stand on, we may proceed with a working definition of philosophy which should be broad enough to encompass all varieties of Western philosophy and yet it should be distinguishable from science and religion with which it sometimes tends to be confused. Shall we then, staying close to its etymology, simply say that it is mainly a rational attempt to know the reality as a whole ? Probably this would work, because being "mainly a rational search for knowledge," it can be easily distinguished from religion which is said to be mainly based on faith rather than on reason and chiefly concerned with the practical application of, rather than the theoretical search for, knowledge. At the same time, being concerned with the knowledge of reality "as a whole" it can be easily distinguished from science, which aims at compartmentalized knowledge.

Now, does Indian philosophy readily fit into the above general framework or working definition of philosophy, or is it reducible to religion, as its critics allege ? Before answering this question it may be borne in mind that firstly, Indian philosophy, like Western philosophy, is not of any single kind. It is well known for its richness and variety. In the course of its long history, it has produced many diverse philosophies, such as, materialism and spiritualism, theism and absolutism, pluralism and monism, realism and idealism, with many subdivisions. Secondly, the problem becomes more complicated because we find no terms in the Indian tradition exactly corresponding to the Western terms "philosophy" and "religion." The terms "*darśana*" and "*dharma*" usually used in the Indian tradition for "philosophy" and "religion" respectively are merely the closest approximations, and they are broad enough to lend themselves to meanings which are not connoted by their Western counterparts.

This should make it clear that we cannot and must not expect to see one-to-one correspondence between the thoughts of the two different cultural milieus. But if the two thoughts exhibit substantial affinity for one another and fit into the same general framework, there is no reason why the two should not be given the same title, provided of course, that none of them makes a radical deviation dangerously approaching the camp of a distinctively different discipline. Allowing thus for individualistic differences, it can be easily shown that what we call Indian philosophy justifies itself fully for the title of philosophy. As is at once evident from the opening aphorisms of the basic texts of some of the major Indian systems, such as Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāyā and Vaiśeṣika, Indian philosophy is mainly a search for the knowledge (*jijñāsā*)[2] of ultimate reality as well as a rational critique and explication (*anvīkṣā*[3] and *vyākhyā*[4]) of the given facts and their underlying ground.

Critics of Indian philosophy may, however, call attention to some other features of Indian thought and in the light of them may try to unseat it from the pedestal of philosophy. It is, therefore, vitally important to examine their charges before making a final verdict on the status of Indian thought.

It is alleged that in view of its general nature as well as in terms of some of its specific attitudes, doctrines, methods and purpose, the d Indian philosophy is indistinguishable from religion. Some major charges may be listed as follows :

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[2] *Athāto Brahma-jijñāsa, Brahma Sūtra* I. I. 1; *Athāto dharma-jijñāsa, Mīmāmsa Sūtra* I. I. 1.

[3] The etymological meaning of Nyāya or Ānvīkṣikī school given in *Nyāya Bhāsyā* is as follows : *Pratyakṣāgamābhyām akṣiptasya anvīkṣā tayā vartata ity ānvīkṣikī. Nyāya Bhāṣya.*

[4] *Athāto dharman vyākhyāsyāmaḥ, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* I. I. 1.

1 **Indian philosophy is spiritual :** This fact is clearly and some- ver-enthusiastically stated by many Indian philosophers them- In the words of Radhakrishnan : "Philosophy in India is ually spiritual... The spiritual motive dominates life in India... dominant character of the Indian mind which has coloured all culture and moulded all its thoughts is the spiritual tendency."[5] According to S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta "the common stamp of an Indian culture" consists in "the unity of moral and spiritual outlook."[6] This is regarded as an out and out religious approach opposed to the purely intellectual concern of Western philosophy.

2. **Indian philosophy is intuitive and mystical :** Truth in Indian thought is said to be realized through intuition rather than by reason. Critics, therefore, point out that Indian philosophy is mystical, basing its doctrines on mystical experience rather than on reason, which, they claim, is the sole tool of any legitimate philosophy.

3. **Indian philosophy is authoritative :** Of the two main branches of Indian thought, one branch consisting of six major systems, called the Orthodox systems, clearly recognizes authority as a source of knowledge and accepts the validity of Vedic authority. Even in the other branch which includes Buddhism and Jainism, although the Vedic authority is rejected, the authority of the founders is not challenged. Buddhists and Jainas pay allegiance to their own scriptures. Thus, barring the solitary exception of Indian materialism, authority almost reigns supreme in the whole of Indian philosophy, leaving little room for the free rational search which is considered indispensable in Western philosophy. The scarce use of reason that can be seen in Indian thought is hardly more than a mere rationalization.

4. **Indian philosophy is motivated by a practical concern :** As against Western philosophy, which seeks knowledge for its own sake and considers disinterested search for knowledge as the distinctive feature of philosophy, Indian philosophy proceeds to seek knowledge with the avowed purpose of terminating suffering.

5. **Indian philosophy is pessimistic :** It is again and again emphasized in Indian philosophy that life is full of suffering and a man must find an escape from it. This, the critics contend, is a typical mark of religion. Distinguishing philosophy from religion, C. F. Lavell observes : "There is a type of mind to which the confusions

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[5] Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, London ; George Allen & Unwin, 1958, pp. 24, 25, 41.

[6] Chatterjee, S. C. and Datta, D. M., *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (6th Edition, Calcutta; University of Calcutta, 1960), p. 12.

and maladjustments of the world are a distress and a fear-flight from them to some refuge of faith is a necessity. Religion, not wholly but quite largely, springs from this distress and fear... There is another type of mind [the scientific-philosophic] to which no refuge is needed because there is no distress, to which confusion is not a horror but a fascination, a summons to investigation and action.'[7]

6. **Indian philosophy is otherworldly :** Life being branded as a vale of misery, the interest of Indian philosophers shifts from this life and world to some other life and world. Belief in transmigration, speculation about heaven and hell and the doctrine of karma and rebirth are various expressions of this mentality.

7. **Indian philosophy is concerned with salvation (mokṣa) :** It is claimed that no Western philosopher is concerned with *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* which may be a goal of religion, but surely not of philosophy.

8. **Indian philosophy is subjective :** Its chief objective is the realization of the Self by controlling the senses and the mind with little concern for the reform of the world and control of outer nature. This self-centered attitude, practically disregarding the outer world, appears as a religious mentality.

9. **Indian philosophy is static and unprogressive :** Because of its fascination for self-centered religious concerns, its beliefs in a static Brahman and the doctrine of karma leading to fatalism, Indian thought has ended in stagnation and unprogressiveness.

If what has been stated above is the whole truth of Indian philosophy, its claim for the title of philosophy surely stands defeated. But, as we shall show in the sequel, many of these summary pronouncements are based upon superficial grounds, some of them involve serious distortions and misrepresentations and, quite often, they mistake a half truth for the whole truth. Thus, we can easily show that they represent a partial, one-sided, grossly exaggerated and hence misleading position.

During the long course of the development of a culture, many diverse ideas are produced and hence it is not difficult to show some such elements in almost any philosophic tradition. In order, therefore, to have a judicious view, one must go by predominant trends and features of the thought process. It is very important to remember in this connection that the concept of philosophy (*darśana*) in the Indian context is somewhat wider and more comprehensive than its Western counterpart, and the Indian notion of religion (*dharma*) is also very much free from its usually loaded and pejorative sense in the West. Indian philosophy, thus, can have a close relation (although not one of identity) with religion in the Indian sense of th[illegible]rm without being adversely and perniciously affected by religion in the Western sense.

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[7] *A Biography of the Greek People* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), pp. 132-133.

The untenability of the above charges can at once be shown if we indicate briefly the import of the Indian view of philosophy and religion and their reciprocal relation. We can then adduce some additional evidence to demonstrate the faulty character of these allegations.

Two words, *ānvīkṣikī* and *darśana*, used in the Indian tradition for philosophy, reflect the nature of Indian philosophy quite well. *Ānvīkṣikī* literally means "review" or "critical examination." Vātsyāyana, the author of *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, defines *ānvīkṣikī* as "a critical examination of the data provided by perception and scripture."[8] The Nyāya school of Indian philosophy, which is noted for its rigorous logical and epistemological concerns, fully expresses this notion of philosophy. The other word, *darśana*, means "seeing" or "insight" which, evidently, emphasizes clear vision or direct realization of the truth. Very early in the Indian tradition it was realized that some deeper aspects of reality cannot adequately be grasped merely by the senses and the intellect. Indian philosophers in their serious quest for truth, however, would not admit easy defeat and would explore other and more potent means of uncovering the truth. This has led serious-minded inquirers to develop higher faculties of knowing which, for lack of better words, are called intuition. This view of philosophy is exemplified by the Yoga system of Indian philosophy. The word *darśana* may also be taken to mean a "standpoint." It was in this sense that Indians admitted the possibility of more than one *darśana*. It may be noted here that the logical and epistemological methods of Nyāya and the techniques of higher insight discovered by Yoga are, with more or less emphasis and with some modifications, common possessions of almost all systems of Indian philosophy. They are, as it were, two poles of Indian philosophy — the intellectual and the spiritual. One cannot, therefore, have a balanced view of Indian philosophy without taking into consideration these dual elements.

If philosophy is concerned with the total view of reality, it must take into consideration our total experiences, viz. sensory, mental, as well as intuitional. The world of waking, dream, dreamless sleep and transcendental experiences cannot all be duly comprehended and assessed by the exclusive use of either the senses or the mind. It is unphilosophical to assume, without proper scrutiny and examination, that supra-sensory intuition is not a genuine and valid experience, as sense experience and intellectual experience are. The fact that the former is rare and hard to attain, while the latter are more common and easily accessible is no ground to discredit the f r. The faculty of fine aesthetic discernment of an artist canno e ignored, because it is a rare possession of some highly cultiv d persons.

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[8] See footnote 3 for its original Sanskrit version.

It may also be pointed out here that some Indian philosophers, notwithstanding their full realization of the importance and use of reason, do not recognize it as the sole distinguishing feature of man. The *differentia* of man, according to them, is *dharma*, the power that enables man to discern what is morally right or wrong (which, of course, includes the rational power). As it is said: "Men and beasts are alike in matters of eating, sleeping, fearing and sexual activities. *Dharma* alone is the additional prerogative of men, and those who are devoid of *dharma* are like beasts."[9] *Dharma* is the power which "supports or upholds."[10] It sustains man and the universe, and brings about social cohesion. If, therefore, this *dharma* ceases to be observed properly, then the binding ropes of society are loosened, as it were, and in that case society would be in the same state as the planetary system would be in the event of the dwindling of the gravitational force.

Dharma expresses itself in the form of such practice (sādhanā) as is in accordance with the fundamental truth and the cosmic moral order. In its genuine form, it is, thus, a necessary practical side of philosophy. As Sri Aurobindo points out: "Religion imparts a dynamic, active, and practical orientation to philosophy."[11] He further amplifies: "Philosophy is the intellectual search for the fundamental truth of things, religion is the attempt to make the truth dynamic in the soul of man. They are essential to each other; a religion that is not the expression of philosophical truth degenerates into superstition and obscurantism, and a philosophy which does not dynamise itself with the religious spirit is a barren light, for it cannot get itself practised."[12] Affiliation of a serious philosophy with a genuine religion, thus, instead of being considered undesirable, should be regarded as highly desirable for an integrated life. One can rightly say that philosophy without religion is empty and religion without philosophy is blind. Hence the views of some scholars that the "time...has come when students of philosophy all over the world, particularly in India, should think afresh and separate Indian philosophy from Indian religion"[13] is unwarranted, being based upon mistaken notions both of Indian philosophy as well as Indian religion.

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[9] For detailed discussion on *dharma*, see author's paper, "Dharma as a Regulative Principle" in *Quest for Truth* (Delhi: S. P. Kanal Abhinandan Samiti, 1976), pp. 546 553.

[10] *Dhāraṇād dharmam ity āhuḥ...*, *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parva, 109.12 & Karṇa Parva, 69.59.

[11] Sri Aurobindo, *Heraclitus* (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1947), pp. 46-47.

[12] Quoted by Adhar Das, *Sri Aurobindo and the Future of Mankind* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1934), p. 53.

In the light of this clarification, it should not be difficult to see that the charges levelled against Indian philosophy emerge from either misconceived notions of Indian philosophy and religion or they mistake what is only a part for the whole of Indian philosophy. In the latter case, some charges levelled against Indian philosophy will fall upon Western philosophy as well.

Let us now examine the first charge of spirituality. If some undaunted seekers of truth in the course of their resolute search came to discover some spiritual reality underlying variegated phenomena of the world, should they have shown intellectual dishonesty or cowardice by refraining from bringing it to light? In fact they should be admired for sharing their hard-earned discovery with others, and for encouraging others to verify it through their own experience. In any case, it is only one aspect of Indian philosophy and is not applicable to some materialistic and naturalistic philosophies of India.[14] Also, as Constantin Regamey has shown, there is no dearth of spiritualist philosophers even in the West.[15]

So far as intuitive and mystic experiences are concerned, we have already pointed out that they have a rightful place in the comprehensive scheme of philosophy, and they are not necessarily matters of religion. If the rational method were to be regarded as the exclusive method of philosophy, many important philosophers of the West such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, all Christian mystics, all rationalists, the entire Moral Sense School, the Natural Law intuitionists of the eighteenth century and Bergson, who make use of intuition (without knowing its full implications) cannot be considered philosophers. We have already indicated that we cannot arbitrarily restrict the definition of philosophy.

Much confusion is created by calling Indian philosophy authoritative. One tends to read into this appellation a sort of dogmatic unquestionable acceptance of some truth arbitrarily handed down from some inexplicable source above. This, however, is not true in the case of Indian philosophy. Firstly, if by "authority" we mean Vedic authority, then there are only two major school of Orthodox Indian thought, namely, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, which are directly based upon Vedic authority. The remaining four Orthodox systems developed their philosophy on independent grounds, giving only a superficial acceptance to the Vedic authority, and Heterodox systems completely reject it. But, on epistemological grounds all Orthodox schools, except Vaiśeṣika and Jainas among the Heterodox schools, clearly recognize authority as a separate and independent source of knowledge, specially in regard to such objects as are not amenable to other ordinary sources of knowledge. In the words of S. Suryanarayana Sastri, "If philosophy is really an attempt to obtain the view of the whole, it ought to embrace the whole; our perceptive powers are limited to the *here and now* of experience, and reasoning proceeds only with the help of characteristic marks and examples from the world of perception."[16] That which is beyond perception and inference, he points out, "requires to be intuited; it has been so intuited in the past and the result is the knowledge contained in Scriptures."[17] Not to avail oneself of hard-earned rare wisdom of competent authorities (who have learned the truth for themselves, and are thereby in a position to speak with authority) is to deprive oneself of a valuable treasure and rare opportunity. And surely, what is thus professed is claimed to be verifiable. It is interesting to note that the three steps to truth which are normally mentioned in the Orthodox tradition, namely, (1) *śravaṇa* (listening to the truth), (2) *manana* (rational reflection) and (3) *nididhyāsana* (absorption), explicitly emphasize that the truth learned through authority has to be rationally examined and then finally experienced for oneself. Śaṅkara, the noted champion of the Vedānta, makes it clear that the purpose of the Scripture is to enhance our knowledge of the unknown and not to distort or contradict what is already known through other valid means. As he observes: "Even if a hundred texts declare fire to be cold or without light, they would not acquire validity."[18] The existence of an amazingly large variety of systems within the same so-called authoritative tradition is a positive proof of the fact that reason is allowed full play in Indian philosophy and authority is open to rational examination and criticism. It is not infrequent that the Scriptures were openly challenged and undermined even within the same Orthodox tradition.[19]

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[13] S. K. Saksena, "Basic Tenets of Indian Philosophy" in his book, *Essays on Indian Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), p. 23.

[14] Numerous books dealing with materialistic and naturalistic thoughts of India have been referred to by Dale Riepe in his paper, "Recent Assessments and Misconceptions of Indian Philphy" in *Quest for Truth* edited by K. K. Mittal (Delhi: Prof. S.P. Kanal Abhinandan Samiti, 1976). p. 79.

[15] Constatin Regamey, "The Meaning and Significance of Spirituality in Europe and in India" in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. X. Nos. 3 & 4 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, October 1960 & January 1961), pp. 105-134.

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[16] S. Suryanarayana Sastri, "On the Study of Indian Philosophy" in *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, (Madras: University of Madras, 1961), p. 7.

[17] Ibid., p. 7,

[18] *Gītā Bhāṣya* XVIII. 66.

[19] *Mundaka* I. 2 7-10 and the *Bhagavadgītā* II. 46 & III. 11-12, for example, make disparaging remarks of the Vedas and their rituals.

The fact that Indian philosophy is dominated by a practical outlook, that it calls attention to the suffering of the world and that it advocates *mokṣa* as a state free from suffering cannot but be regarded as symptoms of its realistic and experiential character. The difficulty raised on the grounds of practical outlook is very flimsy. "Not even a fool undertakes some work without a purpose,"[20] observes Śaṅkara. Why should a philosopher engage himself in the most challenging task of philosophy without having an idea of its practical use or purpose ? This purpose, however, does not vitiate the objective character of philosophical knowledge. It is made clear that the purpose of terminating suffering can be fulfilled only by pure, objective or unbiased knowledge. Thus, this purpose cannot militate against what is called in the West "a purely disinterested search for knowledge." Besides, we must not lose sight of the fact that a genuine desire or love for knowledge (*jijñāsa*) is basic to the Indian philosophic quest, and doubt, rational nature of man, as well as criticism and defense of different philosophic positions also play significant parts in the motivation behind Indian philosophy. In the Nyāya school, for example, doubt is said to provide the chief incentive for philosophic speculation. It may also be pointed out that despite the claim of disinterested theoretical knowledge in the West, many practical political or ethical concerns are evident in the philosophic pursuits of at least some of the Western philosophies. The Socratic view that virtue is knowledge points in the same direction. In the Pragmatic philosophy of William James, truth is said to be determined in terms of utility.

Regarding the Indian concept of *mokṣa*, it may be noted that it is directly linked with the highest knowledge, and, thus, it is more a matter of epistemology than of religion. It is not an imaginary escape, but a verifiable realization of truth. Cases of a somewhat similar ideal can be pointed out even in certain forms of Western philosophy, such as Stoicism, original Epicureanism, and Neoplatonism. Schopenhauer and possibly Spinoza also seem to entertain a similar ideal.

The charge of subjectivism is based on the lack of proper understanding of the glory and grandeur of the immortal soul, by meditating upon which the mystery of the entire universe is said to be revealed. It is, indeed, a remarkable contribution of Indian philosophers, as we shall shortly explain. Likewise, the Indian concept of eternal Brahman and doctrine of karma, if wrongly interpreted, may give rise to a static view of reality and create the impression of a fatalistic and unprogressive society. Their full philosophical implications cannot, however, be discussed within the limited space of this paper. We can only say that these concepts are said to be based upon experiential claims of Indian philosophers and cannot simply be dispensed with by branding them as mere matters of faith.

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[20] *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, Introduction,

After having demonstrated the philosophical nature of Indian philosophy and having indicated in a general way some of the peculiarities of its nature and approach, we may now point out some of its other distinctive features in more specific terms. But the question may be raised at this point as to why Indian philosophy should be any different from Western or any other philosophy. Is not the expression "Indian philosophy" an oddity, because true philosophy is neither Indian nor Western ? If we do not speak of, say, Indian mathematics (despite there having been great Indian mathematicians), what justification is there to speak of 'Indian philosophy" in addition to just philosophy ?

Without trying to be elaborate, attention may at once be drawn to the fact that no sound analogy holds between mathematics and metaphysics. The former deals mainly with abstract forms which despite being applicable to experiential contents or entities cannot themselves be considered identical with these contents or entities, whereas the latter is supposed to be concerned with experiential (in a comprehensive sense) contents or entities, and not merely with abstract forms. Mathematical calculations and geometrical theoreme hold good universally in all cultures and countries, but such is not the case with philosophical doctrines and theories. In other words, the former is not culture-bound, while the latter is. Therefore, despite accepting some broad general features and frameworks of the subject, it may not be incorrect to make distinctions between Greek philosophy and Indian philosophy or between Western philosophy and Eastern philosophy. Since the philosophical activity takes place within a certain cultural setting, it tends to bear the mark of that culture. Culture is shaped by the history and history in its turn is influenced by geographical and other conditions. Therefore, somewhat analogous to the distinctions made between Indian and European history or geography, one can within the general framework of philosophy make a meaningful distinction between Indian and Western philosophy.

We may now point to some of the more important distinctive features of Indian philosophy. They are to be called distinctive in the sense that they are either completely absent or are not found in any dominant form in Western philosophy. In view of the limited space, no elaborate explanation of them will be made. Among these distinctive features mentioned below, some are reflective of the basic attitudes and perspectives of Indian tradition, while others are the results or achievements of its philosophic pursuit. Most of the features are held in common by all systems of Indian philosophy, while some others are applicable to them with some exceptions or limitations :

1. **Philosophy as the highest branch of knowledge :** Unlike other discipline dealing with ordinary (lower) knowledge, philosophy according to the general traditions of India is supposed to deal with higher wisdom (*parāvidyā*). It is, therefore, to be taken most seriously and cherished as the most valuable possession. This knowledge is said to be cultivated after thorough preparation and with unshakable determination. Śvetaketu finished all his education before he received instruction in philosophy from his father. Nārada had to work for long years before he went to Sanatkumar for the philosophic wisdom. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja both lay down intellectual and moral pre-requisites for the study of the Vedānta. It may sound incredible to most of the people in contemporary settings, but the life and teachings of the propounders of the different systems of Indian thought clearly bear witness to the fact that they dedicated their entire life to the cause of philosophy. Their daring spirit, boldness and depth of thought can hardly be over-stated.

2. **Synthetic approach :** Indian philosophy deals with this subject in an integrated way. Unlike Western philosophers, who treat separately the different branches of philosophy, such as, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, etc., the traditional Indian philosophers treat them integrally and discuss them accordingly. Unlike such Western schools as rationalism and empiricism which lay exclusive emphasis on reason and experience, respectively, Indian philosophy generally (though there are a few exceptions) explains experience in such a way that both outer (sensory) and inner (rational or intuitive) experiences are included in it, and thus Western opposition is reconciled. Even while recognizing the supremacy of *moksa* as the highest goal, Indian philosophy integrates other objectives of life, viz., happiness, wealth and moral virtues with it.

3. **Cycle of the world process and the notion of infinity :** All Indian systems except Cārvāka have the bold vision of the infinity of the world process. The supreme reality is infinite and the world is without beginning. The process of evolution and dissolution of the world continues indefinitely in cycles. India's mathematical invention of zero may probably be linked with this cyclic approach.

4. **Majesty of man :** Human life is invaluable because human beings alone have the potential to realize the supreme goal. "There is nothing higher than the human being,"[21] declares the *Mahābhārata*. The soul is uncreated and eternal, however low it may have sunk in this creation. When, through the process of evolution, it reaches the human level, it can then, by utilizing the opportunity offered by human life, realize the highest goal.

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[21] *Na hi manuṣyāt śreṣṭataram hi kiñcit*, Śānti Parva, 180.12.

5. **Introspective approach :** Since the soul is the eternal inmost essence of man and it contains within itself the clue to the mystery of the whole universe, meditation on it becomes the most vital concern of man. That the macrocosm is contained within the microcosm is the essential secret of Indian wisdom.

6. **Karma and rebirth :** Indian philosophy offers an important solution to the problem of evil, suffering and inequality. In the limitless world, souls without beginning are going through the consequences of good and bad actions which they themselves chose to perform in the past. While reaping the results of their actions, they are simultaneously utilizing their limited freedom (with the load of karmas increasing, the freedom is correspondingly curtailed) to perform new actions. The world is, thus, a moral stage where we play our respective roles and, in accordance with our performance, make our future. It also provides an opportunity to learn our lessons and even reach the stage of enlightenment.

7. **Unique combination of love for tradition and freedom of thought :** Indian philosophers have generally been conscious of tradition and, out of respect for the past, they seldom claim originality in their thought. Even while propounding astoundingly new theories, they generally submit with humility that they are simply reformulating ancient wisdom. Most of the great names in Indian philosophers, such as, Śaṅkara, Vācaspati, Rāmānuja, Vātsyāyana and many others, claim only the modest title of commentator. This approach seems quite consistent with the theory of *Satkārya-vāda* (according to which what is produced is said to be already contained in its material cause). But this attitude is so wide-spread that even the famous logician Jayanta, an upholder of the opposite theory, *Asatkārya-vāda*, declares that nothing absolutely original can ever be said.[22] What is ingenious to see is the remarkably varied interpretations that they make while demonstrating their allegiance to the past. Reverence for authority, thus, does not militate against progress. It must not, however, be forgotten that authoritative texts which they try to comment upon are usually the works of highly talented philosophers. In any case, it is interesting to notice that unlike their Western counterparts who, even while working under the influence of their predecessors and borrowing much from them, erect the edifice of their philosophy on the old debris, Indian philosophers tend to highlight the old texts and try to speak through them.

8. **Respect for life and thought :** As a result of the mixing and mingling of so many races and tribes at a very early stage of the development of Indian thought, India developed a composite culture

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[22] *Kuto vā nūtanaṁ vastu vayam utprekṣituṁ kṣamāḥ; Vaco vinyāsa-vaicitryamātram* atra vicāryatām. *Nyāyamañjari* (Introduction).

a[illegible]arned to live with mutual tolerance. This eventually contrib[illegible] to the development of great respect for life as well as for the o[illegible]n of others The former in the form of avoidance of all inju[illegible]o life (*ahiṁsā*) constituted the greatest moral virtue of India. T[illegible]atter in the form of freedom of thought paved the way for philo[illegible]phy of standpoint which expressed in Buddhism and Advaita V[illegible]nta as lower and higher (Vyāvahārika and Pārmārthika) standp[illegible]nts and in Jainism as the judgment of relativity (Syāda vāda). It also promoted an atmosphere of healthy and constructive debates which became a great tradition in India and added to the development of philosophical knowledge.

9. **Disinterested approach to empirical science :** Indian philosophy, as already pointed out, has been closely associated with religion and has developed an introspective approach. This might have been responsible for its lack of fructifying contact with the natural sciences. In this respect the Indian and Western approach by and large seem to be mutually opposed to one another. It is well known that ancient Indian and Greek cultures made great advancement in mathematics, astronomy and medical science. The Indian astronomer Aryabhatta made the discovery of the rotation of the earth and the actual cause of the eclipses, and medical researches done by physicians showed the correct anatomy of man. But these researches, unlike those of Bruno and Galileo, did not create any stir in India and Indian philosophy remained almost unconcerned. In this particular case, though, the reason might have been that Indian philosophy and religion never had geocentric views, but even otherwise Indian philosophy has been largely unconcerned with scientific development. This attitude of indifference to science by philosophy, a highly respected discipline of India, may have adversely affected the growth of the Indian sciences.

10. **Harmony between man and nature :** At the early Vedic stage, Indian philosophy uncovered an eternal cosmic order (*ṛta*) running through the whole universe. Its doctrine of karma emphasized that man is the maker of his own destiny. Nature is considered subservient to the purpose of man and it provides the field for his action. In Indian metaphysics, soul and nature form an organic whole under God and are thus harmoniously related. Thus, there is no inherent antagonism between man and nature. Although nature is finally to be transcended, this transcendence is made possible through a balanced and harmonious response to it. An Indian philosopher does not pronounce the universe to be absurd, as Sartre does.

11. **Emphasis on experiential approach :** Despite the dominant Idealistic trend of Indian philosophy, the attitude of Indian Idealism towards experience is very different from that of the Western Idealism or Rationalism. Knowledge according to Indian philosophy

originates from, as well as culminates in, experience (*anubhava*) [23] This experience may be outer sensory, inner mental, or the highest intuitive experience.

Direct experience or intuitive knowledge is the only way to remove ignorance, the root cause of suffering, and thereby to secure the absolute freedom or salvation. Only that knowledge which emancipates or brings about immortality is the true knowledge, declare the Upaniṣads,[24] and that is none other than the direct experience.

In closing we would like to say a few words very briefly concerning the possible future prospect of Indian philosophy. During its long history, Indian philosophy has gone through many rough weathers and, in moments when it was found languishing, it received a new lease on life on account of its synthetic or assimilative character. As noted above, Indian philosophy developed this trait very early in its history. The Upaniṣadic thought which is considered a peak point in the pre-system building period of Indian philosophy was a result of the confluence of Aryan and pre-Vedic non-Aryan thought.[25] Even in the recent past when Indian philosophy was dwindling under the yoke of British rule, and English missionaries, with a view to exposing weaknesses of Indian thought and culture and establishing superiority of their own, were studying Indian languages, writing books and translating a number of religious and philosophic works from Sanskrit, a new wave of consciousness was created in India. There emerged a new class of intellectuals in India who eagerly absorbed the essentials of Western thought and utilized them for the advancement of their own religio-philosophic culture. Although some of them, such as Dayanand Saraswati and a few others, were revivalists who emphasized going back to the ancient ideals, the movement which vitalized Indian spirit and brought triumph for India was guided by such reformists and syncretists as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Ranade and others. This historical pattern brings the message home to us that the future of Indian philosophy depends on the synthetic and assimilative approach of Indian philosophers towards the contemporary Western philosophy. We must not lose sight of the fact that all that is old is not necessarily good, and all that is new is not despicable. The Indian philosopher of today must, therefore, widen his perspective and sharpen his philosophic tools through a thorough and careful study and a balanced assimilation of the movements of contemporary Western philosophy. That has been the typical Indian mode of response to other thoughts and cultures. That is how Indian philosophy has enriched itself and progressed in the past and this pattern is most likely to continue in the future.

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[23] *Anubhavāvasānatvāt. ca. Brahmajñānasya*, Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 2.

[24] *Sā vidyā yā vimokṣaye*; *Vidyayā amṛtam aśnute.*

[25] K. N. Upadhyaya, *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā* (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna : Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), pp. 75-87, 91.

V

Freedom and Social Freedom

Ioanna Kucuradi

Freedom is an enchanting word. Innumerable fights have been fought in its name; and blood, too much blood, has been shed for its sake. Blood it is still shed. And in the name of freedom, the most unbelievable things are being done.

In the history of Philosophy almost all philosophers have come to grips with freedom and the most diverging assertions were put forth to define it.

What can we learn from these practical and theoretical adventures of freedom ?

The first thing we can learn is the need to make distinctions, and what might help us to make these distinctions is to specify, everytime we deal with freedom, whose freedom it is.

Such an approach to freedom leads us to distinguish, at least, three main kinds of it, which, though interrelated, should by no means be confused. These are the "freedom of Man"—as a species—, which I call anthropological and which is the kind of freedom mostly disputed among philosophers; the "freedom of the individual" in his interpersonal relations, which I call ethical, and social freedom.

Anthropological freedom is a human potentiality— an ontological possibility of Man to be actualized by individuals—, or, a characteristic of Man, distinguishing him from other living beings. It is a plus possibility of Man, actualized through various activities in inter-human relations : a possibility which makes Man—i.e. some men—determinable also by value knowledge and valuable principles in action. This possibility, which individuals actualize, constitutes one of the specificities of Man : it is a value of Man.

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[1] For this term, see my "Philosophy and Human Right", in *Philosophical Foundation of Human Rights*, Ankara 1982, p. 47.

The possibility (or anthropological freedom) actualized by individuals in action, becomes a property of those individuals: the property of those who know and take in to account the value of Man[3] and values in action. In other words freedom is, in the second instance, a value of the individual, or, an ethical value. To put it very briefly : free is he who, in everyday life, acts basing himself on right evaluations (of actions, events etc), evaluations which he tries to make consciously, and with respect to human value. Or: ethical freedom is the characteristic of the individual who is able (when he possesses sufficient information for that) to make right evaluations, and who, basing himself on them, really does what ought to be done in a particular case in order to protect human rights or, in order to secure, in the ever thickening mud of our world, that these rights be less damaged in the existing conditions (like Dr. Rieux in Camus' *The Plague*).

What leads individuals to freedom is, mostly, other free individuals, whom they meet —if they are lucky enough— in life, or, in literary work, and who stimulate them to (ethical) freedom. But what helps individuals to remain free is the principles underlying the arrangement —establishment and changing— of social relations in a given country. Such principles made valid in a country —to begin with in morals, in planning education, in enacting laws, in implementing justice, up to those prevailing in political administration may be principles intending to protect the value or dignity of Man in individuals; they may be the contrary of this, as usually is the case, or, they may be a conglomerate of both.

Because the kind of principles made valid —through laws, institutions etc.— in a country, and consequently, the existence or non-existence of social freedom and its measure, depend, to a great extent, on the cognitive insight and ethical freedom of —the majority of— those is power, and those who govern public institutions in a country. This is why coincidences also play considerable role in life. Something that we can learn from the long adventure of freedom, is this connection that cannot be severed, between social and ethical freedom only free individuals can safeguard the permanent realization of social freedom.

Since social freedom, in general, is an idea, the idea that social relations in a country, ought to be so arranged as to protect the human rights of individuals; so arranged as to give the opportunity to individuals to be determined by value knowledge in action, as well.

Let us now try to get a bit neaear to this idea of "social freedom".

The content of social freedom consists of various "freedoms", which we may divide into a few kinds, and, in fact, from two main view points: from the view-point of the individual within his social relations and from the view-point of the State.

From the view-point of the individual, social freedom appears as moral freedom(s) and legal freedom(s). If from 'moral's we understand "the system of value judgements —the "good"s and the "bad"s— valid in a given group at a given time", 'moral freedom' would mean the absence of effective reaction against an individual :- absence of a reaction affecting his life—, when this individual acts, takes attitudes or evaluates things not in conformity with the relative value judgements valid in the group it belongs to, no matter whether these actions, attitudes, evaluations stem from his concern to protect value in the given conditions, or from other motives.

Social freedom appears as a bunch of various —basic and public-freedoms.

When we take a look at the contexts in which the term 'freedom' is used, what I call 'legal freedoms' of the individual seem to denote the absence of any hindrance for the individual, in doing what each freedom states. And this absence of hindrance is considered to be a right. Such a conception of freedom makes it a "dangerous" concept, a danger which those in power try to counter by bringing restrictions on "basic freedoms".

Still, all the "legal freedoms" are counter points of rights of the individuals they are the demands expressed by some rights of the individual, put under the guarantee of law. The express, the actual legal protection — safeguard and fulfilment — by State organs, public institutions etc., of the rights of the individual in a given country. Thus these freedoms express the idea of the actuality of the rights they correspond to. Let us now see how :

The rights of the individual consist of two main categories : his basic —or human— rights and his economic-social-public-civil etc. rights.[2] The rights of the individual to which freedoms correspond, are his basic rights.

A part of these basic rights is connected directly with the exercise of human potentialities. They are demands, demanding that individuals be not hindered while exercising activities proper to Man only, and not in doing this or that. They demand the protection of rights which can not be given (by a State), but can only be respected (or violated) in individuals by individuals; or: they demand that "nobody" touch an individual for any reason, while this individual is engaged in realising a human potentiality. Put in a legally valid document they become freedoms —the so-called "basic freedoms—, which garantee the possibility to demand legally from "everyone to respect them.

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[2] See also "Philosophy and Human Rights", pp. 47-52.

Thus, so far as this group of basic rights is concerned, conceptually a right and a freedom are exactly the same thing, named from two different view-points: when we call a demand of this kind a 'right', we mean something that individual posoesses, even if it is not legally safeguarded. While we call it a 'freedom' we emphasize its being under the guarantee of law, which guarantee that this right be respected; for this respect depends mainly on individuals. Where these basic rights of the individual are actually respected, there their correlative freedoms exist: people enjoy these freedoms; where they are not, there prevails insecurity or anarchy and terror. And where they are violated by State organs, there reigns oppression.

To give an example, I would mention the so-called "freedom of thought", which, put in a legally valid document, expresses the guarantee that the right of every individual to put forth new knowledge and ideas will be respected, i.e. nobody —his superiors, any State organ, the judge, the police — will "touch" him — cause damage to his other rights— under no circumstances, because he put forth a new piece of knowledge or idea, no matter how divergent this knowledge or idea may be from the existing ones.

The second part of the basic rights of the individual, are demands related to the pre-conditions affording each individual the possibility to develop his human potentialities. The right to "a standard of living adequate for one's health", the right to education, the right to work, for example, are such rights. In opposition to the first group of basic rights, they can be protected only indirectly, through other rights given to the individuals by a State —by means of social, economic, political and civil rights— and through public institutions, founded mostly by political decisions. In other words: the protection of these rights presupposes the fulfilment of the complementary duties of the State.

Now, in order that these rights become freedoms, it is not enough that they be taken under the guarantee of law; a special condition of the given rights, which protect them indirectly, is also required.

The given rights, which constitute the second category of the rights of the individual besides his basic rights, are limits drawn by the State to individuals in each country; they deliniate some areas within which individuals may act as they like and they demand that no citizen transgress these limits. They are rights in which —not all human beings but— all (concerned) citizens in each country are equal. The determination of the lowest payment, of the minimum number of years of work required for retirement are such rights.

The fulfilment or not fulfilment of the indirectly protected basic rights of the individual in a country, depends on how the limits of the rights given to individuals are drawn. This inevitable connection of these two categories of the rights of the individual is the reason why the State —i.e. here, each government; that comes to power— has to afford uninterruptedly the possibilities of protecting equally, -at the same degree, whatever this degree may be— these basic rights of all its citizens; rights which constitute the general pre-conditions of developing, as individuals, their human potentialities, and which can be protected only indirectly. This demand is also, more or less, my wording of social justice.[3]

Now, so that the indirectly protected rights of the individual can become freedoms in a country, even the existence of the possibility of equal protection of these rights of all citizens —even the existence of social justice- would not be sufficient, not only the protection at the same degree of these rights of all citizens, but also a *certain* degree of protection is necessary: the existence of the possibilities of their full, i.e. dignified protection.

To give a simple example to how these indirectly protected basic rights of the individual may become freedoms, I would mention the right to education: it becomes a freedom not only when the possibility to get primary education is afforded for all child-citizens, but when also the possibility to get secondary, vocational, high-school education is afforded to all (concerned) citizens; when all citizens in a country are not hindered, by economic, moral etc. reasons, from developing systematically each of his or her own capacities, a development which will afford him or her the equipment necessary, as a pre-condition— for a dignified life. This is a simple example; things are much more complicated with other rights.

It is easy, I think, to notice that what I said on the relationship between freedoms and rights, concerns only basic — human-rights. So far as given economic and social— rights are concerned, the State of things is quite different; there is no question of their "becoming freedoms". 'Freedom' with regard to a given right, would mean the absence of any hindrance —or the absence of limits— in doing something, which would be in contradiction with the very nature of such rights: their being limits drawn to something; in connection with economic rights, for example, it would mean the *laissez faire, laissez passer* or *laissez acheter, laissez consommer*.

The same is true for political rights, which are also "given" rights. The so-called political freedom does not correspond to any political right, but it is an implication of the basic right of the individual to determine his own destiny, in our case his own destiny as a social being, i. e. to participate in the decisions of establishing and administrating what is "public". Political freedom is the counter-point of this latter right. It is this right, which put under the guarantee of law, becomes political freedom and is exercised by means of various given political rights.

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[3] See also my "Philosophy and Social Injustice", Proceedings of the *Second Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference*, Nairobi, October 1981 (in print).

Thus, social freedom is the general concept including all such freedoms: it expresses the fulfilment of the demand that the protection of the basic rights of the individual be taken under legal guarantee. It pressuposes the abolishment of social injustice, but even the absence of the latter, in a country, would not be sufficient for the existence of social freedom. Social freedom would exist, only when implemented and enforced laws and established institutions afford, under the existing conditions, the possibility of equal *and* dignified protection of the basic rights of all the citizens in a country.

Up to this point we have looked at the question of social freedom mainly from the view-point of the individual. If we now look at this question from the view-point of the State, it appears as the question of the possibilities which a State affords to its citizens through the arrangement of domestic affairs, i.e. it appears as the question of public freedoms.

A State affords these possibilities through its organs and various establishments and institutions. The objective of establishing institutions and of established ones, of creating organs and created ones etc., as well as their functioning with regard to these objectives; and the existence (or absence) of some of them in the special conditions of a country, are also constituents of social freedom as a whole: they contribute to the concrete fulfilment of the indirectly protected rights. Thus, public freedoms are possibilities created by the State for the actual protection of the basic rights of the citizens so that all their citizens may find the opportunity to develop their human potentialities and be unimpeded in being determined by value knowledge. Public freedom are various ways of fulfiling, in a country, the indirectly protected rights of the citizens, according to the existing conditions at a given historical moment.

To give an example to such public freedoms, I would mention State mass-media, for example, though, according to the existing conditions, more specific institutions could be given as examples. One of the main objectives of this public institution is the contribution to the fulfilment of the right to let us name here correct information, which may enable people to make right evaluations of events for themselves and take their attitudes accordingly, not advertising or propaganda in the narrow sense. Still we observe very often that, being State institutions, TV's in many countries are oriented directly or indirectly by those in power political and economic power, and thus cease, to a great extent, to fulfil this objective.

This is why, in some countries, great efforts are made in order to give an "autonomous status to such institutions, which people think would prevent such interferences.

In conclusion I would say that in all its kinds as a potentiality (ontical specificity of Man), as a reality (property of some men), and as a necessity (an idea with regard to the establishment of social relations)— freedom appears to be a value : a human, an ethical and a social value.

In our age freedom finds itself in one of the turning points of its adventure, both theoretically and practically.

Various events and collective actions, which characterise our age —terrorism and the way States and we as humanity react to it, genocide etc.— makes for us necessary to review, from the view-point of how much they protect human dignity, our international document constitutions, laws and ourselves. In the face of such events in our age, if we wish to hear with dignity the predicate of "human being", we have to review them, as soon as possible from this view-point, in our name, and in the name of our countries and our age as well.

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VI

Dogmatists And Their Critics—

a philosophical inquiry into the roots of rigidity —

Lolle Nauta

I. Introduction

Ask a random sample of professional philosophers whether any of them is in favour of dogmatism and most probably you will be disappointed, no candidates for the title being available. If you are looking for dogmatists, you apparrently are in the wrong place. Philosophers like to think of themselves as being undogmatic. In inquiring into "the roots of dogmatism", they are expected to inquire into the roots of a phenomenon, they themselves are not part of. In their own professional eyes they are critical, rational, in favour of discussion and always ready to consider new points of view. Professional doubters they are; professional believers are to be found elsewhere.

It is always the others, who are supposed to be dogmatic Even firm believers, who adhere to a number of clearcut dogmas, will hardly feel happy about being called dogmatic. Yet there are many contemporary philosophers, who think of their fellow philosophers as indeed being dogmatic. As long as there is no consensus in philosophy about fundamental assumptions, every philosophical school or trend will create its own mechanisms of defense. In a way pluralism calls for dogmatism. Members of the other school or group are supposed not to be willing or even not be able to doubt their own assumptions and to see that they are out of touch with reality. Was this not the way the early logical positivists discussed metaphysics ? And what about much of the criticism of logical positivism itself by, let us say, phenomenologists or marxists ? Were the members of the

Vienna Circle in their eyes not very dogmatic especially concerning sense experience, science etc. ?

So, what can we do apart from hoping and trying ourselves not to be too dogmatic ? No longer calling other people dogmatic but just being modest about ourselves ? I do not think so. Modesty may be a virtue on a personal level; in philosophy as a discipline it is not. Here arguments count; being more or less virtuous does not matter at all. Therefore I would like in this paper to spell out the arguments against dogmatism, investigating whether or not they are correct. And after having done so, I will try to inquire into anti-dogmatism, scrutinizing some assumptions of a well known anti-dogmatic philosophical school: the philosophy of Popper and his students, called critical rationalism.

Dogmatism is bound to certain social conditions and the same is true of its critical counterpart. One cannot hold that dogmatism as a phenomenon is liable to certain social and historical determinants and at the same time that, let us say, critical rationalism is free from such "material" influences. In order for a critical mind to develop and to become less susceptible to dogmatic influences, certain social conditions have to be fulfilled. A certain level of education, for example, is at least a necessary condition here. Man's mind hardly can be set free without the acquisition of a certain educational capital.

Now, if in both cases epistemological and social factors are involved and if it is true as well, that we would like to discriminate between a "dogmatic" and a "critical" attitude, then, being philosophers, we are under the obligation to inquire into the relation between epistemological and social aspects. It is lazy thinking, if we deal with things like this on a social and historical level only, apart from the fact that it has hardly anything to do with philosophy. The social and historical sciences are supposed to do the job on this level. And it is also an easy escape just to remain on the level of epistemology, as a number of philosophers like to do as well. Neither dogmatism nor criticism are a matter of epistemology only, as Kant was well aware.

Without even trying to be complete, I will therefore in the second part of my paper raise the problem of the so-called transformations between the socio-historical and the epistemological level. In order to avoid being too abstract, I will use fascism as an example for analysis. Fascism in its different forms of course is connected with a dogmatic attitude, and, apart from that, hardly any philosopher seems to be much in favour of it. Fascism and philosophy are almost mutually exclusive. Of course there are philosophers with fascist tendencies and sympathies, but, as far as I know, serious philosophical thinking never got developed under any fascist regime.

Fascism therefore may be an acceptable example of a transformation of socio-historical factors into epistemological or ideological ones, which all of us can be expected to reject.

II The Case against Dogmatism

The following sequence of arguments against dogmatism can be found among philosophers of a Popperian persuasion.

Dogmatists, they contend, are in the *first* place not able (or willing) to change their assumptions in the light of new evidence. Thus Popper's falsification principle is the cornerstone of a philosophy, which is critical of dogmatic attitudes in every respect, since the refusal to change an opinion in the light of contrary evidence is the core of dogmatism. When faced with falsifying evidence, dogmatists actually will try to change the evidence instead of their own assumptions. Several examples can be quoted here. A popular one concerns the Marxists of the Second International and their prediction of the speedy collapse of the capitalist mode of production. This prediction was, in some cases, made with great precision, extending even to year and date. When it did not come true, the belief of most of them was not shaken at all. The happy catastrophe could still be expected to enter world-history a bit later. Godot is coming tomorrow and "tomorrow" always happens to be later than today.

The *second* argument which is put forward against dogmatism, has more to do with social philosophy than with methodology. Not being able to cope with new information, dogmatists, it is contended, are blocking social progress. In a time of rapid social change new situations require creative ideas and fresh solutions. Dogmatism is to be found in that part of society, which is conservative and reactionary. With their closed minds, members of this group adhere to their old-fashioned ideas when new problems crop up. They are like medical doctors, who stick to their old prescriptions, even when the diseases have changed. Recovery or improvement can not be expected from them.

The *third* argument is connected with the second and goes like this: in being an enemy of social progress our dogmatist will try to block new initiatives, be inclined to eliminate people with a critical mind, and in this way run the risk of becoming an enemy of true humanity.

Several things are at stake here, but it may be clear sofar, that the third and last part of our sequence of arguments concerns political morals. Here Popperians are specifically referring to those dogmatists who enjoy some form of political power. Only if this condition is fulfilled, do the dogmatists have the opportunity to put their critics into prison and to establish or at least support an actual system of repression. The third argument turns out to be of a political nature.

These political implications of course become very clear in Popper's later work, which was published after his discoveries in the field of philosophy of science. In these books a fourth argument can in fact be discerned, namely Popper's opinion that all forms of radical social change, which try to revolutionize society as a whole, in the last resort turn out to be dogmatic. Changing a society as a whole is as impossible as rebuilding completeley an existing city; only piece-meal engineering will do. Marxist revolutionaries, preaching radical social change and discovering that their blueprint cannot be implemented, in the end show their true dogmatic colours. Adhering to their ideology and not willing to give up their political power, they become their own worst enemies, trying to wipe out all forms of criticism and creativity. Everyone who is not in agreement with them, is blocking history and is therefore an enemy, to be eliminated.

I do not want to deny that there are a lot of revolutionaries, who behave like dogmatists in disguise. Stalinism is fact and not fancy. In some respects Popper's criticism of historicist Marxism is to the point. But I do not think his general argument, that all ideologies aiming at radical change are for that reason dogmatic, is correct. Moreover, it does not logically follow from the other three. Political radicals can very well cope with new information, promote social progress and take into account criticism of their assumptions of course. Marx himself is an example, changing his opinions in ten years more often than most philosophers do in their whole life.

We therefore can leave it at our three arguments, without adding a fourth. The epistemological argument comes first. It provides the foundation for the second one, widening the discussion into the field of social philosophy. Both arguments in turn call for the third one, which brings in a moral and political point of view. Being knitted together in this way, a two-way traffic among the three can start. In Popper's eyes the *methodological* rule, to put forward propositions, which are falsifiable, apparently at the same time is a kind of *moral requirement*. Provided certain conditions are fulfilled, there is a kind of moral obligation to be as critical about one's own assumptions as possible. Why ? In not doing so, we will hamper social progress and run the risk of taking sides with hangmen and oppressors.

Is the case against dogmatism well established in this way ? Are we justified in saying that there is a kind of moral requirement to be as critical about one's own assumptions as possible ? And can dogmatists indeed be said not to be able to cope properly with new information ?

Philosophers like very much to generalize about ideas, which in fact are context-dependent. The falsification-principle is an example, because here everything depends on the context one is referring to. Refusing to take into account new information *in general* hardly can be called morally wrong. Who will blame old people for not being able to cope with new information and feeling happy with rapid social change ? Is it justified to criticize religious people for not being ready to put their views to test ?

Popperians could object here by pointing to the fact that the falsification principle got developed as a methodological principle only. It is with the context of science that it is concerned : the "Logic of Scientific Discovery" was written in the thirties as a criticism of the methodological principles of Logical Positivism and that is all.

There are two serious counter-arguments however. The first point is, that even with regard to science the principle turned out to be too general. In the aftermath of Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" it was made clear by Lakatos that scientists cannot be expected to put to test every proposition to which they adhere. There is always a hard core of fundamental assumptions where falsification, at least in the short run, is to be ruled out. As a general principle Popper's theory does not even apply to scientific practice as a whole.

And the second point is, as was already made clear, that Popper's claim in fact is even more general. Thus we are faced with a number of consequences of the falsification principle in the field of social and political philosophy and the philosophy of critical rationalism is more than just a set of methodological principles only.

Shall we then just dismiss the principle for being too general ? I do not think we can. Theories and expectations which evidently do conflict with reality are required at least to get reinterpreted or adjusted. There is no doubt about that. Only people who are mentally ill, are able to uphold unaltered a system of propositions which fly in the face of the facts in every respect.

If however we are not willing just to dismiss the falsification principle, we at least have, as one could call it, a "level-problem" because of the principle's very generality. It is not clear in which context or at which level it is to be applied, as a trivial example may show. A committed and fanatical disciple of Khomeiny as a matter of a fact will on a certain level be able to cope with new information. He will look for a raincoat after discovering that his expectation of sunshine is not coming true. But at the level of ideology he is unable to act rationally; there his mind is closed. His general assumptions about the world cannot be changed as easily as his opinions about the weather. Only in times of crisis are ideological foundations apt to be shaken.

The problem of dogmatism, to say the least, therefore is not a problem of falsification only. Quite intricate problems concerning the relation of theory and practice (level-problems) come up for discussion here. Such problems however hardly appear on the agenda of the critical rationalists. They do draw moral and political consequences from their point of view, but their discussions of principles mainly concerns methodological or epistemological matters. Let us therefore take a look at them and see whether there is a case against anti-dogmatism as well.

III A Case against the Critics of Dogmatism

The point I want to make in this section is that, from an epistemological point of view only, the problem of dogmatism cannot be adequately analysed at all.

One reason for this state of affairs has in fact already been given. Taking the falsification principle as our only point of view, the problem of dogmatism in fact did not appear at all before our epistemological spygless. Apart from mental illness, a *general* inability to cope with new information could not be detected. Only at certain levels or in certain contexts people are unable to put their opinions to test and this even appears to be true for many cases of mental illness. Human behaviour is not a single thing; is divided up into certain provinces, many times provided with clear borders. Well known are the stories about guards of concentration camps, brutes and oppressors, who happen to be so human, nice and tolerant in their private life. So, what is dogmatism actually about ?

There is another reason which makes it difficult, from a theoretical point of view, to deal adequately with the phenomenon under discussion. Originally, in Greek, theory ("theoria") meant looking at the stage, being in the theatre. Now, a theorist and a visitor of the theatre do not have very much in common apart from one thing: in both cases action has been suspended. For a while the normal course of the day has, so to say, been interrupted. Not always do human beings have to care for the production and reproduction of their daily life. Now and then they take time off to consider the sense and nonsense of the affairs they are involved.

There are a lot of things we can laugh about at the theatre, without being able to do so outside its walls. At the field of action our behaviour is dictated by other rules than at a theatre-evening or in a philosophical discussion. We just cannot afford to spend every moment looking into the mirror and laughing about our reighbours and who knows may be even ourselves. Action implies movement and in order to move we must be able to discriminate between a good and a false direction. The faster we move, the clearer the idea of our route must actually be. At the moment when we hesitate—is this really the right way to go ? — and take out our map, our car has already come to a standstill. It is dangerous to move and to study the map at the same time.

Opinions which we like to call dogmatic, are somehow closely related to the mode of action of the subjects concerned. Dear beliefs, which hardly can be changed, are intimately intertwined with a pattern of life. They are not of a theoretical, but of a practical nature. They neither have been brought up in the theatre nor have they been thought up in a philosophical discussion. From an epistemological point of view characteristics like their rigidity or lack of flexibility, for example, cannot be understood at all. With epistemological instruments only epistemological phenomena can be observed.

That worldviews are intertwined with patterns of life, as I like to call them provisionally, is a triviality, Everyone who happens to look around in the world knows this. But knowing *that* does not imply knowing *how*. Marxists, who refer in this respect only to a set of modes of production, are as ignorant as their critical-rationalist counterparts who rely on a few methodological principles only. In particular, the way our own worldview is related to the world of action is most of the time less clear to us than in the case of worldviews and assumptions we simply do not share. Studying and analyzing the mediations between worldviews and patterns of life is not necessarily putting forward trivialities.

That "dogmatism" and "action" indeed are related can become clear from the history of Marxism. Of course, historians of philosophy are most of the time aware of the differences between Marx and Marxism. Even Marx himself sometimes spoke quite ironically about the Marxists of his time. In the discussions however on the relations of Marx and the different kinds of 20th century Marxism, it is not always sufficiently clear that Marx mainly worked at a *theoretical level*. He and Engels, of course, did publish the "Communist Manifesto", but this pamphlet was an exception. The other major works are not pieces of political action at all. Even when Marx dealt with the relation of theory and practice, or with practice alone, he always did so at the level of theory. Considered as a whole, his work is a highly sophisticated endeavour to repudiate capitalism and to justify socialism in *the intellectual milieu of his time*. Marx wrote *for the sake of* the proletariat; he did not write *for* the proletariat. Philosophers, writers, political economists, politicians and such people are supposed to be his readers. If you are not sufficiently educated to read Hegel or Ricardo, Marx is going to be abacadabra for you.

Having been developed at a theoretical level, how then did Marxism become dogmatic? The answer is simple. Marx and Engels themselves were not dogmatic, or at least no more so than any other social scientist. Marxism became dogmatic in the time of the Second International, when the thoughts of Marx' and Engels had to be explained to the masses. It was then that they became *action-related* in fact, because the socialist parties and trade-unions had to be provided with an ideological basis. For this reason Marxists like Plechanow, Kautsky and Lenin as well (who naturally was a man of action) had to put the sophisticated theories of their teachers in a simple and easy form, which is to say: now all kinds of provisos precautions and boundary conditions, as are typical at the theoretical level, had to be done away with. You cannot act under all kinds of restrictions. Action is something irrevocable.

It is important to note that the Marxism Popper got acquainted with was nothing less than the Marxism of the Second International. He himself informs us that his experiences with Marxism — he himself was a Marxist for some months — were crucial to him when he was a student in Vienna. He soon got fed up with the dogmatic way his fellow Marxists interpreted political reality, not being able to have their theories refuted in any way. When we look at Popper's work, the principle of falsification comes first and after that his social philosophy gets under way. Biographically, however, it is the other way around. He himself tells us that for the development of his epistemology his social experiences were crucial.

This political context of the development of the falsification principle does not affect its validity of course. One cannot assess discoveries according to the context in which they occurred. But two other consequences in my opinion do follow.

The firs is that Popper's well-known criticism of Marxism is too general. What he is saying does apply to the historicist ideology of the Second International and to a large part of Marxism Leninism. It does not apply to Marx and Engels, nor to, let me say, Gramsci, Habermas, Thompson, Cohen, Colletti and a lot of other Marxists in our century.

The second consequence relates to the subject under discussion here. Given the fact, that Popper's methodological principles got developed in the context of the Second International, we are justified in saying that he reacted to a *political* situation in an *epistemological* way. Popper's epistemology is the result of a process of transformation of crucial political experiences. Behind his philosophy of science a political crisis is to be seen. Not only in science, but in the philosophy of science as well times of crisis turn out to be fruitful.

Knowing however what is methodologically wrong with dogmatism, does not mean that we are already informed about its nature. Methodological rules do not lead us to the roots of a phenomenon; they merely provide us with a license to pass it by.

So, in fact we are faced with the problem of the relation of theory and practice. Firstly this came to the fore, when the "level-problem" was discussed, the remarkable capacity of human beings to cope with new information at the level of daily practice, apparently without doing so at the level of ideology. Human behaviour seems to be provided with certain "tracks of action", so to say, each of which having a programme or set of rules of its own. Different behaviour domains thus seem to be allowed considerable autonomy from each other. In order to live up to the requirements of one's cultural context, a certain amount of personal *disintegration* seems to be necessary.

Secondly, the problem of the relation of theory and practice came up, when we looked into the assumptions of critical rationalism. Epistemological instruments, we concluded, can only show us epistemological phenomena. They are necessary in dealing with dogmatism, but they are not sufficient. We see from afar the phenomenon of "frozen knowledge", but we do not know why it actually arose there. Even to say, as I have done, that such phenomena are "action-related" does not give us much information. Saying this only amounts to saying that such frozen phenomena do not belong to the level of theory, which is a negative qualification only. Let us therefore turn to a concrete example, to see if something more may be discovered about it.

IV Fascism as an example

Is it not exaggerating a bit to use fascism as an example in a discussion on dogmatism ? Are there not many forms of dogmatism, having nothing to do with fascism and which can hardly be compared with it ? And are there not quite a lot of honest people to be found everywhere, who may be called dogmatic in one way or another, without ever being ready to support racism, torture and other forms of repression ?

Without any doubt there are, as there are also a lot of decent and dogmatic people, who do support torture and repression, sometimes without even being aware that they are doing so. The point however is that I do not see on what grounds dogmatism in general should be criticised apart from moral and political ones. A general epistemological requirement that world views must always be called into question simply does not make sense. And precisely for this reason fascism may be a good example of a species of dogmatism, which is especially difficult to accept and thus raises particularly clearly the question of why this difficulty is there.

Some other reasons as well may justify our choice. The first is that fascism is theoretically weak. Contrary to other political movements it never had excellent theoreticians. Of course, there have been plenty of fascist ideologues, swimming with the high tide of the mass movement and being ready to process legitimations into the ever hungry propaganda machine. Their level of argument however neither can be compared with liberal nor with marxist thinking. A fascist research tradition in fact never developed. In fascism we are faced with a phenomenon which hardly has to be refuted at a theoretical level and which has to be studied at the level of behaviour. They say it themselves. "Action" is one of their catchwords and intellectual endeavours they are not in favour of.

The second reason is, that fascism is a modern phenomenon, closely related to the capitalist mode of production in its imperialist stage[1]. It does not make sense to call social movements before the 20th century fascist and the phenomenon itself is international and not limited to Italy or Germany. Everyone knows about McCarthyism and the Ku Klux Klan in the U. S. A., not to mention political regimes in El Salvador and Chile. However difficult it may be to determine the *nature* of its relation with 20th century capitalism, there can hardly be any doubt that fascism is part of its offspring.

In order to see in what respect fascism can indeed be called dogmatic, it may be useful to develop a *fascist's profile*, mainly based on work done by the Frankfurt School of Social Research.

I will list four important features only, the first concerning the level of ideology. A fascist is holding a Manichean worldview, good and evil being neatly separated and himself of course living on the right side. His reference-group, which is the family, the nation or the race, is symbolizing the positive values he adheres to and his ideology gives him a legitimation for this. On the level of psychology he is in favour of virtues, which sometimes are called masculine Glorifying militarist force and violence, a fascist has a strong dislike for things like tenderness and also for emotions in general, which he prefers to call weak. Women in his company hardly can be seen. They have to stay home and do the cooking and the bearing of children. A fascist's social relations are in accordance with features like this. Being motivated by a strong resentment against deviating behaviour and against strangers in general, other groups easily become a projection of his own repressed needs and wishes. A fascist

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(1) I will not elaborate on Stalinism here, which also is a phenomenon of our century. I do not adhere to the "totalitarianism-thesis" which treats fascism and Stalinism as phenomena of the same kind. However, it cannot be denied that there are important structural analogies between the two.

hates homosexuals, artists, intellectuals and all other people who are disturbing the normal way of life. And his political behaviour has to be in harmony with all this of course. A fascist is obedient to the state and any other form of higher authority. His example and favoured model of behaviour is "the leader".

A little comment on this tentative profile. Features like this should not be dealt with in isolation; for a profile of a fascist they belong together. A person can be quite anti-feministic without being a fascist and one can be in favour of a strong army without displaying the other features as well. In order for a person or group to be called fascist, they must manifest all four of these features at least.

Some may wonder why I am defining fascism on an individual level and not on the level of society. In order to know however what precisely must be explained at the level of society (or the structural level), the phenomenon concerned first has to be described, which can be done at a more—individual level. Many times a structural analysis takes it to easy in this respect, not making it clear enough what it is that has to be explained in a structural way.

In the case of fascism dogmatism acquires on the existential level a specific meaning. A person, being a fascist, exhibits an exceptional kind of inflexibility and rigidity. As studies of the authoritarian personality have shown, he is liable to all kinds of bias and in the extreme tending towards conformist beheaviour.

This rigidity not only finds expression at the level of the mind and not only concerns the ideas of the fascist, but it is also to be found at a more material level. The bodily movements of a fascist are rigid. He is fond of moving in a military way. Being together in groups which have nothing to do with the army, yet he likes doing as if he was Look at the way the Nazis greeted their Leader, a stiffened arm and hand holding up, the body paralysed for the time being Just like in the army, where most of the time individual differences are only disturbing, the uniformity shows the identity of the individual and the group. In his fascist role, an individual is not moving smoothly like a human being is expected to do but like a marionet, his motions being stiff and his gestures being wooden.

This is not just a metaphor, because the marionet like behaviour can be observed at an empirical level, where it acquires a symbolic meaning of its own. I venture the hypothesis that in this behaviour the force and violence find expression which fascists themselves have undergone. Human nature, having been oppressed, is eager to oppress again. Human beings, having been victimized, are in need of victimizing other people. It was Sartre who once wrote, that for hangmen and torturers there never is an end. Repetition is what they are under. Thinking about fascism, the terrible crimes, committed by the Germans against the Jews, come to our mind. Today we witness the extermination of the Palestinians by the state Israel, where history is repeating itself.

If indeed the fascist's rigid behaviour is a manifestation of the violence which he did undergo himself and which he is eager to inflict on other human beings, then on the field of social philosophy two points can be made.

The first concern the problem of human freedom. We are here — provided the hypothesis can indeed be confirmed — faced with human beings, whose lack of freedom can be observed. It can be shown empirically that the patterns of behaviour, they are prisoners of, indeed were forced upon them. I do not want to say that they can not be held responsible for what they have done. The problem of moral responsibility is not to be dealt with here at all. I want to say that any criticism of their behaviour is not in need of an abstract point of view, since observable phenomena are at stake here.

The second point concerns the problem of social determination and is connected with the first. Philosophical discussions concerning social determination (or causation) are sometimes too abstract as well. In the case of fascism there are certain mechanisms active which prevent human beings from developing freely and autonomously. The mechanisms concerned determine their behaviour until within their fingertips. They do not allow them to develop freely. They are *forced* to develop as rowdies, yes-sayers, patriots, soldiers, guards of concentration-camps and maybe in the end as torturers. It is this kind of social determination Marxists should be interested in. They are not supposed to develop a general theory of social causation. Too long the metaphysical shadows of Spinoza and Hegel have haunted their mind. It is *specific, historically determined situations and the way these are transformed at the level of individual behaviour*, they are supposed to analyze and to be interested in. The question whether man's beheaviour *in general* is determined, yes or no, is almost meaningless. *De facto* the determinations of human behaviour are not distributed in an equal way. If we want to fight oppression, we have to fight the historical and social conditions behind it. In order to eliminate fascist interpretations of the world, we are bound to change it.

V. Mechanisms of Transformation (a marxist approach)

Being provided with a profile of the fascist at an individual level, are we now in a position to link it up with the historical and material circumstances of the subjects concerned ? Can the patterns of behaviour which were observed at the micro level of individual behaviour, be located at the macro-level of history and society ?

Such questions can easier be asked than be answered. Most of the time dialectical materialists go exactly the other way. First a macropicture is drawn up and then the micro-aspects, if any are filled in. In this way the methodological principles of historical materialism are dismissed and replaced by a kind of metaphysical theory where all individuals, without any exception, are becoming marionets, dancing at the whims of the laws of history. In marxism of the 20th century economism is metaphysics in disguise.

A lot of research has been done on the macro-aspects of fascism and it has become clear that fascism got a strong foothold in the petty-bourgeoisi the small-scale producers, small scale owners and non-productive employees. With respect to Germany, for example, two relevant points can be made. The first is that their proportion in the general population is well below their proportion in the membership of the national-socialist party, the first being 12% in the years between '30 and '34 and the second varying from 20.6 to 25 6%. Secondly, figures show that in the first quarter of the century "this section of the population suffered most economically" (20, p. 260). In this period "artisans and traders lost almost half of their income" (ibid.). Inflation hit worst at their social level and they got into additional problems because of the growth of monopolies in the field of banking and industry. The things they produced and sold were providing them with less and less income.

So far so good, but these circumstances, supposed they are correctly described, do not automatically yield a thing like fascism or national socialism. We have a profile and we have a socio-economic picture (which is to be completed very much of course), but how are they related ? How do economic circumstances like this lead to the kind of rigidity and marionet-like behaviour which seem to be symptomatic for fascism ?

Looking for the mechanism of transformation, which may be the missing link here, let me make a try withcut assuming that circumstances in reality are always like that.

Being a craftsman I have always worked very hard, as my father and grandfather did. By leading a decent life, my family already for long was able to earn a small income which provided us with our daily bread, sufficient means for the education of the children and something for the church as well. We never spent more than we could help and we were even able to make some savings for times of hardship.

But what is the matter now ? Although I am working harder than my father did and even my wife and oldest son assist me all day, I am earning less. A new machine even had to be bought, but I do not see how I can pay off the loan for it, which I got from the bank. These Jewish usurers are asking more and more. My costs are growing, while I am getting less, for my products. Or better : I am getting as much money or even more then before, but I can hardly buy anything for it. Food and clothes are growing more and more expensive.

So, what is hard work for anyway ? Look at the people who are doing nothing, sitting idly on their luxuries and just loitering about. Where do they get all their money from ? Why is the social-democrat government doing nothing ? And by the way, most of the time, these loiterers and usurers are not even Germans ! Why did they infiltrate into our society with their different ways of life ? Just to take the money from people, who never strayed from the right path ? Let them go home please. Like homosexuals and artists they are; getting well to do without any effort.

This man is neither a guard of a concentration camp nor a torturer. It is a mistake to think that most members of fascist organisations are. It is only that their ideas and feelings about life and society can easily be integrated into a fascist or national-socialist frame-work. Like the Catholic Church which is first creating and then expropriating the feelings of guilt of the members it is supposed to take care of, in the same way fascist parties, according to Barrington Moore, are manipulating their members. And the mechanism. which is put into effect here, is that of resentment and revenge. Fascist parties are organisations, skilled in the exploitation of hate. The most startling thing about fascism are the scale and brutality of its repression. This is what we do not understand or at least most of the time psychologically can not afford to understand.

Our imaginary craftsman does not want to kill or to destroy the people he does not like. In his opinion they either should lead a proper life or go back to the place they came from. Feelings of resentment however are clearly biting him and even they are not conditioned by economic circumstances in a mono-causal way. They are his way of reacting to them, such a pattern of behaviour being a product of certain historical and cultural circumstances. Although he is a Catholic, living in Munchen, he is not-withstanding that part and parcel of a puritan culture of hard work. Having only primary school, he is not acquainted with economic theories. His knowledge in this respect can be written on a finger's nail, dealing with the relation between hard work and a modest income only. Things which are not in accordance with this well tested paradigm, are explained in another way, the method of "personalizing". Not being in accordance with the normal course of things, such phenomena are to be ascribed to evil spirits: communists, freemasons, intellectuals and other media of witchcraft.

So, several mechanisms of transformation may be effective here: legitimations from an earlier stage of the capitalist mode of production which are, so to speak, refuted by the new circumstances; feudal aspects may be important as well; the capitalist mode of production only dominated certain aspects of European life, even in the 20th century; a bourgeois culture with a more rational view of social matters never came to flourish in the southern and rural parts of Germany. But in my eyes the dominant transformation is working through resentment, as may have become clear already from the last part of the portrait of the craftsman by himself. It is by resentment that material circumstances *here* are transformed into certain patterns of behaviour.

I am coming back now to the hypothesis which has already been ventured concerning the fascist's marionet like behaviour. Fascists are not able to get rid of certain painful experiences in the past. These experiences are literally — in a Sartrian sense — sticking to them Fascists are not able to get through to them or even to look at them. They carry them on their backs, neither being able to start another period of their life nor to invent other patterns of behaviour. *Rigidity* and *repetition* belong together. Certain frustrating experiences can press so heavily on the mind of the subjects concerned, that they can no longer discriminate between 'cases' which are similar to the previous ones, and cases which are not. *Every* Jew is like the one who exploited me. *Every* Palestinian is like the Nazis who wanted to destroy my people. Being asked, how Israel could destroy Sidon, Mr. Begin simply retorted to a reporter: when Dresden was destroyed, no protest was heard. Fascist action is the vain and therefore endless repeated effort to get rid of painful experiences in the past. Therefore it is always surprisingly easy for a fascist to plead not guilty. Was not he the first to be harassed? Every fascist is a retaliator. Trying to pay back what has been done to him, he is however, with iron necessity, always mistaking his aim. His objects are innocent.

Here indeed we are faced with a transformation of material circumstances into patterns of behaviour which actually constitute a burden of history. This is the true "Mythe de Sisyphe". No cunning of reason can be observed. Repetition is on. We may call the mechanism concerned the *mechanism of fixation*.

It should not be overlooked that these considerations on fascism which are leaning heavily on work done by others, are required for methodological reasons. Especially two are relevant here.

The first has in fact already been given. Dogmatism is not a problem of epistemology only, as could indeed become quite clear in our context. In the case of fascism epistemological abilities are actually deranged. At certain levels a fascist is deprived of the possibility to widen his experience and to add to his knowledge. So, studying fascism from an epistemological angle only, really amounts to philosophical idealism; one in fact is depriving oneself of the possibility to reach into the material ramifications of socio-historical practice.

There is a second reason as well, which hardly has been touched until now. Considering the exclusively epistemological approach as an idealist one, no progress is made by just turning it upside down, replacing mental entities by material ones. To do so, will lead to another version of philosophical idealism, in materialist disguise this time. Due to the dialectical method Marxists are most of the time neglecting the problem of *transformations*, as I would like to call it. Because dialectics is supposed to take into account ontological and epistemological matters *at the same time*, no room is left for the methodological and empirical study of transformations. Dialectical laws, so to speak, know already how socio-historical practice and human behaviour can be turned into each other: no reason at all to look into that. Due to Hegelian assumptions the turnover or transformation of one into the other has become a kind of automatism.

This second methodological point can be formulated, in other words, by saying that overestimating dialectics in theory will result in underestimating emancipation in practice. There are more transformations than the mechanism of fixation only and emancipation is one of them. Most of the time —and this is also due to Marx and Engels themselves, who were children of the 19th century — human emancipation is looked at as a transformation (transition) into a higher stage. Higher however can mean morally better, more in accordance with certain rules of social justice. But higher can also refer to situations where man has been liberated from material bonds. Statements about emancipation can become really confusing, when both 'layers of meaning' have been put together, as actually is quite common. Then it looks as if a situation, which is more in accordance with social justice, at the same time is going to be a situation, where the laws of social gravity no longer hold: suddenly we have been transferred to heaven and lost our bodily weight. Normal rules concerning, let me say, the division of labour, no longer apply; selling and buying of commodities has become something of the past; conflicts, as they always will arise in a regime of scarcity, are no longer to be expected.

Emancipation is not a transformation of socio-historical practice into something else, as dialectical laws may suggest which are inextricably linked with the 19th century belief in progress. Emancipation is not a kind of elevation. Originally, emancipation means the release of child and wife from the power of the pater familias. In referring to certain restraints of socio-historical practice itself, emancipation consequently joins the original intuition of historical materialism which aims at the transformation of practice. It makes sense to use the concept of transformation here, because knowledge is required in order to get transformed into socio historical practice itself. So, instead of going up, emancipation means going down. Symbolic elements, being provided with social gravity, are liberated from their almost inborn tendency to become free floating; theory is connected with practice, as marx used to say who indeed succeeded in reinterpreting Hegelian concepts in the field of political economy.

Of course more requirements have to be fulfilled in order for emancipation to become real. Real conflicts in socio-historical practice itself are to be present and should have reached the level of social consciousness. No emancipation without class struggle. But I am not studying the mechanisms of emancipation now. My point is only that Marxists can no longer afford to leave the dynamics of transformation to dialectics. In a dialectical structure epistemological and ontological elements are impossible to disentangle. Socio-historical practice however can be studied only, if on a methodological level ontology and epistemology are clearly separated. Only by separating them first, our eyes can be opened for new amalgations between the two, as the inquiry into the roots of rigidity may have shown.

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VII

"The Pratyaksa in Theology"

Antonio F. X. Rodrigues

INTRODUCTION

It is customary to hear doleful plaints about the proverbial crisis of *faith* in the western world particularly among the European people. One hears a lot also about the colapse of the western civilisation which was built up upon christian values. In fact Europe, as a continent, became christian within 400 years from the time Christianity was first proclaimed within its boundaries. It is a historical fact which we have analysed elsewhere[1], leading to the declaration of St. Benedict as the Patron of Europe, that it was Christianity, specially as practised in the 1,500 abbeys spread throughout Europe, that helped the Europeans to learn the value of discipline, and the hard work, the value of time and all that makes for progress. It is not that only Europe can produce geniuses. The fact is that they got an early start in disciplined scientific enquiry and the consequent technology. A single fact that stares us in the face today throughout Europe, is that no matter where we visit a museum in Leningrad or Paris, London, Madrid or Rome, everywhere, almost all the exhibits in which the people pride, are the fruits of christian inspiration. When one sees that the whole structure of the European Society is based, rather flows, from Christian values, one comes to the conclusion that Europe was chosen to articulate the *faith* which the Jews were chosen to reveal to the world. Any one who travels extensively throughout Europe, cannot but be filled with amazement at the sight for example of a newspaper boy who leaves a stack of daily newspapers in a box by the roadside, near a bus-stop and goes away. The papers are meant for sale, but the seller does not wait to see whether those who buy them pay the fare. He comes later to see that all the papers are gone and the price is all there in the box for him to collect. Those who take the tram-car or the omnibus punch their tickets themselves even before they board the conveyance. Aren't such measures based on christian values of honesty and justice? Could we for example adopt such practices say in India? Or in any other place where the culture is predominantly non-christian? The very structure of the European Society *was* christian. Only recently people have begun to question, and that too in a very limited manner, some points of the jurisprudence which for example forbade divorce and abortion because of the Gospels.

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* In India we do not distinguish between philosophy of Religion and Theology. Actually all philosophy is known as *Darshana* which means VISION.

[1] in "Souvenir, fifteenth Centenary of St. Benedict, 480 1980".

LIFE-SITUATION TODAY

It is indeed strange that despite such historical past, many Europeans today donot give a christian upbringing to their offspring. In many places, those who sincerely profess their faith are ridiculed. In the Universities the Chair of Atheism is being introduced. We are not referring to the Communist Russia where unscrupulously the Saviour's Tower is used to display the revolving red star and the bell of the Kremlin's Church of the Assumption is used to give the Radio time today. Many feel that they belong to the post-christian age. Many intellectuals freely question the basic facts of Christianity like the bodily resurrection of Christ, His Divinity and so forth. All this of course in the name of scholarship. No doubt, there is among the European, just as one would expect, highly scientific enquiry in every field including that of religion and theology. However there is no gainsaying the fact that the European Society as a whole is no longer as loyal to the christian faith as it once was. For example, in September 1982, Pope John Paul II addressing the Catholics gathered at Dusseldorf for the 87th Katholikentag appealed: "Convert yourselves and believe and work for the renewal of the world". To the French Bishops gathered for their *ad limina*, in October 1982, Pope John Paul II recalled that from their own reports there were atheists, 'in-croyants' and 'mal-croyants' on the increase in their land once the 'eldest' daughter of the Church.

THE REAL BASIS

In searching for the real basis for this growing un-christian stance which we would like to call a debacle of the European christian civilisation, it would be naive to pin it down to the progress in technology and science. It is indeed long since the myth that religion and science are in conflict has been laid to rest. It would again be naive to blame the prosperity achieved by them as the reason for the loss of faith. It is true that Jesus did say that it would be more difficult for a rich man to get to Heaven than for a huge camel to go through the eye of a needle. Yet we cannot deny that wealth and well-being are numbered among the great blessings Christian faith holds as coming from the Father, the Giver of all good things. Besides, if we are to work for the restoration of all things in Christ, as the Church holds at Vat. II, then the better living standards are a consequence of the very christian project in the world. It would equally be naive to attribute the crisis of faith to some hidden law of evolution whether hegelian or sociological, by which man would go from the primitive, mythological belief, to the enlightheued stage and then finally to no faith at all. For the simple reason that such a consideration would only be an hypothesis which has not been proved to be true say in the case of Japan where people, after achieving great progress and prosperity and this within a comparatively short time, seek faith in God and vigorously turn to religion in their daily life.

Speaking as a thologian, we would venture to say that we must look for a deeper reason as the real basis of the crisis of faith in Europe. Strange as it may sound, we would put it down to their faulty *epistemology*.

SOME CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Human mind goes for truth just as the plumb line goes for the centre of gravity. But just as a mason depends on the plumb line to find out where he stands, so also man needs a way to secure the *valid* knowledge of truth. It is epistemology that deals with the valid means of knowing the truth. The science of Logic deals with the art of thinking correctly. It teaches the laws of inference whether inductive or deductive: how to draw a conclusion; how to arrive at the knowledge of an universal, of a law etc. Logic demands that we proceed correctly when we must draw a conclusion. But it shows us no way to make sure whether that conclusion is true. Surely we know of people who can prove to the hilt their point of view which later proves, when verified, to be objectively wrong. One thing is to be logically correct and quite another it to be epistemologically true It is exactly because of this apparently subtle distinction which is often neglected, that we have divergent points of view held concerning the very object of knowledge and of faith among the philosophers as well as among the theologians. We have the sceptics and the relativists; we have the idealists and more than one type of realists all trying to prove logically the nature of the object of our knowing or cognition. Yet we know that all of them cannot be true for their points of view are not only divergent but in many cases, contradictory.

THE LOGICAL-SCIENTIFIC METHOD

[illegible] the time the findings of men of science like Gallileo etc. beg[illegible] doubts about what was believed to be the teaching of *faith* as based on the holy Bible, science and the scientific method began to acquire untold importance. Given the undeniable fact, disclosed by the human sciences, namely that the scientific method of enquiry has definitely led man to discard as untrue many notions that were 'believed' to be true, theologians whether of the scholastic stream or not, came under the impact of the scientific method which began to be applied successfully in the exploration both of the macrocosm and the microcosm. Theologians applied it in the investigation of the points of reference on which our *Faith* is based. It has been generously applied to verify the data given in the Bible, just as it has been applied to prove the existence of God.

Already in the 17th and 18th cc. there appeared among those who were believers, those who doubted the truth of what the reason taught about the facts and the events which were believed to be true on the authority of the Bible but which could not be *proved* or demonstrated by the scientific method. Emmanuel Kant became famous in the second half of the 18th c. when he published his "Critique of Pure Reason", which actually was a claim for the importance of epistemology. But theologians generally steeped in scholasticism only criticized him and missed the point he had raised, namely that what cannot be proved scientifically need not be accepted as true. Rather, maybe. exactly because they did not miss the point, that the students of theology until recently considered E. Kant as an enemy of Christian theses. Meanwhile theologians continued to make a generous use of the scientific method of knowing, a method which was so logical. Thus we find that untold importance was given for example to the ARGUMENTS to prove the existence of God. Anyone who opens the books of Western philosophy cannot but find most elaborate sections of such arguments to prove the existence of God[2].

It was indeed very consoling for the theologian to give a brilliant expose of the classical arguments from the order or the contingency of things and phenomena and conclude that God exists as the First Cause and as the Intelligent and Unchanging author and Creator of the Universe. However in all this, it was overlooked that to use an argument to prove the existence of God was to make God a mere postulate. An argument only yields the logical truth i.e., a human concept of the objective real, without removing all doubts about its existence. Thus supposing that the argument is meant to prove the existence of God, it does not establish a contact with God as objective Reality. It does not free man from all doubt about his existence. We are not the only ones who think this about the western way of knowing. For example W. E Rennick and

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[2] for example "The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy" by A. C. Ewing,

M. Lazerowitz[3] have this to say: "Since the time of Thales, metaphysicians have employed *one and only* method in the attempt to solve their problems: *reasoning or argument*". But as the same authors continue: "Rival metaphysicians have the same facts both verbal and empirical, at their disposal; yet they reach logically *imcompatible* conclusions, the truth-value of which no hitherto undiscovered fact would seem capable of affecting". That is indeed the peculiarity of the scientific method which relies solely on inductive and deductive inference. Even in the physical, chemical, biological, pathological and sociological fields, we find conclusions changing everyday, different explanations being offered at different times, different remedies and different treatments prescribed by different experts who arrive at different conclusions from the observance of the same symptoms.

THE SNAG IN "THE WAY OF ARGUMENTS" TO KNOW GOD

One can see clearly that the scientific method by itself, applied to the enquiry concerning the object-subject which is basic to all theology and religion, God or the Supreme or the Ultimate Reality, would yield nothing more nor less than agnosticism. As in fact it has, and which, in our opinion has led to widespread loss of faith, and even to atheism. It has led to crisis even among the theologians who still continue to rely on the scientific method in their research in matters of faith. Famous names in Western theology, both catholic and non-catholic, who have become aware of this sorry predicament, have not been able to do much to help, because they themselves have mostly used the inductive-deductive inferential method in their work. Karl Barth tries to *prove* that "God is not an abstract category by which even the christian understanding of the word has to be measured, but he who is called God here is the One God, the Single God, the Sole God". Rudolf Bultman has attempted to *prove* that in the human situation portrayed by Heidegger, the christian message can come to possess tremendous relevance, if it is demythologized, that is by translating its mythological language into the existential language which refers to human existence, its conflicts and possibilities,

Taking just two examples from among the catholic theologians, we find the same type of phenomenon: E. Schillebeeckx does nothing more than applying the inductive-deductive, scientific method to the grounds of reference of christian doctrine and belief and draws 'logical conclusions'. As he puts it himself: "On closer inspection, this Jesus of the historians turned out to be a nineteenth-century projection of ideal notions of humanity..."[4]. E. Schillebeeckx does a great service to the modern man with a scientific bend, but the fact remains that he uses the logical scientific method to establish the basics of christian faith. Another catholic theologian, Karl Rahner, also uses mainly the scientific method to demonstrate the existence of God. It is indeed inductive and deductive inference when K. Rahner writes that reason can know God through the world which resembles Him "concluding from our multifarious experience of the abiding contingency of this experience itself to the principle (cause) of this contingent reality", yet God in His infinity, His absolute perfection and His absolute otherness is incomprehensible for this same finite human thought.

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[3] in "Metaphysics, Readings and Re-appraisals", 1965. Italics mine.

[4] 'Jesus', pp. 67-68.

Still we must note that Karl Rahner does admit "perception" which he calls "categorical perception" as a way to know God, the Ultimate Reality[5]. As he puts it: "There is present in this transcendental experience an unthematic and anonymous, as it were, knowledge of God... The knowledge of God is always present unthematically and without name, and not just when we begin to speak of it. An experience in which he whom we call God encounters man in silence ...". Karl Rahner besides admiting experiential perception as a way of knowing God present within one's consciousness also admits the fallacy into which they fall who rely solely on inferential way of knowing Him. For example we find the following in his writings: "It is precisely we theologians who are always in danger of talking about heaven and earth, about God and man with an arsenal of religious and theological concepts which is most limitless in its size and proportions. We can acquire in theology a very great skill in talking and perhaps not have really understood *from the depths of our existence* what we are really talking about"[6].

THE *PRATYAKṢA* WAY

Here is where our Indian tradition(s) can help us today. It is only in our times that a theologian speaks of God as experienced, though unthematically, in the depths of our being through this "categorical perception" and this, outside some mystical experience claimed only by some saints. In our Indian lore, particularly, the Upanishads, it is this perception which is frequently described as the means of knowing the Ultimate Reality. The authors of the Upanishads describe the resulting knowledge of the Supreme or Ultimate Reality which is perceived as the ground or the support of all other, contingent, reality. In the older Upanishads this is the only way of knowing God. This perceptive-experiential way of knowing God is simply called "*pratyakṣa*". This is not a mere act of the 'intellectus agens' but it is the whole translucent spirit of ours perceiving God's presence supporting its being. It is a holistic way of knowing.

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[5] 'Foundations of Christian Faith', transl. by The Seabury Press, 1978.

[6] Karl Rahner, ibid. Italics mine.

THE INDIAN CATEGORIES

From ancient times, in India we do not separate Logic and Epistemology. Whenever we speak of the ways of acquiring knowledge, we speak of the *valid* ways or means of knowing and we call these '*pramāṇa*(s). Indian philosophers who divide themselves into different systems of philosophy speak of five and even six *pramāṇas.* However from ancient times there are three main ones: *śruti* (revelation), *anumāna* (inference) both inductive and deductive, and *pratyakṣa* (perception). All Indian thinkers admit *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa* (a valid way of knowing) even though some would deny that *śruti* and *anumāna* are such. In this paper we are dealing specifically with *pratyakṣa* as the valid means of knowing the Ultimate Reality whom the Upanishadic *rishis*[7] designated as "*satyasya satyam*" (Real of the real)[8].

We shall limit ourselves to the older Upanishads which are no more than 12 or 13. The Upanishads are the oldest testimony of reflexive thinking we have in India. All the other systems of thought in India have their origins in the Upanishadic thinking and began much later. It is generally accepted that the Upanishadic era was around 700 B. C., about the same time when the age of the great Prophets flourished in Izrael. Elsewhere[9] we have, with the aid of the phenomenological technique both graded the Upanishads and isolated the 'experiential-perceptive method' of knowing found therein.

DATA FROM THE UPANISHADS

In the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upanishad a perception of the Ultimate Reality is described in a language which by itself indicates the validity of the perception :

> "The form of this person is like a saffron-coloured robe, like white wool, like the Indra-gopa insect, like a flame of fire, like a sudden flash of lightning. He who knows Him thus attains splendour like a sudden flash of lightning. Now therefore there is the teaching, not this, not this for there is nothing higher than this, that He is not this. Now the designation for Him is the Real of the real. Verily the breathing things are real, and He is the Real of them"[10].

Commenting on this passage, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says : "The fourth Gospel insists that God 'works' in the world, but He works through the Logos who is Himself God ... while there is a realm which consists in the duality of subject and object, which is perceived by the intelligence to be co-extensive and reciprocally necessary, there is an absolute unity from which all dualities proceed which is itself above duality. ...In this famous passage, the Upanishad speaks to us of the Absolute transcendent non-empirical Godhead"[11].

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[7] this is the usual transliteration of ṛṣiḥ which means 'an ascetic who saw', a sage or seer.

[8] Bṛ. Upaniṣad, II. III 6.

[9] Doctoral Thesis entitled 'The Upanishadic Way'.

[10] Bṛ. Up., II. III. 6: "tasya haitasya puruṣaṣva rūpam ...yathā sakṛd-vidyuttam; sakṛd-vidyutteva ha vā asyā srir bhavati, ya evam veda athāta ādeṣaḥ na iti na iti, na hy etasmād iti, na iti anyat param asti; atha nāma-dheyaṁ satyasya satyam iti, prāṇā vai satyam, teṣām eṣa satyam.

'Non-empirical' to be sure, but One about Whom so much is known that the perceiver acknowledges Him to be some one beyond human language which fails to express Him ('not this, not this) in human concepts and Who is designated as 'The Real'. There is no signs of inference here. Not even the word 'Absolute' is used to designate Him, for 'absolute' is a term, a human mind's category which in its turn is only an 'abstraction'. The Upanishads use 'satyasya satyam' to designate Him. The word 'The Real' stands for something independent from human mind, without making any distinction between essence and existence. In other words 'sat'. stands for Him without Whom nothing can be perceived as being.

In a more advanced Upanishad, the means by which man comes to know the Ultimate Reality is mentioned :

> "A person immersed (in sorrow) is deluded and grieves on account of his helplessness. When he sees the other, the Lord, Who is worshipped and His greatness, he becomes freed from sorrow When the seer sees the Creator ...the Lord, the Person ... He is not grasped by the eye, nor even by speech, nor by other sense organs, nor by austerity nor by work, but when one's nature is purified by the light of knowledge then alone he, by meditation sees Him, Who is without parts"[12].

Obviously it is not through inference that the authors of the Upanishads arrive at the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality or God and of His many attributes. They describe 'perception' (pratyakṣa) in their own way. To take another example: "whatever is to be known is a form of mind"[13]. Perception is described as an act of seeing performed not by the eyes but by the mind, an act by which the human spirit sees someone present as its support. They also describe the attributes of the One thus perceived, even more clearly than the Hebrews did although the latter had the help of the Prophets who experienced and communicated the Other[14]. To take an example:

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[11] "The Principal Upanisads", 1974, pp. 194-195.

[12] Mund. Up., III. I. 2 8: "samāne vṛkṣe puruṣo nimagno 'niśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ. juṣṭam yadā pasyaty anyam isam asya mahimanam iti, vita-sokah yadā pasyaḥ paśyate rukma-varṇaṁ kartāram Īśam puruṣam brahma-yonim.. no cakṣuṣā grhyate nāpi vācā nānyair devaih tapasā karmānā vā, jnāna-prasādena viśuddha sattvas tatas tu tam paśyate niṣkalaṁ dhyāyamānaḥ.

[13] Br. Up, I. V 9: "yat kiṁ ca vijijñāsyaṁ. manasas tad rūpam ..."

[14] It must be recalled that the Hebrews did not enquire about God philosophically but simply knew God in relation to themselves.

> "verily this great Being, infinite, limitless, consists of nothing but knowledge"[15].

In another place we find this description of the Ultimate Reality :

> "The shining, immortal Person who is in this (individual self (soul), He is just this Self, this is immortal, this is Brahman, this is all. This Self is indeed the Lord of all beings, the king of all beings. As all the spokes are held together in the hub and felly of a wheel, just so, in this Self, all beings all gods, all worlds, all breathing creatures, all these selves are held together"[16].

Are not these some of the main attributes of God as any theologian would have them ? And how else shall we say that the Upanishadic Rishis conceived the following prayer which is being freely used by us today :

> "From the unreal lead me to the real,
> from darkness lead me to light,
> from death lead me to immortality"[17].

Undoubtedly, it is not through inference or arguments that the Upanishadic rishis arrive at the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. As they describe it, they arrive at this supreme knowledge through '*pratykaṣa*', and this 'perception' leaves profound effects on the whole personality of the perceiver. It is this way of knowing and this type of knowledge which make them, at some later stage, "brahma-niṣṭham" (established in Brahma) which reminds us of what Isaiah says about the man "whose mind is stayed on God".

However it must be recalled that this *pratyakṣa* or perception is not the sense-perception. There is a type of perception which includes the sense-perception by which we perceive the sense-objects. All *pratyakṣa* is differentiated into *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. The former is the stage when the perceived object is still indeterminate and the latter is the stage of perception when the perceiver is aware of a determinate object which he classifies and conceptualizes. To make this clear we can take this example: when someone sees a distant flying object, first he is aware of something which he cannot say definitely what it is, it could be a vulture or an aeroplane. Only later he perceives it as it really is, definitely an aeroplane or definitely a vulture. This distinction can well be applied to mental objects like our mental operations which are entirely internal to us. Thus we perceive our very act of thinking, remembering, reflecting etc.

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15 Br. Up., II. IV. 12: "...evaṁ vā ara idam mahad bhutam anantam apāraṁ vijñāna-ghana eva."

16 Br. Up., II. V. 14-15: "yaś cāyam asminn ātmani tejomayo' 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣaḥ. yas cāyam ātmā tejomayo' mṛtamayaḥ puruṣaḥ, ayam eva sa yo' yam ātmā, idam amṛtam. idaṁ brahma, idaṁ sarvam, sa vā ayam ātmā sarveṣām bhūtānām adhipatiḥ; sarveṣāṁ bhūtānām rājā, etc.

17 Mund. Up., I. II. 12.

The Western technique of Husserlian phenomenology does help us to understand these internal perceptions from the stage of *'epoche'* to the ultimate stage of the *'eidetic reduction'*. It is true that the phenomenological way has led some to nihilism and utter subjectivism. Jean Paul Sartre, for example in his *"L'etre et neant"* would describes as how he arrives at just 'nothingness'. But, just where J. P. Sartrearrives at 'nothing', our Upanishadic rishis arrive at the knowledge of The Real or the Being of all being. They do so be cause they are prepared to perceive Him after long and steady practice of asceticism. Anyone who follows this path, can even today arrive at the perception of the Godhead supporting one's contingent being. This perception bares the ontological truth, even before our spirit can conceptualize what is perceived[18]. The important thing to note is that for this inner perception, man must dispose himself through both purification of life and by the concentration of one's vital over-all energies. No one need believe that all this process takes place without God's help, Who always helps an earnest seeker. Once this perception takes place, there is a profound change for better in one's personality, so that this perception and its effects can clearly be distinguished from the abnormal perceptions induced through drugs and medicines.

THEOLOGICALLY SPEAKING

In theology, when we are interested in preserving the very foundations of religion, we must acknowledge that the scientific method which draws logical conclusions and which provided the arguments to prove the existence of God, in the yesteryears, is not the best method to establish the existence of God. We must acknowledge that almost exclusive reliance on such method has failed to help the believer in the West to lead a sustained life of faith, in this existential age wherein inductions and deductions of all types leave the mind still in a state of doubt and hesitation and leave a man's life unaffected and unchanged. Man today looks for an experience which would guarantee the reality of The Real.

In the Christian tradition, from the very beginning we have relied on the direct perceptive-experiential way of knowing the fundamentals of our faith. The word "witness" which is so basic for our christian living supposes direct-perceptive-experience. Jesus said that He came to give "witness" to Truth/Reality of God. Jesus defined His disciple's function in the world as that of witnessing. Unless we go beyond the arguments and dispose ourselves to perceive God as the Real or Reality supporting our frail and contingent being, we shall fail.

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[18] This is the way in which we can understand the God without qualities and God Who is worshipped, Personal etc. The former is what is perceived at the stage of nirvikalpaka and the latter, at the stage of Savikalpaka. God Whom man sincerely seeks, does not stay passive but pours love on the seeker. It is in this act that God is recognized as Personal God. We must not look for the Trinitarian point of view in these Indian Documents.

CONCLUSION

No one should conclude from this study that we are condemning the logical-scientific method of research and enquiry. Neither do we suggest that such a method should not be used in religion or theology. Be it far from us even to suggest such a thought. In fact Biblical scholars and theologians are using such a method in our days with great success : J. Jeremias for example, uses it to fix the day of the week when Christ had His Paschal Meal etc.[19] Ed. Schillebeeckx does it in his books, 'Jesus' and 'Christ'. All we maintain is that we cannot use the scientific method in every domain of religion or theology. That this method is not the only way to achieve valid knowledge and apodictic certitude concerning the existence of God and many of His artributes. Thus we maintain that the foundations or the basis of our Faith and religion do not depend only on the 'proofs' which the scientific method yields. Often we may experientially perceive the existence of the Ultimate Reality and come to know Him without having reasons or proofs which can be articulated, but it is an experience which can be had, shown in life and passed along to others. Its proofs may not be given, but its effects on the life on the one who has had it are most evident and which perhaps could well be considered as 'proofs', if one needs any proofs to certify the truth of an experience.

Another point which we make is that we maintain that the experiential perception of God's presence should in no case be relegated to the realms of undefinable mysticism. Mystics, it is accepted, do have experiential perceptions /of Reality beyond. Thus we maintain that anyone today who would take the trouble to dispose himself through prayer and ascetisism[20] can have the experiential-perfection of The Real present within one's consciousness and who continually supports our contingent being.

Therefore let us dispose ourselves as the Upanishadic rishis did, and we too shall experience God Who shares with us His Being, His Life, and ineffable joy, enthuses us with love.

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[19] in "The Eucharistic Words of Jesus", SCM Press.

[20] It is in the process of this asceticism that rishis discovered yoga.

Book-Reviews

Charles Hartshorne : *Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers, An Evaluation of Western Philosophy*, pp. 394, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York 12246 Price $39.50 Cloth and Paper $ 14.95 (1983).

The author of this work Charles Hartshorne is an eminent American philosopher and thinker.

The present work is the latest work of great U. S. Thinker. The whole book is divided into Four Parts besides Preface, Introduction, Index of Topics and Index of persons.

Part One : *Philosophical Achievements of the Ancient Greeks* has been divided into six chapters : 1. In Appreciation of the Pre-Socratics 2. Lessons from Greek Atomism for Modern Thought 3. Plato's Near Miss: Soul as Self-Moved 4. Aristotle's Modal View of Time and Eternity 5. Stoics. Skeptics, and Greek Mysticis 6. Sketch of Greek Ethics and Aesthetics. *Part Two : Between the Greeks and the Moderns* has been divided into : 7. Medieval Philosophy in General, 8. What did Anselm Discover ? 9. Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Others. *Part Three* : *Modern* (*European*) *Philosophers* has been classified into : 10. "The Moses of Modern Philosophy" 11. Spinoza : First of the Moderns or Last of the Medievals ? 12. The "Clearheaded" Philosopher, 13. Hume's Metaphysics and Its Influence 14. The Neglect of Relative Predicates in Modern Philosophy 15. Kant's Traditionalism 16. Schopenhauer's Synthesis of East and West; The Worst of two Words 17. The Unity of Opposites in Hegel and Schelling 18. Kierkegaard on Subjectivity and Freedom. 19. Marxism and Metaphysics, 20. Nietzsche's "Death of God" and Deification of Causality, 21. Lotze, Fechner, Cournot, and other Nineteenth Century Forerunners of Process Metaphysics. *Part Four* : *Recent or Contemporary* (*European*) *Philosophers* has been divided into 22. Russell and Whitehead : A Comparison 23. Husserl and Whitehead on the Concrete 24. Mind and Matter in Ryle, Ayer and Croce 25. Reflections on Wittgenstein 26. Karl Popper on Whitehead 27 Husserl's Most famous (and Heretical) Disciple 28 Sartre : Philosopher, Novelist, Playwright, Political Writer 29. Merleau Ponty from an Anglo-American Perspective and 30. Summary of Insights and Oversights.

It is really a very interesting book written in a different style than the usual Histories of Philosophy. The author has very clearly explained his position about his book in Preface and the Introduction. The author has tried to bring before the readers summary of

Insights and oversights in chapter 30. This is an exhaustive summary of the book and very well written. It covers the whole history of Western philosophy pointing to the insights and oversights of various philosophers in their philosophy. Some such commissions and omissions are mentioned here to give glimpses of this type.

'What Aristotle did not see is that the eternal is abstract, by itself not a complete actuality. (Had he seen this he would not have identified God with the "unmoved mover"... The Church Fathers, after Philo Judaeus, defined God as unmoved mover, but failed to consider seriously the possibility of other definitions...' The greatest weakness that I see in the "neoclassical" form (perhaps any form) of process philosophy is that there seems to be no recent or living physicist or philosopher of science whose views of time and space are clearly compatible with those that my view seems to require.

In this way the learned author has very beautifully pointed out the insights and oversights of almost all the Western philosophers throughout the history of philosophy. It is a very interesting and scholarly contribution to the history of philosophy. It is one of the best books recently written in a critical way pointing to the insights and oversights of various European philosophers.

Anne-Lise Lovlie : *The Self of Psychotherapist—Movement and Stagnation in Psychotherapy*, pp. 154, Universitetsforlaget Oslo—Bergen—Tromso (1982).

Dr. Anne-Lise Lovlie the author of this book is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo. She is an experienced psychotherapist whose research is focused on developing new theories of relationships.

Most psychotherapists agree that the self of the psychotherapist is the most decisive factor for successful therapy. The author examines the therapist variables from the point of view of a self model. She has developed a dialectic view of the self which is her important contribution. This has been developed by her in her important book : The Self : Yours, mine or ours ?

The author has used a dialectic, existential and developmental perspective and shows in his book how stagnation in psychotherapy is related to lack of authenticity in the therapist. This work shows how the therapist's ways of creating therapeutic relationships either promotes growth or maintains stagnation.

The whole book has been divided into seven chapters, besides Introduction and Bibliography : Chapter I Self Understanding which has been further subdivided into : The development of the self, Action, Meaning, Funding, Anxiety, self-esteem, Dialectics. The reflective self, the symbolic self, the unconscious/conscious part process, the definition of the self and self-understanding. The Chapter II Existentialism is further subdivided into : Essence-Existence, Freedom, Responsibility, self-understanding. Experience and truth, Reification, Reified action, reified interpersonal relationships and reified language, Repetitive part processes and reification, Identity, The choice, and Being. Chapter III— Human Problems as Reification has been further subdivided into: The "to-have-and-to be" problem, The problems of non-action, repetition, symptom, Human Problems as reification, Reification and differentiation/reflection : Reification and time, space, action and self-esteem. Chapter IV Psychotherapy—An attempt at "Filling it in" and discusses definitions of therapy : Objectification/Subjectification, Existential liberation, De-reification, Differentiation — Reflection, The I — me dialectic. Chapter V "...In a Relationship she has discussed the dialectic of the psychotherapeutic relationships under different subheadings: Openeness/Closure; Moment/duration; sameness/difference; gratification/frustration; closeness/distance; stimulation/stabilization; subjectification/objectification; doing/undergoing; differentiation/reflection Dialectic themes; Essence/existence; transference/nontransference; resistence/no resistence; Part process and therapy.In chapter VI Change in the client: She has ably discussed: The client needs a relationship, the client needs a safe situation, Action, self creation and therapist-creation, the client needs feedback and acknowledgement, making the client responsible, the need attachment, the client needs another person.

In chapter VII "...A genuine Other..." The author has discussed: Who must the therapist be ? The therapist has to be open, Dealing with countertransference, Being able to be emphatic, On listenting, what to do with what you hear-reflection, Interpretation, Reification, Dialectics.

In the end she has given a very brief survey of the work done and has given an impressive summary and conclusions and says "For therapy to be effective the therapist must be there as a Genuine (Authentic) other in a relationship to the client in order to create conditions for change in the client." She says there are personal qualities in the therapist that makes for change in the client. The therapist must be an open, emphatic, caring, authentic or congruent, understanding, non-dominant fellow human being. She has narrated 9 points as why must the client change given these experiences? 1. The therapist is responsible, 2. The therapsit listens and reflects, 3. The therapist does not define, and the client is therefore forced to define himself. 4. The therapsist accepts the client, and this forces the client to accept himself 5. The therapist does not threaten the client, 6. The therapist creates a safe situation, 7. The therapsist responds to the client's action; 8. The therapist encourages the client to use authentic speech, action and interpersonal relating and 9. the therapist meets the client authentically and the client meets himself authentically.

Dr. Anne Lise Lovelie has very ably developed an entirely different view as a psychotherapist and her method may be known as creative psychotherapy wherein she has laid emphasis on the self of the psychotherapist. She says in the end of his book "The demands on the creative therapist are heavy. The reflection, the differentiation and the radical openness I emphasise have a price. But the therapist is an artist — the rewards are in the creativity — in the love and the work."

This book is an important contribution to the field of Psychotherapy wherein existential philosophy is combined with psychological theory in an effort to arrive at a more integrated view of both the self and the possibilities for change.

We admire the courage of the author in approaching Psychotheraphy in her own way and deserves appreciation for her very important work which has been a deviation from existing theories of Psychotherapy. It is a rather a more philosophical and creative work which deserves attention of modern psychotherapists, philossophers and Sociologists.

Anne-Lise Lovlie : *The Self — Yours, Mine or Ours, A dialectic View*, pp.154, publishers: Universitetsforlaget; Oslo, Bergen, Tromso (1982) Price $ 14.00.

This is another very important publication By Dr. Anne-Lise Lovlie. The purpose of this book according to the author is to develop a dialectic model of the self. The self has been considered by psychologist, philosophers and social scientists. The self concept has been used in psycho-analytical literature, by personality theorists, social psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists. Theorists have used and subdivided the self in various ways: the real and idealized self (Rogers), the true self and the false self (Winnicott), three types of objective selves: the I, the me, and the self as a place (Schaffer), self systems (Sullivan), the linguistic self-system (Becker), self image and ego-ideal (Argyle).

The author develops concepts and ways of analyzing relationships that integrate both the personal self and relationships. The author using dialectics existentialism and psychological theory arrives at a new synthesis for understanding the phenomenon of relating. The whole book is divided into five chapters besides Introduction, Epilogue and Bibliography. Chapter I — Philosophical Foundations which discusses theoretical Foundations : One world view, Dialectics, Existential philosophy, Phenomenology and psychological theory. These are the different backgrounds of the knowledge of self. Chapter II—Transition from the Organismic to the Symbolic Self: Organismic self-creation which takes into consideration Organismic states in early infancy and Creation of the self by the self which includes: Negation, Action, Self-action and examines the views of Freud and Mead.

Chapter III—Translation from the Organismic to the symbolic Self: The Symbolic Self, which discusses other 'contents' of the concept of self—Meaning, Meaning and alienation, Funding, Anxiety and self esteem. Chapter IV— The self as subject and object has been considered which is of great importance from the viewpoint of psychotherapists. Chapter V—The End-And the Beginning Implications for disturbances of the self. Implications for psychotherapy, Part Process as a therapeutic tool and implications for research methods on interaction.

Many psychotherapists agree that the self of the therapist is the most decisive factor for successful therapy. The author examines the therapist variables from the point of view of the self-model, developed in "The Self".

This is a unique contribution based on the theoretical foundations of self based on philosophical and psychological aspects. It will be a new but richer contribution to the understanding of psychoanalytical theory of understanding self. The author deserves our most heartfelt congratulations for bringing stimulating facts discovered by her during her practice as a psychoanalyst for many years. Psychologists, Philosophers, Sociologists, Anthropologists should take advantage of this book. Very interesting book indeed.

Edward Conze : *A Short History of Buddhism*, pp. 142, A Mandala Book of Unwin Paperbacks, P. O. Box 18, Park Lane, Hemel Hempstead, Herts, HP 2 4ATE, England Price Pounds 2.95 (December 1982).

Edward Conze author of this book is a great Buddhist scholar and has to his credit a large number of books: Buddhism, Its Essence and Development, Buddhist Meditation, Buddhist Wisdom Books, Buddhist Scriptures, The Prajnaparmita Literature, Buddhist Thought in India, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, Further Buddhist Studies, The Memoirs of a modern Gnostic, etc.

The present book was published in 1980 and reprinted in 1981. And this has been printed in Unwin paperback in December 1982.

This book provides a compact summary of the historical development of Buddhism from the time of the Buddha to the present day. It divides the Buddhist History into four great epochs, besides Introduction. The Historical Context and the Epochs of Buddist History : Chapter I. The First five Hundred Years : 500—0BC Old Buddhism, which largely coincided with what later come to be

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known as the Hinayana—The peculiarities of the first period. The Monastic discipline, The basic doctrines, The sects and their disputes, The laity and Expansion; Chapter 2. The Second Period : AD 0-500 (The Rise of the Mahayana) is sub-divided into The Mahayana in India. Hinayana Developments in India, Nepal and Kashmir, Ceylon, Expansion into Greater Asia, Central Asia and China. Chapter 3. The Third Period AD 500 1000 (Tantra and Ch'an Zen) India, Nepal and Kashmir, Ceylon, Central Asia, South East Asia, China and Korea, Japan and Tibet; Chapter 4. The Last one Thousand Years : AD 1000-1978 (Conservation)—India : The Collapse and its causes Nepal and Kashmir, Ceylon, South East Asia, China and Korea, Japan, Tibet, Mongolia, The present situation. In the end A Bibliography has been provided which might help in further study of Buddhism.

This is indeed a great introduction of the History of Buddhism by an eminent Buddhist scholar. It is an exhaustive but clear, precise and illuminating book on Buddhism.

Debabrata Sinha : *The Metaphysic of Experience in Advaita Vedanta* (*A Phenomenological Approach*) pp. 150, Motilal Banarasidass Delhi, Patna and Varanasi, Price Rs. 70/— (1983)

Dr. Debabrata Sinha, the author of this work obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. Degrees from the Calcutta University. He did his post-doctoral researches in West Germany where he went twice as recipient of Fellowship and Senior Visiting Fellowship of the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation. His interests are varied — Advaita Vedanta, Phenomenology, Anthropology and Comparative Philosophy. He has taught for several years at the Presidency College, Calcutta and University Department of the Calcutta University. He has been a Visiting Professor in University of Mainz, West Germany. He is author of three books and contributed articles to various national and international Journals. At present he is a full fledged Professor of Philosophy at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada.

The present work is a revised version of Dr. Sinha's Ph.D. thesis. The author himself says that he has taken inspiration and guidance in undertaking this new line of investigation in an old field. Being influenced by Phenomenology the author has very ably discussed the metaphysic of Experience in Advaita Vedanta. The author is well versed both in Advaita Vedanta as well as phenomenology.

The whole book has been divided into three parts: Part One: The Conception of Pure Consciousness (Cit) which has been divided into four chapters: I. Approach to Cit qua subjectivity (Jnâtatā, Ahankāra and Susūpti II. Pure Consciousness in the Perspective of

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Cognitivity III. Self-evidencing Cit vis-a-vis Self-consciousness IV Self in the light of Pure Subjectivity. The Part Two Vedantic Phenomenology is divided into two chapters: V. Advaita Metaphysic of Experience: Phenomenological Prolegomena and VI. Advaita Metaphysic of Experience: Phenomenological Reconstruction; and Part Three: Beyond Phenomenology: The Ontological Standpoint has been divided into two chapters: VII. Advaita Phenomenology Reconsidered and Chapter VIII. Passage to Being: Faith Approach and in the end: Epilogue, Select Bibliography (Of Sanskrit Works) and Index have been provided.

The book is a scholarly contribution to the existing literature on Vedanta based on Phenomenological approach. The author as well publishers deserves our thanks for bringing to light this new approach of the study of Vedanta.

Sri Swami Rama : *Māndūkya Upanishad — Enlightenment without God*, pp. 130; The Himalayan Publishers, RD1, Box 88-A, Honesdale, Pa 18431 (U. S. A.) (1983) Price $ 4.95.

The author of this book is Swami Rama, the founder and spiritual head of the Himalayan International Institute of Yoga Science and Philosophy. Author of *Living with the Himalayan Masters*, A Practical guide to Holistic health, Lectures on Yoga etc.

The present book of the author is an inspiring and profound explanation of the philosophy of the Mandukya Upanishad, which describes the nature of consciousness on four levels: waking, dreaming, deep sleep, and the state beyond these. Mandukya Upanishad is one of the most important Upanishads. In its twelve brief verses, the major questions of existence are answered and the philosophy of Vedanta summarized. Swami Rama has provided a clear commentary on this Upanishad and summarized the Vedanta philosophy.

The author says in Preface that the present book will be useful for psychologists, therapists, and philosophers and especially to those aspirants who are aspiring to realize the Ultimate Truth.

Publishers hope that the book will be useful for those who have been seeking and are still unfulfilled. They can revaluate their thinking process and the way they intellectualize by understanding the two separate methods systematically described within: the meditative ways of having intuitive knowledge and the way of contemplation for attaining the supreme state of consciousness. Swami Rama holds that enlightenment can be attained without the help of religion or the concept of God. According to him, enlightenment means a state free from all pains, miseries and ignorance. He terms Ultimate Truth as Supreme Consciousness and calls it beyond all the states of human consciousness. At the same time, he says that the fourth state, which is beyond waking, dreaming, and sleeping, is attainable here and now. The publishers conclude by saying that self-discipline and Self-Realization can bring enlightenment.

The contents of the book have been divided into: Preface, Publisher's Note, Chapter 1: Awakening, Chapter 2: Mandukya Upanishad, and a Glossary of the main words. The book is very well written in a clear and concise manner and gives the basic ideas of the Mandukya Upanishad. The book is interesting and will attract both Indian and Western students interested in Indian wisdom. It is an important contribution of Swami Rama to the Himalayan Publishers existing list of a large number of titles already in print.

M. M. Agrawal : *The Philosophy of Non-Attachment* (*The Way of Spiritual Freedom in Indian Thought*) pp. 100, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Varanasi and Patna, (1982) Price Rs. 50/—

The author of this book Mr. M. M. Agrawal has tried to explain the notion of non-attachment which is regarded to be of great importance in understanding the spiritual philosophy of the Hindus as expounded in the Upanishads. The author maintains that the philosophy of non-attachment is a philosophy of truly creative consciousness.

The book has been divided into five chapters : I. Introduction II. The Metaphysical View of Life, III. The Nature of Non-Attachment which has been further divided into : Attachment; Desire; Emotion and Action; The Motive of Action; Freedom; The Creative Consciousness. IV. Non-Attachment and Morality is divided into : Atman and Human Equality; Ethics in Gita; Freedom and Virtue. V. Conclusion and Bibliography and Index.

The anthor says in his Introduction : "It is an attempt to evolve a coherent account of non-attachment and to clarify the rather nebulously presented notion in different philosophical and religious documents."

Summing up in his conclusion, Mr. Agrawal says 'The book aims at showing the way to the individual to a wholesome living. It shows one how to live a meaningful life, satisfying at once both the demands of morality and the demands of one's own creative and spiritual urges...' For it encourages men to action by teaching them that their spiritual destiny is in their own hands, even though their material destiny is often not... We can overcome depression, remove fear, despair and other psychological hindrances to creative action, only by at taching the right significance to the determined material results of our actions.

It is an interesting book based on the Upanishadic theme—The Philosophy of Non-attachment. The author in a simple way discussed the subject matter of Spiritual Freedom.

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